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Introduction 
“Why doesn’t Norway have a Nokia?” 
The last ten years have been marked by the increasing use of information and commu-
nication technologies, and particularly by different forms of telecommunications. At 
the same time, the telecom industry has gone through radical changes, due mainly to 
the digitalisation and liberalisation that have revolutionised the sector since the 
1980s. Some companies have disappeared, while new entrants dominate the global 
arena. The Finnish Nokia emerged in the wake of this development, and together 
with the old Swedish incumbent, L.M. Ericsson, they make Scandinavia a telecom 
centre in the world. Norway did not get a Nokia, despite its leading role in telecom 
in the 1980s. What is more, the old Norwegian telecom industry has virtually disap-
peared. An industry that employed thousands of workers in the 1980s has all but 
vanished. Nevertheless, Norway is still a leading country in telecom, and one of the 
most profitable and promising Norwegian companies in recent years is Telenor, the 
former Public Telephone Operator. This thesis will try to provide an historical ex-
planation and understanding of this development, that is, the rise and fall of the 
Norwegian telecom industry. 
 
The thesis has a particular focus on Standard Telefon og Kabelfabrik (STK), the 
largest Norwegian supplier of telecom equipment in the 20th century. Together with 
Elektrisk Bureau, STK divided the Norwegian market through a cartel agreement in 
1934. This happened in the wake of the consolidation of the international telecom 
industry, after which a few companies dominated the global scene. The coming of 
automatic telecom switches spurred this development, as the costs of developing 
these switches were too high for small and medium-sized companies. STK and 
Elektrisk Bureau (EB) were subsidiaries of ITT and Ericsson, respectively, two of 
the largest telecom companies in the world. From the interwar period to the 1980s, 
the structure of the telecom sector was stable. Technological and political conditions 
ensured that multinational companies could sell telecom equipment to Public Tele-
phone Operators (PTOs) at oligopolic prices, through their subsidiaries. It was diffi-
cult for other companies to get access to the market, as the PTOs were caught in an 
oligopolic grip. The thesis describes how this grip tightened from the 1930s, and 
explains how digitalisation and liberalisation eventually loosened it, and why this 
occurred so early in Norway. 
 
The introduction of electronics in telecom in the 1960s marks the beginning of the end 
of the stable regime. First, this was due to the loosening of the oligopolic grip, and 
second, because it turned telecom into a high-tech industry, and it became a political 
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goal to develop a national telecom industry in most countries. In Norway, Tele-
verket, the PTO, set up a research institute in 1967, as did STK in 1968, and these 
became central institutions in the Norwegian system of innovation in telecom. For 
Norway and other countries, heavy investment in telecom-related R&D was a matter 
of industrial policy, but it was also an attempt to exploit the technological develop-
ment, to free itself from the dominance of multinationals. Significant resources were 
poured into R&D in electronics and telecom, to try to develop a national industry 
that could replace and/or challenge the incumbent multinationals. A central field in 
telecom was electronic and digital switching. The new entrants in the industry, i.e. 
Nokia, Nortel and Alcatel, all ascended on the basis of digital switches.1 Conse-
quently, a key issue in explaining the absence of a vibrant Norwegian telecom in-
dustry today is that no one tried to develop a digital switch in Norway.  
 
An alternative strategy for a PTO was to try to free itself from the dominance of the 
multinational companies (MNCs), and thus be able to exploit its procurement power 
to achieve lower price and better quality. These two strategies reflected the PTO’s 
double agenda, as it was both a service provider and an industry provider. In Nor-
way, both strategies had strong advocates and spokesmen, and public bodies did not 
follow a consistent strategy. Some wanted the PTO to support Norwegian industry 
through its procurement policy, while others wanted the PTO to focus only on price 
and quality. A recurrent question was whether it was possible to pursue an offensive 
industrial policy with foreign-owned subsidiaries as industrial partners. Two oppos-
ing perceptions of multinationals emerged. On the one hand, MNCs were seen as 
diffusers of products and technology, and thus economic growth: this was a com-
monly held view in Britain.2 On the other hand, MNCs were perceived as obstruct-
ers of national industrial development, which was a normal perception in France.3 In 
its strategy toward the Norwegian authorities, STK favoured the first assessment, 
and praised its relationship with ITT. EB, however, accepted the “French” line of 
thought, and pursued a strategy of freeing itself from Ericsson. Thus, the two com-
panies chose different adoptions.  
 
                                                          
1 Llerena, Patrick; Mireille Matt and Stefania Trenti: “Government Technological Procure-
ment: The Case of Digital Switching Systems in France” and Christopher Palmberg: "Indus-
trial transformation through public technology procurement? The case of Nokia and the Fin-
nish telecommunication industry" in Edquist et al. (eds.) 2002; Larry MacDonald: Nortel 
Networks: How Innovation and Vision Created a Network Giant, 2000. 
2 Geoffrey Jones: The evolution of International Business, 1996, p. 271; also se David Bailey, 
George Harte, and Roger Sugden: Transnationals and Governments - Recent policies in 
Japan, France, Germany, the United States and Britain, 1994.  
3 About French scepticism towards foreign direct investment, see Jones, p. 277f. and Bailey et 
al. 1994. 
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An important factor in explaining the later development is STK’s strategy and con-
ditions as an innovative enterprise in the 1970s. The question being how STK per-
ceived its role in an industry that went through radical changes. A key element is 
how it handled its schizophrenia, of being a very large Norwegian high-tech com-
pany, and at the same time a very small subsidiary within ITT. In accordance with 
STK and EB’s different strategies, the two companies’ Managing Directors operated 
with different corporate governance systems in the 1970s. EB’s chief followed a 
stakeholder version of corporate governance, whereas STK’s chief, Fredrik Thore-
sen, highly influenced by ITT, pursued a shareholder-friendly corporate governance 
system. The thesis asks how this affected STK as an innovative enterprise. More-
over, it addresses how it affected STK and EB’s strategy when the oligopolic grip 
had loosened, and enabled Televerket to arrange a competitive tender for digital 
switches in 1983. Both companies fell apart in the aftermath of the tender, partly 
due to rigid corporate governance systems.  
 
An underlying view in this thesis is that the choices that were made, and the strate-
gies that prevailed in the 1970s, by PTOs, MNCs and subsidiaries, had a decisive 
impact on the structure of telecom in the 1990s. An equally important presumption, 
however, is that there were strong historical forces that constrained and structured 
the same choices and strategies. There is, for instance, a causal relationship between 
STK’s role as a switching supplier, and the fact that Televerket did not want to sup-
port the development of a Norwegian digital switch. Thus, STK and Televerket’s 
joint history from the 1930s affected their line of thought and mode of conduct in 
the 1970s. That is why I have chosen to draw the lines back to the interwar period, 
to the establishment of ITT and STK. It makes the story more complete, and hope-
fully it contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of why Norway did not 
get an Ericsson or a Nokia in the 20th century; but instead a service provider of 
global standing. It is the story of the rise and fall of the Norwegian telecom industry, 
but it is also the story of the fall and rise of Televerket. 
 
Comparing relations 
The appropriate problem to investigate, to answer the research question, seems to be 
how STK handled the digitalisation and liberalisation of the telecom industry. This, 
however, emphasises STK as the proactive subject, which is not analytically advis-
able. STK ought to be analysed in its relational position between ITT and Telever-
ket, as it was a mediator between the two. Televerket was the sole customer for the 
bulk of the products, while ITT was the main provider of products, technology and 
managerial principles. Televerket’s procurement policy and attitude towards the 
industry and ITT’s strategies and policies both had a decisive impact on STK. More-
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Moreover, a central claim in this thesis is that there are common causes for 
Telenor’s present strength, and the faintness of STK's successor, Alcatel Norway. 
Thus, to explain STK’s fate, we must incorporate Televerket’s development. Fur-
thermore, ITT, STK’s mother company, also had a decisive effect on STK’s devel-
opment. And, more surprisingly, but nevertheless a major finding in this thesis, is 
the fact that STK and Televerket had a great bearing on ITT in the 1980s.  
 
Accordingly, STK’s handling of the digitalisation and liberalisation process was 
very much a question of handling the shifting policies and strategies of Televerket 
and ITT. A way to illustrate, and explain, STK’s decline and Televerket’s relative 
progress is to examine how the relationship between ITT, STK, and Televerket 
shifted over time. STK was a standard manufacturing subsidiary, so its telecom 
business was based on mediating between ITT and Televerket, as it manufactured 
and sold ITT’s telecom equipment to Televerket. An important part of the business 
was to adapt the equipment to the standards and features of the Norwegian network, 
and to maintain and upgrade it. It was predominantly a linear relation, where the 
interaction between Televerket and ITT went through STK.  
 
Televerket ⇔ STK ⇔ ITT 
 
Yves L. Doz called the old relations between multinationals, subsidiaries and gov-
ernment agencies in the telecom industry “a negotiated environment”.4 He has 
documented how national governments and PTOs had a “direct influence on equip-
ment suppliers”, through funding, ownership constraints, choice of suppliers, R&D 
contracts, and assistance for export sales.5 The multinationals and subsidiaries also 
had strong bargaining cards in this “environment”; for instance threatening to lay off 
workers, or offering interesting R&D projects to the subsidiary and host country. An 
important aspect is that in some instances, the subsidiaries sided with their compa-
triots, the PTO or other governmental bodies. It could be termed a “stakeholder-
structure”, as there was a reciprocal stakeholdership between the parties. Still, tech-
nological aspects were just as important, as the PTO's freedom to choose equipment 
was limited by technological “lock-ins”, since it was difficult and expensive to make 
                                                          
4 As Doz claims, “key decisions affecting the strategy of the firm are not the result of any 
analysis of economic and competitive pressures, but they emerge in the interaction with the 
state-influenced customers.” Yves L. Doz: Government Control and Multinational Strategic 
Management - Power Systems and Telecommunication Equipment, 1979., p. 67-68. 
5 Doz 1979, p. 64. 
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switches from different suppliers interact. The lack of suitable technological inter-
faces between the suppliers’ products upheld the industry’s oligopolic position. 
 
The oligopoly was institutionalised in Norway, through the above-mentioned cartel 
agreement. This thesis argues that the industry’s oligopolic grip on the market con-
sisted of five fingers. Two fingers stemmed from path dependency; first, the lack of 
suitable technological interfaces between electro-mechanical switches, which made 
it costly to make new switches interact with old switches of a different make. Sec-
ond, the incumbent equipment supplier(s) had to be retained to maintain and up-
grade the switches in service. Two fingers were related to stakeholdership: the fact 
that Televerket had responsibilities towards the workers of STK and EB, and the 
fact that Televerket acted as an industry provider, in trying to induce industrial ac-
tivity. The fifth finger was Televerket’s dependence on the equipment supplier’s 
competence. It lacked sufficient control over its network and competence of the 
products to take advantage of its procurement power. 
 
The thesis describes how this oligopolic grip loosened from the 1970s onwards. 
How computer-controlled switches eased the problems of interaction between 
different makes of switches, and how the liberalisation process eradicated former 
stakeholder responsibilities.6 And, how Televerket attained control over its own 
network through internal studies, and the acquisition of knowledge of technological 
development through cooperation with other PTOs and international equipment 
suppliers. Moreover, the historical investigation focuses on how the linear relation 
changed over time, from the interwar period to 1990. This study provides valuable 
insight. In addition, I compare STK’s relational setting with EB’s equivalent setting, 
i.e. LME ⇔ EB ⇔ Televerket, which allows us to draw conclusions on the Norwe-
gian telecom industry as a whole.7 
 
The comparison with EB illuminates STK’s character as a company. Important 
differences between STK and EB derived from ITT and Ericsson, as these multina-
tionals pursued different policies and strategies towards their subsidiaries, and the 
Norwegian market. Operating in several negotiated environments, ITT had to bal-
ance the need for national responsiveness to the subsidiaries’ host countries, with 
                                                          
6 Kjell Eliassen and Marit Sjøvang (ed.): European Telecommunications Liberalisation, 1999, 
p. 16. 
7 Literature on LM Ericsson: Artur Attman, Jan Kuuse and Ulf Olsson: L.M. Ericsson 100 år 
Band I. Pionjätid - Kamp om koncessioner - Kris 1876 - 1932, 1976; L.M. Ericsson 100 år 
Band II. Räddning. Återuppbyggnad. Världsföretag. 1932-1976, 1976; Christina Jacobæus 
(ed.): L.M. Ericsson 100 år. Band III. Teleteknikst skapande 1876-1976, 1976; John Meurling 
and Richard Jeans: The Ericsson Chronicle: 125 Years in Telecommunications, 2000. 
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the need to coordinate and standardise the subsidiaries’ activities to attain econo-
mies of scale. An essential part of the responsiveness was to allow the subsidiaries 
to take part in the host countries’ system of innovations. Hence, there was a trade-
off between economies of scale through international integration and access to mar-
kets through national responsiveness. Doz claims that “success in managing such 
trade-offs is the key to MNC survival and success”.8 It was also the key to a sub-
sidiary’s survival and success. Thus, STK undertook considerable R&D, among 
other things to preserve its role as Televerket's favoured equipment supplier, not 
least as a switching supplier, which is the main focus of this thesis. The next section 
gives some brief definitions and clarifications related to telecom. 
 
Switching  
The thesis examines STK’s supply of telecom switches to the Public Telephone 
Operator in Norway over a period of 50 years. Before I elaborate on the analytical 
and theoretical issues, it is pertinent to give a brief introduction to telecommunica-
tion.9  
 
Telecommunication was previously defined as communicating at a distance, be-
tween two or more parties, using electromagnetic waves. Traditionally, there were 
two main economic actors in the telecom sector.10 The first was the operator, or the 
service provider, providing telecom services to the subscribers. Until the 1990s, the 
operators were normally state-owned monopolies, often called PTT (Post, Tele-
phone, and Telegraph); in this thesis, however, I use the term Public Telephone 
Operator (PTO). The Norwegian Telecom Administration was established in 1855 
as a provider of telegraph services. It was called Telegrafverket until 1969, when it 
was renamed Televerket, before it received its present name, Telenor, in 1994. The 
PTO’s national headquarters in Oslo were called Telegrafstyret/Teledirektoratet, but 
were usually referred to as Telegrafverket/Televerket, which is why I have chosen 
to do the same in the thesis. The other actor in the telecom sector was the industry, 
                                                          
8 Yves L. Doz: Strategic management in multinational companies, 1987, p. 112. 
9 The main literature on telecom technology and switching is the following: Robert J. 
Chapuis: 100 Years of Telephone switching (1878-1978) - Part 1: Manual Electromechanical 
Switching (1878-1960), 1982; Robert J. Chapuis and Amos E. Joel: Electronics, computers 
and telephone switching : a book of technological history as volume 2: 1960-1985 of “100 
years of telephone switching”, 1990; ITT “History of ITT switching” 1976. Another impor-
tant source of information in this field is Ivar Mo’s unpublished manuscripts on the 8B and 
11B: Ivar Mo: “Historien om 11B”, 2000; and “Historien om 8B”, 2001. 
10 At present there are more actors in the telecom sector, like regulating bodies. Moreover, the 
convergence of IT and communication technologies has led to several “hybrid” actors, such 
as internet service providers, and companies that provide consultancy on ICT issues. 
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or equipment supplier, such as STK, which supplied the equipment for the telecom 
network.11  
 
A telecom network has three main components. The first is the links, i.e. cables and 
radio link, connecting telephones to the network, and transmitting signals between 
them. The second is the terminals, telephones, fax-machines, data terminals etc. The 
third is the switches, or exchanges, which connect lines by reading the digits dialled 
by a subscriber and finding the adequate “path” through the telecom network to 
reach the desired number. In Norway, Elektrisk Bureau (EB) was the main supplier 
of telephone sets, STK of tele-cables, while the market for switches was more 
evenly shared between STK and EB. The two companies had other products as well, 
like PABX, a switch for private networks, broadcasting equipment, communication 
equipment for the armed forces, and equipment for radio communication.12 Never-
theless, these other products amounted to little in terms of sale and significance, 
compared to the three main components of the network; links, terminals, and 
switches. The relative importance of these three has varied over time, but after the 
introduction of computerised switches in the 1960s, switching has been regarded as 
the central component and technology of the telecom network.  
 
The switch became the fundamental technology in telecom, providing the network’s 
intelligence. It accounted “for over half the capital equipment costs of a telephone 
network”.13 Digital switches, which were dominant from the 1980s, transformed the 
industry. Equipment suppliers laid off thousands of workers, as they were less la-
bour-intensive, R&D costs rocketed, and the stable markets disappeared. Further-
more, the distinction between information processing and communication became 
blurred as the technologies converged. The digital switch was in fact a computer, 
and was thus a product of the convergence of information and communication tech-
nologies (ICT). As the digital switch provided digital services, for instance allowing 
for the Integrated Service Digital Network (ISDN), it was also major facilitator of 
the same process of convergence. Consequently, switching was crucial to develop, 
or maintain, a sustainable business in the industry. Firstly, this was because it was 
                                                          
11 In the United States, the operator and the equipment supplier were vertically integrated in 
AT&T, which owned its manufacturing subsidiary Western Electric. The Swedish PTO also 
manufactured telecom equipment. The normal trend, however, was that the operator and 
equipment supplier were in separate companies. 
12 An important feature of the Norwegian telecom industry was the high demand for ship 
radios, due to the considerable merchant and fishery fleet. 
13 Doz 1987, p. 89; between 1976 and 1980, switching accounted for 56% of the telecom 
industry sales on average, terminals 9%, transmission 18%, and PABXs 12%, leaving minor 
shares for Telex and Data transmission. Nguyen 1985, p. 93. Televerkets langtidsplan (NOU 
1980:10), p. 104. 
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the bread and butter of the industry in terms of sales, but also because the computer-
ised switches became the brain of the network.  
 
The digitalisation of switches and the liberalisation of the PTOs procurement of 
switches caused the global downsizing of the telecom industry. Digital equipment 
was much less labour-intensive in terms of manufacturing and installing. Moreover, 
as R&D costs increased, R&D was centralised by the multinationals, leaving less 
activity for the subsidiaries. Liberalisation led to fewer demands from PTOs and 
government for national manufacturing and R&D in the subsidiaries. The PTOs 
strove for international technological standards and digitalisation contributed to a 
shift from local products to global products, which allowed for competitive pro-
curement policies from PTOs. Besides squeezing the industry’s margins, it also 
caused the multinationals to centralise their activities. Thus, a general consequence 
was reduced activity for most subsidiaries in the telecom industry.  
 
As digitalisation and liberalisation, and the ensuing deindustrialisation were an 
international phenomenon, one may argue that the downsizing of STK’s telecom 
business does not require an individual explanation. Through a reductionist ap-
proach, one could reach an explanation in accordance with generalising theories. 
Even if this is true, I find several reasons for narrating the course of event and ana-
lysing how this process took place. Firstly, the historical knowledge of how power-
ful forces and trends, such as the digitalisation and liberalisation, affect small na-
tions, is valuable. This line of defence is justifiable. It is, however, no more than 
that, a defensive justification. Another reason for asking how is that it is very sel-
dom that global and transformative forces are deterministic, and digitalisation and 
liberalisation were definitely not that. They also opened a window of opportunity 
for entering an industry that traditionally had very high barriers of entry. Therefore, 
the main, and offensive, reason for asking how STK and the Norwegian telecom 
sector went through the digitalisation and liberalisation process, is that it is this way 
we find key reasons for why Norway - with its strong capabilities in telecom - did 
not succeed in using the window of opportunity to create a Nokia. The next sections 
elaborate further on the relationship between explaining and understanding. 
 
Explaining and understanding 
In this section, I try to clarify my theoretical position on some issues I find pertinent 
to history and business history in general, and to my research question in particular. 
Wilhelm Dilthey distinguished the cultural and social sciences from the natural 
sciences on the basis of their object: the former seeks understanding, and the latter 
Introduction 
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explanations.14 Dilthey’s point was that we explain nature, but we understand the 
spirit. Nature is studied from the outside, and uniformities are observed with the 
intention of creating causal laws. The human sciences, on the other hand, are studied 
from the inside, through an understanding of the human intentions and experiences 
behind texts, expressions and actions. An interpretive or hermeneutic method is 
required for reconstructing the cognitive process that motivates or gives meaning to 
human actions. This thesis has the ambition to both explain and understand the de-
velopment of the Norwegian telecom industry. 
 
Several branches of the social sciences, not least economics and sciences related to 
business, have more similarities to Dilthey’s definition of the natural sciences: they 
seek explanations rather than understanding, and study human behaviour from the 
outside, observing uniformities with the aim to create generalising theories. An 
important reason for this development is the ambition to be useful, to be an instru-
mental science, which requires some degree of predictability in the theories. In order 
to achieve this, however, intentional explanations are often omitted, because gener-
alising theories require uniform behavioural assumptions. I have always thought it a 
paradox of the instrumental social sciences’ generalising approach: on the one hand 
they omit intentional explanations from their analysis, which is, on the other hand, 
designed to advise policy makers on intentional action.  
 
An important reason for including intentional explanations is that they avoid deter-
ministic explanations, which are problematic in several ways, not least because they 
leave out the moral responsibility for human actions. Moreover, the British historian 
Sir Geoff Elton claims that history will “instruct us in the use of reason”, these in-
structions will be minimised if intentional explanations are left out.15 Francis Sejer-
sted claims that the ultimate subject of history ought to be about human beings’ 
never-ending struggle to avoid being the slave of history, and this is hard to recon-
cile with deterministic explanations.16 Hence, fundamental issues are at stake while 
omitting human actions based on free will. Operating with uniform behavioural 
assumptions, the generalising theories often take human preferences for granted, 
while an historical analysis often reveals how individual or collective preferences 
are historically constructed. In highlighting this, one admits that free will is struc-
tured, and thus reduces the danger of becoming a victim to voluntarism.  
 
                                                          
14 Poul Lübcke (ed.): Engagement og forståelse, København, 1982, p. 27f. 
15 Quoted from Francis Sejersted: Demokratisk kapitalisme, 1993, p. 339. 
16 Sejersted 1993, p. 243 ff. 
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To clarify my position, I find Sejersted’s distinction between disintegrat-
ing/generalising theories and integrating/totalising theories constructive, as the for-
mer is commonly used by social sciences, while the later is more used by historians. 
Sejersted speaks of totalising theories; I prefer approach or method, as it is seldom 
we speak of totalising theories.17 Moreover, the term 'totalising' has unfortunate 
connotations, as it brings to mind the idea of including every relevant factor. An 
historical analysis is by nature reductionistic, as an essential part of the interpreta-
tion is how one chooses to reduce the number of factors. Thus, I prefer the term 
integrating approach, rather than totalising. Knut Kjeldstadli speaks of a 
corresponding distinction, that is between external and internal causes.18 Generalis-
ing theories will often limit themselves to external causes, whereas an integrating 
approach includes internal causes. Hence, my interpretation integrates internal 
factors and causes, without having any ambition to include all relevant factors. 
 
Thus, generalising theories are reductionistic, in the sense that they seek external 
variables that have more or less similar causal effects in different cases, so the the-
ory can be generalised. There is little doubt that fruitful generalising theories are 
valuable, not least for historians, who take them as a point of departure for more 
ideographic studies. Some go far, however, in indicating that generalising theories 
are the only research that “constitutes a contribution to knowledge”.19 I distance 
myself from such a position. Disintegrating theories can provide authoritative ex-
planations of why something happened, but tend to remain external to actual proc-
esses, that is, to how things happened. Conversely, integrating theories are not re-
ductionist in the same manner, rather they try to integrate relevant internal factors to 
provide an understanding of how things happened, as they are not confined to the 
generalising ambition. 
 
Several developments may be seen as general, in the sense that similar mechanisms 
are spelled out in different places, such as industrialisation, democratisation, and/or 
                                                          
17 Sejersted’s theory about a specific Norwegian democratic capitalism is a totalising theory, 
which is inspired by the German Sonderweg-theories. One thing is that there are few such 
theories, but another is the fact that many would choose not to label them theories. My point 
is that the distinction is valuable, even if it does not apply solely to theories, but also to meth-
ods. 
18 Knut Kjeldstadli, Fortida er ikke hva den en gang var. En innføring i historiefaget, 1992, p. 
28. 
19 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba: Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research, 1994, here after Svein Andersen: Case-studier og general-
isering, 1997, p. 12. 
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Stein Rokkan’s nation building.20 Whereas generalising theories reveal valuable 
similarities in each case, the totalising theories point to the dissimilarities. An inte-
grating theory, according to Sejersted, shows how a country or an institution goes 
through such general developments. This distinction is particularly relevant for my 
research question, in as much as I ask how STK and the Norwegian telecom sector 
went through the digitalisation and liberalisation process. Through this, we learn of 
other, internal or integrating causes, why the Norwegian telecom industry has virtu-
ally disappeared. The point is that the generalising approach does not merely reduce 
the number of variables in the explanation, but it also reduces the field of the intel-
lectual interpretation. On the other hand, the totalising approach broadens the field.  
 
* 
 
It does not follow from my adherence to the humanistic and hermeneutic tradition, 
that I abandon the use of theories. On the contrary, it is my ambition to conduct a 
theoretically informed analysis, motivated by the axiom that “rich history is rich on 
theory”. My theoretical position is eclectic, thus, it is the matter of the case that 
decides what theories or analytical approach I apply. As the thesis is about STK’s 
relational position between Televerket and ITT, it uses theoretical perspectives that 
are designed to understand and explain relations. STK’s relation to ITT requires 
theories regarding multinational companies, while its relation to Televerket calls for 
theories and literature on government-industry relations, including public procure-
ment policies. A key concern is how STK, and Televerket, developed competence 
and innovative capability through interaction, thus theories regarding innovation in 
relations are used. Finally, STK’s need to balance the interest of its many stake-
holders, ITT, Televerket and Norwegian institutions, makes corporate governance 
theories valuable. The first branch of theory I present is that related to multinational 
corporations. 
 
Multinational companies 
Many books on multinational business and companies have contributed to the con-
tents of this thesis, like Geoffrey Jones’s The evolution of International Business 
and Mira Wilkins’s analysis of American Business abroad from 1914 to 1970.21 
These two authors have been central in studying freestanding companies (FSC), that 
                                                          
20 Stein Rokkan: ”Statsdannelse, nasjonsbygging og territoriell konsolidering i Europa” in 
Stat, nasjon, klasse : essays i politisk sosiologi, 1987. 
21 Geoffrey Jones: The evolution of International Business, 1996; Mira Wilkins: The Matur-
ing of Multinational Enterprise: American Business abroad from 1914 to 1970, 1975. 
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is companies that were established to do the bulk of their business abroad.22 This is 
a focal point in this thesis, as ITT only did minor manufacturing and sales in the 
United States. FSCs were controlled from headquarters in the home countries; thus, 
they were a foreign direct investment, not a portfolio investment.23 The concept is a 
rewarding analytical tool for understanding ITT and STK in its early years. It is not 
straightforward, however, to label ITT a FSC, as the term is used for companies 
operating in a foreign country.24 Moreover, it was not normal that the non-operating 
headquarters had as many subsidiaries as ITT did. Furthermore, the FSCs were 
normally short-lived, thus ITT was atypical, in that this structure lasted for over 60 
years in its telecom business.25 Nevertheless, ITT followed the pattern of other 
FSCs, in as much as it undertook to construct and organise an infrastructure, and 
that it cooperated closely with the financial community. 26 Furthermore, the notion 
makes sense, as ITT was a freestanding company, not entrenched in any country: 
Europeans regarded it as American, and Americans regarded it as European.27 
 
An important feature of FSCs regards ownership advantages, a concept that is de-
rived from John Dunning’s eclectic paradigm for analysing foreign direct invest-
ment.28 The ownership advantages explain the subject of the investment, i.e. the 
investor, while the locational advantages determine the object of investment. As 
Wilkins states, “a firm must have advantages over actual or potential local competi-
tors to survive abroad”.29 For regular MNCs, these advantages are often perceived in 
line with Raymond Vernon’s “product cycle” tradition, that MNCs develop owner-
                                                          
22 Mira Wilkins and Harm Schröter (ed.): Free-standing company in the world economy 
1830-1996, 1998. 
23 Direct investment means that investor retains the managerial control of the enterprise, 
unlike a portfolio investment. Hence, the degree of the investors’ control decides whether it is 
FSC or a portfolio investment. Moreover, the designation of the headquarters, as a mother 
company or a location for control, determines whether the company is a FSC or not. 
24 Hence, in Wilkins terminology it was ITT’s subsidiaries, such as STK, that were freestand-
ing companies. 
25 Wilkins says she “was impressed with how often these (FSCs) were short-lived activities.” 
Mira Wilkins: “The Free-Standing Company Revisited” in Wilkins and Schröter (ed.) 1998, 
p. 6. 
26 Wilkins 1998, p. 10. 
27 Chapuis 1982, p. 263. The main ITT literature used in the thesis is: Robert Sobel: ITT - The 
Management of opportunity, 1982; Robert J. Schoenberg: Geneen, 1985; Rand V. Araskog: 
The ITT Wars, 1989; Maurice Deloraine: When Telecom and ITT were young, 1974; Anthony 
Sampson: The Sovereign State of ITT, 1974; Peter Young: Power of Speech - A History of 
Standard Telephones and Cables 1883-1983, 1983; and Abo Tetsuo: “ITT’s International 
Business Activities, 1920-40: The remarkable Advance and Setback of a ‘Pure International 
Utility Company’“1982. 
28 John Dunning: Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, 1993. 
29 Wilkins 1998, p. 10. 
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ship advantages from their performance and experiences in the home country, which 
serve as a basis for foreign direct investments.30 These advantages are internalised 
within the boundaries of the firm, as opposed to FSCs, where the ownership advan-
tages are not located within the firm, as they do not have activities at home, but 
rather within the owners’ environment. The first chapter looks into the ownership 
advantages that led to the creation of ITT: the most notable one was the ability of 
ITT’s first CEO, Sosthenes Behn, to operate in the politicised telecom market. An 
important element is that there were different ownership advantages underpinning 
ITT and LME’s operations as multinationals, which help to explain differences in 
the room for strategic manoeuvring enjoyed by STK and EB.  
 
A central query is STK’s role as a subsidiary within ITT, thus theories concerning 
how MNCs organise their subsidiaries are crucial. MNCs have to balance the need 
for national responsiveness and international integration. When operating with inte-
grated strategies, multinationals give subsidiaries responsibilities according to their, 
and their home country’s, advantages. Several studies conducted by John Cantwell 
and others reveal that internationalisation of R&D within MNC follows patterns 
according to the host countries’ relative advantages in industries and technological 
fields.31 Through this, subsidiaries can play a dynamic part in the MNCs’ corporate 
strategy.32 They can pursue strategies, which enhance their rank as a subsidiary 
within the multinational, and, as Robert Pearce and others argue, try to attain a man-
datory position in certain areas and/or product segments.33 An important distinction, 
however, is whether a favourable position is granted as a result of governmental 
pressure or awarded on the basis of performance and/or locational advantages. Thus, 
there is a difference between positive locational advantages and negative locational 
advantages, even if both can pull in the same direction.  
                                                          
30 Raymond Vernon: “International investment and international trade in the product cycle”, 
1966. Also see Mark Casson: “An Economic Theory of the free-standing company “ in Wil-
kins and Schröter (ed.) 1998, p. 99. 
31 John Cantwell’s work on patent statistics shows that MNCs do R&D in subsidiaries where 
the host countries have specific advantages either in the technological field or the industry. 
John A. Cantwell: “The globalisation of technology: what remains of the product cycle 
model?”, 1997; Cantwell and Elena Kosmopoulou: “What determines the internationalisation 
of corporate technology?”, 2002. 
32 First, in terms of innovation, in tapping into the respective host countries’ innovation sys-
tem. Second, with resource allocation, in exploiting the traditional locational advantages set 
up by John Dunning, and in a constant search for more efficient production through econom-
ics of scale and scope. 
33 Joseph R. D’Cruz: “Strategic management of subsidiaries”, 1986, p. 81; Robert Pearce: 
“The evolution of technology in MNE: the role of creative subsidiaries”, 1999; Robert 
Pearce: “Multinationals and Industrialisation: The Bases of ‘Inward Investment’ Policy”, 
2001. 
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It was an intricate game of politics and economics that determined a telecom sub-
sidiary’s rank within the MNC and within the host country. STK tried to attain 
mandatory positions within ITT, by participating in several R&D projects within 
telecom and switching. A political condition for granting STK governmental R&D 
contracts was that it could attain a lead position within ITT, or at least retain the 
intellectual property rights from the development contracts. A crucial element in 
explaining STK’s destiny is to gain a firm grasp of how this game worked. A central 
dimension in this game was the government-industry relation, which the next sec-
tion addresses. 
 
Government-industry relations 
The government-industry relation is an essential perspective in analysing the tele-
com industry, simply because the governments, through the PTOs, were the domi-
nant customers. Thus, Televerket’s policies and strategies in these matters had a 
more decisive impact on the development of STK’s telecom business than anything 
else,34 both for the technological strategy, in terms of when and how to modernise 
the network, and the choice of procurement relations with the equipment suppliers. 
In analysing this, I have used Doz’ international study of negotiated environments in 
the telecom industry and the electrical industry. Moreover, the implications of na-
tional versus foreign ownership are pertinent. In this sense, the thesis is based on 
Tore Grønlie and my own work on state ownership in Norway, as the main argu-
ment for state ownership was to secure national ownership.35 It was easier for gov-
ernments to cooperate with national companies, for instance granting them R&D 
contracts. Many regarded foreign companies as obstacles to industrial development, 
and this concern about powerful multinationals increased during the 1960s. This 
was reflected in Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s book The American Challenge, 
                                                          
34 Literature on Televerket: Thorolf Rafto: Telegrafverkets historie 1855-1955, 1955; Evert 
Bestorp: Oslotelefonen 1880-1985, 1990; Harald Rinde: Kontingens og kontinuitet : fram-
veksten av stiavhengige organisasjonsmønstre i skandinavisk telefoni, 2004; Rinde: Et tele-
system tar form - 1855-1920 - Norsk telekommunikasjonshistorie bind 1, 2005; Harald Espeli: 
Det statsdominerte teleregimet - 1920-1970 - Norsk telekommunikasjonshistorie bind 2, 2005; 
Lars Thue: ‘Volume 3 in Norsk telekommunikasjonshistorie - 1970-2005’, forthcoming; 
Christopher Sjuve: “Bredbåndshistorien - bit for bit : utviklingen av det norske telenettet 
1967-1985 - visjoner og virkelighet”, 2002; Gard Paulsen: “Samarbeidets protokoll - Utvik-
lingen av et nordisk datanett, 1971-1981, 2004. 
35 Tore Grønlie: Statsdrift. Staten som industrieier i Norge 1945-63, 1989; Sverre A. Chris-
tensen: Statens forhold til Norsk Hydro, 1945-1952, 1997; “Statlig eierskap og nasjonal kont-
roll” in Christensen et. al., 2003. It was a variant of selective protectionism. Thomas David 
and André Mach: “Institutionalisation and questioning of ownership restrictions in Switzer-
land and Sweden”, 2002. 
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published in 1968, and numerous other books, which warned against the dominance 
of the American multinationals.36 A Norwegian version came with Nils Petter 
Tanderø’s The Swedish Challenge in 1974.37  
 
Still, as the Norwegian telecom industry was dominated by multinationals, the gov-
ernmental bodies had to settle for cooperating with foreign subsidiaries, and try to 
help them achieve a mandatory position within their MNC. The governments bal-
anced between appealing to and pressuring the subsidiaries to induce industrial 
development. Moreover, PTOs balanced between acting as a service provider and an 
industry provider. In being a service provider Televerket was more interested in 
access to the technology and competence of ITT and LME, to modernise the tele-
com network. As an industry provider, it tried to give the subsidiaries promising 
industry and R&D projects. In countries with a nationally owned telecom industry, 
it was normal to promote national champions, such as Siemens in Germany.38 In 
countries where foreign equipment suppliers dominated, however, host governments 
could use the ‘procurement card’, to put heavy demands on the subsidiaries, for 
instance to reduce foreign ownership and influence. France was the main proponent 
of this strategy, and the French subsidiaries of ITT and LME were nationalised in 
this way in the 1970s.39 Combined with high investment in telecom-related R&D, 
this interventionist policy paved the way for the establishment of Alcatel as a global 
player from the 1980s.40  
 
In the procurer relation, PTOs could either engage in close co-operation with the 
industry, to gain from knowledge flow and innovation through user-producer rela-
tions.41 Ericsson and the Swedish PTO had such a relation; Mats Fridlund called it a 
“development pair”, which allegedly benefited both parties.42 The other strategy was 
                                                          
36 Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber: The American Challenge, 1968. Other books are Edward 
A. McCreary: The Americanization of Europe, 1964; James McMillan and Bernard Harris: 
The American Take-Over of Britain, 1968. Conf. Wilkins 1975, p. 345. 
37 Nils Petter Tanderø: Den svenske utfordring : multinasjonale selskapers innflytelse i norsk 
næringsliv: hvorledes kan oljepenger endre forholdet?, 1974. 
38 Eli Noam: Telecommunications in Europe, 1992, p. 82. 
39 Llerena et al. 2000. 
40 Literature on Alcatel: Razeen Sally: “Alcatel’s Relations with the French state: the Political 
Economy of a Multinational Enterprise” 1993; Razeen Sally: State and Firms, Multinational 
enterprise in institutional competition, 1995; Llerena et al. 2000; David Charles “Alcatel: a 
European champion for a globalizing market”, 1996. 
41 Bengt-Åke Lundvall: “Innovation as an Interactive Process: From User-Producer Interac-
tion to the National Systems of Innovation” 1988; Lundvall (ed.): National systems of innova-
tion - towards a theory of innovation and interactive learning, 1992. 
42 Mats Fridlund: “Switching Relations and Trajectories: The Development Procurement of 
the AXE Swedish Switching Technology”, 2002. 
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to opt for an arm’s-length relationship, which would be beneficial according to 
economic theory, since the PTOs could exploit their monopsonic position in the 
market, i.e. being the only buyer in the market. Yet, a dichotomy of an efficient 
distant market relation and an innovative close user-producer relation is too simplis-
tic. Firstly, close user-producer relations did not necessarily spur innovation. Sec-
ondly', an arm’s-length approach was difficult, as the PTO needed to learn from the 
supplier. Technological control of the telecom network was necessary due to secu-
rity and defence reasons. Moreover, the PTO needed technological competence to 
be able to exploit its monopsonic position. The next section addresses the innovative 
character of such relations.  
 
Innovation 
The third theoretical perspective I will draw upon is that associated with innovation. 
A main tradition relates to the concept of a ‘system of innovation’ (SI).43 This was 
coined in the mid-1980s, emphasising that countries, regions, sectors or industries 
had certain systemic characteristics, which structure, spur and/or constrain innova-
tion.44 In a sense, the Norwegian system of innovation in telecom was set up in the 
1960s. This is not to say that there was no SI before:45 as long as economic activity 
takes place there is a SI, in the sense that systemic features will always influence 
innovation. Nevertheless, the normative aspects of SI, that innovation takes place 
through interaction, and through combinations of technologies and knowledge 
bases, came forward in the 1960s. Moreover, important R&D institutions were es-
tablished. Thus, a R&D-system was created. 
 
The technological development within electronics facilitated new ways of combin-
ing technologies, and this stressed that innovation took place through interaction 
and combinations. Christopher Freeman and Carlotta Perez argue that economic and 
institutional development is motivated by shifts in techno-economic paradigms, each 
containing a new key technology.46 So, Norway was in line with other countries, in 
setting up a new institutional infrastructure to handle the new key technology, elec-
                                                          
43 Lundvall 1988; Charles Edquist, Leif Hommen and Lena Tsipouri (eds.): Public Technol-
ogy Procurement and Innovation, 2000. 
44 The conceptual framework draws upon three theory-traditions: theories on interactive 
learning, evolutionary theories and institutional theories. 
45 There was, for instance, a vibrant innovation milieu within radio and wireless communica-
tion in Norway before 1960. 
46 These include the steam engine (late eighteenth century), railways (mid-nineteenth cen-
tury), electricity (late nineteenth century), petrochemicals (early twentieth century) and in-
formation technology/electronics (mid-twentieth century). Christopher Freeman and Carlotta 
Perez: "Structural Crises of Adjustment: Business Cycles and Investment Behaviour.", 1988. 
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tronics. Knut Sogner has described how a public infrastructure for allocating re-
sources to R&D, and to the electronic industry in particular, was set up in the 
1960s.47 Kjersti Jensen’s has analysed how the public policy towards R&D in elec-
tronics was highly influenced by Telegrafverket’s alleged lack of interest in R&D.48 
A result was the establishment of Televerket’s research institute (TF*) in 1967, 
which John Petter Collett and Bjørn Lossius have written about.49 Soon after, STK's 
inaugurated its own research centre (FA*). 
 
There is an extensive literature on the Norwegian electronics and telecom industry 
in the post-war years.50 Taking into account the number of historical investigations 
that have been conducted, it is striking that there is so little substantial research on 
either STK or EB.51 After all, these two companies were among the largest high-
tech companies in Norway. As such, this thesis fills an empirical gap. Furthermore, 
the effort to combine theories on MNCs with the SI approach is an attempt to fill an 
analytical gap in the Norwegian literature. Being a small country, Norway is des-
tined to rely on importation and adaptation of technology, which means that this 
perspective is particularly important. A key aspect in the SI literature is that innova-
tion takes place through interactive learning, through user-producer relations be-
tween organisations. In this relation, Bengt-Åke Lundvall emphasises the home 
market, and that “long-term interactive learning is most easily organised in a setting 
where there are few linguistic and cultural constraints for the transfer of tacit 
knowledge and where a multilateral system of trust relationships can most easily be 
                                                          
47 Knut Sogner: Fra plan til marked - Staten og elektronikkindustrien på 1970-tallet, 1994; 
En liten brikke i et stort spill. Den norsk IT-industrien fra krise til vekst 1975-2000, 2002. 
48 Kjersti Jensen: Forskning og ny teknologi; fra mulighet til forutsetning. Om modernise-
ringsmiljøet som pådriver i norsk industriutvikling på 50 og 60-tallet, 1989. 
* Norwegian abbreviation for Televerkets Forskningsinstitutt. 
49 John Petter Collett and Bjørn Ole Helsing Lossius: Visjon Forskning Virkelighet - Telever-
kets forskningsinstitutt gjennom 25 år, 1993. 
* Norwegian abbreviation for Forskningsavdelingen. 
50 Jon Petter Collett (ed.): Making Sense of Space - The History of Norwegian Space Activi-
ties, 1995; Olav Njølstad and Olav Wicken: Kunnskap som våpen: Forsvarets forskningsinsti-
tutt 1946-1975, 1997; Knut Sogner: God på bunnen - Simrad-virksomheten 1947-1997, 1997; 
Olav Wicken (ed.): Elektronikkentreprenørene - studier av norsk elektronikkforskning og -
industri etter 1945, 1993. 
51 John Petter Collett’s unpublished paper on Elektrisk Bureau is an exception to this: “I 
skyggen av svensk storkapital? A/S Elektrisk Bureau innenfor LME-konsernet” 1986. The 
books written for STK and EB’s anniversaries are not based on academic research. G. C. 
Wasberg: Standard Telefon og Kabelfabrik A/S 50 år - 1915 - 1965, 1965; Bjørn Bjørhovde: 
Alcatel STK Litt av en historie, 1990; Peder Skogaas: Over alle grenser, Elektrisk Bureau - 
100 år i teleteknikkens tjeneste, 1982. 
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organised”.52 The question is whether it was possible to establish such relationships 
with foreign companies. 
 
The TF tried to form such innovative relations in the Norwegian telecom industry. 
Its main mission was to prepare Televerket for the digitalisation of the telecom sec-
tor, and another important task was to contribute to developing business in Norway. 
Since foreign companies dominated the industry, it wanted to promote the subsidiar-
ies’ position within LME and ITT. The TF’s director, Nic. Knudtzon, argued that by 
using R&D contracts, it could help STK and EB attain a mandatory position within 
their MNCs.53 The TF’s role for Norwegian telecom has been valued highly in the 
literature.54 “In the 1970s, the TF played a role as a pioneer in a technically back-
ward PTO” claims a report, “within 20 years it brought Televerket to a lead position 
in Europe.”55 This thesis questions this postulation, and highlights the role of 
Televerket’s Technical department (TA), particularly how the TA attained technical 
control and knowledge over its network, which was crucial in programming and 
installing computerised switches from the 1970s. 
 
An important source of knowledge and competence for Televerket in the 1970s was 
cooperation with other PTOs in the international telecom organisations. In addition, 
it needed an interactive relationship with an equipment supplier, to come to grips 
with computerised switches. Televerket formed a trans-national relationship with 
ITT's Belgian subsidiary BTM, which was STK's patron in switching. It is not 
straightforward to grasp this relation with the analytical tools provided by the rather 
nationally oriented SI approach. One thing is Lundvall’s point about cultural and 
linguistic constraints. Another is that national actors often will share visions and 
goals beyond short-term interests. Moreover, cooperation between national organi-
sations is more often than not provided for by public financial support. An implica-
tion of these aspects is that SI relations are often characterised by trust and coopera-
tion, and are less burdened by Oliver Williamson’s transaction costs.56 It explains 
how Lundvall in one SI study finds that “interactions between agents had to involve 
non-price relationships”, and that market interactions are “incapable of transmitting 
the qualitative information between users and producers”.57  
                                                          
52 Bengt-Åke Lundvall, Björn Johnson, Esben Sloth Andersen and Bent Dalum: “National 
systems of production, innovation and competence building” in 2002. 
53 TF’s annual report 1970, Collett and Lossius 1993, p. 93. 
54 Collett and Lossius, 1993; Terje Nord and Trond Einar Pedersen: “Endring i telekommuni-
kasjon - utfordringer for Norge” 1996, p. 52. 
55 Nord and Pedersen 1996., p. 52. 
56 Oliver Williamson: Market and Hierarchies, 1975. 
57 Lundvall et. al. 2001, p. 218. 
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Michael Porter provides an alternative perspective with his “cluster theory”. He 
agrees that innovation takes place through interaction, in the interface between or-
ganisations, but it is indicative that Porter speaks of buyer-supplier relations, not 
user-producer. He talks of upgrading mechanisms, which develop due to demanding 
customers, and which are in accord with the market mechanisms, and that actors 
operate after an economic rationale.58 This distinction between Porter and SI might 
provide a better understanding of the relational setting in the Norwegian telecom 
industry. A key point is that Lundvall’s user-producer relations entail a degree of 
trust and commitment, which goes beyond short-financial interests. This in turn 
makes the question of stakeholdership relevant. STK’s ability and willingness to 
commit itself depended on how it ranked and valued its national stakeholders. 
Hence, the next section presents the last theoretical perspective, that of corporate 
governance. 
 
Corporate governance 
The concept of corporate governance is used in many different ways, but the under-
lying definition in this thesis is that it is a system/philosophy that is designed to take 
the interest of the corporation’s stakeholders into account. A loose definition of a 
stakeholder is a party that has something at stake in the company, though a stronger 
definition would be that the stakeholder has a legitimate claim on the corporation. 
The number of stakeholders will, normally, be proportional to the various purposes, 
or functions, the corporations fulfil. Such purposes or functions are to generate 
financial returns to the shareholder; to supply a given product, such as telecom 
equipment to Televerket; to create and secure employment; to contribute to eco-
nomic growth, and thus prosperity and welfare in society; and, what is particularly 
important in telecom, to be a vehicle for innovation and technological develop-
ment.59 Each stakeholder will have particular interest in one or more of the func-
tions: the shareholder in the financial return, Televerket in the price and quality of 
the equipment, the employees in secure work, the government in economic growth 
and technological development.  
 
                                                          
58 Michael Porter: The Competitive Advantage of Nations, 1990, p. 19. This is evident for 
Torger Reve, who has performed two “Porter studies” in Norway. (Reve et. al 1992; Reve 
and Jakobsen 2001) Reve’s other theoretical mentor, besides Porter, is Oliver Williamson, 
who has developed the transaction costs theories. See Torger Reve: "The Firm as a Nexus of 
Internal and External Contracts," in Aoki, Gustafsson, and Williamson (eds): The Firms as a 
Nexus of Treaties, 1990. 
59 One might argue that a company's consequences should be incorporated, so as to include 
those affected by pollution or other environmental consequences are stakeholders as well. 
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There are two main schools of thought regarding corporate governance: that is, 
shareholder and stakeholder philosophy.60 The first has its origins in Berle and 
Mean’s line of reasoning, regarding the separation of the owner and the manager. 
Hence, corporate governance regards how a dispersed group of shareholders can 
make sure that the corporation is governed according to their interests.61 This under-
standing is closely related to principal-agent theories and the shareholder value 
principle, i.e. that the corporations should be governed so as to increase the financial 
return of the shareholder. The second theory is closely associated with the idea of a 
stakeholder society; the normative assumption is that the governance should take all 
the stakeholders of the corporation into consideration. Moreover, there is a notion 
that the company has responsibilities towards society as a whole, that they are 
bound by a, more or less, tacit social contract.62 There is a general agreement that 
the shareholder value principle has conquered new ground during the last decades.63 
Some see this as an integral part of a converging globalisation process, where busi-
ness is conducted increasingly according to Anglo-Saxon principles.64  
 
The triumph of the shareholder theory implies that former stakeholders, employees, 
local communities, the government, the society, have lost their prerogatives towards 
the corporation. The only stakeholder left, with legitimate claims in the prevailing 
corporate governance system, is the shareholder. Which also means, in theory, that 
all other functions are subordinated to generating financial returns to the share-
holder. It follows from this that a financial conception of the firm dominates: this 
development started in the US in the 1960s. “The pioneers of this new strategy”, 
says Neil Fligstein, “focused on the corporation as a collection of assets that could 
and should be manipulated to increase short-run profits”.65 One of the pioneers in 
this transition was ITT, and its CEO from 1959, Harold S. Geneen. He used ITT as 
a vehicle for creating one of the largest conglomerates in the world, and is regarded 
as the epitome of the financial capitalism of the 1960s. He developed a management 
system that came to be known as «Geneenism», which was based on financial con-
                                                          
60 Mary O’Sullivan: “The Innovative Enterprise and Corporate Governance, 2000. 
61 Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means: The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 
1932; Margaret M. Blair: Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the 
Twenty-First Century, 1995. 
62 Will Hutton: The world we’re in, 2002. 
63 OECD: “OECD principles of corporate governance”, in www.oecd.org; Trygve Gulbrand-
sen: “Internasjonal forskning om eierskap og kontroll i privat næringsliv” 1999, p. 23 f. 
64 “The philosophy of shareholder value is taking hold in countries which had resisted it for 
years and there are signs that the structures of corporate governance are acquiring an Ameri-
can - or Anglo-American - tinge to keep pace.” “Governance responds to globalisation” in 
Financial Times 02.06.00. 
65 Neil Fligstein: The Transformation of corporate control, 1990, p. 226. 
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trol, and a resilient belief in the ability to run the corporation through analysing 
numbers.66 As a result, ITT developed a new characteristic ownership advantage, of 
financial and managerial control. This underpinned Geneen’s acquisition pro-
gramme and success well into the 1970s, and also had strong bearings on STK. 
 
As the financial conception of business swept over American business, there was a 
rapid technological development in electronics. The development in the semicon-
ductor and computer industry in the 1960s was so strong that one can to talk of an 
electronic revolution in the 1960s. All the major innovations in the field were car-
ried out in the United States, which created a European anxiety to narrow the Atlan-
tic gap in technology.67 A result of this was a growing public initiative in the field of 
electronics and telecom, and several R&D projects and programmes were set up in 
European countries. Companies cooperated with other companies and public R&D 
bodies in different R&D projects. An implication was that the number and impor-
tance of national stakeholders increased.68 Hence, the two development traits, i.e. 
the electronic and financial revolution in the 1960s, nurtured two competing corpo-
rate governance systems.  
 
STK was, as many subsidiaries are, burdened by a type of schizophrenia; being a 
large Norwegian high-tech company and at the same time a small foreign subsidi-
ary. This burden was not lightened after the electronic and financial revolution. On 
the one hand, STK had to come to grips with the emerging system of innovation in 
telecom, which required a technological and long-term perspective on business, 
within a national framework. On the other hand, it had to come to terms with 
Geneen, who stressed “that they were businessmen rather than engineers, that there 
were no compulsion to be in a technology if it was no business”.69 The financial 
conception of the firm left room only for one stakeholder, namely the shareholder, 
whereas the new system of innovation increased the number of STK’s stakeholders. 
For Geneen, the sources of riches lay primarily in efficient resource allocation, 
whereas the new perspective on technology highlighted innovation as the prime 
source of future prosperity. Moreover, Geneen’s managerial philosophy strength-
                                                          
66 The “difference between well-managed companies and not-so-well-managed companies is 
the degree of attention they pay to numbers, the temperature chart of their business”. Harold 
Geneen, with Alvin Moscow: Managing, 1984, p. 184. 
67 OECD: Gaps In technology: Electronic Components, OECD-report, Paris 1968, Gaps In 
technology: Electronic Computers, OECD-report Paris 1968; Gaps In technology: General 
Report, OECD-report Paris 1968. 
68 This is in line with Alf Chaiton’s claim, that “localization of competitive advantage fosters 
the stakeholder view.” Alf Chaiton et. al.: ”The Schizophrenic Corporation: Corporate Gov-
ernance in a Clustered World” 2000. 
69 Young 1983, p. 143. 
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ened STK’s bond to ITT, while STK’s participation in the system of innovation 
strengthened its national ties.  
 
STK's schizophrenia affected its social conditions as an innovative enterprise, a 
concept that Mary O’Sullivan and William Lazonick have developed by stressing 
that a study of innovative enterprises requires a theory of the organisational econ-
omy, rather than the market economy.70 O’Sullivan and Lazonick’s point of depar-
ture is that the theory of the market economy sees resource allocation as individual, 
reversible, and optimal whereas the innovation process “is collective, cumulative, 
and uncertain”71 “The learning process that is the essence of innovation cannot be 
done all alone, all at once, (or) with any degree of certainty”.72 They have identified 
three social conditions of an innovative enterprise: organizational integration, fi-
nancial commitment, and strategic control.73 These three conditions emphasise that 
it is the organisation, i.e. the enterprise, not the market, which creates incentives, 
allocates resources and determines investments.74 It is not straightforward to apply 
this these concepts and approach to STK’s telecom business in the rudimentary way 
this study does. Still, I find it rewarding, not least because it highlights STK’s de-
pendence on Televerket and ITT. 
 
A final pertinent aspect related to corporate governance was the complex and mu-
tual stakeholdership in the telecom sector. Most industries were important as they 
contributed to economic growth, employment and technological development. The 
telecom industry had an extra dimension, as it provided a crucial infrastructure for 
business and society, which was very important for security and military reasons. 
Thus, it has been asserted that there is a “tacit definition of the telecom sector as 
                                                          
70 Among several publications is Mary O’Sullivan: “The innovative enterprise and corporate 
governance” 2000; William Lazonick: “The Theory of Innovative Enterprise”, 2001. 
71 William Lazonick, “The Theory of the Market Economy and the Social Foundations of 
Innovative Enterprise”, 2003, p. 24. 
72 Lazonick 2003, p. 24. 
73 O’Sullivan 2000. William Lazonick: “Innovative Enterprise and Historical Transforma-
tion”, 2002, p. 14. 
74 “In our framework, ‘strategic control’ determines how strategic decision makers choose to 
build on ‘asset positions; ‘organizational integration’ determines the structure of incentives 
that characterize ‘organizational processes’ that can perform individual actions and individual 
capabilities (including those of strategic managers) into collective learning; while ‘financial 
commitment’ determines whether the enterprise will have the resources available to it to 
persist along an ‘evolutionary path’ to the point where its accumulation of innovative capabil-
ity can generate financial returns.”, Marie Carpenter, Lazonick and O'Sullivan: “The stock 
market and innovative capability in the New Economy: the optical networking industry”, 
2003, p. 974. 
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belonging to the ‘hard core’ of national autonomy”.75 Some, particularly the French, 
felt their reliance on foreign equipment suppliers as a threat to their independence.76 
Hence, most governments and PTOs felt an obligation to develop their domestic 
telecom industry. Moreover, governments were obliged to take the employees in the 
telecom industry into consideration. The industry exploited the PTOs’ stakeholder 
responsibilities to attain high margins in the negotiated environment. The liberalisa-
tion turned the table, as the PTOs were freed from the old stakeholder responsibili-
ties.77 
 
* 
 
It follows from this presentation that I believe that a comprehensive theoretical 
approach is required to grasp the complex negotiated environment, and to explain 
why and understand how digitalisation and liberalisation tore it apart. Moreover, 
even though the theoretical fields are different, as they have a different subject mat-
ter, they contain dichotomies with strong similarities. Regarding foreign direct in-
vestment, it is a dichotomy between perceiving multinationals as engines of growth, 
or obstructers of industrial development; with public procurement, there are disputes 
whether the government should disregard industrial policy in favour of price and 
quality, or the other way around; regarding innovation, there are disagreements 
whether a demanding buyer-supplier relation induces more innovation than a trust-
ful user-producer relation; and finally, concerning corporate governance, there are a 
set of shareholder-friendly norms versus stakeholder norms. Now, the recurrent 
dichotomies show obvious similarities, but are not always concurrent. Nevertheless, 
in an oversimplified way, we may label one of the positions Anglo-Saxon or mar-
ket-friendly, and the other continental or market-sceptic.  
 
Now, returning to the issues of free will, it is a common understanding that it is 
structured by norms and convention.78 An important point in this relation is that 
there are often conflicts over which norm systems should prevail. Individuals’ or 
collective entities’ freedom of will is often put in actions as a choice among such 
system norms. This is not too dissimilar from George Kelly’s concept of “personal 
constructs”, by which we interpret reality.79 The degree of freedom in these in-
stances will vary according to the degree of contingency in the historical situation. 
                                                          
75 Eliassen et al. 1999, p. 24. 
76 William Cats-Baril and Tawfik Jelassi, “The French videotex system Minitel: A successful 
implementation of a national information technology infrastructure”, 1994. 
77 Eliassen et al. 1999, p. 16. 
78 Sejersted 1993, p. 358 f. 
79 Here after Sejersted 1993, p. 366. 
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Regarding the above-mentioned dichotomies, the thesis will show that the 1970s 
was a rather contingent phase, bestowing the actors with freedom to choose among 
the different sets of ideas or norm systems. More importantly, the thesis shows that 
the individual and collective preferences, in terms of which norm system to choose, 
can be explained historically, and that these in turn had a decisive impact on the 
historical development, and thus offers much in explaining the rise and the fall of 
the Norwegian telecom industry.  
 
Sources 
Alcatel STK’s archive is the main empirical foundation in this thesis. The other 
major archival sources I have used have come from Televerket; some are located at 
the Norwegian State Archive (Riksarkivet) and some at the Norwegian Telecom 
Museum. In addition to this, I have used material from the Ministry of Communica-
tion and Industry. Finally, I have used empirical sources from Elektrisk Bureau and 
Nera. I tried to find relevant sources at BTM in Antwerp, but without any success. 
Regarding the empirical foundation for this thesis, it is pertinent to mention that the 
archives of STK’s telecom business were a disappointing sight when I first visited 
them in 1999. Major parts of the company’s archives had been, and were about to be 
destroyed.80 I was given permission to take with me substantial parts of the archive, 
and it is my intention to hand this material over to Norsk Telemuseum. I have trans-
lated Norwegian texts into English, so I could quote them. When quoting primary 
sources, i.e. documents from archives, I have put the original Norwegian quote in 
the footnote. I have not done this when quoting from published material. 
 
A major source of information has been interviews, with a total of 35 persons, 
mainly former employees of STK, but also from Televerket, BTM, EB, and Nera. I 
do not the think the project, with its empirical orientation and analytical approach, 
would have been feasible without these interviews. It has been particularly impor-
tant for the 1950s and 1960s, as these periods are scarcely documented in the ar-
chives. Furthermore, as often is the case, the interviews have provided an extra 
dimension to the understanding of the theme, which is difficult to find in the written 
sources. Even if some might find this analysis over-loaded with theoretical reflec-
tions and technical details, I hope I have managed to bring forth some of the smell 
                                                          
80 Moreover, many of the records were not archived according to subject matter, but under the 
names of the managers who dealt with the issue. When these managers resigned, many of 
them took their records with them, and often destroyed them. Interview with the former Man-
aging Director in STK, Fredrik Thoresen, and the former Manager of STK’s telecom division 
Gunnar Tidemand. 
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and colour that the interviews contributed. The next paragraph gives a brief outline 
of the thesis.  
 
Outline 
Chapter 1 describes the establishment of STK and ITT in the interwar period, as a 
part of the automatisation and oligopolisation of the telecom industry. The main 
purpose of the chapter is to explain and describe two central factors in STK’s devel-
opment. Firstly, the ownership advantages that underpinned ITT's foreign direct 
investment in Norway. The other key question, is why Televerket did accept the 
agreement, or in other words, why it was caught in the suppliers’ oligopolic grip. 
The main purpose of chapter 2 is to explain why Televerket installed STK and 
BTM’s electro-mechanical crossbar switch, the 8B, in the 1950s. Chapter 3 elabo-
rates on the electronic revolution, as well as the new perceptions of research and 
technology that evolved in the 1960s, which contributed to the establishment of the 
TF in 1967, and STK’s Research Department (FA) in 1968. A second important 
development was the growing scepticism towards powerful multinationals, where 
ITT was regarded as the incarnation of a powerful MNC, not least due to the its 
CEO, Harold S. Geneen, seen as the epitome of the financial revolution in the 
1960s.  
 
Chapter 4 presents STK's largest-ever telecom project, namely the development of 
the semi-electronic 11B switch. It also elaborates on how the oligopolic grip loos-
ened in the early 1970s, inducing Televerket to ignore the cartel agreement from 
1934. It also shows how the linear relation was changed when Televerket formed an 
independent relation with BTM. Chapter 5 examines STK as an innovative enter-
prise. Moreover, it undertakes to explain why EB was selected as a cornerstone 
company in 1976 by the government, rather than STK. The chapter analyses the 
differences between STK and EB on different levels: first comparing STK’s Manag-
ing Director, Fredrik Thoresen, and EB’s Managing Director, Kjell Kveim; and then 
discussing the impact of ITT and LME, respectively on STK and EB. The sixth 
chapter deals with Televerket’s strategy for installing digital switches, and focuses 
mainly on the competitive tender for supplying Televerket with these switches. A 
central issue is why Televerket only ordered one system, and the importance of the 
Norwegian market for ITT. Chapter 7 seeks to explain why and how digitalisation 
and liberalisation led to the fall of the Norwegian telecom industry in the 1980s. The 
last chapter sums up my findings and seeks to explain Why Norway does not have a 
Nokia. 
 

Chapter 1 Automatisation and oligopolisation 
 27
Chapter 1 Automatisation and oligopolisation 
Introduction 
This chapter provides the historical background to the rest of the thesis. Its analyti-
cal purpose is to elaborate on the developments from the mid-1920s that led to the 
establishment of ITT and STK, as well as the cartel agreement between STK and 
EB, which segmented the Norwegian telecom sector and industry for 50 years. This 
cartel agreement was a result of the industry’s oligopolic grip on Telegrafverket, 
which in turn was based on several factors that will be presented in this thesis. An 
underlying assumption in this work, is that the question: “Why did Telegrafverket 
accept the cartel?”, pinpoints crucial elements in the telecom history in general, and 
in STK's development in particular. The rise of ITT will be analysed using analyti-
cal tools from theories on multinational business, namely the freestanding company, 
and ownership advantages. These issues are central, as ITT's initial ownership ad-
vantages, and its lack of an operating headquarters, defined the company’s character 
for the next 60 years, and thus STK's room for manoeuvre.  
 
Standard Telefon og Kabelfabrik A/S came into being on 1 January 1934. It was a 
result of a merger between Skandinaviske Kabel- og Gummifabrikker* (SKG) and 
Standard Electric A/S, which was an ITT subsidiary in Norway at the time. SKG is 
important as it represented STK's Norwegian and manufacturing origin. Still, it was 
a cable company, and this thesis is about telecom. Standard Electric A/S and ITT 
were descendants of the American Bell System. Hence, an understanding of STK's 
historical roots requires insight into the Bell System and its overseas operations 
through the company International Western Electric. The founding of STK also 
needs to be put into its local context. Norway contributed to the notion of a Scandi-
navian telecom wonder, with a very high telephone density and a growing telecom 
industry. The Swedish LM Ericsson developed into a world leader as an equipment 
supplier. In Norway, however, the most promising company, Elektrisk Bureau, was 
taken over by Ericsson in 1928. Thus, the establishment of STK, under ITT's own-
ership, was a part of the subsidiarisation of the Norwegian telecom industry.  
 
STK came about as a result of the oligopolisation of the telecom industry. In this 
process, the larger companies, like ITT, LME and Siemens, swallowed small and 
medium-sized equipment suppliers, and carved up national markets for telecom 
equipment into monopolies and oligopolies. This was partly a response to the mo-
nopolisation of the telephone operators, through Public Telephone Operators 
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(PTO). In Norway, this development started in 1901, when Telegrafverket took over 
Christiania* Telefonselskap, which operated the large Oslo network. The early years 
of telecom were marked by several competing companies, both operators and 
equipment suppliers. This feature reappeared at the end of the century, when digi-
talisation and liberalisation reshaped the sector. Thus, the period in between, from 
1930 to 1990, was marked by oligopoly and monopoly. The period coincides with 
the lifespan of STK and EB as subsidiaries. Thus, the establishment of STK took 
place in a time when the telecom sector and industry in Western Europe fell into 
structures that proved to be durable. These developments were in turn highly influ-
enced by technological developments.  
 
The establishment of (inter)national telecom networks through long-distance lines 
induced the PTOs’ monopoly, while the automation of the switches segmented the 
telecom industry into national oligopolies.1 Technological developments, which 
increased the fixed costs and the complexity of the telecom network, had a strong 
formative character.2 Andrew Davies has, however, made a strong case in arguing 
that technological developments did not have monopolisation of the operators as an 
inevitable outcome.3 He argues that this market structure was more a result of the 
incumbent operators' - particularly AT&T's - desire to reap the benefits of a monop-
oly. “The national monopoly paradigm succeeded in the United States and most 
European countries not because it was superior in terms of efficiency”, claims Da-
vies, “but because it protected and promoted the interests of established or dominant 
communication monopolies.”4 This is an important issue, and Davies is probably 
right that the deterministic perspective on technology has disguised human motives 
and actions in the traditional historical explanations of this formative phase of tele-
com. Still, this is not a major theme in this thesis.  
 
Moreover, it is a common notion that the period 1890-1920 was particularly forma-
tive in Western societies. This is the basic assumption of the Chandlerian school, 
which operates with different taxonomies of capitalisms, based on how each nation 
                                                          
* Christiania was the name of Oslo, between 1624-1925, named after the Danish king Chris-
tian IV. From the 1870s it was normal to spell it Kristiania, to make it look more Norwegian. 
1 “The automation of the telephone service in large towns, and (...) the establishment of long-
distance cables routes were to be the salient features of the development of telephony during 
the decade 1920-1930.” Chapuis 1982, p. 249. 
2 Andrew Davies: Telecommunications and Politics. The Decentralised Alternative, 1994, p. 
20 f.; Alfred D. Chandler: The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Busi-
ness, 1977. 
3 Davies 1994, p. and Rinde 2004, p. 18 f. 
4 Davies 1994, p. 32-33. 
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handled the second industrial revolution.5 Francis Sejersted's theory of a Norwegian 
Democratic capitalism is also based on this conjecture, with respect to how Norway 
handled capital-intensive industrialisation.6 Jan Glete underpins the assumption. He 
found that the ownership and power structures in Sweden in 1920 were more similar 
to those of the 1980s, rather than those of the 1890s.7 There is good reason to as-
sume that the same holds for political parties and other central institutions as well. 
“During the great industrial breakthrough,” Glete asserts, “several structural centres 
were established, which for a long time ahead had governing impact on Swedish big 
business.”8 The same reasoning applies for the telecom sector.  
 
The telecom industry was segmented through the process of developing and install-
ing automatic switches.9 The contracts that were signed for the deliveries of the first 
generation of automatic switches in the inter-war period formed, by and large, the 
market structures and relations for telecom equipment until the 1980s. Tele-
grafverket’s decision to install Western Electric’s Rotary switch in 1916, for in-
stance, led to the establishment of STK's forerunner, Norsk Western Electric. Its 
mother company was Bell/AT&T's manufacturing company, i.e. the supplier of 
telecom equipment and, hence, the industrial component in the Bell System, West-
ern Electric. In 1925, ITT bought Western Electric’s European subsidiaries, and 
Western Electric’s international business thus became ITT’s backbone. That is why 
this “telecom tale”, like most others, starts with the Bell System.  
 
The Bell System and the Scandinavian telecom wonder 
Alexander Graham Bell’s invention in 1876 led to the creation of the Bell System. 
In the subsequent years, the International Bell Telephone Company established and 
ran telecom networks in several large European cities, among them a network in 
Christiania, which was running from July 1880. In order to secure its supply of 
equipment, the Bell System in 1881 bought Western Electric, which was a leading 
manufacturer of telegraphic equipment. “In February 1882, Western Electric and 
                                                          
5 Alfred D. Chandler: Scale and scope: the dynamics of industrial capitalism, 1990. Among 
others who operate in this tradition is William Lazonick: Business Organization and the Myth 
of the Market Economy, 1991. One may argue that Alexander Gerschenkron initiated this line 
of thought, while arguing that the timing of a country’s industrialisation, and particularly the 
mode of financing it, was decisive for its later character. Alexander Gerschenkron: Economic 
Backwardness in Historical Perspective, 1962. 
6 Sejersted, 1993, p. 163 f. 
7 Jan Glete: Nätverk i näringslivet, 1994, p. 27-28. 
8 Glete 1994, p. 27-28. 
9 I am not saying there was one-dimensional causal relationship here, but that the automation 
of switches was a cause, and was used as a reason for consolidating the industry into an inter-
national oligopoly. 
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Bell signed an agreement making Western Electric Bell’s exclusive manufacturer of 
telephones in the United States.”10 Hence, through Bell’s ownership of Western 
Electric, the operating and manufacturing units became amalgamated in the US, 
which stood out as an exception in the telecom sector in the western world.  
 
The year after Bell’s acquisition of Western Electric, the Bell Telephone Manufac-
turing Company (BTM) was established in Antwerp, with Western Electric and Bell 
as dominant owners.11 In the same year, 1882, Western Electric founded a subsidi-
ary in the UK, which was later named Standard Telephone and Cables (STC). It 
held several subsidiaries in the Commonwealth and came to be in charge of Western 
Electric's “manufacturing of cables and transmission apparatus”, while BTM was 
entrusted with the manufacturing of switches.12 The Bell System's further expansion 
in Europe was to a large degree co-ordinated and supplied from STC and BTM.13 
BTM remained one of Western Electric’s, and later ITT’s, chief subsidiaries, espe-
cially in the field of switching. STK, for instance, always belonged to the “BTM 
camp”. Thus, BTM served as STK's mother company in the switching business.  
 
Both Western Electric and the Bell System made considerable profits from their 
business in Europe: Western Electric on costly equipment and Bell on high sub-
scription fees. It is argued that in countries where the Bell System held a strong 
position, the development of telecom was halted due to the high prices.14 In Scandi-
navia, however, domestic firms challenged the Bell System, primarily because Bell 
and Western Electric’s prices were so high.15 Hence, both operators and manufac-
turers entered into competition with Bell and Western Electric. Private associations 
formed co-operatives that established telecom networks in local areas.16 The capitals 
of Norway and Sweden, for instance, each had two telephone networks, with one 
local operator competing with the International Bell Telephone Company. The local 
operators started out with much lower fees than Bell: firstly, because they made a 
conscious choice of price before quality, secondly, because they acquired equipment 
from others rather than from Western Electric. 
                                                          
10 Stephen B. Adams and Orville R. Butler: Manufacturing the Future - A History of Western 
Electric, 1999, p. 44. 
11 Of 4000 shares, Western Electric held 2160 and International Bell Telephone Company 
800. No author Bell Telephone Manufacturing Company 1882-1982. 1982. 
12 ITT, 1976, p. 3. 
13 Rinde 2005, p. 142. 
14 James Foreman-Peck: “International Technology Transfer in Telephony, 1876-1914” in 
David J. Jeremy (ed.): International Technology Transfer. Europe, Japan and the USA, 1700-
1914, 1991, p. 122-152. Here after Rinde 2005, p. 142. 
15 Rinde 2005, p. 142; Attman et al. 1976a, p. 50-51. 
16 The remains of the paragraph is based on Rinde 2005, p. 150 f. 
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Western Electric's main rival from the outset, and ITT's rival throughout the 20th 
century, was the Swedish LM Ericsson. In the late 1870s, Lars Magnus Ericsson’s 
technical workshop received American telephones for repair and adjustment, and 
through this he acquired sufficient experience to start his own production. A deci-
sive matter, it seems, was that Bell did not have patent protection in Scandinavia.17 
Another important source of technology for LME was Siemens in Germany. There 
were significant improvements in transmission and switching until 1900, and the 
telephone, i.e. the actual apparatus, with microphone, handle etc., was also much 
improved.18 Before the automation, the telephone was the most cost-draining part of 
the network, partly because it had to generate its own electricity.19 LME's business 
during the first years was based on copying and modifying US and German technol-
ogy, and offering telecom equipment at modest prices in Sweden, and later in the 
rest of Scandinavia.  
 
A Norwegian competitor to LME, the Elektrisk Bureau (EB), was established by 
Carl Söderberg in 1882. Besides being LME's sales agent in Norway, Söderberg 
was among the founders of Christiania Teleforening, Bell’s competing network in 
the Norwegian capital. EB was a considerable company in the Norwegian context. 
“It had a production capacity of 25,000 telephone sets” annually, and had consider-
able exports, with affiliates in Copenhagen, Rome and New York.20 Initially, the 
bulk of EB’s sales came from imported electro-technical products. But Söderberg 
also had aspirations to carry out independent manufacturing of telecom equipment. 
The first products, however, were mainly copies of those of LME and Siemens. 
Söderberg also took advantage of the sales network he had developed as LME’s 
agent in Norway. Lars Magnus Ericsson’s reaction to EB’s technological and mer-
cantile reliance on LME is noteworthy. He thought it was fair that EB tried to estab-
lish its own business based on copying the technology of others: after all, this was 
what LME had done itself.21 Moreover, Ericsson thought such plagiarism would 
only stimulate innovation, and that the best firm would prevail anyway. This resem-
bles the attitudes that characterised the development of Internet-related technologies 
in the 1980s and 1990s, but is in stark contrast, however, to the technological strat-
egy that LME applied towards its subsidiaries throughout the 20th century.  
                                                          
17 Jacobæus (ed.), 1976, p. 16. 
18 Thomas Alva Edison's invention of the carbon microphone was a leap forward in terms of 
practical use of the telephone. 
19 After the automation, the telephone received low voltage from the switch, Finn Jahren: 
Glimt fra Televerks-kulturen - Abonnent og Teleteknikk¸ 1995, p. 14. 
20 Skogaas 1982, p. 209; Rinde 2005, p. 221. 
21 Attman et al. 1976a, p. 68. 
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The fairly advanced telecom industry in Scandinavia went hand in hand with a high 
density of telecom subscribers. The British telephone engineer Herbert Laws Webb 
concluded in 1910 that it was “in the Scandinavian countries that the telephone has 
the freest and most rapid development in Europe”.22 There were three times as many 
telephone subscribers per inhabitant in Norway, as in the leading industrial econo-
mies like Germany and the UK. As a colleague of Webb, A. R. Bennett, claimed, 
“wherever two or three Scandinavians were gathered, «they almost infallibly pro-
ceed to immediately establish a church, a school, and a telephone exchange.»“23  
 
Table 1.1 Telephone subscribers per 1,000 inhabitants, 1900 
Sweden 15.6 Germany 5.1 Austria 1.2 
Norway 15.0 Great Britain 5.1 Spain 1.0 
Switzerland 12.4 Netherlands 3.3 Hungary 0.9 
Denmark 11.0 France 1.8 Rumania 0.3 
Sources: Rinde 2005, p. 133. 
 
There is an intriguing historical parallel between these years and the Scandinavians’ 
frequent use of Internet and mobile telephones in the 1990s.24 It is fair to assume 
that the Nordic countries’ progressive role in telecom from the 1980s has important 
roots in the infant years of the telephone. For our purpose, however, the reasons for 
the Scandinavians’ affection for telephones and communication serve as an interest-
ing and important background for STK's development. 
 
One important reason for the technical and industrial development was Bell’s lack 
of patent protection in Scandinavia; it enabled the industry to evolve through copy-
ing US, German, and each other's technology. A notable factor is that Western Elec-
tric did not establish any manufacturing subsidiary in Scandinavia; Bell imported 
the equipment from the BTM plant.25 Hence, the domestic industry’s initial growth 
was based on import substitution.26 The local telephone companies' willingness to 
                                                          
22 Herbert Laws Webb: The development of the telephone in Europe, 1911, here after Chapuis 
1982, p. 145. 
23 A. R. Bennett: The Telephone Systems of the Continent of Europe, 1895, here after Rinde 
2005, p. 132. 
24 Johan Hauknes and Keith Smith: “Corporate Governance and Innovation in Mobile Tele-
communications: How did the Nordic Area Become a World Leader?” 2002. 
25 This was probably due to the relatively small markets and the peripheral location in 
Europe. However, in this matter it might be a question of the chicken and the egg; Western 
Electric did not invest in Scandinavia, due to the stronghold of the local manufacturers. 
26 Attman et al. 1976a, p. 50-51. 
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opt for low cost and domestic products was vital and increased the density of tele-
phones. There was a reciprocal effect here, the cheap equipment enabled the local 
telephone companies to compete with Bell for subscribers, and the local telephone 
companies enabled the domestic industry to compete with Western Electric. 
 
Harald Rinde has highlighted the local willingness and ability to establish local 
telephone companies as an explanation of the high density of telephones in Scandi-
navia.27 These companies made a conscious choice of accessibility and economy, 
over the higher quality that Bell could offer. Finally, Scandinavians have been said 
to be infatuated with technology, which in turn fuelled the expansion and develop-
ment of telephony.28 This structure, of many private networks, was challenged by 
the PTOs’ monopolisation of telecom provision around the turn of the century. 
 
PTO - monopoly and monopsony 
The situation in Christiania, with two competing telephone companies, did not last 
for long. It was perceived as irrational and provoked a fierce debate about the “tele-
phone issue” in the newspapers.29 Christiania Telefonforening and Bell, however, 
were not able to agree on a merger, so the companies were forced to merge, and 
formed Christiania Telefonselskap in 1886.30 It was privatised and obtained a con-
cession to operate the network for 15 years. This reflected the prevailing opinion 
that telephony was not suited for competition, and that it was a natural monopoly 
since it was inefficient to operate two networks. Moreover, the City Council’s action 
showed that a public initiative was required. The Telegraph law from 1881 had 
already given Telegrafverket a formal monopoly on long-distance calls.  
 
The development of the national network and increasing long-distance traffic paved 
the way for a national monopoly. The minister in charge of telecom in 1899, Jørgen 
Løvland, argued that one should not organise the telephone affair by “dividing the 
country into several telephone provinces, but by creating one telephone empire”.31 A 
new law was passed in 1899, giving Telegrafverket the exclusive right to run tele-
com networks and to redeem all telephone companies in Norway. In 1901, when 
Christiania Telefonselskap's concession expired, Telegrafverket took over the tele-
                                                          
27 Rinde 2004 and 2005. 
28 ”Skandinaver er de beste forsøkskaninene” in Dagens Næringsliv 11.08.03. The article is 
about a US research report, which concludes that Scandinavian countries are the best place to 
launch new products, with mobile telephony used as an example. 
29 Bestorp 1990, p. 16 f. 
30 Rinde 2005, p. 148. 
31 Quoted from Bestorp 1990, p. 48. 
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com network in Christiania.32 This was the largest private network in Norway, con-
stituting 40 per cent of the local traffic. Hence, it was a decisive starting point for 
monopolising the telephone service in Norway. Still, Norway stands out in a Euro-
pean context, as the process of monopolising the telecom services took such a long 
time. Only 50% of the private networks had been taken over by Telegrafverket by 
1920.33 The process of deprivatisation was halted, due to the government’s poor 
financial state.34 Thus, Norway had a dual regime of private networks operating side 
by side with Telegrafverket. It was always the intention to put the private networks 
under Telegrafverket, but as this was not finalised before 1974, Rinde has coined 
the awkward Norwegian situation as “permanent temporality”, and it had a profound 
effect on the Norwegian telecom sector, to which we will return. 
 
Most European countries went through the same process around 1900 and sought to 
monopolise the telephone business under state ownership and control. PTOs were 
established, with the postal service and/or with the former telegraph administra-
tions.35 An important reason for the emergence of PTOs was the construction of 
national networks through long-distance lines. “The years 1910 to 1920 were 
marked by the appearance of the first long-distance and very long-distance routes”, 
states Chapuis, “constituted by cable circuits using electronic tube repeaters.”36 
Moreover, the national networks were connected to an international network from 
the 1920s. This entailed national co-ordination.37 Furthermore, the increasing com-
plexity of the technology required standardisation and raised the fixed costs. This 
contributed to an understanding of telecom as a natural monopoly.38 As with tele-
graphs and railways, it seemed irrational to construct separate networks and admini-
strations. 
 
In most countries, the PTOs bought private telecom companies and developed into 
monopolists. Denmark and Finland were notable exceptions to the general European 
development, as these countries’ networks were run by regional companies, with the 
government as an independent regulator. Nevertheless, the process of public control 
and monopolisation was well under way in most countries. This had different con-
sequences for the networks and the subscribers. Our main concern, however, is that 
monopolisation turned the national markets for telecom equipment into mo-
                                                          
32 Bestorp 1990, p. 49 and 51. 
33 Rinde 2005, p. 336. 
34 Espeli 2005, p. 279 f. 
35 Chapuis 1982, p. 117 f. 
36 Chapuis 1982, p. 247. 
37 Davies, 1994, p. 72 f.; Attman et al. 1976a, p. 50; Rinde 2005, p. 281. 
38 Rinde 2004, p. 17 f. 
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nopsonies, i.e. with only one buyer of equipment. Hence, the PTOs’ monopolist 
position in their downstream activities - provision of telephones - gave them a mo-
nopsonic position in their upstream activities - procurement of telecom equipment. 
This had several consequences to which we will return throughout the thesis, the 
most important one being that it gave the PTOs great procurement power when 
dealing with the telecom industry. Thus, the industry had to comply with the de-
mands from the PTOs in order to sell equipment. 
 
One important demand from the European countries, concerning the international 
telecom industry, was domestic production. Apart from the general wish for indus-
trialisation and employment, the security dimensions of telecom were important. In 
response to these demands Western Electric established manufacturing subsidiaries 
in Antwerp, London, Berlin, Paris, Milan, Vienna, St Petersburg and Budapest.39 It 
also established subsidiaries in almost every part of the world, in cities like Tokyo 
(later NEC), Montreal (later Nortel), Buenos Aires and Sydney.40 An important 
technological reason for the host governments’ demand for domestic production was 
that the switches became more complex, first through the manual multiplex switch, 
and later with the automatic switches. This highlighted the need for national control 
of the networks, and the wish for technology transfer.  
 
The path dependency of automatic switches 
The cost of personnel for the manual switches halted the further expansion of tele-
phone subscribers. Moreover, when a network surpassed 10,000 subscribers, it re-
quired more switches to communicate. This created a complex system, and thus 
diseconomies of scale. Hence, there were many attempts to create effective and 
reliable automatic switches. One of the first systems was the Strowger system, de-
veloped by Almon B Strowger, a funeral director in Kansas City.41 The switch, or 
selector, followed a step-by-step logic, responding directly to the dialled number, 
with vertical and rotating movements.42 The Strowger system was installed in nu-
merous cities in the USA and Europe, among them Skien in Norway in 1920, which 
was the first automatic switch installed in Scandinavia.43 
 
                                                          
39 Western Electric also had production facilities in Tokyo, Montreal, Buenos Aires, and 
Sydney. 
40 Adams and Butler 1999, p. 50. 
41 The anecdote is that Strowger invented the automatic switch in order to get rid of the man-
ual operator, who was the wife of his competitor and ensured that her husband got more 
funerals than Strowger. 
42 Chapuis 1982, p. 60. 
43 Rafto 1955, p. 344; Bestorp 1990, p. 68. 
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At the turn of the century, AT&T, which became the holding company of the Bell 
System in 1889, “authorized a study by Western Electric to develop a project for 10 
000 line exchange”.44 The outcome of Western Electric’s efforts was the Rotary 
switch, which was regarded as superior to the Strowger system.45 It did not respond 
directly to the dialled pulses; instead, the numbers dialled were received by regis-
ters, which controlled the setting of the switches.46 The registers “eliminated the 
fixed relationship between the numbering scheme and the number of switching 
stages”, which led to “less switch wear and lower maintenance”.47 The Rotary 
switch was installed in several cities; it was produced for more than 60 years and 
was central in the Norwegian network until the 1980s. 
 
The demand for telephones grew exceptionally in the Norwegian capital from the 
turn of the century. Telegrafverket realised that the manual switching system that 
was installed from 1895 would not be able to handle the traffic. The cost of person-
nel was very high with the incumbent network, both for the physical switching, but 
also because of the many errors that had to be taken care of. It became a problem for 
large cities to operate tens of thousands of subscribers by manual switches. With 
automatic switches, it was possible to allocate one switching station to each part of 
the city. In 1911, there were 130 automatic switches in use in the USA, and it 
gained ground in Europe too. The expansion of urban telecom networks in these 
years obliged most PTOs to consider the developments in switching. The Director 
General of Telegrafverket, Leonard Iversen, and his chief engineer, Sivert R. Abild, 
headed a committee that participated on international congresses concerning automatic 
switches. Thereafter, the committee went on a study tour around Europe and to the 
USA, before it produced a thorough report on the need for automating the Oslo 
network in 1913. This envisaged a plan for 30,000 lines, with a potential for 90,000 
lines.48  
 
The Norwegian parliament, the Stortinget, sanctioned the plan, and international 
companies were invited to present tenders. The committee was extended with the 
inclusion of executives of the telephone companies in Copenhagen and Sweden, to 
evaluate the tenders. In January 1916, the committee chose Western Electric's Ro-
tary switch for the Oslo network. Besides Western Electric's low price, it was the 
reputation of Western Electric and BTM that counted the most, along with the fact 
                                                          
44 Chapuis 1982, p. 166. 
45 Godefroy Dang Nguyen: “Telecommunications: a challenge to the old order.”, 1985, p. 100. 
46 Meurling and Jeans 2000, p. 79. 
47 Meurling and Jeans 2000, p. 79. 
48 Rafto 1955, p. 333-334; Rinde 2005, p. 308. 
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that the Rotary switches had been tested in other cities. The contract with Western 
Electric was signed in 1916, and the first automatic switch was due already in 1917, 
but the project was postponed, mainly because of the World War.49 The automatic 
switch was installed in 1921, which was early in a European context; Hague was the 
only capital that installed automatic switches earlier. This suggests that Norway still 
was in line with the other Scandinavian countries in being pioneers in telecom. The 
Bergen Telefonkompagni, which was privately owned, also ordered Rotary in the 
1920s. The switches were imported from BTM in Antwerp, and installed by West-
ern Electric Norway, which was founded in 1920, and which eventually became 
STK's telecom department.50  
 
The first contracts signed for automatic switches in large cities had profound effects 
on the market situation in the following years.51 As for the relation between the 
PTOs and the equipment suppliers, there were strong path-dependent effects from 
the ordering of automatic switches, through technological lock-ins, and what Brian 
Arthur calls increasing returns.52 The Rotary contracts secured STK's and BTM's 
positions as sole suppliers for Oslo and Bergen's telecom network until the 1980s. 
Hence, much of the 20th century's market structure for telecom equipment was laid 
in the interwar years. Through the ordering and installation of automatic switches, 
PTOs and equipment suppliers entered enduring and intimate relationships. The 
equipment suppliers that battled for these contracts in Europe were Ericsson, Sie-
mens, Western Electric, and Automatic Electric Chicago (Autelco), which produced 
the Strowger system. Western Electric operated through its subsidiary, the Interna-
tional Western Electric Company (IWEC), which handled the overseas business. 
Thus, IWEC was a holding company for BTM, STC, Western Electric Norway and 
other companies. It was not very successful, however, in winning large switching 
contracts in Europe. The German PTO ordered a variant of the Strowger switch 
from Siemens, and IWEC lost a long-fought struggle to supply the British network 
in 1922.  
 
The loss of the British contracts was allegedly due to amateurish political handling. 
IWEC confused the British by making a combined offer of Rotary and the US ver-
sion of Rotary, called Panel. Moreover, IWEC and STC planned to carry out the 
bulk of the manufacturing in Antwerp, not in Britain. This was a “fatal political 
                                                          
49 Rafto 1955, p. 300. 
50 Wasberg, 1965, p. 35. 
51 Deloraine, 1974, p. 46. 
52 Paul A. David: “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY” 1985; W. Brian Arthur: “Compet-
ing technologies: an overview”, 1998. 
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error” as it was politically impossible to entrust the manufacturing of “nationally 
important equipment to another country”.53 “The British Post Office considered that 
Parliament would never sanction such a proposal” and dropped IWEC's offer, in 
favour of the Strowger switch.54 The loss of the UK market implied that IWEC 
would have a hard time getting access to other Commonwealth markets as well. 
Thus, “by 1923 two large European countries had made their choice”, says ITT's 
famous French telecom engineer, Maurice Deloraine, “which was against the sys-
tems supported by Western Electric”.55 The last large contract for automatic 
switches in Europe was for the French network, but IWEC had no reason to be op-
timistic given its record in Germany and the UK. As a consequence, Western Elec-
tric's owner, AT&T, considered divesting itself of IWEC. One possible buyer was 
International Telephone & Telegraph, with its eccentric manager Sosthenes Behn. 
 
ITT - a freestanding company 
The founder of ITT, Sosthenes Behn, was born on St. Thomas in the West Indies. 
He had a Danish father and a French mother, and was educated in Paris and Corsica, 
before he received US citizenship.56 He served as a colonel in the Signal Corps for 
the US army during the First World War in Europe. “Fiercely proud of his wartime 
achievements, Behn enjoyed being addressed as «Colonel Behn» for the rest of his 
life.”57 His military experience got him acquainted with telephony and the poor state 
of the European networks. However, he and his brother ran a sugar business in 
Puerto Rico, and received the local telephone company and its concession as a pay-
ment for bad debt.58 ITT was created through the acquisition of a telephone com-
pany in Cuba and the one obtained in Puerto Rico.59 It has been said that Behn 
chose the name, IT&T, hoping that others would confuse it with AT&T.60  
 
ITT's headquarters was in the US, but the company did not do any business there. 
Thus, it was a multinational company (MNC) without an operative mother com-
pany. Mira Wilkins has described such companies, which were established to do the 
bulk of their business abroad, as freestanding companies (FSC). They were con-
trolled from headquarters in the home country: thus, a FSC was a foreign direct 
                                                          
53 Young, 1983, p. 38. 
54 Deloraine 1974, p. 48. 
55 Deloraine 1974, p. 49. 
56 Tetsuo 1982, p. 105. 
57 American National Biography Online March 2002; http://www.anb.org/articles/10/10-00117. 
58 Tetsuo 1982, p. 105. 
59 Sobel 1982, p. 14 f. 
60 The original abbreviation was IT&T; it was changed to ITT in the 1960s, Sobel 1982, p. 36. 
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investment, not a portfolio investment.61 These kinds of companies, or foreign direct 
investments, were common around 1900, particularly in enterprises aiming to ex-
ploit natural resources such as oil, mining, pulp and paper, or constructing infra-
structure, like railways, roads, banks and telecommunications.62 The FSCs served as 
agents for industrialisation and modernisation on the part of advanced countries, in 
relation to less advanced ones. They were often backed by large banks, which were 
eager to capitalise on national advantages by overseas investments. Hence, ITT's 
telecom business in the West Indies was a classic FSC, as was ITT's close relation 
with the National City Bank and the JP Morgan group. Both banks had representa-
tives on ITT's board of directors from the outset.63 
 
Based on its business in the Caribbean, ITT expanded into Europe and obtained the 
concession for the telephone service in Spain in 1924. This was in severe competi-
tion with European equipment suppliers, such as LME, Siemens and Philips. These 
companies were not traditional operators, but were keen to obtain the concession in 
order to sell their equipment. The ordinary way of pursuing the business for the 
telecom industry in the first years was to obtain a concession for running a network 
and thereby sell the equipment.64 Thus, it is indicative that the title of the first vol-
ume of LME's history, covering the period 1876-1932, is called “The Battle for 
concessions”.65 Later, Behn “referred to the Spanish situation as his “springboard” 
from which he hoped to develop other concessions in Europe”.66 He was reluctant to 
buy telecom equipment from European manufacturers, as he feared that unfavour-
able terms would squeeze the profit margins in his Spanish adventure.67 Thus, in 
order to secure supplies for his Spanish project, Behn wanted to link up to, or buy, 
an equipment manufacturer with operations in Europe. 
 
Behn had been in touch with AT&T's management while trying to connect Cuba to 
the US network through a cable. Moreover, Behn learned of AT&T's desire to sell 
IWEC, through the National City Bank, which served both companies. Thus, Behn 
approached Western Electric, to buy IWEC in early 1925. This was a bold move, 
                                                          
61 Direct investment means that the investor keeps the managerial control of the enterprise, 
unlike a portfolio investment. Hence, the degree of the investors’ control decides whether it is 
a FSC or a portfolio investment. Moreover, the designation of the headquarters, as a mother 
company or a location for control, determines whether the company is a FSC or not. 
62 Wilkins and Schröter, 1998. 
63 Tetsuo 1982, p. 107. 
64 Chapuis 1982, p. 261 f. 
65 Attman et al. 1976a. 
66 Deloraine 1974, p. 49-50. 
67 Sobel 1982, p. 38 f. 
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given that IWEC dwarfed ITT, with “revenues in excess of seven times those of 
Behn's properties”.68 IWEC's European subsidiaries, however, had problems with its 
profitability, supposedly due to mismanagement and undercapitalisation and, above 
all, because of the failure to get access to the British and German markets with Ro-
tary. Hence, IWEC needed further investments and commitment from the parent, 
AT&T. Robert Sobel, the author of ITT’s history, claims that the US government 
favoured the divesting of IWEC, because “American telephone customers had to 
subsidize the growth of foreign installations”.69  
 
The US government’s attitude must be put in the context of the general concern for 
AT&T’s dominant position in the USA. Thus, a sale of IWEC was a means of 
avoiding anti-trust charges, as was the establishment of Bell Laboratories in 1925, 
which was set up because the “Bell System needed to show that it was striving for 
the sorts of improvements that competition created”.70 Finally, it is likely that the 
US government was concerned about the military importance of communication 
technology, and did not want AT&T to export vital technology. Western Electric’s 
management, however, was not keen on selling its overseas operations, and turned 
down ITT's offer. Behn, still eager to secure supply for the Spanish contract, bought 
a French company, Thomson-Houston, soon renamed Compagnie Générale de Con-
structions Téléphoniques (CGCT), which also “could prove a perfect vehicle for 
entry into the lucrative French market.”71 
 
IWEC's destiny was not settled. It became an integral part of a power struggle be-
tween AT&T and Western Electric’s presidents. Western Electric’s Charles DuBois 
had just lost the race for AT&T’s presidency to Walter Gifford and hung on to 
IWEC as part of his power base, whereas Gifford, apart from being more anxious 
about anti-trust charges and AT&T’s financial standing, did not mind reducing 
DuBois’s influence.72 Gifford decided to sell IWEC to ITT. “DuBois and many 
others at Western Electric were crushed when they heard the news” of the divesture 
of IWEC.73 In September 1925, AT&T and ITT “divided the world between them-
                                                          
68 Sobel 1982, p. 42. 
69 Sobel 1982, p. 42. “Moreover, at this time A.T.T. was having to defend its domestic rate 
increase: A.T.T. pointed to the large interest charges it had to pay on loans. Why, the state 
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selves. AT&T agreed not to compete overseas, and on his part the Colonel wouldn’t 
erect telephonic-equipment plants in the United States”.74  
 
The arrangement supports the widely held perceptions of the banks’ integral role in 
organising FSCs in the first part of the twentieth century. The National City Bank 
and JP Morgan were instrumental in the transaction, initiating it by bringing Behn 
and Gifford together, and assuring its completion by arranging the financing of 
ITT's acquisition. $25 million out of the $30 million was paid in ITT gold bonds, 
“which AT&T turned over to J. P. Morgan & Co. for sale on the market.”75 Thus, 
ITT relied on the securities market and “in close connection with this deal, two 
executives of J. P. Morgan & Co. joined ITT's directorates in 1926”.76 From the 
banks' perspective, it reduced its financial claims towards AT&T, and raised its 
financial stake in ITT proportionally. All the same, it continued to be financially 
engaged in manufacturing and supplying of telecom equipment overseas. 
 
ITT changed IWEC's name to International Standard Electric (ISE), and in the fol-
lowing years ISE acquired more companies in Europe, which were merged with 
former IWEC subsidiaries. Most of the subsidiaries were given a name that included 
“Standard” in order to link them to the mother company, like the German Standard 
Elektrik Lorenz (SEL) and Standard Telefon og Kabelfabrikk (STK).77 ITT also 
invested in several telephone companies in Central and South America and bought a 
large US cable company. Its gross earnings rose from $3.5 million in 1921, to $100 
million in 1929, while the number of employees grew from 1300 to near 100,000 in 
the same period.78 The expansion was financed mainly by bond issuing. Still, how 
could an eccentric Colonel, Sosthenes Behn, turn a small freestanding company into 
one of the world’s largest telephone companies? This question is essential for grasp-
                                                          
74 Sobel 1982, p. 44; IWEC’s name was changed to International Standard Electric Co., 
which in turn was a subsidiary of ITT. The name International Standard Electric Co. was 
seldom used. Hence, for the sake of simplicity, I will use the name ITT throughout the thesis. 
75 “Of the staggering price of $30 million paid to buy International Western, a large portion, $ 
25 million, was paid in ITT gold clause bonds (redeemable in 20 years and carrying an annual 
interest of 5.5 %).” Tetsuo 1982, p. 107. 
76 Tetsuo 1982, p. 107. 
77 Others were Standard Electric Aktieselskab, Copenhagen; Standard Electric Company 
Warsaw; Standard Electric Doms a Spolecnost, Prague; Standard Electric Romana S A, Bu-
charest; Standard Eléctrica S.A., Madrid; Standard Eléctrica S.A., Lisbon; International Stan-
dard Electric Corporation, Branch office Rio de Janeiro; Standard Elettrica Italiana, Milan; 
Standard Telephones and Cables, Ltd, London and Standard Telephones and Cables (Austral-
asia) Ltd., Sydney. 
78 The networks in Central and South America and Caribbean were “to incorporate them into 
the All American Cables network, thereby connecting them with each other and with New 
York.” Tetsuo 1982, p. 112. 
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ing the nature of ITT and how it pursued its strategies and policies throughout the 
20th century. 
 
ITT's ownership advantages 
One way of explaining ITT's international growth is by using John Dunning's eclec-
tic paradigm for explaining and analysing foreign direct investments (FDI). The 
subject of the investment, the investor, is explained by detecting ownership advan-
tages.79 Hence, to get an analytical grip on ITT, we need to take a closer look at the 
ownership advantages behind the company’s acquisition of IWEC. Analyses of 
ownership advantages may seem like an academic exercise, with only theoretical 
relevance to the circumstances in question, but in this case there is reason to believe 
that the banks conducted such an analysis, comparing and evaluating ITT's and 
AT&T's ownership advantages for engaging in overseas telecom business. An im-
portant dimension of FSCs is that the ownership advantages are not located within 
any firm. Traditional multinationals develop ownership advantages from their per-
formance and experiences in the home country, which serves as a basis for FDI.80 
This was not the case for FSCs or ITT, whose ownership advantages lay in the own-
ers' environment. Thus, ITT's ownership advantages were partly derived from its 
American base and partly from Behn's personality. 
 
It is straightforward to identify US firms’ ownership advantages in telecom in com-
parison with overseas competitors. The US had been the world leader since Bell’s 
invention. In 1928 there were 16 telephones per 100 inhabitants in the USA, while 
the corresponding figure in Europe was 2 per 100.81 Furthermore, the US corporate 
and financial system was keen to assist entrepreneurs who wanted to capitalise on 
US technological advantages with overseas investments. The US government also 
supported FDI, and ITT benefited from this when it ran into financial difficulties in 
the late 1930s, while having to pay its annual interest on its bonds. When this 
proved impossible in 1939, ITT was saved by the appearance of the Export-Import 
Bank of America as the “lender of last resort”. It was considered “a matter of high 
policy that the United States not lose its important international communication 
enterprise”.82 Thus, one should never underestimate the political power of the home 
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81 Chapuis 1982, p. 47. 
82 “Even though the Export-Import Bank did not offer the entire loan, the Bank's decision 
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nation as an ownership advantage. The UK and US’s high level of FDI in the 19th 
and 20th centuries underpins this.  
 
Still, IWEC had turned into a financial burden within the Bell System. Why should 
Behn and ITT stand a better chance in managing foreign subsidiaries in the telecom 
business? Behn was convinced that he could organise the business in a more profit-
able way than AT&T.83 The subsidiaries in Europe required close political attention, 
as the host governments pursued protectionist policies. AT&T may have reasoned 
that Western Electric did not have the capacity to engage in complex political strug-
gles to win contracts for telecom equipment overseas, and that it would be better if 
Western Electric concentrated on its obligations towards AT&T and the US market. 
The National City Bank and JP Morgan may have reasoned the same way, believing 
that their financial commitment to both AT&T and ITT would yield higher divi-
dends, letting Behn and ITT handle the politicised export markets. 
 
Behn has been characterised as “the epitome of the politicized businessman, earning 
his profits and building the I.T.T. empire through political maneuverings (sic.)”.84 
Telecom was at the core of national autonomy and called for gentle handling of the 
subsidiaries' conduct in the host nations. Moreover, international business was vul-
nerable to political volatility, and Behn’s ability to manoeuvre in the landscape of 
business, politics and international relations is well documented - and severely criti-
cised.85 Last but not least, Behn’s personality has been regarded as an invaluable 
asset in creating and developing ITT. His “fluent Spanish and courtly manner” have 
for example been highlighted as an important asset when ITT obtained the conces-
sion in Spain.86 He also spoke French, and allegedly capitalised on his European 
ancestors. 
 
The first major change that Behn implemented was to present the subsidiaries as 
national companies, with their prime loyalty to their home nations and domestic 
PTOs. This was crucial in the protectionist interwar years, and especially in the 
telecom industry. One of the first things Behn ordered, as a part of this strategy, was 
the establishment of R&D institutes in Paris and London.87 Even if this was valuable 
in industrial terms, it was more important for political matters. It was an assurance 
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of ITT's compliance to the host-nations of the subsidiaries. ITT's technological 
foundation was secured for the next quarter of the century by the agreement with 
AT&T: ITT was given access to Western Electric’s technical information for the 
next 25 years, “and also be authorised to manufacture under Western Electric’s 
patents”.88 Hence, Western Electric’s “Rotary became the chief weapon in (ITT’s) 
switching armoury”.89 Behn and ITT's first critical test was the contest for delivering 
automatic switches to Paris.90  
 
Through the acquisition of IWEC, ITT obtained another French subsidiary, namely 
Le Materiél Téléphone (LMT), which was to be ITT's vehicle in the “fierce” battle 
for winning the Paris contract.91 Behn revealed his political qualities by outmanoeu-
vring the opponents, Ericsson and Strowger. A part of ITT's bait to the French ad-
ministration was the promise to set up the aforementioned R&D “laboratory in Paris 
if Rotary was selected”.92 Behn pursued an effective PR campaign towards the 
French public and government, including the creation of “a small company in 
France” called the “Company for French Telephone Development”. ITT's pricing 
was also lower than those of the two competitors, and LMT and ITT won the con-
tract with Rotary in 1926.93 
 
“Although the first order was to be placed with LMT, it was known that the real 
talent behind the proposal was at BTM-Antwerp.”94 Several BTM engineers moved 
to Paris, and Norwegians, Britons, Danes, Hungarians and Australians from other 
ITT houses were engaged in installing Rotary in France.95 This reflected the fact 
that ITT did not have operating headquarters that could send experts to assist its 
subsidiaries. In 1974, Maurice Deloraine asserted that “LMT's reputation and 
strengths to this date are still largely based on the success” of the French Rotary 
contract. The exchange, “which had a life expectancy of 25 years, was still working 
36 years later”.96 ITT's victory in Paris in 1926 was the European breakthrough for 
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the Rotary switch, which was later installed in several European cities.97 ITT in-
stalled the Rotary switch in Spain. The Norwegian branch of Western Electric had 
acquired competence through the early installation of Rotary in Norway, and several 
Norwegians from Western Electric went to Spain to install the Rotary switches 
there.98 
 
Hence, Behn and ITT succeeded where IWEC had failed, namely at winning a con-
tract for a major European city. An important consequence of the contract in Paris 
was that France took a dominant position within ITT's European business. In the 
switching business, there was the French and Belgian BTM camp; in R&D matters, 
there was the London and Paris camp. France became ITT's main market for tele-
com equipment; it was a lucrative market - called ITT's “golden cage”.99 French 
telecom was dominated by foreign multinationals, particularly ITT. Compagnie 
Generale d’Électricité (CGE) tried to balance this by forging an alliance with Au-
telco. Although the attempt was abortive, it “marked the beginning of the CGE's 
long march against ITT”.100 ITT had to comply with the highly politicised French 
business, which eventually laid the foundation for Alcatel's acquisition of ITT in the 
late 1980s. 
 
The subsidiarisation of the Norwegian telecom industry 
ITT's acquisitions of manufacturing subsidiaries came about as a result of tariffs 
being put on imported products; if ITT wanted access to a market it had to produce 
in the host countries. LME followed the same path, and bought manufacturing sub-
sidiaries to accommodate to the prevailing protectionism in the host countries.101 
This was the background for ITT and LME's investments in Norway around 1930; 
LME became the largest owner of EB in 1928. STK was a product of a merger be-
tween Standard Electric A/S and Skandinaviske Kabel- og Gummifabrikker (SKG). 
Standard Electric was IWEC's former subsidiary in Norway, and its telecom busi-
ness had been established when Telegrafverket ordered Rotary switches for Oslo's 
network.  
 
STK had no Norwegian precursor in the telecom business, hence the founding of 
Western Electric’s Norwegian subsidiary, and in 1934 STK augmented the Norwe-
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gian telecom industry. LME's acquisition of EB, however, meant that the only nota-
ble Norwegian equipment supplier came under foreign control. Hence, an important 
question is why the Norwegian telecom industry, represented by EB, deteriorated, 
when the Swedish company Ericsson flourished. There are several causes to take 
into account. First, LME started to export earlier than EB, so LME was entrenched 
in large markets when the market for telecom equipment became segmented. EB 
was a latecomer and focussed on smaller countries and companies, and was not able 
to compete for large contracts with PTOs.  
 
The main reason, however, is that EB did not manage the technological transition 
from manual to automatic switches. It developed a small automatic switch, but it 
was not suited for more than 250 lines. There were few operators wanting to auto-
mate such small networks, so EB only sold 47 of these switches.102 LME, on the 
other hand, developed an automatic switch, the 500-point system that became a 
commercial success. It was used worldwide, and in many Norwegian cities, among 
the first to order were Hamar and Kristiansund in 1920.103 Moreover, LME had an 
innovative culture, which was based on the engineering tradition of Lars Magnus 
Ericsson's workshop.  
 
Another vital reason was that LME engaged in a fruitful relationship with the pri-
vate operators in Sweden, and later with the Swedish PTO. LME's production of the 
500-point switch came about as a result of a selection process by the Swedish PTO 
in the 1920s. The Swedish PTO manufactured switches itself, which enhanced its 
competence, and thus contributed to the fruitful relationship with LME.104 This gave 
LME valuable input and stability to engage in technological development, and this 
was particularly the case for the development of switches. EB's relation to Christi-
ania Telefonforening and Telegrafverket, however, was purely mercantile.  
 
The government and Telegrafverket were not very concerned with securing a Nor-
wegian telecom industry; this became apparent through the tariff policy on telecom 
equipment. There was practically no tariff on imported equipment from 1920, in 
contrast to for example Sweden, and EB's persistent demands for raising the tariffs 
were not heeded. As the cabinet stated, it was “rejected because these products 
ought to be «as cheap as possible» in consideration of «our nation’s communication 
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system»”.105 The toll and procurement policy towards the telecom industry had to 
balance Telegrafverket's need for high quality and low cost equipment, against the 
wellbeing of the Norwegian industry. Hence, Telegrafverket, like other PTOs, had a 
double agenda, being both a service provider and an industry “provider”. This char-
acterised the PTOs' policy and relation to the telecom industry throughout the 20th 
century, and Telegrafverket's line of policy did not serve EB's chances well.  
 
There is no saying that the Norwegian telecom industry, represented by EB, would 
have developed into a potent equipment supplier, had it benefited from higher tariff 
protection or a favourable procurement policy from Telegrafverket. On the other 
hand, there is little reason to believe that the government or Telegrafverket consid-
ered EB's prospects carefully. It seems as if the competitive approach was preferred 
on principle and for short-sighted financial reasons. A competitive approach, how-
ever, with low tariffs and an arm’s-length relationship with the suppliers is not one-
dimensional. It could either be underpinned by a competent procurer, which took 
advantage of its monopsonic position and played off the suppliers against each 
other, or, it could be an isolated procurer, with meagre competence, left to deal with 
powerful MNCs. 
 
The years after the First World War were a struggle for survival for EB, which dur-
ing these years was headed by Jens Bache-Wiig. He became a central actor in ITT 
and the Norwegian telecom industry for half a century. He had an engineering de-
gree from Karlsruhe in 1902, and worked in Germany for a few years, before he 
moved to the USA and served as a leading manager for Westinghouse in Pittsburgh. 
He returned to Norway and became Professor at the Norwegian Institute of Tech-
nology (NTH*), at the age of 30, in 1910. He left his chair in Trondheim in 1916, to 
become managing director of Elektrisk Bureau. EB started to manufacture home 
appliances: iron sets, ovens and broadcasting receivers. While telecom equipment 
had represented two-thirds of the sales in 1920, this was reduced to one third in the 
late 1920s.106 Bache-Wiig's strategy was presumably based on his experiences from 
Westinghouse. It became a financial burden, however, when the economic crisis 
came; the export markets were nearly blocked, due to the emergent protectionism in 
the late 1920s and Telegrafverket reduced its orders of telecom equipment.107 
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Bache-Wiig reasoned that if it was to stand a chance in the telecom industry, EB 
needed to link up with one of the major companies. He engaged in negotiations with 
Western Electric Norway in 1925 about a merger and/or EB installing Rotary 
switches in Norway on behalf of IWEC/ITT. These negotiations stranded when 
Bache-Wiig resigned after EB's annual meeting in 1926, due to a conflict with the 
company's shareholders.108 In March 1926, a few months after Western Electric 
Norway turned into Standard Electric A/S following ITT's acquisition of IWEC, 
Bache-Wiig was asked to be managing director of ITT's Norwegian subsidiary.109  
 
Western Electric Norsk Aktieselskab was registered in Oslo in April 1920. This was 
a result of Telegrafverket’s decision to automate the Oslo network with Western 
Electric's Rotary switches. The director was Einar A. Brofos, who had also func-
tioned as Western Electric's sales agent in Scandinavia since 1910.110 IWEC's main 
business in Scandinavia was “Pupinised” cables. Brofos's biggest effort was the 
delivery of a cable between Stockholm and Gothenburg, which was the first Euro-
pean long-distance cable with Pupin spools.111 Michael Pupin, a professor in electri-
cal engineering at Columbia University, “had envisioned the loading coil, a method 
of amplifying the voice by long-distance telephone”.112 AT&T bought his patent in 
1900, and it “became the single most important telephone-related invention between 
1876 and 1913”.113 On the basis of this patent, Brofos laid the foundation for ITT's 
business and subsidiaries in Scandinavia.  
 
Brofos asked Bache-Wiig to take over Standard Electric A/S, and he started his 
tenure on 1 May 1926.114 In 1927, Bache-Wiig contacted Skandinaviske Kabel- og 
Gummifabrikker (SKG), and asked the company to produce cables based on West-
ern Electric's patents, so Standard Electric A/S could avoid tariffs on imported ca-
bles. The first round of meetings did not lead to anything, partly because the gov-
ernment removed the tariff on such cables. In 1928, it was SKG that initiated new 
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meetings, as the company was in financial trouble and wanted to produce Pupinised 
cables.115 
 
SKG was founded by the Hanover company Hackethal Draht und Kabelwerke and 
Norwegian investors in 1915. One of the Norwegian investors, Johs G. Heftye, was 
the brother of Telegrafverket's Director General, Thomas T. Heftye (1905-1921).116 
The company was to produce cables, lines and similar products, to supply the con-
struction of telecom and electricity networks. From the late 19th century, the produc-
tion and use of hydroelectric power grew rapidly in Norway. This paved the way for 
several new industries, including equipment suppliers for carrying the electricity, 
such as cable companies. In 1915 Thomas Heftye presented ambitious plans for 
expanding and modernising the national telecom network, which probably induced 
his brother to get into the cable business. SKG was in many ways an affiliate of the 
German company, importing machines and licensing technology from it.117 It ex-
perienced severe technological problems and tough competition in the cable market. 
Thus, while SKG was founded on an economic boom, it was hit heavily by the eco-
nomic decline in the 1920s. The share capital was nullified in 1927, and its main 
bank and creditor - Den norske Creditbank (DnC) - became the owner of 99 per cent 
of the share capital.118  
 
The negotiations for a license agreement between SKG and Standard Electric A/S 
developed into a question of a merger, and Brofos and Bache-Wiig negotiated with 
a representative from DnC. The interest from Standard Electric A/S was fuelled by a 
new “national cable plan” that Telegrafverket's Sivert R. Abild was working on 
during these years. This was a plan for erecting a network of long-distance tele-
phone cables in Norway.119 Standard Electric took over DnC’s interest in SKG in 
1930, but the two companies did not merge formally until 1 January 1934, under the 
name Standard Telefon og Kabelfabrikk A/S (STK). By this time, Bache-Wiig had 
been sent to manage ITT's German subsidiaries, and Paul Hallgren was picked from 
a high position in the Swedish PTO, presumably to help ITT obtain better access to 
the Swedish market. ITT held 75 per cent of the shares, and another Norwegian 
bank, Christiania Bank og Creditkasse (Kreditkassen), held the rest, which were 
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preference shares. This split was only window-dressing to attain concessions from 
the Norwegian government.120 
 
EB was practically bankrupt when LME bought 75 per cent of the shares in 1928, a 
holding that was reduced to 40 per cent after negotiations with the Norwegian gov-
ernment.121 In 1931, EB bought a majority stake in Norsk Kabelfabrikk, a cable 
company situated in Drammen.122 Thus, STK and EB offered a fairly similar prod-
uct range and faced similar business conditions. This did not, however, result in 
competition between the companies. 
 
Cartelisation and oligopolisation 
In 1934, ITT/STK and LME/EB entered the Lillehammer Agreement, a cartel agree-
ment that divided the Norwegian market between the companies. It was one of 
several more or less formalised cartel understandings that were negotiated during 
these years. There had been several attempts to reach market arrangements on an 
international level between the major companies in the telecom industry, but with no 
success. Nevertheless, the Lillehammer Agreement was a result of attempts to re-
structure the industry on an international level. Our main query, however, is why 
Telegrafverket accepted this formalised oligopoly, while it had, in theory, a power-
ful position. It is important to note that Telegrafverket did not have a monopoly in 
the 1930s and, hence, was not a monopsonist in the market for telecom equipment 
either. In 1934, 253 private telephone companies held 80,000 of the 200,000 tele-
phone subscribers in Norway.123 Nevertheless, there was a clear ambition to extend 
Telegrafverket's position into a monopoly, and it was regarded as only a matter of 
time before it would take over the private companies. 
 
Following the advent of automatic switching and the emergence of PTOs, there 
were attempts to divide the market between the world’s major equipment suppliers. 
In 1921, in the midst of the post-war depression, Western Electric, LME, Siemens 
and Autelco met in Amsterdam in an attempt to reduce competition.124 The Amster-
dam meeting caused much bitterness among the players and led to them “crossing 
swords in the world market”.125 The abortive effort induced AT&T’s divesture of 
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IWEC. ITT's new and assertive position halted any further consultations on the 
issue. An arrangement endorsed by the British PTO was reached for the UK in 
1924. The British market was divided among the major actors, all producing the 
British version of the Strowger System.126 A not too dissimilar agreement was 
reached in Germany, although Siemens held a dominant position as it developed the 
switches. The Reichpost did not want to be dependent on a single supplier, however, 
and “pressured Siemens to license its technology” to other companies.127 Siemens 
held 40 per cent of the market, ITT's subsidiary, SEL, had 30 per cent, and two 
other companies, puppets of Siemens, held the rest.128 The British and German solu-
tion tried to combine the rationality of a single switching system for the whole coun-
try, with competition between suppliers.  
 
The solution for Norway was formed by the fate of the Swedish ”Match King”, Ivar 
Kreuger, who had acquired a majority stake in LME in 1930.129 The telecom busi-
ness had many similarities with the match business; it was a matter of gaining con-
cessions and footholds in overseas markets and was thus a highly politicised busi-
ness, with big opportunities for businessmen like Kreuger and Behn, who thrived on 
the borderline of business and politics. In the subsequent years, Kreuger tried to cut 
a deal with Behn and ITT, proposing either dividing the markets or selling LME to 
ITT. Swedish corporate law, with its prohibition of any foreign interest controlling 
more than 20 per cent of the shares in a company, halted Kreuger’s attempts to sell 
LME. However, in desperate need of cash for his falling empire, Kreuger mortgaged 
his majority stake in LME to ITT, enabling him to borrow $11 million from Behn's 
company in 1931.130 Kreuger's bankruptcy and suicide in March 1932 left ITT and 
LME in a deep financial chaos that took years to resolve. 
 
It was the Wallenberg family and their bank, the Stockholm Enskilda Bank, as more 
than once in Swedish business history, that saved LME from bankruptcy.131 Wallen-
berg succeeded in holding the New York banks and Sosthenes Behn at bay, when 
the Americans demanded that LME should limit itself to the Scandinavian market. 
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Wallenberg insisted on keeping LME as an independent Swedish concern with ac-
cess to a worldwide market. Even though market access in general was excluded 
from the agreement, it included settlements on market issues in Argentina and Mex-
ico, and a clause on the two companies’ sale of automatic switches in Norway and 
Denmark.132  
 
Thus, the STK-EB market agreement in Norway was forced upon the Norwegian 
telecom sector. This is not to say that such an agreement was not welcomed by 
Telegrafverket and the other stakeholders. The multinationals were accused of 
dumping the prices for automatic switches in the first bids in order to obtain a mo-
nopoly position. When International Western Electric won the contract in Oslo and 
Bergen, it was accused of dumping.133 This was to a certain extent confirmed, in that 
Western Electric Norge, and later STK, lost several millions on the contract,134 but 
STK secured its position for supplying the Oslo network for decades to come. STK 
and EB engaged in price wars for the delivery of automatic switches to the Norwe-
gian market after LME took over EB in 1928.135 Telegrafverket and the government 
did not, according to Harald Espeli, consider exploiting the buyers' market.136 Still, 
one might argue that it had done so while procuring Rotary switches for Oslo from 
Norsk Western Electric in 1916. 
 
EB tried to augment its position by claiming it was more of a Norwegian company 
than STK. In a meeting with the head of Telegrafverket and the minister of com-
merce, EB's union insisted that the remains of the contract for automating the Oslo 
network should be taken over by EB, at the cost of Standard Electric.137 In order to 
secure Norwegian employment and the Norwegian telecom industry, EB also de-
manded that it be granted contracts for automating the cities of Trondheim and 
Drammen.138 Standard Electric was consequently portrayed as the “Foreign Trust”, 
which was not a compliment in these years. EB’s union accused it of dumping: 
“Thanks to the trust’s ruthless competition, a company that employs 600-700 com-
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petent blue and white collar workers is threatened by partial or total termination due 
to lack of orders”.139 
 
Moreover, EB claimed that their automatic switches were far better and more eco-
nomical than Standard Electric’s. There is no sign of superiority of LME's 500-point 
switch over ITT's Rotary in any other sources, however; thus the union's description 
and characterisation of Standard Electric must be seen in perspective of the worker's 
interest. But EB held a strong card in that LME's switch was produced in Norway. 
Standard’s lack of national manufacturing facilities was serious in these years of 
unemployment. The Norwegian subsidiary was aware of the sensitive issue and 
asked ITT for permission and funds to invest in a telephone factory.140 The Rotary 
switches installed in the 1920s were imported from BTM. The problem for ITT was 
that BTM also felt the economic crisis and the prevailing protectionism in Europe, 
and had already laid off several thousand workers, and still had over-capacity in its 
plant.141 However, STK was not left with much of a choice, and in 1933 the com-
pany started minor assembly and installation of the Rotary Switches in SKG’s cable 
factory.  
 
In the same year, representatives from Standard Electric/STK and LME/EB met in 
Lillehammer to negotiate a cartel agreement for telecom equipment in Norway. 
Standard Electric’s Brofos and Hallgren met the managing directors of EB and 
LME, Albert Kvaal and Hans Theobald Holm respectively.142 As mentioned above, 
it was a part of ITT and LME's settlement after the Kreuger crash, but it was also a 
response to the ongoing price war between STK and EB. The agreement’s opening 
statement was that since Telegrafverket and the private operators wanted national 
manufacturing of telecom equipment, an agreement was necessary, as “Standard and 
E.B. understand that there is not enough of such business in Norway for two na-
tional telephone factories to operate on an economical basis”.143  
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STK was granted the largest cities in Norway, Oslo, Bergen, Ålesund and Dram-
men, as well as large parts of the counties of Akershus and Vestfold, while it gave 
LME/EB the rest of the country. In general, this meant that ITT and LME kept their 
former geographical areas. Even though the agreement looked favourable to EB, it 
benefited STK, which by the early 1960s had over two-thirds of the Norwegian 
switching market.144 The parties negotiated a similar agreement for the cable market 
in 1939. Both of these contracts stipulated that the market share should have been 
50-50. If one party got more than the other, it was to pay 10 percent of the sale that 
exceeded 50% to the other party.145 Such an “excess fee” was paid in the 1930s, but 
we do not know when this practice ended. The geographical division, however, was 
in accordance with ITT and LME’s specialities: ITT focused on urban switches, 
while LME, serving the relatively scattered Swedish population, had a competitive 
edge in rural switches.146 Thus, STK and EB operated in different markets, with 
different products and with different technologies. In effect, there was not an oli-
gopoly but two monopolies, or a duopoly, in the Norwegian market for telecom 
equipment. 
 
“The «secret» agreement was soon known and accepted by Televerket”, according 
to Christian Westring, former director of LME and EB, who worked in Tele-
grafverket in the 1940s and 1950s.147 But, Telegrafverket retained its arm’s-length 
relationship with the suppliers after the Lillehammer agreement. This combination - 
of a purely market relationship with the suppliers and no competition - is probably 
the worst buyer-supplier relationship a procurer in general, or a PTO in particular, 
can engage in. Telegrafverket was neither able to achieve fair prices due to competi-
tion, nor to reap the benefits of knowledge transfer, innovation through user-
producer relations, or the trust that can be derived from a closer relationship. We 
need to ask why Telegrafverket accepted these conditions.  
 
Oligopolic deadlock 
There is little empirical evidence on how Telegrafverket and the government con-
sidered the agreement. In fact, we do not know when and how Telegrafverket 
learned about the treaty. Such agreements had to be reported to the “trust control” 
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marketing director in the 1970s. 
147 BGA: Christian Westring 27.10.86, “Markedsutviklingen for offentlige telefonsentraler i 
Norge - historikk” (Den “hemmelige” avtalen ble snart kjent og akseptert av Televerket). 
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according to the “Trust Law”, but there is no evidence that the parties did this.148 
Nevertheless, it seems as if Telegrafverket accepted the oligopoly when it rejected 
an offer from Siemens on automatic switches for the city of Drammen.149 There is 
little empirical evidence on the matter in the archives. Thus, we have to come to 
grips with this issue with the modest sources available and theoretical reflections. In 
the answer to this question, why Telegrafverket accepted and/or preferred the Lille-
hammer agreement, and hence manufacturing subsidiaries as suppliers, lies nothing 
less than STK's reasons for existence, and its room for strategic manoeuvring.  
 
There were three alternative ways for PTOs to organise their supply of telecom 
equipment. First, it could be supplied by a national-owned industry that developed 
its own equipment. This was the case in very few countries in the early years of 
telecom: mainly the USA, Sweden and Germany. Hence, the PTOs could not choose 
this variant in a straightforward way, since it depended on the industry and com-
pany's ability to succeed on the export market. Export was crucial in order to spread 
the R&D costs on a large sale, and the Norwegian market was far too small to sup-
port a first-class equipment supplier. Thus, the ambitions for a Norwegian “plant for 
radio-, telephone- and telegraph sets”, proposed in the “Three year plan” in 1933 - a 
pamphlet inspired by the Soviet Five-Year Plans in the interwar years, required 
considerable exports to be realistic.150  
 
EB was the only potential national supplier, but this possibility was ruled out, as the 
company did not survive the combination of the post-war depression and the techno-
logical shift to automatic switches. Nevertheless, EB still considered itself as the 
obvious alternative for supplying the Norwegian network, regardless of its subordi-
nation to LME. It presented itself as a full-blooded Norwegian company, as if 
LME's ownership did not matter. Telegrafverket's Director General Tore Olaus 
Engset saw this differently. He refused to give EB a national monopoly for telecom 
equipment, as he “thought it economically unwarrantable to encourage a large in-
dustry in this country, which had no chance of exports, and for which the home 
market was too small”.151 Hence, since EB was excluded from the export market, it 
did not need a protected home market, he reasoned. It seems as if Engset preferred 
competition, but the Lillehammer agreement did not give him that. 
                                                          
148 Espeli 2005, p. 204. 
149 Espeli 2005, p. 544. 
150 Ole Colbjørnsen and Axel Sømme: En norsk 3-årsplan, 1933, p. 70, here after Espeli 
2005, p. 205. 
151 Arbeiderbladet 31.03.1933, (fant det nasjonaløkonomisk uforsvarlig å opelske en stor 
industri her i landet som ingen eksportmuligheter hadde, og for hvem det innenlandske mar-
kedet var for lite.” in “Telegrafdirektøren og den udenlandske trustkapital). 
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There were two other options left, importing equipment from a foreign supplier or 
procuring equipment from manufacturing subsidiaries. The first alternative was the 
case in Denmark and Finland, which was related to the lack of a PTO with a mo-
nopoly. One consequence of the regional telecom systems in Denmark and Finland 
was that the regional operators were more dedicated to their role as service provid-
ers than as industry providers. The third option, supply from manufacturing subsidi-
aries, was a natural outcome for Norway, as this was the rule in the rest of Europe. 
The establishment of such subsidiaries came about as a result of tariffs on imported 
equipment. There were different reasons for this choice. The first was the wish for 
self-containment, which was fuelled by the protectionism that prevailed in the 
interwar years.152 Importing equipment from abroad would mean a drain of hard 
currency. There were also ideas of national autarky - self-sufficiency - in these 
years, but such ideas had a radical flavour in a small country like Norway.  
 
Another reason for domestic manufacturing of equipment was related to the transfer 
of competence and technology. This was crucial for assuring national control over 
the telecom network, which was even more important in the interwar years, when 
international relations were volatile. The chances of being isolated from foreign 
equipment suppliers in the midst of an international crisis were not unlikely. “Ini-
tially, PTT officials saw local manufacturing as a way to decrease the risks of rely-
ing on distant foreign suppliers for maintenance and follow-up contracts.”153 This 
argument was put forward by the British, when they rejected the idea of letting the 
Belgian BTM plant supply them with automatic switches.154 Accordingly, domestic 
control had something to do with the military importance of telecom. In reasoning 
further along the same lines, it is pertinent to recall that telecom was often termed 
the nerve centre of a nation’s communication system, thus being at the “core of 
national autonomy”, which entailed a degree of national technological control. This 
“ensured its exclusion from the competition rules in the Treaty of Rome” after the 
Second World War.155 
 
One issue was technological control and competence, regarding the telecom net-
work, and another was to lay the foundations for a technical industry in general. In 
this sense it was important to reap the benefits of producing one’s own telecom 
                                                          
152 The newspaper debate between EB's union and Telegrafverket's Engset shows that this 
was important. “Telegrafdirektøren og den udenlandske trustkapital” in Arbeiderbladet 31.03; 
03.04; 10.04; 29.04 and 10.05.1933. 
153 Doz 1987, p. 94. 
154 Young 1983, p. 38. 
155 Eliassen et al. 1999, p. 24. 
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equipment, but it was also regarded as valuable to have access to the technology and 
competence within a large MNC, such as ITT and LME. Another element was to 
create and secure jobs, which was crucial in the 1930s with high unemployment. 
The newspaper debate between EB's union and Telegrafverket's Engset demon-
strates this.156 Still, although this explains mainly why Telegrafverket opted for 
manufacturing subsidiaries, instead of importing the material, but why did Tele-
grafverket accept the cartel agreement? Firstly, Engset was explicit that he did not 
want a monopoly, and maybe thought an oligopoly would benefit Telegrafverket in 
terms of comparing prices. An important aspect related to employment is that the 
industry and the workforce were vulnerable to fluctuations in Telegrafverket's pro-
curement of telecom equipment. The agreement provided some stability for the 
manufacturers and installers from STK and EB. Moreover, the need for creating 
stable employment dominated the economic and industrial debate in the early 1930s.  
 
Moreover, ‘cartel’ and market regulation did not have those negative connotations 
in the 1930s, as competition was not regarded as entirely positive.157 During the 
early 1930s, for instance, much of the Norwegian agricultural sector was organised 
in co-operatives, and with governmental supported market regulation.158 Competi-
tion was to a large extent seen as a waste of resources, especially when it led to 
ruinous rivalry, which could be the case in industries with high fixed costs. Market 
agreements, on the other hand, were appreciated as a means of organising and ra-
tionalising production. This was also in line with the reasoning behind a state mo-
nopoly of telephony, to achieve common standards and a rational network. Hence, 
plan and organising were seen as values, as opposed to unorganised markets with 
resource-wasting price wars. After the Second World War, STK's and EB’s division 
of the market became an accepted and integral part of the Labour Party's industrial 
plan economy. 
 
An important aspect is that if Telegrafverket should have exploited its monopsonic 
position, it could have done so only with sufficient competence and knowledge of 
the technology and prices in the telecom industry. Moreover, the Norwegian market 
was so small, which left Telegrafverket with little bargaining power in relation to 
the MNCs. Thus, Telegrafverket would probably have ended up as an isolated pro-
curer, with meagre competence, left to deal with powerful MNCs, with or without 
                                                          
156 “Telegrafdirektøren og den udenlandske trustkapital” in Arbeiderbladet 31.03; 03.04; 
10.04; 29.04 and 10.05.1933. 
157 Øyvind Tønnesson: “Fra selvstendighetslinje til forpliktende internasjonalt kartellsamar-
beid - Norsk Hydros posisjon i verdens nitrogenindustri i mellomkrigstiden”, 1997. 
158 Harald Espeli: ”En reguleringshistorisk skisse av jordbrukssektoren: 1970-2000”, 2002, p. 39. 
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the Lillehammer agreement. Finally it was the question of technological compatibil-
ity. Engset and the director of the Oslo network refused to procure equipment from 
EB for the Oslo network, because Standard Electric had started the installation. “For 
technical, practical and economical reasons, one was tied” to the already installed 
system from Standard Electric.159 It was difficult for technological reasons, but also 
Telegrafverket's installers had to be updated on both technologies. This argument 
held sway until the digitalisation of the 1980s. 
 
A five fingered oligopolic grip 
An important part of the reason why Norway does not have vigorous telecom today 
lies in the interwar period, as automatisation and oligopolisation created very high 
barriers of entry into the industry. Thus, the window of opportunity for creating an 
independent telecom industry was closed for the next 40-50 years. It was in this 
formative period of monopolisation and oligopolisation that the multinational tele-
com companies ITT, LME and Siemens established firm grips on their markets. The 
introduction of automatic switches, with high development costs, contributed to the 
segmentation of the industry. The Norwegian telecom industry, represented by EB, 
did not manage this transition. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explain why 
EB did not succeed in this, but some factors are worth bearing in mind. First, Espeli 
has showed that EB received little support from the government in terms of tariff 
protection, or from Telegrafverket or the private operators through a national pro-
curement policy. There is little probability that EB would have developed into a 
telecom multinational at any rate, but without such a support it was impossible. The 
Norwegian market for telecom equipment was probably too small to foster a multi-
national in telecom, even if Ericsson's success demonstrates that this was not an 
absolute obstacle. 
 
As to Ericsson, it is essential to recall that Sweden was a remarkable exception, in 
being a small country with many MNCs. A key reason for this development was the 
bank-oriented capitalism, and the banks’ role during the economic crisis in the 
1920s. The Wallenberg bank, the Stockholm Enskilda Bank, as well as Den Svenska 
Handelsbanken, bought insolvent companies, so the companies survived the finan-
cial crisis that knocked out their owners and entrepreneurs.160 As a result, Swedish 
                                                          
159 Arbeiderbladet 03.04.1933. (Med hensyn til Oslo telefonanlegg centralstasjonssystem 
uttalte telegrafdirektøren i tilslutning til Oslo telefonanleggs direktør at man ved telefonan-
leggets centralstasjoner av tekniske, praktiske og økonomiske grunner er bundet til det ved 
anleggets ombygging innførte Standard Electric’s system.” in “Telegrafdirektøren og den 
udenlandske trustkapital). 
160 David and Mach 2002; Christensen 2003, p. 76. 
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industry was consolidated and strengthened through this crisis. In Norway, on the 
other hand, the crisis in the 1920s led to a massive inflow of foreign investment, 
through foreign acquisitions of Norwegian companies.161 In the wake of this, both 
EB and SKG were sold to LME and ITT. Hence, the subsidiarisation of the Norwe-
gian telecom industry in the 1930s was in line with the general development of 
Norwegian industry at the time. What is more, it was in line with the international 
trend in telecom.  
 
Even in large countries like France and Britain, the telecom industry became domi-
nated by foreign subsidiaries in the interwar period. A special relationship devel-
oped between the subsidiaries and the PTOs and other governmental bodies in the 
host nations, which Yves Doz has termed «negotiated environments».162 Different 
actors had more or less effective bargaining cards at hand. An aspect of this was that 
the telecom industry was able to attain favourable prices for its telecom equip-
ment.163 An important question is how the industry could establish an oligopoly, 
when the PTOs had such strong procurement power. One might say that the telecom 
industry in Norway, and elsewhere, held a five-fingered oligopolic grip over the 
PTOs. Most of these factors were apparent when Telegrafverket accepted the Lille-
hammer agreement. The two first fingers were related to path dependency.  
 
The first factor was the lack of standardised technological interfaces, so that differ-
ent kinds of equipment could interact in good manner. Automatic switches, for in-
stance, operated with different signalling systems, which could not communicate 
with other switches in a straightforward way. Interaction was not impossible; one 
could for instance ‘translate’ the signals, but this was expensive. The PTOs were 
caught in technological path dependencies, as new equipment had to be accommo-
dated to the incumbent equipment it was to interact with. Moreover, it would be 
expensive for Telegrafverket to install equipment from both STK and EB in the 
same district, since it would need more personnel, able to operate both systems. The 
second aspect was that Telegrafverket was dependent on STK and EB for repairing, 
maintaining and upgrading the switches in the network. As the PTO acquired 
equipment from a supplier, it was dependent on its assistance for maintenance, so it 
could not undertake a one-off procurement from a company that did not have manu-
facturing subsidiaries in Norway.  
 
                                                          
161 Fritz Hodne: Norges økonomiske historie 1815-1970, 1981, p. 477; Christensen 2003, p. 
76. 
162 Doz 1979, p. 67-68. 
163 This is documented in several sources: Noam (1992) give a good account of this. 
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The third factor relates to Telegrafverket’s lack of competence. It was not able to be 
a proficient procurer and exploit its monopsonic position, as it lacked oversight and 
control over the network and the development of new generations of equipment in 
the industry. The two final factors, which called for a national procurement policy, 
relate to the PTO’s stakeholder responsibilities. The fourth factor was the interests 
of the workers in the telecom industry. Each time Telegrafverket reduced its equip-
ment orders, STK and EB played the employment card, showing a great deal of 
concern for their workers. In this relation, the industry had important allies in the 
labour unions. The fifth factor was Telegrafverket's responsibility as an industry 
provider, which ought to be separated from the employment issue. The PTO was 
expected to contribute to industrial development and innovation within a national 
context. This was a main argument for demanding national manufacturing of tele-
com equipment. STK and EB became two of the largest high-tech companies in 
Norway, but at the same time they were subsidiaries of foreign multinationals. 
 
To summarise, ITT/STK and LME/EB's oligopolic grip consisted of these five fin-
gers: 
 
1. Lack of technological interfaces 
2. Televerket's dependence on the industry for maintenance of old 
equipment 
3. Televerket's lack of knowledge and competence in general 
4. Televerket's employment responsibilities 
5. Televerket's responsibility as an industry provider 
 
The rest of the thesis can, among other things, be read as a tale of how the strength 
in each of these fingers varied over time, according to the technological, institu-
tional and political developments. This is not to say that other things did not have an 
effect on the Norwegian telecom industry. One major factor was ITT's special trait 
as a freestanding company, which will be demonstrated in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 2 Lonely riders 
Introduction 
In 1952, Telegrafverket installed a modern electro-mechanical crossbar switch at 
Ski outside Oslo. It was ordered from STK/BTM, and Norway was to be the first 
country to use the switch. The event was celebrated with extensive media coverage: 
one newspaper described the switch as “a mixture of a radar and electronic com-
puters!”1 STK and Telegrafverket were to gain first-mover advantages in switching, 
by manufacturing and using the most modern telecom switch in the world. Later 
versions of the switch was named the 8B, the name, however, came to be synony-
mous with trouble for Telegrafverket, as Norway became the only user of the 
switch, and it incurred heavy costs, technologically and financially. The 8B situation 
shaped Telegrafverket's relationship with STK for decades. Moreover, it had a deci-
sive impact on Telegrafverket's technological strategy in the 1970s. That is why this 
chapter seeks to explain how STK and Telegrafverket ended up as a lonely rider 
with the 8B switch. 
 
This chapter covers STK’s history during the 1940s and 1950s. In hindsight, this 
phase seems relatively stable in international telecom: the technological and institu-
tional setting was fairly stable.2 Nevertheless, the 1950s had a decisive impact on 
later developments in the Norwegian telecom industry. Firstly, this was because 
STK and BTM were able to persuade Telegrafverket to be the first to install the 8B. 
This stands in an interesting contrast to the second important theme: that Tele-
grafverket refused to procure advanced radiolink equipment, i.e. for wireless trans-
mission, from Nera, a Norwegian company. This is the most hotly debated issue in 
the history of Norwegian telecom.3  
 
Many claim that Telegrafverket’s rejection of Nera’s radiolink equipment is the 
prime example of the PTO’s technological backwardness at the time. Telegrafverket 
“had no vision for the technological development that took place”, says Randi 
Søgnen.4 It did not “take any initiative to find its place in the new technical envi-
                                                          
1 Mo 2001, p. 5. 
2 Although the transistor was invented in 1947, it did not have a transformative impact on 
telecom before the 1960s. 
3 The bulk of the historical literature on Telecom, Telegrafverket, and R&D in the Norwegian 
ICT industry highlights the radiolink issue. Collett and Lossius 1993, p. 17; Njølstad and 
Wicken 1997, p. 65; Jensen 1989, p. 97 f.; Lossius 1991, p. 34; Oland 1993, p. 17; Søgnen 
1984 and 1985. 
4 Randi Søgnen: Offentlege innkjøp som industripolitikk - telekommunikasjonssektoren, 1984, p. 
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ronment”, and opposed “impulses and pressure from the industry and R&D estab-
lishment”.5 Moreover, Telegrafverket was accused of not assuming a role as an 
industry provider, as other PTOs did, i.e. it did not help Norwegian industry through 
its procurement policy.6 The two issues, the 8B and radiolink, will be analysed in 
view of how the oligopolic grip affected Telegrafverket’s decision in each case. 
 
In being the first subsidiary to install the 8B, STK hoped to attain a mandatory posi-
tion within ITT. Instead, STK and Telegrafverket became victims of ITT's lack of 
operating headquarters and a home market in telecom. This led to a competition 
between BTM and the French subsidiary, CGCT*, over which crossbar switch ITT 
should market. BTM was outmanoeuvred by the French, who once again proved 
their dominance in ITT. The chapter examines the bizarre competition within ITT. 
When ITT's New York head office was not able to halt the internal competition, it 
was because it was preoccupied with domestic US problems. A consequence was 
more freedom for the European subsidiaries, which gave ITT an almost confederate 
structure, which the French were able to exploit to their own advantage. 
 
A final subject in this chapter is that Norway lost its position as a leading telecom 
nation during these years, because the investments in telecom were very low in the 
1950s. Telegrafverket's main argument for not installing Nera’s equipment was that 
it lacked resources to assist the Norwegian telecom industry in product develop-
ment, the reason being that the Labour government did not prioritise telecom in its 
economic plan, which was geared towards energy-intensive industrialisation. This 
was decisive for the relationship between STK and Telegrafverket, which is why 
this chapter also includes a political level in the analysis. The quality of the network 
deteriorated, while the “telephone queues”, i.e. of people waiting for having a tele-
phone installed, grew. The chapter suggests why the Labour government was so 
negligent towards telecom. Even so, in the early post-war years, the government did 
consider turning STK into a «national champion», by acquiring a share of the own-
ership, as it had done with other companies.  
 
STK's telecom business from 1933 to 1960 
Standard Electric began the minor assembly of telecom equipment in SKG’s cable 
plant in 1933. The year after, STK rented a location at one of the switching stations 
in Oslo, Fagerborg, which was suited for training personnel. In 1935, the telecom 
                                                          
5 Søgnen 1984, p. 40. 
6 “Foreign suppliers were chosen even in areas where Norwegian companies could deliver the 
equipment.” Søgnen 1985, p. 130. 
* Compagnie Générale de Constructions Téléphoniques. 
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staff moved to Økern, STK's main industrial site, with 16 people working at the 
plant. As mentioned above, about 20 Norwegian engineers went to work for other 
ITT companies in the 1920s. Among them was Sverre Ramstad, who later came to 
be in charge of STK's telecom business; he was trained at BTM before he went to 
Seville and Madrid in the late 1920s. As a result of the economic crisis, however, 
several of these engineers returned to Norway in the 1930s. The home-comers sup-
plied STK with valuable competence in the telecom field. STK's manufacturing 
increased throughout the 1930s, and in 1937, there were 90 employees in STK’s 
telephone factory.7 
 
The Oslo network was automated with Rotary switches, which led to an increase in 
the number of subscribers from 30,000 in 1926 to 56,400 in 1939.8 The project was 
a success for Telegrafverket; a substantial share of the errors in the network was 
rectified, and the workforce in the Oslo District was reduced from 1200 to fewer 
than 600 between 1920 and 1940.9 The automation and modernisation of the tele-
com network helped Norway sustain its high telephone density; with 250,000 tele-
phones in 1940, Norway was in eighth place in the world, in terms of telephones per 
capita.10 It seems that Telegrafverket was satisfied with STK's role as a supplier.11 
This is no surprise, given that STK had several experts on Rotary, with experience 
of installing the switch in Europe. STK supplied more Rotary switches, in accor-
dance with the Lillehammer agreement, to the rest of the Oslo-fjord area, and to 
Ålesund and Bergen, increasing its switching sales tenfold between 1933 and 
1938.12 These installations entailed increased sales of transmission equipment and 
related products. Another important area for STK was the sale of radio equipment; 
thus the delivery of switches accounted for only 30% of the telecom business in the 
1930s.13  
 
Nevertheless, STK was mainly a cable manufacturer; the sale of switches accounted 
for only 15% of STK's turnover in the late 1930s.14 The share of telecom and cables 
was fairly stable during this decade, and telephone, telegraph and radio equipment 
                                                          
7 Wasberg 1965, p. 92. 
8 Rafto 1955, p. 485. 
9 Annual errors per line were reduced from 5.2 in 1921 to 0.6 in 1940, Rafto 1955, p. 485. 
10 Rafto 1955, p. 562. 
11 This is the general impression of Thorolf Rafto's account of these years. 
12 From NOK 216,658 in 1933 to NOK 2,826,980 in 1938. STK's Annual Reports from 1934-
1938. 
13 STK's Annual Reports from 1934-1938. 
14 According to STK's annual report, all of Telegrafverket's procurement of long-line cables 
was from STK; moreover, 60% of Pupinised cables came from STK. 
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accounted for around 45% of the total sales in these years.15 The supply of lines and 
cables, on the other hand, constituted about 55% of the turnover. Thus, according to 
these numbers, STK was more of a cable company than a telecom company. How-
ever, a large part of STK's sales of lines and cables was for the telecom network, i.e. 
long-line cables and subscriber cables. Thus, if one adds the sale of telephone lines 
and cables to that of tele-equipment, the combined total constituted almost 60% of 
STK's revenues.16 Consequently, the cable business dominated in terms of product 
range, while telecom was largest in terms of customers. 
 
Table 2.1: STK's sales, 1933-1938 (NOK) 
0 %
20 %
40 %
60 %
80 %
100 %
Power Cables 2647682 4001113 4769163 5699800 6348180 6586561
Tele-cables 1134721 1790831 1670634 2746478 2181602 1947091
Radio-equipment 1137464 1387111 1110128 1898009 2303194 2014735
Tele-equipment 414 836 1604412 1998363 1133548 2705754 2421595
Switching-equipment 216 658 521 496 1502588 1384882 2155183 2826980
1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
 
Source: Annual reports. 
 
A minor issue worth mentioning concerns the plan to turn STK's into ITT's main 
switching manufacturer in Europe. In 1939, ITT feared that BTM’s plant in Ant-
werp would be damaged by the war and halted by a German occupation, as had 
happened during the First World War. It was not expected that Norway would be 
involved in the war. Thus, ITT “planned to transfer the manufacturing of automatic 
switches from BTM in Antwerp to Oslo”.17 Equipment and machines were sent to 
Oslo, and STK had received approval from the Norwegian authorities to erect a 
                                                          
15 The products were switches, transmission equipment, and other telephone equipment, 
telegraph equipment, and radio equipment. STK's Annual reports from 1934-1938. 
16 This is based on the STK's Annual Reports from 1934-1938. 
17 Wasberg 1965, p. 92-93, ([P]lanlagt å overføre en store del av fabrikasjonen av automatisk 
telefonsentralutstyr fra BTM i Antwerpen til Oslo). 
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large telephone factory.18 Construction was to start in April 1940, but the German 
invasion of Norway in that month put an end to the project. However, the plant at 
Økern was expanded during the war. The civil investments in the network were 
surprisingly high during the occupation, and the number of telephones increased by 
77,000, or 30%, between 1940 and 1945, of which the Germans used only a frac-
tion. Hence, Harald Espeli claims that the occupying authorities gave the civil tele-
com network a higher priority than the post-war Labour government did.19 After the 
war, there was a reshuffling of the industrial sector in Norway, partly due to the 
handling of former German-owned companies, which also affected the telecom 
industry. 
 
State ownership 
In the early post-war years, the Norwegian government increased its ownership in 
the manufacturing industry substantially.20 This was a result of the confiscation of 
German ownership, a more radical and nationalistic sentiment on the part of the 
voters and the Labour government, and the lack of a strong and wealthy bourgeoisie 
that could organise and finance industrial expansion based on hydroelectric power, 
which was capital-intensive.21 The war created an opportunity for restructuring 
Norwegian business and industry, and for reducing foreign ownership and influ-
ence. STK was probably also seen in this light. The Swedish PTO had its own 
equipment plant, and STK's managing director Jens Bache-Wiig feared a similar 
development in Norway, since the activity at Telegrafverket's own workshop had 
increased.22 “It is yet a long way off for the Telegraph Administration to start any 
real production,” reported Bache-Wiig to ITT's New York head office, “but some of 
the men in the Administration are interested in bringing this about, same as it has 
been done in Sweden already”.23 To halt this development, in August 1946 Bache-
Wiig met with the Minister of Industry, Lars Evensen, and invited the government 
to become a shareholder in STK.24 
 
Bache-Wiig and Evensen were acquainted, particularly on issues regarding state 
ownership. Bache-Wiig was elected as Chairman of the Board in Årdal Verk, a 
                                                          
18 Wasberg 1965, p. 69 f. 
19 Espeli 2005, p. 254. 
20 Grønlie 1989. 
21 Christensen 1997. 
22 STKHAT: “P.M. by Jens Bache-Wiig from meeting with minister of industry Lars Evensen 
31.8.46 and 02.10.46”. 
23 STKHAT: “Jens Bache-Wiig to Fred T. Caldwell 02.10.46”. 
24 STKHAT: “P.M. by Bache-Wiig from meeting with minister of industry Lars Evensen 
31.8.46 and 02.10.46”. 
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wholly state-owned aluminium company established in 1946.25 He was also Chair-
man of the Board of Norway’s largest industrial enterprise, Norsk Hydro, a fertiliser 
company in which the state had attained a 44 per cent stake as a result of a post-war 
settlement.26 The ownership model, which combined a dominant state ownership 
with private shareholders, came to be known as the Hydromodel. The name indi-
cates how the government handles the ownership, namely as an ordinary and pas-
sive shareholder, so the company is managed according to principles of free enter-
prise.27 Evensen laid down the principles of a non-interfering ownership very early 
after the war, which might explain why Bache-Wiig did not show a traditional reluc-
tance to a governmental stake in STK.  
 
Bache-Wiig’s strategy was both defensive and offensive. The defensive element 
was pointed out in his report to ITT: he wanted to avoid a situation where “some-
body else starts manufacturing in our line of production”.28 Bache-Wiig was proba-
bly more concerned about losing the market position for cable than that for telecom 
equipment. The offensive dimension was as clear, when Bache-Wiig asserted, “that 
cooperation with the Government will increase our business possibilities”.29 A cru-
cial element of the Hydromodel was the reciprocal relationship between control and 
industrial growth; national and governmental control provided a company with 
political legitimacy, which made it easier for the government to stimulate industrial 
expansion.30 By introducing the state as an owner, Bache-Wiig wanted to lay the 
foundations for a dominant position in the Norwegian market for cable and telecom 
equipment. As Bache-Wiig told ITT, “In case we had the Government as our share-
holder, we may work towards absorbing E.B.s telephone business”.31 
 
The Norwegian cabinet approved Bache-Wiig’s idea, and was ready to take over 
Christiania Bank og Creditkasse’s 25% stake in STK.32 The government’s consent 
                                                          
25 The Germans started to erect an aluminium plant at the head of the Sognefjorden in West-
ern Norway; the government took over what was left behind. 
26 Bache-Wiig's tenure as the chairman of Hydro’s board led to a close cooperation between 
STK and Hydro. See further down. Christensen 1997. 
27 Christensen 2003. 
28 STKHAT: “Jens Bache-Wiig to Fred T. Caldwell 02.10.46”. 
29 STKHAT: “Jens Bache-Wiig to Fred T. Caldwell 02.10.46”. 
30 The same logic applied for most nations; countries operated with some sort of selective 
protectionism to secure national ownership and control in selected companies; such compa-
nies are often called national champions and were given favourable conditions for industrial 
expansion. David and Mach 2002; Christensen 2003. 
31 STKHAT: “Jens Bache-Wiig to Fred T. Caldwell 02.10.46”. 
32 STKHAT: “P.M. by Jens Bache-Wiig from meeting with minister of industry Lars Evensen 
02.10.46”. 
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should be seen in the light of its handling of the former German-owned companies 
in the electro-technical industry, i.e. the Norwegian subsidiaries of Telefunken, 
AEG and Siemens. The former owners of Bergen Telefonkompagni, the private 
operator in Bergen, which Telegrafverket redeemed in 1947, formed a holding com-
pany, Bergen Industri-Investering, which took over the former German subsidiaries. 
However, the government retained a 20% stake in the companies. Most of these 
companies became important players in the electro-technical industry, but one of the 
companies - Nera - was in telecom. It proved to be the only Norwegian-owned 
company in the telecom industry of any significance throughout the 20th century. Its 
competence base had its roots in the Norwegian community in exile in the United 
Kingdom during the war.  
 
Norwegian engineers, who spent the war years in the United Kingdom, returned 
home with technologies, knowledge and aspirations, and had ambitions to create a 
national electronic industry. They were instrumental in establishing the National 
Defence Research Establishment (FFI*) in 1946, which became the central institu-
tion for the «military technicians». The radar technology was essential for the 
founding of FFI, mainly because of its military significance, but also because of its 
anticipated economic value for the Norwegian merchant fleet. It was also the basis 
for radiolink in high frequencies, i.e. broadband wireless transmission.33 Nera’s 
Bergen department was set up when it was granted FFI’s license on radiolink in 
1950.34 It rented a location at FFI’s office, and with several of the employees re-
cruited from FFI. So, Nera-FFI became a development pair. Nera's industrial ambi-
tions to create a large new export industry have been described as “a vision in Kris-
tian Birkeland’s and Sam Eyde’s spirit”.35 A precondition for its success, however, 
was that Telegrafverket supported Nera by procuring the radiolink equipment, but 
Telegrafverket and the government had modest ambitions for the telecom industry 
during these years, which might also explain why the government did not become a 
shareholder in STK. 
 
It took almost a year before Sosthenes Behn and ITT decided to welcome the Nor-
wegian government as a minority owner in STK. Behn’s acceptance was not 
surprising, given his strategy of national responsiveness. At this time, however, in 
                                                          
* Norwegian abbreviation for Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt. 
33 A key actor in bringing this technology to Norway, and developing it further, was Helmer 
Dahl, who headed FFI’s radar department in Bergen. Njølstad and Wicken 1997, p. 65. 
34 The company was established with Norwegian owners in 1947, based on the former sub-
sidiary of Telefunken. Dahl convinced the director of Bergen Industri-Investering, Aage 
Figenschou, who was a close friend of his, to invest in the electro-technical industry. 
35 Collett and Lossius 1993, p. 17. Birkeland and Eyde were the pioneers and entrepreneurs 
behind Norsk Hydro and its initial technology for producing fertiliser. 
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prising, given his strategy of national responsiveness. At this time, however, in late 
1947, the Norwegian government asked for a postponement of the arrangement, due 
to fiscal problems. This delay, however, rendered the plan futile.36 Thus, nothing 
came of Bache-Wiig’s scheme to turn STK into a national champion in cable and 
telecom. The abortive attempt and the cabinet’s lack of interest in concluding the 
deal that ITT had accepted may reflect the Labour government’s relative lack of 
concern about telecom in the post-war period. Norway went from being a pioneer in 
telecom before World War II, to being one of the laggards in Europe. The main 
reason was that the Labour government did not prioritise this sector in its plan econ-
omy, which was geared towards the construction of power plants and investment in 
energy-intensive industry.37 
 
The Labour government’s low priority of telecom 
Despite the relatively high telephone density, with Norway being in ninth place in 
the world in 1947, there was a large number of Norwegians waiting for tele-
phones.38 In 1950, there were 62,700 on Telegrafverket's waiting list, and by 1955 
the number had risen to 76,400.39 The waiting list, or the “telephone queues”, be-
came Telegrafverket's nemesis into the 1980s. Even though it shared this problem 
with most PTOs in Europe,40 it became a heavy burden, which reflected the fact that 
the Labour government did not prioritise telecom in its allocation of the scarce re-
sources after the Second World War. When Telegrafverket presented a five-year 
plan for upgrading and extending the network in 1945, it was granted only 60% of 
what it considered necessary.41 This continued throughout the 1950s, when Tele-
grafverket never received what it deemed necessary for upgrading and modernising 
the network. At Telegrafverket’s centennial anniversary in 1955 the Director Gen-
eral, Sverre Rynning-Tønnesen (1942-62), “tore his hair” because of the insufficient 
funding from the government.42  
 
The main reason for the meagre government funding of telecom was the scarcity of 
resources in the reconstruction period, but it also reflected the Labour government's 
perception of telecom as a social good: it was not regarded as a necessity. The head 
                                                          
36 STKHAT: “Bache-Wiig to Evensen 15.12.47”. 
37 Christensen 1997. 
38 Espeli 2005, p. 320. Norway had 12 telephones per hundred inhabitants. The United States 
had 24, and Sweden was second with 19.4, while France only had 5.3. 
39 Øvregaard p. 26; Oland 1992, p. 19. 
40 Rafto 1955, p. 570; Fridlund 2000. 
41 Rafto 1955, p. 570. 
42 Elektroposten 1955:36, here after Espeli 2005, p. 319. 
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of the National Labour Union, Konrad Nordahl, spurned the public desire for tele-
phones by calling it “a noble need”.43 In 1956 the Minister of Communications, 
Kolbjørn Varmann, praised the telephone queues, claiming the high demand was “a 
sign of wealth and prosperity”.44 Why did such ideas not halt investments in Swe-
den, where a Labour Party also ruled? Its telecom network was regarded as among 
the best in the world. A reason might be that the Norwegian labour movement was 
more puritanical than the Swedish one.45 Rynning-Tønnesen regretted that he was 
not able to convince the “finance technicians” to invest more in telecom.46 When 
rejecting an application for hard currency for manufacturing telecom equipment, the 
Minister of Finance Erik Brofoss asked rhetorically: “Does anyone believe that the 
Norwegian people can solve its dollar problem by calling each other on the tele-
phone?”47 The need for telecom was recognised for the incumbent industry,48 and it 
was acknowledged that poor communication facilities could halt growth in existing 
industries. Thus, although telecom’s value for logistic purposes was appreciated, the 
idea that communication in itself could spur growth did not prevail.  
 
The notion of communication as a trigger of and precondition for growth was accen-
tuated in the 1990s, particularly in the request for broadband. Such ideas are anach-
ronistic in analysing the immediate post-war period, because they are intertwined 
with a market conception of the economy, which entails that actors in the market 
strive constantly for more efficient resource allocation, and act upon new informa-
tion. Thus, the economy, i.e. the resource allocation, will be more efficient, the 
better the infrastructure provides distribution of information. The importance of 
communication and information is also in accordance with the evolutionary perspec-
tive on the economy, which stresses that new combinations (mutations) of knowl-
edge are the main source of innovation and growth.49 Hence, communication and 
distribution of information and knowledge will facilitate new “mutations”, and thus 
spur growth. These notions, underpinning the relation between communication and 
growth, do not correspond to those of the planned economy, which is defined by 
                                                          
43 Collett and Lossius 1993, p. 19 and 20 or Espeli 2005, p. 319. 
44 Minister of Communication, Kolbjørn Varmann in the Stortinget in 1956, St.f. 1956, p. 
1539-1540. 
45 Francis Sejersted made this point at a seminar at the Norwegian School of Management 
17.11.05, where he presented his book: Sosialdemokratiets tidsalder: Norge og Sverige i det 
20. århundre, 2005. 
46 Espeli 2005, p. 318. 
47 Here after Einar Lie: Ambisjon og tradisjon. Finansdepartementets historie 1945-1965, 
1995, p. 119. 
48 Norsk Hydro’s need for sufficient telecommunication was a recurrent topic in its expansion 
after the war, Christensen 1997. 
49 Robert Nelson and Sidney Winter: An evolutionary theory of economic change, 1982. 
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hierarchical co-ordination; it was only 'the planners’ that needed first-rate access to 
information.50 Besides, the prevailing conception of technology was according to 
the linear model or science push, i.e. that scientific research and progress is the main 
driver of technological development, which is exactly what the evolutionary econ-
omy opposes.51 
 
STK’s telecom business expanded its manufacturing capacity immediately after the 
war, and its sales increased from NOK 500,000 in 1945 to NOK 14 million in 
1949.52 As the government funding of telecom decreased, so did Telegrafverket’s 
orders: STK's telecom sales stagnated and were still NOK 14 million in 1958. EB 
had to lay off workers, and STK used only half the plant’s capacity in 1956.53 STK's 
sales figures in the 1950s reflect the state-led industrialisation: they were dominated 
by cables and lines, which constituted between 70% and 80% of STK's turnover. 
Telecom and radio equipment accounted for only 10% to 20% of the sales in the 
annual reports.54 STK's sales to Telegrafverket and private operators, which in-
cluded telecom cables and lines, were between 25% and 30%. Nevertheless, STK 
was perceived mainly as a cable company, not least due to its supply of cables in the 
reconstruction era. As ITT's annual report in 1951 stated: “The important hydroelec-
tric program now under way in Norway requires large quantities of power cable, 
which is being supplied by Standard Telefon og Kabelfabrik A/S”.55 The table be-
low illustrates this pattern.  
 
                                                          
50 Friedrich von Hayek has highlighted the problem of information for the planned economy. 
conf. Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales: Saving capitalism from the capitalists, Crown 
Publishers, Inc 2003, p. 52-53. 
51 Christopher Freeman: Technology Policy and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan, 
1987, p. 118-119; Nelson and Winter 1982. 
52 Wasberg 1965, p. 144, and STK's Annual Report 1949. 
53 Espeli 2005, p. 402. 
54 STK's Annual reports 1948-1960. The remaining sales were posted under the heading 
“Various”; in 1952 cables represented 80% of STK's sales. 
55 ITT's Annual Report, 1951. 
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Table 2.2: STK's average annual sales, 1948-1960 (1000 NOK) 
0
10 000
20 000
30 000
40 000
50 000
60 000
70 000
80 000
90 000
100 000
110 000
120 000
Tele & radio-equipment 13 370 16 569 16 381 9 974 14 768 23 788
Others 2 660 3 544 12 423 17 178 23 922 30 393
Cables and Lines 42 637 77 436 80 199 91 480 91 898 112 355
1948-50 1951-52 1953-54 1955-56 1957-58 1959-60
Source: Annual reports. 
 
STK's choice of leaders illustrates the dominance of cable. Rolf Østbye, who re-
placed Bache-Wiig in 1946, was a chemical engineer, and thus a «cable man». Øst-
bye became CEO of Norsk Hydro in 1955, and was replaced by the head of the 
cable division, Amund Braaten, in 1953. Neither of them was an expert in telecom, 
so this field was entirely left to Sverre Ramstad, who became Technical Director in 
1946.56 In contrast to Braaten, who was a rather shy person, Ramstad was a very 
strong figure in STK, almost a potentate, in total control of STK's telecom busi-
ness.57 Whereas Braaten was acclaimed for the (re)construction of the cable plant 
after the war, the same is said about Ramstad, with respect to the telephone plant.58 
Telegrafverket's funding and procurement increased from the late 1950s; thus, 
STK's telecom sales doubled from NOK 13.7 million in 1957 to NOK 27.7 million 
in 1960, and had risen to NOK 46 million in 1964.59 The main reason for this was 
STK's supply of the electro-mechanical 8B switch. But before we turn to this issue, 
we need to take a brief look at ITT's history from 1940.  
 
                                                          
56 Interview with Jest Braathen, led the “Nodal Switch project”, later worked in Thomson 
CSF/Thales. Son of Amund Braaten, STK's Managing Director in 1953-1972. 
57 Interview with Fredrik Thoresen. 
58 Wasberg 1965, p. 123. 
59 Wasberg 1965, p. 144. 
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ITT after World War II 
ITT's prospects were dim at the outbreak of World War II, as its subsidiaries in 
occupied countries were at the mercy of the Axis countries and their allies. Yet, 
Behn navigated it through the difficulties, so ITT came out of the war with a very 
healthy financial balance - underpinning the myth of “the nine lives of I.T.&T.”60 
Much has been said about Behn's ties to the Germans during World War Two,61 but 
Robert Sobel puts more emphasis on Behn's cooperation with the US government, 
than on his alleged collaboration with the Germans.62 ITT's ties to the US govern-
ment paved the way for vital sales of overseas telephone companies in the 1940s. 
ITT ran telephone networks in Romania, Spain and Argentina, which for different 
reasons and at different times were prone to expropriation. Behn was able to con-
vince the governments in these countries, and the US State Department, that it was 
better for all parties that ITT's telephone companies were “nationalised”, financed 
by these countries’ reserves of US dollars in the United States, which were blocked 
anyway.  
 
ITT sold its Romanian utility for $13.8 million in 1940, after the Germans’ arrival in 
Bucharest.63 It was able to sell its Spanish utility, CTNE, to the Spanish government 
for $80 million in 1944.64 The most remarkable deal was struck when Behn con-
vinced Juan Peron to buy ITT's utility in Argentina for $94 million.65 This was in 
due time, as the Argentine dollar deposits in Washington ran out shortly after, and 
the developing Peronism would have ruled out any compensation a few years later. 
A part of the arrangements in Spain and Argentina was that ITT was to supply the 
equipment to the companies for decades to come. Thus, with vital assistance from 
the US State Department, ITT was transformed from insolvency into a “cash 
melon”.66 As a result, in 1947 ITT was attacked by corporate raiders, who disap-
proved of Behn's management ability and luxurious habits, the lack of dividends to 
the stockholders since 1932, as well as the firm’s meagre profitability, compared to 
its sales and assets.67 
 
                                                          
60 This was the title of an article in Fortune in the 1920s, here from Sobel 1982, p. 98. 
61 Sampson, 1973; Sutton 1976. 
62 Sobel 1982, p. 82f and 97f. 
63 Sobel 1982, p. 101. 
64 Sobel 1982, p. 116. 
65 Sobel 1982, p. 118; Schoenberg 1985, p. 102. 
66 Schoenberg 1985, p. 102. 
67 Sobel 1982, p. 123f; Schoenberg 1985, p. 102-103. 
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ITT had been regarded as the international counterpart of AT&T, but this notion 
faded away as it was nearly out of the telephone operating business, with only the 
Chilean telephone company amounting to anything substantial. Moreover, ITT's 
domestic manufacturing took off during the war, mainly as a contractor for the mili-
tary. Through acquisitions, greenfield investments, and service from European ITT-
refugees such as Maurice Deloraine, it created International Telephone Develop-
ment, operating from New Jersey, near ITT's headquarters in New York. Its domes-
tic business was profitable during the war, but it did not fare well in peacetime, 
when the stable orders from the military ceased.68 Behn was eager to use ITT's fi-
nancial muscles to increase the domestic business, to offset the risk of political in-
stability and expropriation in the overseas business.69 His ambition was that two-
thirds of ITT's revenues should come from the United States. This led to a series of 
poor acquisitions. ITT lacked experience in businesses serving customer markets. 
Thus, it was still ITT's European telecom business, International Standard Electric, 
which in terms of “sales, profits and dividends was the corporation's star per-
former”.70 
 
Behn never regained his dominant position in ITT after the raiders placed represen-
tatives on the company's board in 1948. William Henry Harrison, recruited from 
Western Electric and AT&T, was to co-pilot ITT with Behn, but their rivalry never 
ended. A former ally hypothesised Behn's thoughts during these years: “I'm never 
going to be able to satisfy these devils in building up domestic business. I under-
stand the manufacture of telephones; I know how to sell to the kings and queens and 
the post-office department. I just don't understand this fast-moving American econ-
omy”.71 The ownership advantages that turned Behn into the master of a global 
telecom company were not adequate for navigating ITT through the commercial 
markets and shareholder capitalism. One outcome of the corporate raiders’ attack on 
ITT, Behn's rivalry with Harrison, and the focus on domestic operations, was in-
creased autonomy for the European subsidiaries.  
 
                                                          
68 Sobel 1982, p. 103-104 and 120f. 
69 “Behn’s attempt to deploy assets to America were based on his experiences of the 1930s 
and during the wartime period, when first it was difficult to repatriate earnings and then his 
plants were seized and in some cases bombed out. In the late 1940s there were fears that parts 
of Europe might turn to communism, in which case ITT would once again suffer losses, and 
there was constant talk of a possible new European war, one that would ravage the Conti-
nent.” Sobel 1982, p. 141. 
70 Sobel 1982, p. 141. 
71 Sobel 1982, p. 127. 
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ITT was compared to the Habsburg monarchy; the subsidiaries were sovereign and 
“only loosely linked to the others at the administrative level”.72 An important reason 
for this was the national identity and the independent role that ITT's subsidiaries 
had. It had been a conscious policy on Behn's part to be responsive to national sen-
timents in order to secure contracts for ITT, such as when he agreed to invite the 
Norwegian government to become a shareholder in STK. Furthermore, in contrast to 
many US multinationals, ITT employed almost exclusively national managers in its 
overseas companies. A Swedish ITT veteran says that ITT “was a loose federation 
of disagreeing companies!”73 This became evident when ITT's main switching 
weapon, the Rotary switch, lost its sting after World War Two, and the new genera-
tions of crossbar switches appeared. 
 
ITT's crossbar battle 
The crossbar switch received its name because of its vertical and horizontal bars. 
Ericsson played a central role in developing it; the principles were discovered while 
the Swedish PTO searched for a first-generation automatic switch in 1910.74 The 
Swedish PTO developed its own version of the crossbar switch, and Bell Labs sent 
representatives to examine it in the 1930s.75 It laid the foundation for AT&T’s 
crossbar switches, first introduced in New York in 1938. Ericsson also took up its 
investigation in the 1930s, and cooperated with Bell Labs on this matter, “and in 
1943, LME decided to start its manufacture of crossbar switches”.76 Since the Swed-
ish PTO had its own version, Ericsson had to find a customer abroad, which it did in 
the regional companies in Finland and Denmark.77 These operators were more dedi-
cated to their duties as service providers and, less prone to take industrial considera-
tions, which made them natural targets in LME's search for a customer. Another 
noteworthy point is that, along with the United States, the Scandinavian countries 
were once again pioneers in telecom, this time in installing crossbar switches. Even 
if LME did not benefit from a secure home market for its crossbar switch, it did not 
                                                          
72 Chapuis and Joel 1990, p. 226. 
73 “Stig M. Eriksson’s memorials from his time in the Swedish ITT house Standard Radio & 
Telefon AB” in http://www.iclinvia.se/veteran/99q4/itt_hist.htm (1999-09-22). 
74 LME had been a latecomer with the automatic switches, and had tried to reach a license 
agreement with Siemens for producing a step-by-step switch, but failed. Therefore, the Swed-
ish PTO started to search for an automatic switch around 1910. The outcome was two 
switches: the AGF, a 500-point selector switch, which belonged to the first generation of 
automatic switches, and the second switch, namely the crossbar switch, belonged to the next 
generation. 
75 Chapuis 1982, p. 379. 
76 Meurling and Jeans 2000, p. 181. 
77 JTAS from Jutland placed its order in 1949. 
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have subsidiaries following their own agendas with competing products, as was the 
case with ITT.  
 
ITT lagged behind its competitors in developing the crossbar switch. An important 
point was that the technology agreement with Western Electric expired in 1950. 
AT&T was not keen on assisting ITT, as it feared that it would intrude into the US 
market. AT&T's new partner was LME, with which it cooperated in developing the 
crossbar switch, and it entered into a technology and licensee agreement with the 
Swedish company in 1951.78 Thus, ITT's opponents joined forces. The main prob-
lem, however, was ITT's lack of a mother company coordinating the R&D, and a 
secure home market that could be a springboard for exports. Thus, four different 
versions of the crossbar switch were developed within ITT. First, Kellogg 
Switchboard and Supply Co. developed a switch in 1950; the company was one of 
Behn’s fairly successful acquisitions in the US, carried out in 1951.79 Second, ITT's 
German branch SEL developed a crossbar switch in 1955, but the Bundespost 
wanted only one system for the whole country, and chose Siemens’s version in-
stead.80 The last two switches were developed by BTM and CGCT.  
 
BTM was designated to be ITT's centre of switching, and the Belgians carried out 
substantial R&D on introducing electrical circuits to switches in the 1930s. BTM 
could pride themselves with electronic elements in the 7E version of the Rotary 
switch, allegedly the first switch in the world with such elements.81 This, however, 
only reflected the fact that BTM was stuck too long in the first generation of auto-
matic switches. Based on this work, BTM developed the ‘Mechanic-Electronic 
System’, and the descendants were called the 8A and 8B.82 The rotating selector of 
the 7E was replaced by a crossbar selector, which allegedly “gives an exact account 
of how the 8-A System came into being”.83 The French crossbar switch, the Pen-
taconta, was fairly similar to the standard crossbar switches that LME and AT&T 
                                                          
78 “In 1950, AT&T approached LME about a mutual patent exchange which included the 
patent on the transistor. In 1951 LME and Western Electric closed a similar exchange con-
tract which also allowed LME's engineers to visit Bell Labs and Western Electric.” Fridlund 
2000, p. 148. 
79 The 1040 System, The newly formed ITT Kellogg introduced the 7 XB switch in 1952. 
Chapuis 1982, p. 405. 
80 SEL’s HKS was exported to Austria and Greece. Chapuis 1982, p. 407-408. 
81 Chapuis 1978, p. 201. 
82 The Rotary switch had the serial number 7; this was apparently because No. 7 was the code 
number for Western Electric’s equipment “intended for use exclusively outside the United 
States”. However, ITT used this as a starting point for numbering their switches. Thus, the 
next generation switches - the crossbar switches - were given the number 8. Chapuis 1982, p. 193. 
83 ITT 1974, p. 130. 
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offered. BTM's version was more futuristic: it was a “radically different crossbar 
switch”, according to STK's Ivar Mo, “with extensive use of electronics to control 
it”.84 Later versions of the switch used transistors, which were developed at Bell 
Labs in 1947, and ready for industrial exploitation from the mid-1950s.85 BTM's 
main task was to find a PTO that was willing to inaugurate what was described as 
the “the world’s most modern telephone switch”.86 
 
Telegrafverket and the Oslo District authorities were eager to upgrade the Oslo 
network. This was chiefly because Telegrafverket’s main problem was long tele-
phone queues, with almost 80,000 applicants.87 The bulk of these were in Oslo; 
hence, an elimination of the queues in Oslo would reduce the national queues by 
50%. Furthermore, the Oslo network was crucial for the national network, since it 
was a transit network for national long-distance calls and international calls. Tele-
grafverket got to know about BTM's crossbar switch through STK, and had techni-
cal personnel present when BTM installed a trial switch in the suburbs of Antwerp. 
It was apprehensive, however, about being the first procurer, as it was aware of the 
French Pentaconta project, and the ongoing competition in ITT.88  
 
If the switch turned out to be successful, STK might have benefited from its initiat-
ing role by obtaining export contracts on behalf of BTM/ITT. This could contribute 
to industrial and economic growth in Norway, and moreover, export orders for STK 
could solve a serious employment problem in the industry. The parties might have 
had the installation of Rotary switches in the 1920s in mind. Due to Telegrafverket’s 
early automation and order of the Rotary switch, Norsk Western Electric's sent sev-
eral installers abroad. Besides, export could benefit Telegrafverket economically. 
STK and EB's production lacked scale, which rendered their equipment more ex-
pensive than in other countries.89 Hence, a common goal for STK and Tele-
grafverket was to provide STK with production for export.  
                                                          
84 Mo 2001. A main difference from the common crossbar switches was the use of the multi-
selector, which gave it superior capacity. Both the 8A and the 8B “were ahead of their time”. 
ITT 1974, p. 23. 
85 “To telephone switching, the great advantage of electronics components, instead of traditional 
electromechanical ones, were primarily their high speed in switching on and off. In electronic 
components, that used electrical currents, it took about one millionth of a second which was 
10.000 times as fast as the mechanical action of an electromechanical relay.” Fridlund 2000 p. 50. 
86 Wasberg 1965, p. 146. 
87 Nils Jacobsen (Ap) in St.f. 1964, p. 1345, (8. Dec.) “Telegrafverkets budsjett for 1965”. 
88 Riisnæs’ chapter 3 “Marked, Langtidsavtalen” in Mo 2001, p. 7. 
89 “Prices for conventional equipment vary from $250 to $300 (per line) in low-wage coun-
tries with efficient large-scale production and up to $600 in smaller markets such as Switzer-
land and Norway.” Doz 1979, p. 75. The lack of scale in the manufacturing operations of 
STK and EB is a recurrent theme in sources from Televerket and STK in the 1970s. 
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The worst scenario, however, was if the switch became a failure on the world mar-
ket, and Telegrafverket was stuck as the only user. Then it would have to pay a high 
price for further development and upgrading of the switch. It was particularly im-
portant for small countries to avoid this, since larger networks would attain greater 
economies of scale in upgrading a system. Yet, in 1952 it ordered BTM's switch, 
which was installed at Ski outside Oslo. Telegrafverket was still apprehensive, but 
when it learned that Brazil was to become a major customer of BTM’s 8B, it in-
stalled another 10,000 lines at Åsen in 1958. BTM promised Telegrafverket all 
technical support, and it was essential for Telegrafverket that STK should partici-
pate in the development of the 8 series, in order to enhance the technical and manu-
facturing competence in the Norwegian telecom industry.90 The 8B’s use of the 
transistor only added to this point. Several engineers from STK went to BTM to 
learn from and join in the development. The first 8B, installed in 1960 at Eiksmarka, 
a suburban area of Oslo, was produced by BTM, but the second 8B, installed at 
Grorud in 1963, was fully produced at STK's plant at Økern.91 But before this took 
place, the French had outmanoeuvred BTM. 
 
France was ITT's largest market in Europe, and was essential to ITT's success, both 
in itself, but also through its influence on the Spanish and Italian markets. Conse-
quently, France was ITT's main market for switches in Europe, while the main pro-
ducer of switches was BTM. However, the strategic decisions were supposed to be 
taken in New York. In the early 1950s, “CGCT had cooperated with BTM in an 
unsuccessful attempt to interest the French Administration in the 8-A System”.92 To 
get access to the French market, CGCT had to comply with the demands of the 
French government and PTO to develop a French telecom industry. Hence the 
French PTO never seriously considered BTM’s crossbar switch. CGCT developed 
its own crossbar switch, the Pentaconta, and fought LME for contracts in France. 
The Pentaconta was chosen for the urban networks, and LME's French crossbar was 
chosen for the rural networks.93 Thus, as with the Rotary system in 1926, ITT suc-
ceeded in becoming the major supplier of switches in France, and the French deci-
sion had a major impact on ITT - and STK. Matters were even worse for BTM and 
STK, since the Brazilians called off further orders of BTM’s 8B, because the iron in 
the selenium diodes rusted due to the warm and humid climate in Brazil.94 CGCT 
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used the Brazilian failure for what it was worth, and it was decisive in CGCT’s 
“victory” over BTM. 
 
ITT arranged a meeting in Paris in 1959 to compare “all recent switching systems 
developed by the various ITT companies”.95 No discussion was allowed, and “the 
meeting was informed that the (Pentaconta) system had been chosen as the ITT 
standard system, to be promoted wherever feasible”.96 BTM's representatives were 
furious, and claimed that Pentaconta won because there were too many Frenchmen 
residing at ITT's headquarters in New York.97 ITT ordered BTM to manufacture the 
Pentaconta, and to stop the “manufacture of the 8-B System and to transfer the tools 
to STK, Oslo”.98 BTM lost the Belgian PTO as its customer, the Dutch PTO also 
refused to order the Pentaconta, and, thus, BTM’s oldest and most stable markets 
vanished. These markets were small, however, compared to the French and CGCT’s 
potential export markets. The Pentaconta became ITT's “warhorse” on the export 
market, used in over 70 countries. BTM joined the Pentaconta camp, and Norway 
was left alone with the 8B.99 The next section asks why Telegrafverket agreed to 
become the first procurer of the 8B. 
 
Telegrafverket’s procurement policy 
In 1959, Rynning-Tønnesen said that Telegrafverket chose equipment that was tried 
out, in order to avoid “children’s diseases”,100 which is difficult to reconcile with the 
procurement of the 8B. He was probably referring to Telegrafverket's unwillingness 
to buy radiolink equipment from Nera, which had, in cooperation with FFI, devel-
oped a high-frequency radiolink for transmission, and wanted Telegrafverket to 
install this equipment for long-distance transmission. Many have perceived Tele-
grafverket’s refusal to support Nera through procurement as a token of its back-
wardness in terms of technology.101 The rejection of Nera instigated a fierce debate 
regarding public procurement; it was discussed in the cabinet, and led to the estab-
lishment of a committee for electronics, whose main message was that Tele-
grafverket had to support the Norwegian electronic industry. Despite harsh criti-
cism, Telegrafverket insisted that with its meagre resources it had to focus on being 
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a service provider, not on supporting uncertain industrial products.102 Its main ar-
gument was that it could not afford to take any chances. It is interesting that this was 
put forward at the same time as Telegrafverket procured the 8B.  
 
Jon B. Riisnæs, who worked at STK’s Telecom Division from 1958, claims that 
Telegrafverket was a competent and aggressive procurer from the late 1950s.103 
Riisnæs recalls that Telegrafverket was confident and demanding in the meetings 
with BTM in Antwerp. The general impression, however, is that Telegrafverket did 
not take on such a role before the early 1970s,104 but Riisnæs insists that this ten-
dency was clear from the late 1950s.105 The time aspect is essential, as the first 8-
series switch, installed in 1952, was regarded probably as a trial switch, while it is 
probable that the next procurements were seen as a more permanent choice. When 
the Brazilians called off further orders in 1959, however, Telegrafverket was to 
some extent caught in a lock-in, i.e. it would be expensive to drop the switch after 
having installed several. If Telegrafverket took a confident and conscious choice, as 
Riisnæs indicates, one could argue that it was in line with Norway’s leading position 
in telecom, in the beginning and the end of the 20th century. Furthermore, Tele-
grafverket followed the other Scandinavians’ course, in being among the first in the 
world to install crossbar switches.  
 
There is little evidence, however, to support the claim that Telegrafverket’s switch-
ing personnel were at the forefront of the technology in the 1950s. No one has sup-
ported Riisnæs’s view.106 In fact, there are very few traces in the archives of the 
procurement of the 8-series switches, which is in stark contrast to the Nera issue.107 
It also remains unclear whether it was Telegrafverket or the Oslo District authorities 
that were instrumental in the decision regarding the 8B. Harald Espeli makes a good 
point, when arguing that the lack of empirical evidence indicates that Telegrafverket 
                                                          
102 It had to procure the equipment it thought was best, regardless of national industrial con-
siderations. 
103 When Telegrafverket negotiated with BTM regarding the 8B, they really impressed the 
Belgians according to Riisnæs. Interview with Jon B. Riisnæs. 
104 Some see the establishment of Telegrafverket’s R&D institute in 1967 as the turning point 
(Collett and Lossius 1993), while others stress the increased competence in switching tech-
nology that Telegrafverket’s technical department attained from the 1960s. This aspect will 
be discussed later in the thesis. 
105 Interview with Jon B. Riisnæs. 
106 Interview with Bjørn Gladsø, Nic. Knudtzon, Magnhild Slettbak, Gunnar Tidemann, Ivar Mo 
all suggest the opposite of Riisnæs’ claim. Slettbak worked in different sections in 
Televerket's Technical Department, Bjørn Gladsø had leading positions in Televerket's Tech-
nical Department, most notably in the Station (switching) office from 1958-1993. Knudtzon 
was Director of Director of Televerkets Forskningsinstitutt. 
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did not reflect too much upon the question, and that it merely accepted the products 
BTM/STK offered. Sverre Ramstad played a decisive role in convincing Tele-
grafverket to order BTM's switch.108 He was a figure of consequence in ITT's Euro-
pean telecom business, and had a high standing at BTM. Ramstad shared BTM's 
anxiousness to find a customer for the 8B, and he had the personal qualifications to 
enrol Telegrafverket into his vision of turning STK into a major switch supplier in 
ITT and Europe. 
 
BTM's problems with marketing its crossbar switch demonstrate the importance of a 
secure home market. It also explains why it was so difficult to find the first cus-
tomer for a switch; PTOs were wary of being left alone with a system. In this re-
spect, Norway served as a testing ground for BTM’s 8B, and being a small and 
developed country it was well suited for this. It was easier to implement a new 
switch in a comparatively small network, with few types of switches to interact 
with. Moreover, the 8B switch was to be installed in areas were the Rotary switch 
had been installed, and these switches had no problem interacting since the 8B was 
based on the Rotary. Another important aspect of Norway’s small network was that 
Telegrafverket had less bargaining power in terms of customer mass (number of 
lines) than other PTOs. Thus, Telegrafverket was probably the only PTO - in fact it 
proved to be the only one - which BTM could us as a guinea pig for its switch.  
 
Telegrafverket's options were limited by the Lillehammer agreement; it could not 
have chosen LME's crossbar in STK's areas. Also, STK belonged to the BTM camp, 
as opposed to the German SEL camp, to which the Austrian ITT subsidiary be-
longed, or to the French camp, as Italy and Spain did to a certain degree.109 Thus, it 
was no alternative for Telegrafverket to buy the Pentaconta from CGCT instead, like 
the Italians and Spaniards did. Then again, there was little reason for Telegrafverket 
to disregard BTM; its merits in the switching field were impeccable, probably only 
equalled by LME in Europe. It had been a dominating force in the switching indus-
try since 1882, and Telegrafverket regarded BTM’s supply of Rotary switches as 
successful.110 Hence, it may be an exercise of over-explanation, i.e. to explain why 
Telegrafverket wanted to engage in cooperation with BTM, on developing and in-
stalling cutting-edge technology in its network. And, as noted in the introduction, 
Telegrafverket received positive media coverage on the project as well.111 Still, it is 
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worthwhile to reflect upon Telegrafverket's modest competence in the switching 
field. 
 
A major problem for Telegrafverket was the shortage of qualified engineers, which 
hampered its proficiency, and thus its relationship with the industry. Olav Skeie, a 
chief engineer in the PTO, explicated this problem in a memo in 1957. He proposed 
to expand and reorganise Telegrafverket's technical department.112 He claimed that 
Norway was a laggard in telecom, and that the main reason was insufficient plan-
ning. The chief task as he saw it, was to plan better, not short-term and project-
based planning, but “to lay down basic specifications and planning of the entirety - I 
will call it a lack of fundamental planning”.113 Skeie wanted to release engineers 
from the operating day-to-day business, and reassign them to a strategic level. The 
reaction to Skeie’s memo was unanimous; there was a shortage of engineers in Tele-
grafverket.114 It was difficult to circumvent this problem. 
 
Telegrafverket had a poor standing in the post-war years, so most telecom engineers 
preferred to join STK and EB, due to higher salary and status.115 Norwegian compa-
nies, like Nera, and research institutes, like the FFI, were also more attractive. Be-
sides, there were relatively few candidates graduating in the “light-currents” field, 
i.e. electronics and communication, from the Norwegian Institute of Technology 
(NTH*). It was dubbed the “flashlight-field”, indicating its low standing among the 
students.116 Strong current was particularly important in Norway, due to the many 
waterfalls, and the construction of hydropower stations. The meagre interest in tele-
com has also been explained by the claim that the industry and/or technology were 
regarded as mature until the late 1950s, i.e. before the “transistoration”.117 The ex-
ception to this notion was the development of radio technology, and particularly 
                                                          
112 NTMS: O. Skeie II.F.15/12-57: “Om utbygging, eventuelt reorganisering av de tekniske 
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radiolink in Norway. Nevertheless, because of its poor standing, Skeie claimed, 
Telegrafverket was in the hands of the industry. 
 
This was even more so in the case of switching, as Telegrafverket's main expertise 
was in transmission.118 The raison d’être for PTOs was transmission, i.e. the running 
of national and international networks. Telegrafverket organised several tele-
districts, which were comprised of former independent and private operators, and its 
main task was to bundle these districts together into an efficient national network. 
Hence, it is indicative that Skeie does not mention switching in his report. One pos-
sible reason for the low switching competence is that it was left to the tele-districts. 
Another reason was that Telegrafverket simply relied on ITT and LME and their 
subsidiaries in this matter. There was allegedly only one person in Telegrafverket, 
Nils Johnson, who had real capability in this field in the 1960s.119 In a report from 
Telegrafstyret’s committee on establishing a laboratory in 1961, “the ambition was 
limited to attaining one engineer «with good knowledge of both, or at least one, of 
the two main types of automatic switches» the PTO used.120 Magnhild Slettbak, who 
worked in Telegrafverket's technical departments from 1961, says that there was 
much more prestige in working with transmission than with switching.121  
 
The uneven competence, i.e. transmission over switching, was not a Norwegian 
idiosyncrasy. The “importance of switching was obscured on the international 
scene”, claims Chapuis; the issue was discussed at international conferences when 
the first generation of automatic switches appeared, but “disappeared entirely from 
international meetings (…) from 1922 onwards”.122 Hence, there was little flow of 
knowledge and information across national borders. This meant that countries with-
out a switching industry had little chance to enhance their competence. This also 
explains why there were so few candidates studying switching; it “became a semi-
arcane technique for which engineers had no objective point of comparison”.123 
“The engineers of the operating services did not pay any great attention to that very 
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special technique”, claims Chapuis,” as their duty was merely to ensure that the 
equipment installed performed its function with reasonable efficiency.”124 Thus, the 
international context underpins the fact that Telegrafverket's competence was in 
transmission, not switching. This was also the case for the Norwegian telecom sec-
tor, particularly for Nera-FFI.  
 
The radiolink issue 
After setting up a trial link, between Bergen and Haugesund, in cooperation with 
Telegrafverket, Nera-FFI wanted to set up a radiolink between Oslo and Bergen in 
1951. But Rynning-Tønnesen refused, partly because Telegrafverket had a project 
for laying a coaxial cable over the same route. The PTO did not reject wireless 
transmission in itself; it had experimented with radiolink, using German UHF-
equipment, but it was hesitant of Nera-FFI’s use of high frequencies. Nera-FFI had 
developed a radiolink using high frequency, the microwave areas, and argued that it 
was the future of (wireless) transmission. Telegrafverket was uncertain of this and 
regarded the project as too risky because the technology was not fully developed. 
Nera-FFI agreed, but saw the project as a way to further develop it, and claimed that 
the PTO had a responsibility to contribute. Telegrafverket, on the other hand, could 
not envisage allocating scarce resources to an uncertain R&D project, while the 
«telephone queues» reached almost 80,000, equivalent to more than 1/8 of the num-
ber of connected telephones.125  
 
NATO became the saviour of Nera-FFI’s radiolink project in the 1950s. A radiolink 
was set up between Oslo and Bergen, financed by NATO’s project to establish a 
common control and command system.126 As a result, the Norwegian Defence Com-
munications Administration (FFSB*) was set up in 1953 and administered a separate 
military telecom network. Norway differed from most countries in having two 
separate telecom networks. This broadened the existing gap between Telegrafverket 
and the military technicians. First in line to ridicule Telegrafverket's laggardness 
was FFSB’s leader, Colonel Bjørn Rørholt.127 Rørholt allowed himself to be photo-
graphed standing upside down; he claimed he wanted to see the world from Tele-
grafverket's point of view.128 Rørholt’s provocativeness, and the ensuing strained 
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strained relations with the PTO and Rynning-Tønnesen, has been emphasised as a 
major cause of Telegrafverket's stubbornness towards the military technicians.129 
The need for broadcasting TV signals settled the technological issue, since this 
required microwaves.130 Telegrafverket was given the responsibility of constructing 
the new network, which would also serve telecom purposes. 
 
The Ministry of Industry and Defence, as well as the Norwegian Broadcasting Cor-
poration (NRK*) wanted Telegrafverket to buy Nera’s equipment. Nonetheless, 
Telegrafverket ordered the bulk of it from ITT’s British subsidiary STC, as it did 
not trust Nera's capability.131 STK eagerly advised Telegrafverket to choose STC, 
before Nera.132 Telegrafverket was severely criticised for choosing STC rather than 
Nera. Even though the cabinet intervened in order to secure Nera contracts later on, 
it seems that Telegrafverket had an ally in the Ministry of Communication.133 It 
reflected the fact that the PTO was more dedicated to its obligation as a service 
provider than to the support and promotion of Norwegian industry. Its resources 
were so scarce that it did not conceive of being an industry provider; it had a hard 
enough time providing a telecom service to the public. It did not object to support-
ing national industry through selective procurement, but it wanted more financial 
backing and did not want the responsibility of procuring Nera's equipment, when it 
did not regard it as advisable from a technical point of view.134 One of Tele-
grafverket's most interesting arguments was that STC was a safer bet, since it was a 
part of a large MNC. As such, the issue bears similarities to the 8B procurement.  
 
Conclusion 
Telegrafverket’s acceptance of the 8B, and its rejection of Nera's radio link, can be 
explained in light of the oligopolic grip. Firstly, the 8B had few problems interact-
ing with the Rotary switches already installed in the Oslo network. Thus, this finger 
did limit Telegrafverket’s choice. The same applies for the second finger: Tele-
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grafverket needed STK to maintain and upgrade the Rotary switches. Still, it could 
have chosen CGCT’s Pentaconta, which would have accommodated these first fac-
tors.135 The same goes for Telegrafverket’s responsibility for securing employment 
at STK. Thus, it was the remaining two fingers, the lack of competence and the role 
as an industry provider, which made it the first procurer of the 8B. As an industry 
provider, it supported STK's attempt to attain a mandatory position within ITT's 
switching business. Still, most of the evidence suggests that Telegrafverket lacked 
the competence to assess the question of crossbar switches thoroughly. It perceived 
itself as a facilitator of transmission and entrusted the industry with the switching 
issues. This is not to say that Telegrafverket did not consider the benefits of install-
ing such a modern switch in Oslo, and the possible rewards STK could get from 
cooperating closely with BTM on the project - only that Telegrafverket was not in a 
position to evaluate the 8B and its future prospects in an adequate way.  
 
Nera had a weak grip on Telegrafverket with respect to selling radiolink equipment. 
It could appeal to the PTO’s responsibility as an industry provider, and activate 
political authorities to instruct Telegrafverket. In contrast to switching, radiolink 
involved no question of interfaces or maintenance of old equipment, and the em-
ployment issues were negligible. Telegrafverket had an ally in the Ministry of Com-
munication and was thus able to free itself from Nera’s potential grip. Most histori-
ans who have discussed the radiolink issue accept the «military technicians’» 
version, i.e. that Telegrafverket did not support Nera because it lacked competence. 
It is interesting that the scholars put less emphasis on the scepticism among FFI's 
own engineers, many of whom believed the technology was too futuristic to de-
velop, especially for a small country like Norway.136 The Air Force reasoned the 
same way when it rejected Nera’s equipment.137  
 
Telegrafverket certainly had competence in transmission; perhaps that is why it did 
not want to buy Nera’s equipment. Bjørn Gladsø, who started his tenure in Tele-
grafverket in 1955, stresses that the company certainly knew what it was doing 
when it disappointed Nera.138 Maybe its competence enabled the PTO to assess the 
technological and financial issues, and thus be a demanding and proficient procurer. 
Without crediting Telegrafverket with foresight, it is worth mentioning that the 
technological development proved Nera-FFI to be wrong. Later development in 
coaxial cables provided much higher capacity, with which radiolink could not com-
                                                          
135 The Pentaconta was installed in networks that had Rotary switches, for instance in France. 
136 Njølstad and Wicken 1997, p. 139. 
137 Oland 1992, p. 13. 
138 Interview with Bjørn Gladsø. 
Chapter 2 Lonely riders 
 86
pete. The political impact of the radiolink issue was immediate. The next chapter 
shows how this formed the discussion on how Norway was to handle the electronic 
revolution, and formed the Norwegian system of innovation in telecom in a decisive 
manner.  
 
The negative effects of the 8B procurement did not surface before the late 1960s. 
During the 1960s, it contributed to increased sales for STK's telecom department. 
As Mo claims, the “8B became the backbone of STK's telephone-business”.139 A 
major source of revenues for STK's telecom business over the next years was to 
provide service and maintenance for the 8B. As the only user of the switch, Tele-
grafverket was totally dependent on STK, thus the 8B tightened the oligopolic grip. 
So STK profited from being a lonely rider with the 8B. The next chapter will show 
that a key reason for the 8B’s expansion in the 1960s was that the government fund-
ing of Telegrafverket increased, in order to overcome the telephone queues. One 
may argue, as Mo does, that STK's system responsibility provided the firm with 
competence in switching technology and systems.140 Yet this electro-mechanical 
competence was obsolete within a decade. The 8B also affected ITT's strategy. The 
resource-wasting battle between CGCT and BTM for switching primacy in ITT led 
the New York headquarters to seek greater coordination and control over its over-
seas subsidiaries. So, Harold S. Geneen was picked as Behn’s successor, and be-
came an epitome of the financial revolution that swept across the United States in 
the 1960s.  
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Chapter 3 STK as a foreign high-tech company 
Introduction 
Harold S. Geneen became ITT's CEO in 1959, and on one his first trips to Europe, 
he was received at the Orly Airport by ITT's renowned French scientist Maurice 
Deloraine. “Geneen looked him up and down for a few moments and then said: 
«Ah, so you are Deloraine, the fellow who spends all this money on research and 
development.»“1 The incident encapsulates two key developments in the 1960s, 
namely the financial and electronic revolution. As such, this decade marked the 
beginning of the end of the electro-mechanical oligopoly, and digitalisation and 
liberalisation were in an embryonic stage. The chapter is not centred around Tele-
grafverket's procurement of switches from STK, but rather on how the increased 
focus on electronics and R&D, as well as ITT's financially oriented management, 
affected STK's room to manoeuvre.  
 
There was an institutionalisation of a new R&D system in Norwegian telecom in the 
late 1960s, which was inspired by the same normative assumptions that came to 
underpin the system of innovation approach in the 1980s. Telegrafverket’s research 
institute (TF*) became the foundation stone in the new R&D system. STK and EB 
were expected to take part, and as Olav Skeie claimed in 1960, they had a duty to 
attain a more active position in research and development within their respective 
multinationals.2 To accommodate this, STK set up a Research Department (FA*). 
This chapter tries to explain the establishment of the FA in 1968. The TF gave STK 
development contracts to help them attain a mandatory position within ITT. This 
pinpoints a crucial theme of this thesis, namely STK's room for strategic manoeuvre 
in the telecom industry within Norwegian society and ITT's corporate structures.  
 
A main rationale behind the FA was to increase STK's absorptive capacity, so it 
could import ITT's technology and products to Norway. Through this process of 
adapting and installing the technology, STK could attain the competence that could 
serve as a platform for industrial development. This indicates two contending percep-
tions of multinational companies, which is a second major theme in this chapter. The 
first is that foreign companies obstruct the development of a national industry. One 
way of avoiding foreign domination, as practiced, for instance, by the French gov-
ernment, was to nurture national champions within electronics. The other, more 
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positive perception, was that multinationals were diffusers of technology, compe-
tence and growth. The chapter shows how STK and EB chose different strategies in 
proving their worth to Norwegian society, by playing on these different perceptions 
of multinationals. On a different level of analysis, this dichotomy can be viewed in 
terms of competing corporate governance systems, which is the final theme of the 
chapter.  
 
The financial and electronic revolution nurtured two conflicting corporate govern-
ance systems. Geneen's financial conception of business was epitomised by state-
ments such as “the only line is the bottom line”. In this perspective, employment, 
welfare, or economically relevant goods, such as competence and technology, were 
regarded as more or less irrelevant externalities of ITT's prime concern, i.e. profit-
seeking. This was in stark contrast to the increased stakeholding that followed the 
creation of new R&D systems in the 1960s. The new normative assumptions regard-
ing innovation that surfaced in the 1960s bore a strong resemblance to the system of 
innovation approach from the 1980s, not least because innovation took place 
through interaction between users and producers. STK's increasing cooperation and 
interaction with Norwegian institutions meant that its Norwegian stakeholders in-
creased in number and importance. More than ever, STK had to balance between 
accommodating national stakeholders and American shareholders. It had to find its 
role as a foreign high-tech company.  
 
STK's telecom business and lucrative long-term agreements 
The growth of STK's telecom business in the 1960s was based mainly on the in-
creased installation of the 8B switch, which in turn was a result of a new procure-
ment regime for telecom equipment in Norway. STK and EB entered long-term 
agreements with Telegrafverket to rationalise the equipment suppliers’ production. 
The main thing, however, was that Telegrafverket's investments increased, in order 
to get rid of the telephone queues. These long-term agreements were lucrative for 
the industry, as STK's figures for income on telecom equipment reveal. Unfortu-
nately, we lack STK's figures for the first years of the 1960s, so the quantitative 
presentation is somewhat limited.  
 
STK had experienced strong growth after the war; the number of employees reached 
2725 in 1965, up from 675 in 1945.3 Sales in the 1960s increased from NOK 185 
million in 1960, to NOK 501 million in 1970; the increase in fixed prices was 75 per 
                                                          
3 Sigmund Fjeldbo: Veien fram - Telefonsentralmontørene ved STK gjennom 50 år 1933-
1983, 1983. 
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cent.4 The relative share of cable and lines decreased from 67 per cent of STK's total 
sales in 1960 to 54 per cent in 1970. Cables and lines for telecom were a growing 
part of this, representing 20 per cent of STK's total sales in 1970.5 As a result of 
ITT's conglomeration in the 1960s, STK had attained a sizeable consumer business, 
selling different types of domestic appliances produced by ITT companies; this grew 
from 10 per cent in 1964 to 16 per cent in 1970. Sales of telecom equipment in-
creased substantially from the 1950s. They averaged 15 per cent in 1960, though 
they still included radio equipment, which was reclassified under “technical and 
others” from 1964. Telecom equipment accounted for 16 per cent of sales in 1964, 
and increased to 22 per cent in 1970, according to the annual reports. The sales 
increased from NOK 45 million in 1964 to NOK 110 million in 1970, with an 86 
per cent increase in fixed prices. Switches, mostly the 8B, dominated this product 
line, with 79 per cent of the sales, which is why the annual report labelled telecom 
equipment as switching equipment.6  
 
Table 3.1: STK's sales, 1964-1970 (1000 NOK) 
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
Cables and Lines 124591 161302 183631 223038 232845 210582 236583 271639
Switching equipment 27737 45236 42491 51517 69264 74717 71252 109651
Consumer goods 32609 42714 46760 51107 57435 55157 76709 87855
Technical electronics &
Others
26639 21052 25883 30384 33204 26913 32276
1960 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
 Source: STK's annual reports. 
 
                                                          
4 Annual reports. The annual reports for 1962-64 are missing from STK's archive; the figures 
for 1964 are derived from the annual report for 1965. Inflation between 1960-70 was 54%, 
according to Statistisk Sentralbyrå’s consumer price index (http://www.ssb.no). 
5 STKA: STK's Business plans 1967-1971 & 1968-1972; the internal business plans submit-
ted to ITT separated power cables from tele cables, which the public annual report did not. 
6 STK's business plan 1967-1971; in 1966, switching equipment accounted for $4.8 million, 
while total telecom equipment was $6 million. 
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The 8B became the largest switching system in use in Norway, with almost 350,000 
lines installed, and was running for nearly 40 years. A considerable part of STK's 
revenues came from 8B equipment for national automation, so one could call across 
districts automatically. STK installed a large transit switch for national automation 
in Oslo in 1965.7 Based on the increasing demand for the 8B, STK established a 
telephone plant in Kongsvinger; the location was a result of the government's policy 
for rural areas.8 STK held 60% of the Norwegian switching market in 1966, against 
EB's 40 per cent.9 The increased sales of the 8B in the 1960s were caused by the 
growth in Telegrafverket’s investments, which in turned were a result of the wish to 
eliminate the telephone queues. Leif Larsen launched his tenure as Director General 
from 1962 with the slogan: “Do away with the waiting-lists!” The queues drained 
Telegrafverket, and were used against it in the radiolink conflict. In a lecture before 
NATO colleagues in 1959, the provocative Colonel Rørholt talked about Tele-
grafverket and its 17,000 employees in scathing terms: “A surprisingly large number 
is occupied with such tasks as collecting revenue or writing to subscribers, for in-
stance to tell them that they cannot have a telephone installed until 1963 or some-
thing like that.”10 Telegrafverket’s network was indeed in a poor state in the 1960s. 
 
Norway also failed to keep up with the automation of the network, both for local 
and long-distance calls. Hence, the Norwegian network was definitely not among 
the most modern in Europe. Technical problems, resulting in long waiting times for 
long-distance calls, the lack of a dialling tone, and problems getting through to other 
subscribers, gave Telegrafverket a bad image. Still, it was the telephone queues that 
hurt the most: the official records showed 80,000 applicants in 1965.11 The queues 
would have been much longer than the official records reveal, if those who did not 
consider it worthwhile to apply were included. Moreover, the waiting time was 
long: nearly 5,000 applicants had waited for a decade in 1960, some as long as 20 
years.12 The inadequate telephone services also became a problem for the governing 
Labour party. The willingness to sacrifice something for the common good declined 
as the memory of the war became more distant, and the voters were no longer will-
ing to accept Labour’s portrayal of this as “wealth queues” or “welfare state 
queues”.13 They were more inclined to accept the Conservative opposition’s jibe, 
                                                          
7 STK's Annual report 1965. 
8 STK's Board Meeting 06.10.66., and Annual report 1969. 
9 STK's business plan 1967-1971. 
10 Oland 1993, p. 34. 
11 Nils Jacobsen in St.f. 1964, p. 1345, (8. Dec.) ”Telegrafverkets budsjett for 1965”. 
12 Espeli 2005, p. 467. 
13 Minister of Communication, Trygve Bratteli in St.f. 1960, p. 948; and Bratteli, in St.f. 
1963, p. 1167. 
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that these were “flaw queues”, a sign of bureaucracy and political inability.14 The 
failure to present telephone queues as wealth queues affirms John Kenneth 
Galbraith’s assertion from 1958: “In the affluent society no useful distinction can be 
made between luxuries and necessities.”15  
 
One the one hand, Telegrafverket received modest governmental funding, and on 
the other, the grants fluctuated from year to year, depending on the financial state of 
government. This led to employment problems for STK and EB, which had to lay 
off workers when Telegrafverket's investments were reduced in 1964.16 There is 
every reason to believe that STK and EB suffered from the reduced procurement 
from Telegrafverket, but the companies also used the “employment card” in the 
negotiated environment, in pursuit of their own interests.17 The long-term costs of 
unpredictable funding for procuring equipment were high.18 STK and EB were not 
able to plan and rationalise their production of telecom equipment, which in turn 
rendered the equipment expensive. In addition to the economies of scale STK and 
EB could reap from larger and stable orders, Telegrafverket and the equipment 
suppliers would benefit from the ability to plan future deliveries and installations, 
not least in better resource allocation. This was especially important for Tele-
grafverket's allocation of its switching experts, which were, to put it mildly, a scare 
resource.19  
 
The new Minster of Communication from 1964, Erik Himle, did not continue Brat-
teli’s rhetoric that the telephone queues were a sign of prosperity. It was not the 
“lack of understanding for the telephone problem” that was halting the development, 
Himle maintained, “but the lack of capital”.20 His short tenure as minister was busy; 
                                                          
14 Reidar Bruu (H) in St.f. 1964, p. 1347. 
15 Galbraith 1958. Sejersted (2005) says: “The social democrats had problems in incorporat-
ing the consumerism. (…) They did not like the affluent society, but contributed to its mak-
ing.”, p. 350. 
16 Both companies had increased their capacity, in order to be able to meet Telegrafverket's 
growing demand and verbal guarantees. EB decided not to go public with Telegrafverket's 
verbal guarantee of increased orders. It figured that this would harm the relationship with 
Telegrafverket, on which the company depended. NTM-EBii: EB to Ministry of Communica-
tion 08.06.63; and Internal EB Memo 14.01.64, “Telefonsituasjonen - Fylkesarbeidssjef 
Fiskaa’s P.M. av 30.12.1963”. 
17 Doz 1979, p. 62. 
18 Thus, it was a short-sighted policy to let Telegrafverket's investments be decided by the 
financial condition of the state. Besides the immediate problems for the workers at STK and 
EB, a structural problem became evident with the cutbacks in 1964. 
19 Interviews with Bjørn Gladsø; Magnhild Slettbak. 
20 Erik Himle, St.f. 1964, p. 4326 (10. June) “Interp. fra repr. Kyllingmark om Regjeringen 
vil ta telefonpolitikken opp til ny vurdering.” 
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besides introducing a new financial policy for Telegrafverket, he was also in charge 
of the 1964 White Paper to the Stortinget that drew the political conclusions from 
the Tvedt Commission.21 This was a Post and Telegraph Commission established in 
1955 to reorganise Telegrafverket and its relationship with the government. As the 
Commission argued, “Telegrafverket could not solve its financial problems within 
the present form of organisation”, as that entailed “a strong binding to the national 
budget”.22 Himle and the Labour party did not support “the recommendation of a 
more liberal solution for Televerket’s organisation”, and it “continued to be a part of 
the Norwegian central administration, but with the board and management now 
organised as a detached directorate” from 1969.23  
 
In addition, Himle was able to put a new procurement regime in place. STK and EB 
entered a four-year agreement for the supply of telecom equipment, and ITT and 
LME supplied loans in exchange. There were several reasons why the Labour gov-
ernment finally approved increased and sustainable funding of Telegrafverket. 
Firstly, there was a greater appreciation of the importance of telecom for business 
and growth.24 Secondly, investment in the telecom network was no longer consid-
ered to be a zero-sum game. The industry was able to rationalise production, which 
in turn led to less expensive equipment for Telegrafverket, or at least greater profits 
for STK and EB. Third, the long-term agreements solved an employment problem 
for STK and EB. Finally, and most importantly, however, was the public outrage 
over the telephone queues, and the success of the political opposition in linking this 
to the perception of the Labour party as less concerned with the everyday life of the 
people. An indication of this was that while fewer resources were allocated to mod-
ernising the national network in the four-year plan for 1965-69, reducing the tele-
phone queues “was given top priority in the new four-year programme”.25 
 
Himle feared that Telegrafverket was too close to the suppliers, and that they would 
not be tough enough in negotiating the long-term agreements with STK and EB.26 
Himle himself was a radiolink man from the armed forces, and regarded Tele-
grafverket as “cable-verk”. He asked Jens Chr. Hauge to lead the negotiations on 
behalf of Telegrafverket. Hauge had been a Minister of Defence and Justice in the 
                                                          
21 St. prp. nr. 82 (1964-65), “Telegrafverkets og Postverkets organisasjon m.v”. 
22 St. prp. nr. 82 (1964-65), “Telegrafverkets og Postverkets organisasjon m.v”, (Telegrafver-
ket ikke kan løse sine finansieringsproblemer innenfor den nåværende organisasjonsform som 
innebærer en sterk finansiell binding til statsbudsjettet.) 
23 Hauknes and Smith 2002. 
24 This is a general impression from Stortinget’s documents and debates. 
25St. prp. nr. 82 (1964-65), “Telegrafverkets og Postverkets organisasjon m.v”, p. 20. 
26 Interview with Erik Himle, Minister of Communication 1964-65. 
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1940s and 1950s, and a key player in forming Labour’s industrial policy. Himle 
wanted to exploit Hauge’s competence in economy and negotiations.27 This was not 
very successful, as Hauge lacked intimate knowledge of telecom, which was crucial 
in negotiating such agreements, since they were riddled with technicalities.28 Tele-
grafverket benefited from the long-term agreement, but not as much as the suppliers 
did. The agreements were very lucrative for STK and EB, and both companies made 
large profits on their telecom business in the second half of the 1960s.29 EB made 
most money on its supply of LME's crossbar switches, the KV, while for STK the 
tele-cables contributed the most.  
 
STK had higher manufacturing costs for its switches than EB, since it was the sole 
manufacturer of the 8B.30 Still, STK's switching business was very sound, with a 
return on sale, after taxes, of more than 4% between 1965-1968. Nevertheless, it 
was tele-cables that dominated STK's telecom business in sales and profit. Its return 
on sale averaged 7.2% in the same period and provided over 30% of STK's total net 
income between 1965-68, almost three times as much as the sale of telecom equip-
ment. The high sales and profits in tele-cables were partly a result of the long-term 
agreements, which included transmission equipment, and enabled a more rational 
manufacture. STK's strong position in tele-cables was based on its cable compe-
tence. STK's switching business, however, was not up-do-date in terms of effi-
ciency. Even if Sverre Ramstad was a very qualified telecom engineer, he was not 
perfect for running a telecom plant. The same goes for his successor, Ernst Berent-
sen, who became STK's telecom director in 1964.31 The director of tele-cables, Arve 
Rambøl, was recruited from FFI, and attained a strong position within STK; he 
replaced Sverre Ramstad as Technical Director in 1966. Thus, he was to direct STK 
through the electronic revolution the industry underwent.  
 
                                                          
27 Interview with Erik Himle. 
28 Mo 2001. 
29 Espeli 2005, Thue 2006, Knut Elgsaas og Otto Døscher Tobiesens: Samfunnsmessig styring 
av statlig forretningsdrift, 1981, p. 138; Interview with Fredrik Thoresen. 
30 This became evident after Telegrafverket's cost inspections in the mid-1970s, see chapter 4. 
31 Interview with Fredrik Thoresen. 
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Table 3.2: STK's Net Income after tax in dollars, 1965-1968 
-300,000
200,000
700,000
1,200,000
1,700,000
Switching systems 222,000 233,000 278,000 308,000
Communication Cable 623,000 794,000 760,000 778,000
Power Cable 1,035,000 1,292,000 1,259,000 1,271,000
Others -282,000 193,000 365,000 427,000
1965 1966 1967 1968
Source: STK's Business Plan 1967-1971 and 1968-1972 
 
STK and EB reaped the bulk of the economic benefits from the long-term agree-
ments; hence Telegrafverket was not successful in utilising its procurement power to 
reduce the prices. Telegrafverket tried to use this power for other purposes, how-
ever, as Larsen suggested the agreements “ought to have a clause” obliging the 
suppliers “to perform improvement and development work” in the areas covered by 
the agreement.32 This was merely to secure increased system competence on the 
equipment the companies sold to Telegrafverket. Larsen also suggested, however, 
there should be a clause stipulating that a “certain amount of the research and devel-
opment work” performed by the parent companies of STK and EB “should take 
place in Norway”.33 This suggests that Larsen wanted STK and EB to conduct R&D 
on a broader scale, to stimulate a general industrial development, and that Tele-
grafverket should use its procurement power to be an industry provider. The rest of 
this paragraph, however, gives an ambiguous impression of Larsen’s stance, as he 
considered whether to “demand that the ‘engineering group’ that worked in Ant-
werp with the 8-B switches” be transferred to Norway.34 Thus, it remains unclear 
                                                          
32 NTM-EBiii: Larsen/Telegrafstyret to EB 08.05.65. (I avtalene bør en bl.a. få med bestem-
melser om at leverandørene har plikt til å foreta forbedrings- og utviklingsarbeid på de områder 
avtalen omfatter). 
33 NTM-EBiii: Larsen/Telegrafstyret to EB 08.05.65. (Endelig bør en få med bestemmelser om 
at en viss del av det forsknings- og utviklingsarbeid som de to bedrifters moderselskaper driver, 
skal skje i Norge). 
34 NTM-EBiii: Larsen/Telegrafstyret to EB 08.05.65. (å kreve at den ”engineeringsgruppen” 
som arbeider i Antwerpen med Standards 8-B-sentraler blir flyttet hit). 
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whether Larsen reasoned only as a service provider, or if he had the provision of 
industry in mind.  
 
Larsen’s suggestions regarding R&D were not included in the written agreement, 
but it is clear that it was a “tacit understanding” within the new procurement regime 
that STK and EB were obliged to participate in Norwegian industry in general, and 
the electronics industry in particular.35 This was not least due to the improved finan-
cial results STK and EB attained from the long-term agreements. A main reason for 
why R&D became a part of the procurement regime was the increased focus on 
R&D and electronics in the 1960s. The next section looks into this. 
 
Electronics and innovation 
The word electronic did not come into everyday use before the 1950s; the rapid 
spread of the word reflects that the transistor is regarded as the most important in-
vention of the 20th century.36 It revolutionised several industries, through automa-
tion, and increased accuracy, control and production capacity. The development of 
semiconductor technology, or microelectronics, had a strong bearing on computers, 
which benefited several service industries, and it was also a major facilitator of new 
combinations of products and technologies. There were three basic developments in 
the electronic and computer revolution: firstly, the transition from electro-
mechanical technology to semiconductors, secondly, the development of program-
ming principles in computers; and thirdly, digital technology. All three develop-
ments radically changed the telecom sector. This section gives a short elaboration of 
technological change in the semiconductor and computer industry until the 1970s, 
before it moves on to an account of the new perceptions and understandings of re-
search and technology that evolved in the western countries from the late 1950s. 
 
The historical background to the transistor is closely related to the challenges of 
amplifying long-distance phone calls. The triode vacuum tube, developed by Lee De 
Forest in 1906 and perfected by Bell Labs, “allowed the signal to be amplified regu-
larly along the line”, and thus “a telephone conversation could go on across any 
distance as long as there were amplifiers along the way”.37 Yet, it proved to be unre-
                                                          
35 Interview with Jon Stenberg, who was Director of Personal relations in Elektrisk Bureau.. 
36 It has been defined as the “technique that is based on the utilisation of the free electrons’ 
physics in vacuum tubes, gas filled tubes and semiconductors, and encompass both the elec-
tronic elements and those apparatuses and equipment that exploits these elements.” Elektro-
nikkutredningen 1963, here after Jensen 1989, p. 108. 
37 “AT&T bought De Forest’s patent and vastly improved the tube. It allowed the signal to be 
amplified regularly along the line, meaning that a telephone conversation could go on across 
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liable and the numerous tubes needed caused complexity. Bell Labs researched 
solid-state physics, hoping the solution might lie in the use of semiconductors. The 
use of radar during World War II brought advances in the use of tubes for detecting 
radio signals, as well as an understanding of semiconductors. In 1947, Bell Labs 
presented its first transistor.38 AT&T licensed the technology, which contributed to a 
rapid distribution of the technology.39 It had a wide variety of applications, not least 
for the military, which became the main market for the rapidly evolving semicon-
ductor industry.40  
 
The increasing use of the transistor met with the same problem as the vacuum tube, 
i.e. problems of reliability and complexity. “As the number of transistors employed 
in a system grew, the probability that the failure of a single component or intercon-
nection would cause a failure in the system increased exponentially”.41 The inven-
tion of the Integrated Circuit, in 1958/59, was a response to this; it combined several 
transistors on one silicon chip.42 The integrated circuit, or microchip, was later inte-
grated into several different products, thus increasing the accuracy, reliability and 
applications of the product. It became a major building block in the digitised tele-
com network; moreover it was essential in the development of computers. Its suc-
cessor was the microprocessor, invented by Intel in 1972.43 This is a programmable 
microchip, containing thousands of transistors.  
 
The different generations of electronic computers follow the development of semi-
conductors. The first generation of electronic computers used tubes, and was put 
into service in 1946. The IBM 360, launched in 1965, belonged to the second gen-
                                                                                                                                        
any distance as long as there were amplifiers along the way.” David C. Mowery and Nathan 
Rosenberg: Paths of innovation: technological change in 20th-century America, 1998, p. 124. 
38 Physicists John Bardeen and Walter Brattain at Bell Labs presented the point-contact tran-
sistor in December 1947. “Three years later, their colleague William Shockley developed the 
junction transistor, a vastly improved model that made the transistor commercially viable and 
launched the electronic revolution.” All three scientists won the 1956 Nobel Prize in physics, 
for their work. in http://smithsonianchips.si.edu/augarten/pv.htm 
39 AT&T sought cross-licenses in return for its patents. “As a result, virtually every important 
technological development in the industry was accessible to AT&T and all of the patents in 
the industry were linked through cross-licenses with AT&T.” Mowery and Rosenberg, 1998, p. 
125. 
40 Mowery and Rosenberg, 1998, p. 125. 
41 Mowery and Rosenberg, 1998, p. 126. 
42 Jack Kilby at Texas Instruments invented the first Integrated Circuit in 1958; the compo-
nents in Kilby’s Integrated Circuit were wired together. Fairchild Semiconductor presented a 
new Integrated Circuit in 1959, Robert Noyce was essential in putting all the components on 
a chip of silicon and connecting them with copper lines that were printed on an oxide layer. 
43 Chapuis and Joel, 1990, p. 111. 
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eration, using transistors. It marked the computer revolution, and became the lead-
ing mainframe computer that fortified IBM’s dominant position in the 1960s and 
1970s.44 The third generation of computers, launched by Digital Equipment Corpo-
ration, used integrated circuits.45 The fourth generation is marked by the microproc-
essor, and was widely used from 1975. As the underlying semiconductor technology 
has remained stable, subsequent computers have been regarded as belonging to the 
fourth generation, but processing power and storage capacities have increased be-
yond imagination, in accordance with (Gordon) Moore’s Law, i.e. the number of 
transistors in an integrated circuit doubles every 18-24 months. At present there are 
several million transistors on a chip.46  
 
An essential factor in the development of computers was the Stored Program Tech-
nique, which implied that a computer could be programmed to perform different 
tasks and operations, regardless of its hardware.47 It meant that the instructions 
could be reprogrammed according to new tasks, but also - which is pivotal for tele-
com - according to different surroundings. Another significant trait of the electron-
ics and computer revolution was the development of digital technology. It was de-
ployed in the first electronic computers after World War II; the registration of num-
bers in computers was initially done in a decimal form, but was replaced by binary 
digits, ‘0’ and ‘1’. An essential feature of computer and telecom networks was that 
the binary digits could be transmitted easily, by varying the electrical signals, on/off. 
Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) transformed the human voice into a digital form, 
thus allowing digital transmission of voice telephony, which enhanced capacity, 
reliability and accuracy. Moreover, PCM became “the launching pad for digital 
switching” from the 1980s.48 The rapid technological change from the late 1950s 
went hand in hand with an intellectual development regarding science and technol-
ogy, which also had a strong impact on the telecom industry. The remainder of this 
section looks into this. 
                                                          
44 “The computer performances were spectacularly increased regarding both speed of calcula-
tion and reliability”, due to the transistor”. Prices also fell in terms of quality of service of-
fered.” The use of computers spread rapidly: 20,000 were in use in the Western world in 1964, 
“80% of them in the United States”; Chapuis and Joel, 1990, p. 111. W. E. Steinmueller: 
“The U.S. Software Industry: An Analysis and Interpretive History.”, 1996, p. 15-22. 
45 Chapuis and Joel, 1990, p. 149. 
46 The Large Scale Integration (LSI) in the 1970s, had tens of thousands of transistors per 
chip, than it was Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) in the 1980s, with hundreds of thou-
sands and beyond, well past several million in the latest stages. 
47 The stored program principle, i.e. that the instructions of the computer, the programme, 
were stored in the electronic memory, and were handled the same way as other numerical 
data, was essential to telecom. 
48 Chapuis and Joel 1990, p. 293. 
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* 
 
The developments of microelectronics contributed to an increased focus on research 
and technology, and its importance for economy and military made it a matter of 
high politics. The intellectual developments in economics reinforced this tendency. 
The awareness of the relationship between technological change and economic 
growth was strengthened in the late 1950s. Formerly, economic growth had been 
explained by the allocation of capital and personnel. A new generation of econo-
mists accentuated the human factor, i.e. technology and knowledge, or what is 
known as the residual factor. It is also called the “Solow Residual”, due to Robert 
M. Solow’s influential studies in this field; he claimed that 87.5% of growth in out-
put in the US between 1909 and 1949 could be ascribed to technological improve-
ments alone.49 In an article from 1962, Kenneth J. Arrow claimed: “It is by now 
incontrovertible that increases in per capita income cannot be explained simply by 
increases in the capital-labour ratio”.50 
 
Moreover, Arrow and Richard R. Nelson presented the ‘underinvestment rationale’ 
around 1960. They claimed there was a market failure in R&D spending; firms 
would not invest as much in R&D as would be beneficial to society’s interest.51 
Arrow asserted that there was a free-rider problem: “A conclusion was that private 
sector could be expected to underinvest in scientific research,” says Vernon W. 
Ruttan, and “that public investment would be necessary to achieve a socially opti-
mal level of research.”52 A central presupposition for Arrow was that technology 
was regarded as information, which, as other commodities, is accessible at no cost. 
This perception, that technology was like information, was soon outdated.53 Never-
                                                          
49 Robert M. Solow: "A Contribution to the theory of Economic Growth" in 1956. 
50 Kenneth J. Arrow. “The economic implications of learning by doing”, 1962. This was 
based on Moses Abramowitz: “Resource and output trends in the United States since 1870”, 
1956; John W. Kendrick. “Productivity trends: Capital and labor”, 1956. These scholars laid 
the ground for what has been called the new economic growth theory, or endogenous growth 
theory, and gave an economic and academic justification for pursuing a more offensive sci-
ence and technology policy. 
51 Kenneth J. Arrow: “Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention”, 1962; 
Richard. Nelson “The simple Economics of Basic Research Scientific Research.” 1959; Here 
from Vernon W. Ruttan: Technology, Growth and Development - An induced Innovation 
Perspective, 2001, p. 538-539. 
52 Ruttan p. 538-539. 
53 The prevailing paradigm regards technology and knowledge as sticky and context-
dependent, which reduces the chance of copying. E. Von Hippel: “Sticky information and the 
locus of problem solving: implications for innovation”, Management Science, 40, 1994, 429-
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theless, the underinvestment rationale was significant in gaining acceptance for 
increasing the public R&D spending, which was an important feature of the elec-
tronic revolution that took place in the United States. 
 
The major inventions in electronics before 1970 took place in the USA. An impor-
tant reason for the US dominance was the stable market that the military and NASA* 
provided, and the public funding of R&D. Important reasons for this were the Cold 
War, and the «space race» between the USA and the USSR, which was intensified 
after the Sputnik shock in 1957. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, warned about the 
military industrial complex in 1960, stating an “increasing share (of research) is 
conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government.”54 John K. 
Galbraith’s concept of the techno-structure also pointed to the close ties between the 
government, business and the R&D system.55 Hence, the role of the US government 
is decisive in explaining how the electronic revolution widened the technology gap 
between the United States and Europe. In his influential book, The American Chal-
lenge, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber claimed that the “most serious (handicap) 
European business suffers in competition with its American rivals (…) is the sys-
tematic and organized assistance the US government gives to key industries through 
its contracts and research grants”.56  
 
Servan-Schreiber asserted that 63 per cent of the US electronic industry’s business 
was “in the form of government contracts, compared to 12 per cent for European 
industry”.57 The US government financed 85 per cent of the electronic industry’s 
R&D. As a “percentage of sales”, Servan-Schreiber claimed, “European research 
funds are less than half those in the United States”.58 The European countries were 
eager to narrow the “technology gap” and took on new R&D policies to enhance 
their competence and control in electronics.59 They also had to confront an increas-
ing volume of FDI from US companies. One of Servan-Schreiber’s main points was 
the degree to which large US corporations were increasing their operations in 
                                                                                                                                        
439. Conf. Lucia Cusmano: “Technology Policy and Co-operative R&D: the role of relational 
research capacity” 2000. 
* National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
54 “Military-Industrial Complex Speech”, in Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, 1960, (http://webusers.anet-stl.com/~civil/docs-
militarycomplexeisenhower1961.htm). 
55 John Kenneth Galbraith: The New Industrial State, 1967. 
56 Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber: The American Challenge, 1968, p. 44. 
57 Servan-Schreiber 1968, p. 44. 
58 Servan-Schreiber 1968, p. 44. 
59 OECD: Gaps In technology: Electronic Components; Gaps In technology: Electronic 
Computers; and Gaps In technology: General Report. 
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Europe.60 Thus, there was an apprehension about being too reliant on the United 
States and American MNCs. Several books were published on the subject, including 
The Americanization of Europe and The American Take-Over of Britain.61  
 
Still, there was also a trans-Atlantic cooperation, as many in the western societies 
perceived the Sputnik shock as a warning of future Soviet predominance in science 
and technology. Many feared that the liberal Western model was inferior to the 
state-dominated industrial policies in the eastern bloc. This feeling of inferiority 
seems paradoxical, taking into account the unparalleled growth the western societies 
experienced in the ‘golden age’ between 1945 and 1970, still, it created yet another 
rationale for state activism. In 1961, the former Marshall Plan organisation, the 
OEEC, was transformed into the OECD, i.e. the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. In 1963, it published the Piganiol Report on ”Sci-
ence, Economic Growth and Government Policy”, which, among other things, 
called for more public funding of R&D. In the same year, the Frascati Manual was 
drawn up to measure the level of R&D and technological development, and, thus, to 
help form polices.  
 
The period up to 1960 is often characterised as the naïve period, where the linear 
model of technological development, i.e. science push, dominated.62 The new sci-
ence and technology policy reflected a stronger belief in the ability to influence 
technological change.63 R&D activity increased in general, particularly in electron-
ics. An institutional infrastructure for allocating resources and coordinating R&D 
was established and national R&D programmes were launched. The intellectual and 
political development demanded new institutional forms, but one should not under-
estimate the impact of the new dominating technology, electronics. Christopher 
                                                          
60 Servan-Schreiber was not in favour of a Gaullistic protectionism, but he stated that: “If we 
allow American investment to enter freely under present conditions, we consign European 
industry - or at least the part that is most scientifically and technologically advanced and on 
which our future rests - to a subsidiary role.” Servan-Schreiber 1968, p. 52. 
61 McCreary 1964; Servan-Schreiber 1968; McMillan and Harris 1968, Conf. Wilkins 1975, 
p. 345. 
62 It was nurtured by the technological breakthroughs from ‘big science’ during the World 
War and the Cold War. Christopher Freeman: “The ‘National System of Innovation’ in his-
torical perspective”, 1995; Johan Hauknes and Olav Wicken: “Innovation policy in the post-
war period - Trends and patterns” 1999. A commonly used reference to the “science-push” is 
J. Langrish, M. Gibbons, W.G. Evans, and F.R Jevons: Wealth from Knowledge: A Study of 
Innovation in industry, 1972. 
63 The traditional notion, in line with the linear model, was that technology shaped society, 
but during the 1960s, there was a growing confidence that society could shape technology. 
Lars Fuglsang: “Three perspectives in science, technology and society studies (STS) in the 
policy context”, in 2000. 
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Freeman and Carlotta Perez argue that economic and institutional development is 
motivated by shifts in techno-economic paradigms, each containing a new key tech-
nology.64 Thus, a concrete institutionalisation took place, with the establishment of 
new organisations and public bodies, which reshaped, and to some extent, created 
new R&D systems. Moreover, institutions, in terms of norms and attitudes towards 
R&D, were also reshaped and created. 
 
The perception of what spurred innovation also changed in this decade; incremental 
innovations, learning by doing, as well as new “mutations” of technologies, knowl-
edge, competence, were accentuated as sources of innovation.65 This has much in 
common with the ideas put forward in the literature on evolutionary economics and 
systems of innovation. The policies and institutionalisation that took place created 
new systems of science and technology, or what eventually came to be called sys-
tems of innovations. Being a general-purpose technology, electronics was decisive 
in shaping new attitudes towards innovation, as it facilitated new mutations of tech-
nology. Moreover, much incremental innovation took place by implementing elec-
tronics in products and processes. Hence there were reciprocal effects between the 
electronic revolution, the character and usage of electronics, and the abandonment 
of the linear model, and thus the development of evolutionary economics in the 
1970s, and the system of innovation approach in the 1980s. The next section looks 
into how these processes took place in Norway, and how they formatted the Norwe-
gian system of innovation in telecom. 
 
A Norwegian system of innovation in telecom 
In Norway, the policy discussions regarding a new science and technology policy, 
and electronics, were much influenced by the radiolink conflict, i.e. Telegrafverket’s 
refusal to support Nera through procurement. It set off a policy debate concerning 
the procurement policy of Telegrafverket and other public institutions, which was 
coupled with the discourse regarding a new policy for science and technology and 
the electronic revolution. Those in favour of Nera-FFI, with the Minister of Indus-
try, Kjell Holler, and FFI's Helmer Dahl in the lead, decided to confront Tele-
grafverket's procurement policy, by linking it to the challenges and possibilities 
offered by electronics. This section gives an account of the new norms related to 
innovation, by looking into the report of the “Committee for Electronics” (CE). Its 
                                                          
64 The steam engine (late eighteenth century), railways (mid-nineteenth century), electricity 
(late nineteenth century), petrochemicals (early twentieth century) and information technol-
ogy/electronics (mid-twentieth century). Christopher Freeman and Carlotta Perez: “Structural 
Crises of Adjustment: Business Cycles and Investment Behaviour.” 1988. 
65 Arrow 1962. 
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task was to “present propositions on what steps should be taken to stimulate the 
development of the electronics industry in Norway.”66 Then it gives an account of 
the establishment of Televerket's R&D institute in 1967. 
 
Norway was, as most countries, caught in an electronics fever from the late 1950s. 
In an award-winning thesis on how to develop an electronic industry in Norway, 
Telegrafverket's Olav Skeie stressed that electronics was both an independent indus-
try and a key industry “for several other industries”. As he claimed, there were “few, 
if any, processes in the industry, that cannot be guided or regulated by electronic 
equipment”.67 Electronics was particularly important for automation, which was a 
buzzword at the time.68 The “fundamental new thing with today’s technique”, Skeie 
continued, “is that electronics gives more and flexible possibilities for programming 
and regulation”.69 Still, the economic implications of electronics were overshad-
owed by its key position in the society: “Electronic equipment has the same role in 
society as nerves and sensory organs in the body”, said the CE, and “accordingly, 
the right use of electronic equipment will have a big impact on how well a society 
functions, and how fast the material growth proceeds”.70 
 
Among the proponents of an offensive science and technology policy, it was com-
mon to stress that Norway was too dependent on hydroelectric power; that it needed 
to develop an industry based on knowledge and technology.71 To some extent, this 
was a battle between the traditional economists in the Ministry of Finance, known as 
the power-economists, and the modernists, who had strong allies among the military 
technicians from the FFI camp. Skeie wrote: “Today we float on low cost electrical 
energy, (which) may be a danger to our independence and prosperity.”72 His mes-
                                                          
66 The Committee for Electronics’ report (Innstilling fra NTNFs Utvalg for Elektronikk), p. 
1.(Fremlegge forslag om hvilke skritt som bør tas for å stimulere utbygging av den elektro-
niske industri i Norge.) 
67 The Norwegian Engineering Society arranged a thesis competition in 1958, on how to 
develop an electronics industry in Norway. One of the two winners of the competition was 
Telegrafverket's Olav Skeie. Skeie published his award winning thesis from 1958, in 1960, 
Olav Skeie: Verdensmarked - Scientific management, 1960p. 28-29. 
68 Kjell Holler, the later Minister of Industry and Director General of Televerket wrote a 
popularised book on electronics and automation, Kjell Holler: Automatisering. Spøkelse eller 
realitet?, 1957. 
69 Skeie 1960, p. 28. 
70 Innstilling fra NTNFs Utvalg for Elektronikk, (De elektroniske hjelpemidler spiller samme 
rolle i samfunnet som nerver og sanseorganer legemet. (...) På samme måte vil den rette bruk 
av elektroniske hjelpemidler være av stor betydning for hvor godt et samfunn fungerer og 
hvor hurtig dets materielle vekst går frem). 
71 Jensen 1989, p. 84. 
72 Skeie 1960, p. 45. 
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sage was bold and desperate: the Norwegian electronics industry had to “expand or 
die”.73 The modernists argued that knowledge-intensive industry; and first and 
foremost electronics, would be the industry of the future.74 This reasoning gained 
ground in the late 1950s, in line with the international development. What is more, 
Norwegian economists were at the forefront of research concerning the residual 
factor’s impact on economic growth.75 This, and the development of semiconductor 
technology, formed the background for Kjell Holler's request to the Norwegian 
Research Council for Science (NTNF*) to set up a Committee for Electronics.  
 
Besides praising electronics in general, CE’s main agenda was that public offices 
should play an active role in stimulating the Norwegian electronics industry through 
a national procurement policy and by giving development contracts to the industry. 
Kjersti Jensen claims that Holler and Dahl had decided to use the CE to substantiate 
the criticism of Telegrafverket's procurement policy.76 Thus, the report was very 
critical of Telegrafverket, both for its lack of competence and for not using its pro-
curement power to stimulate Norwegian industry. The background to this criticism 
was Telegrafverket's reluctance to procure Nera-FFI’s radiolink. The «military tech-
nicians» dominated the CE, which was headed by Helmer Dahl.77 The overwhelm-
ing majority of members of the CE had taken a strong stance in the radiolink con-
flict. The main message was that Telegrafverket lacked an R&D unit, which would 
have enabled it to appreciate the benefits that Nera's broadband radiolink provided.78 
The CE also accentuated that the import of electronic goods was high, and that the 
bulk of the imports was telecom equipment from ITT and LME.79 Thus, Tele-
grafverket did not take on its role as an industry provider, by using its unique posi-
                                                          
73 Skeie 1960, p. 27. 
74 Olav Wicken: “Stille propell i storpolitisk storm. KV/Toshiba-saken og dens bakgrunn.” 
Forsvarsstudier nr. 1/88 Institutt for Forsvarsstudier, p. 13, her etter Jensen 1989, p. 3. 
75 Odd Aukrust and Juul Bjerke: Realkapital og økonomisk vekst 1900-1956, 1958. Here after 
Jensen 1989, p. 128. 
* Norwegian abbreviation for Norges Teknisk- Naturvitenskapelig Forskningsråd. 
76 Jensen 1989, p. 94. 
77 The only member that did not count among the military technicians was Skeie. Tele-
grafverket was content to have him in the committee, but he was headhunted by EB before 
CE’s report was completed. CE’s other members were CEO Vebjørn Tandberg, Tandberg 
Radiofabrikker, Director Leif Gaudernack EB, R&D-director at FFI Karl Holberg, Chief 
engineer at Nera E. Kulvik, Colonel Rørholt, CEO Willy Simonsen, Simonsen Radio. Jensen 
1989, p. 96. 
78 Elektronikkutredningen 1964, p. 116. 
79 The annual value of the Norwegian production in electronics amounted to NOK 200 mil-
lion, which was about the same as the total value of the import of electronic goods. Jensen 
1989, p. 109. 
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tion in Norway as a procurer of technology. Independent R&D was regarded as a 
necessary requirement for taking on such a role. 
 
Telegrafverket had considered the research question in line with Skeie’s memoran-
dum of 1957, which had asked for better planning and coordination of Tele-
grafverket's business.80 Håkon Nymoen, a laboratory engineer, was sent to Sweden 
in 1958, to study the Swedish PTO's R&D. His report stressed that it was imperative 
that Telegrafverket conducted independent R&D.81 Rynning-Tønnesen, however, 
did not want to get carried away by the “present research mania”.82 Nevertheless, an 
internal committee was formed in 1959 to consider the R&D issue. The committee’s 
report was finished in 1961, and it accepted Telegrafverket’s modest modus oper-
andi, due to financial constraints, and the lack of qualified personnel. Thus it advo-
cated a laboratory, closely attached to Telegrafverket's everyday problems. It main-
tained, however, that the company needed “a more distinct research and develop-
ment activity, to satisfy the demand society is entitled to put on Telegrafverket”.83 
Little came out of laboratory report in 1961; the initiative was with the military 
technicians.  
 
The CE did not recommend that Telegrafverket should carry out research in accor-
dance with the science-push model. On the contrary, it accepted that big countries 
would lead the way in electronics, “but to think that one can exploit research results, 
without participating actively, is based on a misunderstanding”.84 R&D was essen-
tial to enhance the absorptive capacity, the CE claimed, and thus, it turned Arrow’s 
free-rider argument upside down: to be a capable free-rider, one needs to undertake 
R&D. These issues were at the core for the CE, since Norwegian firms were small, 
there were few corporate R&D units, and the linkages to the public R&D institutes 
were weak. R&D was regarded as too academic, with modest commercial interest 
for business.85 It was crucial to engage in independent R&D, mainly to be able to 
assess and exploit the R&D results of others. Besides, the committee tried to combat 
the linear perception of technological development, by stating that innovations that 
                                                          
80 The Norwegian Telecom Museum, Ingar Hansen’s delivery, 003.4 Telegrafstyret 1958-72: 
“Om utbygging, eventuelt reorganisering av de tekniske avdelinger ved Telegrafverket, Av O. 
Skeie II.F.15/12-57”. 
81 Oland 1993, p. 56 f. 
82 Rynning-Tønnensen at telephone-engineer meeting in 1959, Telektronikk 1959: 81 and 85; 
here after Espeli 2005, p. 420. 
83 Innstilling fra Telegrafstyret laboratorieutvalget av 1961, here after Oland 1993, p. 60. 
84 Elektronikkutredningen 1964, p. 123, (men å tro at man kan utnytte forskningens resultater 
uten selv å følge aktivt med, bunner i en misforståelse). 
85 Jensen, 1989, p. 131; Bjørn Ole Helsing Lossius: MARSAT - Prosjektet. Om utviklingen av 
teknologi og industri for maritim satellittkommunikasjon. 1991. 
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took place in the production process, had economic significance, and that R&D 
would stimulate this sort of innovation. Consequently, the theoretical origins of the 
system of innovation approach are traceable in the CE’s report. 
 
A focal point of the system of innovation approach, emphasised by Bengt-Åke 
Lundvall, is that innovation takes place through interaction, and interactive learning, 
between users and producers of technology.86 Fridlund’s study of the Swedish PTO 
and LME is based on this assumption.87 The CE’s report was in accordance with 
these ideas, and praised the close cooperation between the PTOs and national 
equipment suppliers in Sweden and other countries, which, according to the report, 
contributed to industrial growth and a modern telecom network.88 CE advocated a 
similar role for Telegrafverket, and asked for a two-step development: Tele-
grafverket should upgrade its competence through R&D, and then it should engage 
in cooperation with the industry in the early stages of product development. More-
over, Telegrafverket should finance parts of the industry’s R&D costs through de-
velopment contracts.89 The aim was to establish relations between Telegrafverket 
and the industry, to spur innovation. Based on its competence acquired from R&D, 
Telegrafverket should act as a demanding customer, and engage in interactive rela-
tionships with its suppliers. 
 
The CE asserted that when Telegrafverket preferred to procure equipment from 
foreign companies, it was because of its meagre competence. Even if it was a 
greater risk to procure equipment from domestic suppliers than from large multina-
tionals, Telegrafverket was not able to consider this risk. Moreover, even if foreign 
equipment would be beneficial for an isolated project, in the short run, Tele-
grafverket lacked the proficiency to assess this question. The CE argued that it 
would be better, in the long run, to establish relationships with domestic equipment 
suppliers. In procuring from domestic firms, the concrete interaction would be 
established. This was in accordance with Lundvall’s assertion that “long-term 
interactive learning is most easily organised in a setting where there are few 
linguistic and cultural constraints for the transfer of tacit knowledge and where a 
                                                          
86 Lundvall1988; Lundvall (ed.) 1992. Close relations between suppliers and customer have 
given rise to a great deal of research in the so-called IMP group (International Marketing and 
Purchasing Group). confer for instance Håkan Håkansson and Ivan Snehota: Developing 
Relationships in Business Networks, Routledge 1995. 
87 Fridlund’s study is a part of a book edited by Charles Edquist, one of the founding fathers 
of the system of innovation approach. 
88 Elektronikkutredningen 1964, p. 55. 
89 Collett 1984, p. 7. 
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cultural constraints for the transfer of tacit knowledge and where a multilateral sys-
tem of trust relationships can most easily be organised”.90 
 
For a committee for electronics, it is noteworthy how little attention was paid to 
electronics technology in the CE’s report. The committee’s main concern was the 
public procurement policy in Norway; therefore Eirik Oland is right in asking if this 
was merely a request for protectionist measures, due to the European integration and 
Norway’s membership in EFTA* from 1960.91 When the CE report was circulated to 
concerned parties for comment, the NTNF was asked to produce a national dossier 
on general R&D.92 The NTNF decided that the CE’s report should function as the 
section on electronics in the general R&D dossier, with an additional R&D report on 
electronics. The R&D report from 1964 was in line with the CE’s report, stating that 
it was critical for Telegrafverket to establish an R&D department, in order to func-
tion as a locomotive for the electronics industry in Norway.93  
 
Telegrafverket's board of directors formed a working committee in December 1964, 
and agreed on “a close cooperation between FFI and Telegrafverket in the research 
work”.94 The Director General from 1962, Leif Larsen, and FFI director, Finn Lied 
agreed that Telegrafverket’s R&D unit ought to be located alongside FFI’s main 
office at Kjeller outside Oslo. Sharing expensive equipment and favourable areas 
were arguments that were put forward, but the main reason was to detach the R&D 
unit from Telegrafverket, and to put it under FFI’s influence. Telegrafverket's tech-
nical environment was regarded as so conservative, according to Knut Endresen, 
who worked for FFI at the time, that it was considered a necessity to separate the 
R&D unit from it.95 Telegrafverket was a hopelessly backward organisation; accord-
ing to Ole Petter Håkonsen, who worked for ELAB at the time and later became 
technical director at Televerket, “only jerks would start to work there”.96 It was 
                                                          
90 Lundvall et. al. 2002, p. 219-220. 
* European Free-Trade Association. 
91 Oland 1993, p. 85. In 1959, The Ministry of Industry asserted that protectionist measures 
were necessary to preserve the Norwegian telecom industry, and that a significant amount of 
hard currency would be saved. St. meld. 1959 nr. 4 Om statens innkjøp, here after Oland 
1993, p. 45. 
92 The initiative came from two Labour-MPs, who thought that too much of the government’s 
R&D funding was allocated to nuclear research. Interview with Director of NTNF, Robert 
Major, in Forskning nr. 2 1996. Nuclear research used 15 % of the government’s R&D fund-
ing according to Major. Conf. also Oland 1993, p. 103. 
93 NTNFs Forskningsutredning 1964, and Oland 1993, p. 105-106. 
94 Telegrafverket’s Styremøte 11.12.64. (Det var enighet om et nært samarbeid mellom FFI 
og Telegrafverket i forskningsarbeidet.) 
95 Knut Endresen in interview with Oland 1993, p. 147. 
96 Ole Petter Håkonsen and interview with Oland 1993, p. 147. 
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regarded as necessary to let FFI direct the development during the first years, before 
it could stand on its own feet.97 In July 1965, Telegrafverket decided to set up an 
R&D unit at Kjeller, and “as soon as possible to build up Telegrafverket's research 
team”.98 
 
Telegrafverkets Forskningsinstitutt (TF) was established in 1967, alongside FFI at 
Kjeller.99 Telegrafverket chose Nic. Knudtzon as the R&D-director, at the expense 
of Håkon Nymoen, who became second in command.100 Knudtzon belonged to the 
FFI camp; Helmer Dahl was his supervisor while he wrote his graduate thesis at the 
Norwegian Institute of Technology (NTH*), and he worked at FFI’s telecom de-
partment for two years. Unlike most others, however, he had spent considerable 
time overseas, first two years at MIT* in 1948 and 1949, and at SHAPE* in The 
Hague from 1957 to 1968.101 One of the first things Knudtzon did was to change the 
R&D unit’s name from Laboratory, as it was called in the preparatory reports, to 
Research Institute. He thought laboratory was too “equipment-oriented” and wanted 
to signal a higher level of ambitions for the TF.102 Knudtzon said he wanted the TF 
to assist Telegrafverket in its procurement of equipment, and to function as Tele-
grafverket's watchdog towards the industry. Still, he did not want the TF to get 
caught up in Televerket’s day-to-day business. Knudtzon’s fear was in line with 
most other PTOs’ R&D units, and followed a “classic blueprint for the organization 
of corporate R&D in the Telecoms Industry” in keeping “an arm’s-length relation-
ship with the company’s businesses”.103 Thus, it is indicative that long-term plan-
ning was not far-reaching enough for Knudtzon, so he replaced the phrase with 
distant-time planning.104 
 
                                                          
97 Knut Endresen in interview with Oland 1993, p. 147. 
98 Telegrafverket’s Styremøte 20.07.65, (så snart som mulig å bygge opp et Telegrafverkets 
forskningsteam). 
99 Actually it moved to Kjeller after a few months, in November 1967. 
100 Telegrafverket's “Styremøte 8. mars 1967, 55. Innstilling av forskningssjef”. 
* Norwegian abbreviation for Norges Tekniske Høyskole. 
* Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
* Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. 
101 Thus, he did not start at Telegrafverket before 1968. Interview with the former Head of 
TF, Nic. Knudtzon; Collett and Lossius 1993, p. 36 f. 
102 Collett and Lossius, 1993, p. 43. 
103 The blueprint “was published in 1971 by Dr. Jack A. Morton, who became vice president of 
Bell Laboratories” Jack A. Morton: Organising for innovation: A Systems Approach for Techni-
cal Management, McGraw-Hill, New York 1971. Here after Martin Fransman: Telecoms in 
the internet age: from boom to bust to....?, 2002, p. 218-219. 
104 Collett and Lossius, 1993, p. 43. 
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An essential part of the rationale behind the TF was the anticipation of a fully digi-
tised telecom network. Knudtzon gave a speech in 1970 that illuminates the TF’s 
cognitive landscape at the time: “We must not believe that we are only just now living 
through an information explosion, which soon will pass. The fact is, that we are sub-
jected mercilessly to an accelerating law and are only at the initial phase of a mas-
sive explosion.”105 There were three technological areas in particular into which the 
TF wanted to channel its resources: firstly, digitising the transmission network by 
Pulse Code Modulation (PCM); secondly, data communication, and thirdly, switch-
ing.106 An important area, encompassing these three fields, was “network planning”, 
that was to develop means to monitor the whole telecom network day-by-day, and to 
plan the future digital network. Another important area for the TF, detached from 
the digital network, was (maritime) satellite communication. Even if it was not de-
pendent on digital technology, it pointed towards a central technological field for 
the forthcoming ICT revolution, namely wireless communication.  
 
Knudtzon had ambitions to assist Telegrafverket in modernising the network, but 
also on pressing technical issues and in procuring equipment, the TF wanted to be a 
watchdog towards the industry. Last but not least, it wanted to contribute to indus-
trial development. It was to play a national and integrating role for R&D activities in 
the Norwegian telecom industry. Knudtzon said the TF was to be the spearhead of a 
triangle, consisting of the TF, other relevant R&D institutes, and the industry.107 The 
obstacle for use of development contracts, however, was the lack of nationally 
owned companies in the telecom industry. The Norwegian authorities were in line 
with most governments in giving preference to national industry in their industrial 
policy. The governmental Development Fund* was established in 1964 to support 
Norwegian industry in general, and the Norwegian electronics industry in particular. 
STK was granted a loan for developing a “self-deadened” telecom-line, but the 
foundation supported mainly nationally owned companies.108 When the chairman of 
the Development Fund, Erik Brofoss, talked of key companies in the electronics 
industry, it went without saying that these were nationally owned. These included 
Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk, Simrad and Tandberg.109 
 
                                                          
105 Quoted from Lossius, 1991, p. 131. 
106Nic. Knudtzon: ”Perspektiver for teleteknikken og status for televerkets forskning: foredrag 
Norsk telefoningeniørmøte, Rauland, 9.-11 juni 1972” 1972, Collett and Lossius, 1993, p. 61. 
107 Interview with the Nic. Knudtzon; Collett and Lossius, 1993, p.94. 
* Utviklingsfondet. 
108 RAUii: ”Referat fra Utviklingsfondets styremøte 24.02.70, sak 224 STKs selvdempende 
linjer”; and ”STK til Utviklingsfondet 07.08.70”. 
109 Sogner 1994, p. 35. 
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The TF, however, argued that national ownership would be an impossible criterion 
in the telecom industry, as there were no Norwegian companies of any significance. 
One had to exploit the subsidiaries, i.e. STK and EB, both for their industrial com-
petence as large companies, and their access to LME and ITT’s knowledge and 
R&D network. The Department of Industry accepted that foreign-owned subsidiar-
ies could sign development contracts, but required that the results of the contract 
were utilised in Norway.110 An important mission for the TF was to promote the 
subsidiaries’ position within LME and ITT. Knudtzon argued that by use of R&D 
contracts, the TF could help STK and EB “win the internal MNC competition 
among the subsidiaries, so resources and mandate could be allocated to Norway 
with possibilities for export”.111  
 
This line of reasoning - that TF/Telegrafverket should assist STK in its internal 
competition within ITT - pins down the essence of this thesis, i.e. STK's room for 
strategic manoeuvring in the telecom industry, within Norwegian society and ITT's 
corporate structures. It highlights the four theories or approaches this thesis applies, 
namely the significance of government and industry relations; systems of innova-
tion; MNCs’ global strategies and corporate governance. The corporate governance 
perspective is pertinent, in as much as TF/Telegrafverket and the government chal-
lenged ITT and LME's positions as sovereign stakeholders in STK and EB, respec-
tively. In the new system of innovation, and/or changing negotiated environment, it 
was not obvious that STK's main obligation was to serve ITT; it might as well be to 
contribute to developing a Norwegian high-tech industry. Thus, the new R&D sys-
tem that came with the TF reinforced STK's schizophrenia, of being a small subsidi-
ary within ITT, and a large Norwegian high-tech company. At the same time, how-
ever, as national actors raised their status as STK's stakeholders, so did ITT. When 
the electronic revolution swept across the United States, ITT fronted a financial 
revolution, helmed by Harold S. Geneen. 
 
Geneenism 
Behn’s standing in the US press was not high at the end of his tenure in the late 
1950s; ITT was dubbed a “non-profit organisation”.112 Its strategy and structure 
were blurred, and the trouble related to the 8B and Pentaconta had not passed unno-
ticed.113 The New York head office lacked control and influence over the European 
                                                          
110 Collett and Lossius, 1993, p. 90. 
111 TF’s annual report 1970, here from Lossius 1991, p. 91. 
112 “Stig M. Eriksson’s memorials from his time in the Swedish ITT house Standard Radio 
&Telefon AB” in http://www.iclinvia.se/veteran/99q4/itt_hist.htm (1999-09-22). 
113 Schoenberg 1985, p. 126. 
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subsidiaries, which provided the bulk of the revenues and profits. It was said that 
“every year”, the subsidiaries “delivered a bag of money to New York - maybe“.114 
The board wanted a leader who could perform financial control, and they could not 
have found a better man than Harold S. Geneen, who was regarded as a financial 
wizard. He became ITT's top man in 1959, and used it as a vehicle for creating one 
of the largest conglomerates in the world, guided by a financial logic. ITT’s turn-
over rose from some $765 million in 1960 to $14.6 billion in 1976.115 It was said 
that Geneen “acquired 350 businesses in 80 countries”, often, “after inspecting a 
company's books for no more than ten or 20 minutes”.116 By the end of the 1960s, 
telecom accounted for only one third of ITT’s sales, and the domestic business 
dominated ITT sales - if not profits.117 
 
Geneen's main argument for ITT’s domestic growth policy was that the share of 
revenues from the United States, the domestic market, was too small. “Our real 
problem”, Geneen claimed, “was that some 80-85 percent of (...) earnings came 
from abroad and were subjected to the particular economic conditions and political 
vicissitudes in these countries”.118 Fidel Castro, for instance, expropriated ITT's 
Cuban subsidiary in 1960; ITT had also lost six subsidiaries in the Eastern European 
bloc, and was constantly worried about the “weak currencies in Western Europe in 
relation to the strong American dollar”.119 Behn had also pursued growth through a 
merger and acquisition strategy, but he sought to diversify within ITT’s field of 
knowledge, i.e. in the electronics industry and communication business.120 Geneen, 
however, also sought to capitalise on ITT’s industrial and technical knowledge, but 
it was the financial aspects that mattered in his growth strategy.  
 
Geneen was regarded as a financial genius, and he thrived in the economic boom in 
the 1960s. This has been called the decade of conglomerates, and ITT is a prime 
example among giants like Textron, Litton and Gulf & Western. Conglomeration, or 
unrelated diversification, denotes large corporations with companies in unrelated 
                                                          
114 Schoenberg 1985, p. 109. 
115 “Rand Araskog redeploys ITT: high tech is the guiding light” in International Manage-
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116 “Tyrants, Statesmen, and Destroyers (A Brief History of the CEO)”, in Fortune Magazine 
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120 Sobel 1982, p. 190 f., Geneen and Moscow, 1984, p. 202. 
Chapter 3 STK as a foreign high-tech company 
 111
industries and sectors, where the economies of scope or synergy are negligible.121 A 
motive was to balance the cycles of the incumbent companies. This was for instance 
Nokia's argument when merging with two other companies in 1966.122 Others have 
claimed that the CEOs were motivated more by the building of corporate empires 
than by increasing profits. Still, there was a logic behind the conglomerates, as by 
sharing administrative costs and instigating financial control and modern business 
standards, one could fulfil the profitable potential of companies. ITT's ownership 
advantages during its conglomeration were its ability to carry out financial control 
and managerial streamlining of acquired companies. Geneen epitomised what Neil 
Fligstein perceived as essential in the financial conception of the firm, namely that 
“firms are viewed as collections of assets earning differing rates of return”, rather 
than “as producers of given goods”.123 
 
There were numerous grounds for the conglomeration process. First, the US anti-
trust laws put restrictions on horizontal and vertical integration, thus firms that 
sought external growth opted for unrelated diversification, in order to avoid prose-
cution.124 A second precondition for the merger wave was the bullish stock market 
in the United States during the 1960s, which encouraged companies to finance ac-
quisitions by stocks.125 Another significant condition for the conglomeration in the 
1960s, lay in the US management tradition, in the belief that a manager could man-
age anything.126 After Peter F. Drucker’s seminal book The Practice of Manage-
ment, published in 1955, skilled managers were perceived as a vital and a scarce 
resource, along with other economic factors. Hence, if one could allocate “skilled 
                                                          
121 The distinction between related and unrelated diversification will often be a matter of 
opinion. While CEOs in acquiring firms often will claim that there are synergies, critics will 
argue that managers are raising their own prestige, rather than the shareholder’s value. In the 
last decades, the term conglomerates has become an insult to a company, and core compe-
tence has been the credo. (Conf. Gary Hamel and C. K. Prahalad: “The Core Competence of the 
Corporation”, 1990 and Gary Hamel and C. K. Prahalad: Competing for the Future, 1994). Still, 
it might be that the financial logic behind the conglomerations in the 1960s was sound, while 
it is not today. Most large companies today have implemented modern management princi-
ples and better financial control, hence there are less margins to be reaped by doing this. 
122 Martti Häikiö: Nokia - The inside story, 2002, p. 49. The three companies were in the 
rubber, wood, and cable business, and started with electronics in the 1960s. 
123 Fligstein, 1990, p. 15. 
124 Fligstein, 1990, p. 28. 
125 The effects might have been reciprocal: the bull market might have been a result of the 
financial conception of the firm. This led to greater focus on things that increased the stock 
price, such as short-term profit. Fligstein, 1990, p 28. 
126 Haldor Byrkjeflot og Tor Halvorsen: “Institusjonelle forutsetninger for faglig og profesjo-
nell ledelse - industriledelse i Tyskland og USA” 1997, p. 107f. 
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management” better within a conglomerate, one could capitalise on it.127 The MBA 
education focused on strategy, management and finance, which were necessities in 
every industry. These qualifications implied a stronger focus on standardisation and 
financial performance, and less on craftsmanship and industrial development. In as 
much as the distinction is noteworthy, companies were more interesting as produc-
ers of profits, than of products. 
 
A normal way to enhance the profitability of an acquired company was to perform 
what ITT called “defensive football”, i.e. retain the line of the business that contrib-
uted sufficient return, and cut of the rest.128 Geneen increased margins by striving 
constantly for better resource allocation. In a sense, ITT's conglomeration was a 
matter of renovating and modernising the acquired companies. Consequently, 
Geneen aimed to exploit existing capabilities, or ownership advantages, rather than 
to create new capabilities. His abovementioned meeting with Maurice Deloraine at 
Orly Airport, supports this. Peter Young cites two technological conditions that 
were crucial for ITT’s growth: the “electronic computer and the jet engine”. While 
the computers “kept track of the mass figure”, the jets allowed ITT staff to “fly to 
potential trouble spots”.129 This gave ITT the nickname of “International Talking & 
Travelling Corporation!”130 It furnished an infrastructure for Geneen’s regime, with 
rigorous reporting and five-year business plans from all companies. “Harold Geneen 
likes facts. His whole corporate structuring of ITT was geared to rooting out the 
facts.”131 His obsession with facts went hand in hand with a centralised management 
philosophy, in which all major decisions had to be analysed and evaluated by the 
head office and Geneen himself.  
 
                                                          
127 Peter F. Drucker: The Practice of Management, Pan Books: New York, 1954. The book 
was written for General Electric, and the conclusion - that a manager could manage anything 
- was allegedly ordered by GE, in order to legitimise its conglomeration. Michael Goold and 
Kathleen Luchs “Why diversify? Four decades of management thinking” in 1993. 
128 “Hand in hand with such reorganization goes a technique that (John) Lobb and his manag-
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129 Young 1983, p. 142. 
130 “Stig M. Eriksson’s memorials from his time in the Swedish ITT house Standard Radio 
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“I want to know what’s going on. I don’t want some proud guy get 
into his own Vietnam and then suddenly hand me his resignation. 
Hell, his resignation can’t bring back the $10 million he’d lose. (...) 
That’s why I make everyone tell me about red-flag areas-spots where 
trouble may be brewing.”132 
 
Managers were summoned to ITT's headquarters every month, except August and 
December, to present reports and plans, and to be cross examined by ITT's top man-
agement and their equals. These managerial showdowns became a trademark of ITT 
and Geneen.133  
 
Geneen’s principles and management style were regarded as extraordinary in the 
United States, but the real task was to implement Geneenism in the overseas compa-
nies. The European subsidiaries were among ITT's cash cows at the beginning of 
Geneen’s tenure. Merrill Lynch claimed, “You could do nothing at the top of ITT 
and still make some money.”134 Still, the profit ratio in Europe was not impressive 
compared to assets or sales. “Behn’s concept of management,” according to a for-
mer aide, “was simply to organize to take advantage of all the tax laws - particularly 
European laws on dividend”.135 His strategy of national responsiveness rendered 
any form of integrated strategy for the European ITT companies impossible. Yet, 
this meant that the potential returns from rationalising, streamlining, financial con-
trol, and not least increased coordination and cooperation between the European 
companies were very large.  
 
To instigate coordination and cooperation among the European companies, Geneen 
set up ITT-Europe.136 The managerial meetings in Brussels took “the physical form 
of a monthly invasion”. 
 
                                                          
132 Allen 1979, p. 296. 
133 One of several cited scenes, appears as follows: Geneen: “John, what have you done about 
that problem?”; John: “Well, I called him, but I couldn’t get him to make a decision.”; 
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134 Schoenberg 1985, p. 108. 
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On the last Monday of every month, a Boeing 727 takes off from New 
York to Brussels, with sixty ITT executives aboard (…). For four days 
they stay in Brussels, still insulated in their special ITT world: many 
of them keep their watches on New York time. Most of their time is 
spent in the marathon meetings which are the core of the system”.137  
 
When Geneen reviewed the reports and plans of the managers “he made them think 
even more”, so they could “understand the financial implications and inconsisten-
cies in front of their colleagues”.138 Some European managers were replaced by 
Americans, and the rest had to learn “a new language: the meaning of terms like 
cash flow, return on assets, and key ratios.”139 Allegedly, the managers “acquired 
new attitudes: that they were businessmen rather than engineers, that there were no 
compulsion to be in a technology if it was no business”.140  
 
Geneen succeeded in implementing new attitudes, and in introducing a financial 
vocabulary and a rigorous report system in Europe.141 He also succeeded in intro-
ducing some co-ordination and cooperation among the European subsidiaries.142 His 
efforts to avoid duplication of production, internal competition and to stimulate 
cooperation among the European subsidiaries were natural, given his focus on effi-
cient resource allocation. It was difficult, however, for most MNCs to coordinate the 
subsidiaries' functions and allocate resources according to locational advantages. If 
MNCs wanted access to markets with trade barriers, they had to comply and pro-
duce in the host countries.143 The MNCs' response, according to Robert Pearce, was 
“separate manufacturing subsidiaries operating in each important national mar-
ket”.144 As a consequence, the subsidiaries were miniature replicas of the parent 
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company, replicating the mother company, only on a smaller scale and, mainly, in a 
more inefficient way.  
 
Geneen sought to combat the subsidiaries’ character as miniature replicas, and he 
did succeed, in industries other than telecom. ITT's European subsidiaries also had 
interests outside the telecom business before Geneen’s period, mainly in other fields 
related to electronics. The size of the non-telecom industries increased substantially 
under Geneen, since he brought the merger and acquisition wave to Europe. Thus, 
the product portfolio of the subsidiaries was enlarged, to include domestic appli-
ances, TV, and radio. A large part of ITT's European business, however, such as 
Sheraton and Avis, was not managed by the incumbent subsidiaries. To a certain 
degree, Geneen managed to structure the European business according to national 
advantages. An important instrument was the introduction of Product Line Manag-
ers (PLM), residing in New York.145 Geneen was cautious, however, not to provoke 
the national managers, and started off by supporting them against the PLM.146 “ 
Having first “gained the Europeans’ confidence and respect”, he switched tactics 
and “gradually sided with the PLMs when it came to commercial and consumer 
products, where national considerations did not intrude.” 147 The exception from this 
was telecom - where national considerations did intrude. 
 
Miniature replicas were especially common in the telecom industry, due to govern-
ments’ procurement power and the national interest attached to the sector. Thus, 
Geneen had to follow along Behn’s line of national responsiveness in this business. 
If ITT confronted a national manager, it ran the risk of provoking national govern-
ments and PTOs. The PTOs “could withhold enough business to erase profits if 
Geneen trifled with their friend, and countryman, the general manager”.148 The 
country managers were not interested in losing prestige by giving up business to 
other ITT houses, or by laying off people. They wanted to uphold the character of 
miniature replicas. Furthermore, an inevitable outcome of ITT's efforts to rationalise 
its European subsidiaries was to reduce the workforce, which it did in other lines of 
business. But, if ITT laid off workers in the telecom industry, it would renounce one 
of its main bargaining cards in the negotiated environment the industry operated in. 
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Hence, even if Geneen wanted to erase duplication and internal competition, and 
encourage cooperation in ITT-Europe, he did not want to alter the oligopolic setting 
in the industry. The close relations between the PTOs and the equipment supplier 
had two sides, one of monopsony and one of oligopoly. It was the monopsony, i.e. 
the PTOs' procurement power, which hindered integrating of ITT-Europe's telecom 
business. The other side of the coin was the market’s character of oligopoly, which 
provided the equipment suppliers lucrative margins. The prices of European telecom 
equipment were supposedly 60 to 100 per cent higher than in the United States.149 
One interesting example is the French market, which was called the “golden cage” 
by ITT. In order to stimulate national equipment suppliers, the French PTO paid 
generously for telecom equipment, “a concomitant result”, says Doz, “being wind-
fall profits to the ITT subsidiaries”.150 Thus, Geneen had to balance responsiveness 
and efficiency, whereas STK had to balance the interests of its US shareholder and 
its Norwegian stakeholders. 
 
Foreign subsidiaries 
During the 1960s, both STK and EB tried to amend the governmental concession, to 
increase ITT and LME’s ownership respectively. ITT wanted to augment its divi-
dend base and make it easier to pay higher dividends by taking over Kreditkassen’s 
25 per cent share. The bank held preference shares, which only were entitled to 6 per 
cent dividends, so it resembled a bond loan. Thus the bank was keen on selling its 
share, as the yield was low, and it had to participate in expensive share extensions to 
keep the concessionary limit on 25 per cent of the share capital.151 Its only reason 
for keeping the shares, was to maintain its business relationship with STK. LME, on 
the other hand, wanted to increase its ownership from 40 per cent to 50 per cent in 
1961, as it feared losing control over EB. Moreover, a majority ownership would 
allow LME to consolidate EB in its accounts, which would increase LME’s credit-
worthiness. When LME was obliged by the Norwegian authorities to reduce its 
ownership in EB from 75 to 40 per cent in 1928, managing director Albert Kvaal 
bought 10.3 per cent of the shares. The shares were placed in a holding company 
LME controlled; thus, LME had a controlling ownership in EB all the time. Kvaal’s 
successor, Victor Harboe Lund, “inherited” the shares, and his widow wanted to sell 
                                                          
149 Nguyen 1985, p. 98. 
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these shares to LME in 1961, which led EB to apply for a new concessionary char-
ter.152 
 
There were fairly positive attitudes towards foreign ownership in the early 1960s. 
Whereas the sentiments towards foreign ownership in the early post-war years were 
marked by national inferiority, claims Tore Grønlie, this changed in the early 
1960s.153 Foreign companies were welcomed if they contributed to industrial growth 
and prosperity.154 A sign of this was when Trygve Lie, former Secretary General of 
the UN, acted as a “dollar ambassador”, trying to attract US investment for indus-
trial projects. Lie also served as a member of STK's board, replacing Bache-Wiig 
who retired in 1966. The wish for national ownership was applied mainly to core 
industries. Being a small, and relatively poor country, most actors recognised that 
foreign presence was inevitable. The handling of EB's concession in 1962 showed 
that telecom was an area were the Ministry of Industry was content to depend on 
foreign firms, “since we do not have specific advantages” in this field.155  
 
Knut Sogner has showed how the increased attention and activism from the gov-
ernment in industrial issues, for instance through the Development Foundation, 
moved strategic arenas from the companies’ management, into a semi-public sphere 
of managers and bureaucrats.156 The government took a keen interest in supporting 
key companies in the electronic industry. Erik Brofoss said it was imperative “to 
pick some growth-companies and give them specific advantages”.157 STK and EB 
were not assessed as key companies in the 1960s, because they were foreign-owned. 
Moreover, telecom was not regarded as a key industry that the governmental appara-
tus was to support; instead it was an industry where foreign ownership was wel-
comed. An indication of this was how little the ministry knew of STK's relationship 
with ITT, which became evident when handling the concession in 1966.158 
 
                                                          
152 The 3000 LME shares were in a holding company called A/S Tao, which was created to 
prevent the sale of Kvaal’s shares on the open market after his death in 1954. LME had 12 
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155 RA-EBi: EA/LM Notat 04.08.62: “AB Aulis - konsesjon på erverv av aksjer i A/S Elekt-
risk Bureau.”, handwritten comments on the document dated 10.08.62 and signed Skj. 
156 Sogner 2002, p. 27. 
157 Sogner 1994, p. 35. 
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Braaten sent a PM to the Ministry of Industry “about STK's cooperation with 
ITT”.159 ITT's General Agreement, regulating the business within the multinational, 
demanded a corporate R&D fee from all of the subsidiaries, 3% of the turnover, 
which was re-allocated to R&D projects that were deemed to be worthy of sup-
port.160 The agreement also stated that all technical knowledge developed within the 
company could be exploited freely among other units. Thus, there were no internal 
intellectual property rights within ITT. The disadvantage of this agreement was that 
it was difficult for small subsidiaries to develop into a lead house, and manufacture 
for export. If small subsidiaries, like STK, developed a product that was attractive 
for a customer from a large company, it was likely that the local ITT unit would 
prefer to manufacture it, instead of importing it from STK. The benefit was that 
STK had access to all technical information within ITT, and could thus function as a 
mediator in the diffusion of ITT's technology in Norway. 
 
This partly explains the different strategies of STK and EB when they applied for a 
new concession. STK stressed its independence as a Norwegian company, but first 
and foremost it praised the value of being a member of ITT, and the technology and 
competence to which it had access. Braaten gave a newspaper interview with the 
title “American capital gives the industry large benefits”.161 He pictured Norway as 
a small and poor country unable to manufacture and carry out research that could 
measure up to US standards, thus industrial cooperation with the United States was 
necessary. He accentuated how STK had prospered since ITT had saved SKG in the 
1930s; it had 3000 employees, of which 300 were engineers. The main reason for 
STK's success, said Braaten, was that it benefited from the work of 25,000 engi-
neers in the service of ITT. Finally, he praised the “favourable influence one gets 
from the Americans’ management and effective mercantile organisation”, and how 
this would benefit Norwegian business in general.162  
 
EB, in contrast, emphasised its independence from LME, stressing that it was an 
autonomous Norwegian company, with a licensee agreement with LME. EB was 
more “Norwegian” than STK, both in terms of ownership, and because it had a pre-
war tradition as an independent company. Hence, it was easier for EB to depict itself 
as a Norwegian company, and it had an identity to preserve. Still, EB claimed fur-
                                                          
159 STKHA: “Pro Memoria - om STKs samarbeid med ITT”, 18.10.66, sent from Braaten to 
Rostoft. 
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ther integration with LME was beneficial, since it would allow EB to attain a man-
date over products and areas. LME did give EB permission to develop and produce 
equipment for wireless communication in 1961, but this resulted from pressure from 
the Norwegian government.163 When the Minister of Industry, Kjell Holler, visited 
LME's headquarters and plant in Stockholm in 1962, he was told that LME's policy 
“was to decentralise manufacturing in different ways”.164 EB's chairman G. Ring 
Amundsen argued along the same lines, stating that EB had a mandate in certain 
technical areas and that it had been granted export orders from Ericsson.165 This is 
true, in as much as elementary production and assembly were put out to subsidiaries 
with spare capacity, while LME took care of the advanced production.166  
 
In his study of EB's relationship with LME, John Petter Collett finds that EB's role 
as a sub-supplier clearly underscored its subordinate role, and was a sign of its in-
dustrial and technological dependence on LME.167 Besides, it was called “lease-
production”, indicating that it was not on a permanent basis. Furthermore, it was not 
a part of an integrated LME strategy, in terms of exploiting locational advantages in 
host countries. EB, for instance, produced parts for LME's XY switch, an outdated 
switch from the interwar period, which Televerket had ceased to order.168 There was 
little progressive or promising in manufacturing this when the electronic revolution 
had transformed the telecom industry. EB did not engage in R&D either: LME's 
R&D was centralised in Stockholm, and according to LME's centennial history, 
only “limited tasks has been solved abroad”.169 It is interesting that EB's managing 
director, Eilif Bjørnstad, contradicted the claims of EB’s chairman Amundsen in a 
meeting with Jens Johansen from the Ministry of Industry, a former employee of 
EB. Bjørnstad stressed that EB was subject to LME, and had only modest auton-
omy. This undermined Amundsen’s depiction of the company. The chairman’s 
attempt to dress up realities only made him look like LME's “servant”. 
 
                                                          
163 Collett 1986, p. 11. Hence, it was not a result of positive locational advantages in Norway, 
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164 NTM-EBi: LMEs Svein Åberg to Eilif Bjørnstad 11.09.62 about Holler’s visit to Ericsson. 
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168 NTM-EBii: Letter from Tc to Txc 20.09.64: “Tilvirkning av XY-velgere ved EB”; Note 
08.12.64: “Produksjon av XY-velgere”. 
169 Attman et al. 1976b, p. 265. 
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Bjørnstad told Johansen that EB was strictly controlled by LME, with no possibili-
ties for export, and that the terms for LME's internal sales to EB “were rather 
harsh”, portraying them as it “hidden dividends”.170 Perhaps Bjørnstad did not want 
LME to get a majority, or maybe he thought it futile to try to deceive the former EB 
employee Johansen, on the subject of how LME looked upon EB. Johansen, who 
remembered how the “big Swede” dominated, wanted to reject LME's application. 
He suggested that the government, and EB, used access to the Norwegian market as 
a bargaining card towards LME, in order to increase the Norwegian influence. Odd 
Chr. Gøthe, an influential bureaucrat, also saw it as an important political task to 
strengthen EB. He wanted to turn the Norwegian majority in EB into a block, start-
ing with the shares that were up for sale. He proposed that Elektro-Union should 
buy the shares, and that it could form the basis of a Norwegian group at EB's Gen-
eral Assembly.171 Elektro-Union was a sister company of Nera, owned by Bergen 
Industriinvestering (BII). Gøthe thought the government’s 20 per cent ownership in 
BII would strengthen a potential shareholder bloc in EB.  
 
Nothing came out this, as Elektro-Union declined. However, Gøthe’s proposal is 
interesting in several ways. Firstly, because Gøthe thought it natural to use state 
ownership to secure national control in EB; secondly, because Elektro-Union, as we 
will see in chapters 5 and 7, came to play an important part in EB's history; and, 
finally, because Gøthe’s initiative shows how keen some of the bureaucrats in the 
Ministry were to shore up EB's national identity. STK's application in 1966 did not 
receive a fraction of the attention that had been paid to EB's application in 1962. 
Nevertheless, LME was allowed to secure a majority ownership in EB, in exchange 
for increasing investments in Norway, while STK's request to increase ITT's owner-
ship was rejected by the Conservative government in 1966.172 It was satisfied to 
learn of STK's relationship with ITT, but never considered allowing 100% owner-
ship by ITT. Despite the meagre practical importance of Kreditkassen’s 25 per cent 
share, it said that certain decisions required an 80 per cent majority in STK's Gen-
eral Assembly. It also mentioned the symbolic value, and that it would restrain ITT 
from extracting excessive dividends.173 An important aspect in this relationship was 
                                                          
170 RA-EBi: Memo 24/8-1962 JJ/MF (Jens Johansen): “Konsesjonssøknad fra A.B. Aulis, 
Stockholm, om kjøp av aksjer i A/S Tai Investering, Oslo”. (“var temmelig harde” and “skjult 
utbytte”). 
171 Odd Chr. Gøthe’s handwritten comments, 10.08.62 on EA/LM Notat 04.08.62: “AB Aulis 
- konsesjon på erverv av aksjer i A/S Elektrisk Bureau.” 
172 STKHA: Rostoft to STK 13.08.1967. 
173 STKHA: J. B. Hjort’s memo from meeting with Rostoft 7.12.1966. 
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that STK exported very little, and thus ITT dividends were almost exclusively de-
rived from the Norwegian market.174 
 
When Braaten exalted STK's relationship with ITT since the 1930s, it was because 
he felt that STK had an independent identity and integrity. The positive picture he 
gave in the interview, however, was a matter of public relations; it diverted attention 
from his opposition to the prevailing Geneenism in ITT. STK was, as ITT's other 
subsidiaries, subjected to Geneen’s meticulous policy of accounting, reporting and 
planning. Braaten was sceptical about this, stating that the “increasing requirements 
from Area and World Headquarters as to current and special reports” were among 
STK's “main problems”.175 He was in favour of sound accounting, reporting and 
planning, but the “swamping flow of papers reduces time available for attacking real 
and pressing problems”.176 It was not that Braaten feared such control: his experi-
ences from the Managerial meetings in Brussels were good, and Geneen never rep-
rimanded him.177 Mainly because STK's business in general was sound, ITT did not 
mind that much as long as the subsidiary in question made money.178 “The burden 
related to complying with ITT reporting procedures”, complained an internal STK 
document, “is becoming a serious problem”.179 
 
Moreover, Braaten had misgivings about Geneen's efforts to integrate the subsidiar-
ies, feeling that the national identity of STK was under threat. He regarded it as a 
Norwegian company that was a member of an international group, and he was first 
in line to accentuate STK's national traditions and obligations. He was a classic 
Managing Director within ITT, in that he was a “figure of national consequence”, 
hence he did not accept being shuffled around by ITT or ITT-Europe.180 Geneen 
said once that Braaten was the most stubborn man he had met, which probably 
earned him Geneen’s respect.181 Braaten did not provoke any formal confrontations 
                                                          
174 RA-S57: ”Til Regjeringens medlemmer fra Industriministeren 13.06.67 - Notat til regje-
ringskonferanse”. 
175 STKA: STKs Business Plan 1968-1972. 
176 STKA: STKs Business Plan 1968-1972. 
177 Interviews with several STK aides. 
178 Interview with Jest Braaten. Some also suggest that Norwegians had a mentality for order 
and planning, implicating that ITT companies from other nations had far more trouble ac-
commodating to the «Geneenism». 
179 “Too much of management's time and attention is diverted to completion of reports instead 
of the daily run of the business. The considerable expansion of our activity together with a 
very tight personnel situation is already a great strain on our management.” STKA: STKs 
Business Plan 1971-1975. These paragraphs are signed by Braaten in the Business Plan. 
180 “they might work for Geneen, but he could not just order them about. They were too power-
ful, to entrenched.” Schoenberg 1985, p. 121-122. 
181 Interview with Jest Braaten. 
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with ITT. It seems that he did not care too much about how ITT was managed, as 
long as it did not interfere with STK's business and its national identity. Geneen’s 
call for coordination and time-consuming reporting did this. The establishment of 
ITT-Scandinavia was the last straw for Braaten. 
 
This was established in 1968, as a part of the establishment of ITT-Europe. The idea 
was to coordinate ITT's activities in Scandinavia. First and foremost, it was an at-
tempt to get a larger share of the Scandinavian market, by using STK as Scandina-
vian headquarters.182 Braaten was sceptical about this construction, first because the 
time-consuming reporting “intensified following the introduction of the Scandina-
vian organization”.183 He also felt it threatened STK's national identity. The Board 
of Directors supported Braaten, stating that “caution” was required so STK “does 
not lose its integrity as a Norwegian company”. It stressed that STK had to sustain 
its status and position towards Norwegian stakeholders - government, customers, the 
Norwegian public in general, and employees.184 This was a reaction to Geneen's 
integrating efforts, but it also reflected the fact that STK had to take into account the 
changing attitudes towards ITT and LME, which were perceived as powerful multi-
nationals, which profited on public procurement in Norway, without investing too 
much in the country. 
 
Three years after the concession application was rejected, STK's national status was 
put on the agenda again, when it applied for a concession to acquire Emaljeverket, a 
refrigerator company. “The Government rejection was a clear discrimination,” re-
ported Braaten to ITT.185 The Emaljeverket case stirred up a debate regarding US 
multinationals. A newspaper wrote that ITT had ordered STK to double its turnover 
and profit within five years, and that this was in accordance with other American 
big firms’ intrusion in the western European countries.186 ITT and LME were sub-
jected to criticism, for not reinvesting enough in Norway, but just skimming the 
                                                          
182 “The object of the Scandinavia cooperation is to improve the overall results for ITT. To 
obtain a rational and efficient use of available resources, similar and equal solutions to the 
switching networks in the Scandinavian countries should be applied as far as possible. The 
main engineering focus will therefore be concentrated at STK where the available resources 
are greatest. The other switching companies may draw on the larger capacity of know-how 
there.” in STKA: ITT Scandinavia Business Plan 1970-1974. 
183 STKA: STKs Business Plan 1971-1975. 
184 STK’s Board meeting, 28.10.68. (det må vises varsomhet, slik at Standard Telefon og 
Kabelfabrik A/S ikke mister sin integritet som norsk selskap, men opprettholder denne status 
og den posisjon selskapet har vis a vis myndigheten, kundene og offentligheten forøvrig. Det 
ble spesielt påpekt at konsesjonsvilkårene ikke måtte krenkes og at selskapets forhold til norsk 
lovgivning, institusjoner, ansatte o.s.v. måtte opprettholdes uforandret). 
185 STKA: ITT Scandinavia Business Plan 1970-1974. 
186 Editorial in Dagbladet 08.03.69. 
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cream of public investments in telecom and electricity.187 Thus, Braaten “noticed a 
change in the Public Opinion as regards ownership of Norwegian Industry”. “In 
order to meet this exposure”, he claimed, “STK must seek, to as large an extent as 
possible, to identify itself as a national enterprise”.188 Moreover, drawing “attention 
to the feelings of our employees to foreign ownership”, he advised it “would be 
wise to strengthen and support the local management”.189 One way of doing this was 
to establish a local, i.e. national, research department. 
 
The military technicians around FFI, and other supporters of Nera, stressed that ITT 
and LME obstructed Norwegian initiatives in the important high-tech industry that 
telecom had become.190 To meet this criticism, STK reported to ITT that it had to 
“secure development contracts” and inform the “authorities and public about local 
(STK's) development activities financed by ITT development funds.191 Torbjørn 
Brataas, the first Research director in STK, emphasises ITT's - and thus STK's - 
poor standing in the late 1960s, particularly among military technicians, such as 
Helmer Dahl and Fredrik Møller.192 Another opponent of ITT was the businessman 
Gustav A. Ring, author of the book Who shall own Norway? Published in 1969, and 
inspired by French Gaullism, Ring addressed the need for national control in the 
electronics industry.193 Brataas is certain that these attitudes were decisive for the 
establishment of STK's Research Department. Telegrafverket and TF also put pres-
sure on STK to conduct R&D, and Braaten and technical director Arne Rambøl 
welcomed this pressure, as they were happy to use this in their stance towards 
ITT.194 Thus, for ITT it was a matter of national responsiveness when it allowed 
STK to establish a research department in 1968. It had to respond to Norwegian 
sentiments. 
 
                                                          
187 “The government and authorities expect that capital available at STK be utilized as much 
as possible to the benefit of the country because the capital has been earned in Norway.” 
STKA: STKs Business Plan 1971-1975. 
188 STKA: STKs Business Plan 1971-1975. 
189 STKA: STKs Business Plan 1971-1975. 
190 Interview with Torbjørn Brataas, first director of STK's Research Department (FA), later 
employed in STK's defence business, Thomson and Thales. 
191 STKA: STK’s Business Plan 1967-1971. 
192 Interview with Torbjørn Brataas. 
193 Gustav A. Ring: Hvem skal eie Norge?, 1969; Interview with Torbjørn Brataas. 
194 Interview with Torbjørn Brataas. 
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Norwegian high-tech companies 
STK's Research Department (FA*), which was established August 1st 1968, did not 
come out of the blue. First, STK had a Technical Department of some significance, 
which carried out development work. The Annual Reports show that the funding for 
research, development and engineering (RDE) increased from around 2% of the 
turnover in 1965 to 4% in 1967.195 The number of engineers with higher education 
increased during the 1960s, and the technical department alone employed over 250 
in the late 1960s. The main RDE activity in electronics/telecom was to study estab-
lished products from ITT, in order to be able to adapt and install them in the net-
work. STK had been engaged in independent technology and product development, 
most notably maritime radio and cryptology for the military, in its Technical Labo-
ratory, and later the Division for Technical Electronics. Still, due to the emphasis on 
research, the FA changed the perception of STK as a company, as it was no longer a 
mere importer of ITT's products; it was to take part in the development of telecom 
equipment, and it was a high-tech company.196  
 
Maritime communication was an important business in Norway, due to the large 
merchant fleet and the fisheries. Oslo was an international centre in this field in the 
1930s, when several MNCs placed their radio business in Norway.197 Both EB and 
STK had substantial business directed towards the maritime segment, as did Simrad 
and Nera.198 STK had been in this business since the 1920s, and it grew after the 
war, but never amounted to any significance compared to cables and telecom in 
STK's books. The electronic revolution led to bold visions for the maritime sector in 
Norway, and the company Norcontrol worked with nuclear-driven and unmanned 
vessels.199 STK took an active part in this milieu. “A substantial part of STK's pre-
sent and future business activity”, reported Ivar Ørbeck to ITT in 1969, “is and will 
be devoted to marine electronics such as radio, navigation and ship automation.”200 
But maritime electronics remained a minor business within STK, as the company 
did not succeed in obtaining important contracts in this field.201 The maritime trajec-
tory became more important for EB and Nera than for STK, as EB and Nera became 
                                                          
* Norwegian abbreviation for Forskningsavdelingen. 
195 STK's Annual reports 1965, 1967 and 1968. 
196 Interview with Torbjørn Brataas and Ivar Ørbeck, former Technical Director in STK. 
197 Sogner 1997, p. 19. 
198 Ivar Mo: “Prosjektet Narolf”, 1998; Wasberg 1965, p. 148 f.; Skogaas 1983, p. 157 f. 
199 Signy Ryther Overby: “Etableringen av norsk skipsautomatiseringsindustri”, 1993. 
200 IØA, Box: “Div artikler Rapporter 1968-74 I. Ørbeck”: “Computer applications onboard 
ship”, 28.11.69. 
201 Lossius 1991, p. 101 f. 
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key players in developing maritime satellite communication in Norway. For STK, 
the links with FFI and Great Britain proved more influential. 
 
Several STK engineers were engaged in “illegal” activities during the war, some in 
establishing radio contact with London, others in tapping into the Germans’ communi-
cations. STK's ‘control’ over the Oslo network was an important asset in this 
sense.202 Some fled to the UK, and after the war, many more visited STC’s labora-
tory, the Standard Telecommunication Laboratory (STL) in Harlow outside Lon-
don.203 The head of the Technical Laboratory, Kåre R. Meisingset, had worked 
under Helmer Dahl on radar technology in the UK during the war.204 He started as a 
radio engineer at STK in 1946; and from 1952 he concentrated on cryptology, with 
FFI, and Rørholt from the FFSB. Rørholt “approached STK with an idea on how to 
mass produce random key information suitable for encryption of teleprinter sig-
nals”.205 Meisingset and Rørholt patented digital “Electronic equipment for «crea-
tion» of a cipher-key”.206 STK manufactured a cipher machine for encrypting and 
decryption for use with teleprinters, and sold several thousand machines to other 
NATO countries in the 1950s and 1960s.207 The export success was remarkable, and 
formed the future defence business of STK. Still, the crypto-business was always 
somewhat detached from the rest of the company, partly due to the required secrecy.  
 
In many ways, the STL functioned as STK's mother company in R&D issues; it was 
regarded as one of the best telecom centres in the world, second only to Bell Labo-
ratories.208 STK's engineers were welcomed warmly at the STL, and encouraged to 
ask all kinds of questions.209 This was very different from ITT’s French R&D centre, 
the Laboratoire Central de Télécommunications (LCT) in Paris. Apart from the 
language barrier in France, STK's people did not experience the same openness in 
France, thus there was little knowledge and technology transfer from LCT to STK, 
                                                          
202 Wasberg 1965, p. 101 f.; Obituaries of Salve Staubo Aftenposten 02.02.89. and Bjørn Rørholt 
Aftenposten 13.05.93. Karl Hanssen was central in STK's surveillance of German communica-
tion during the war. Salve Staubo: “Rapport fra sambandssjefen” in 
http://www.maritimt.net/jps/salvesstaubo_files/SalveStaubo.pdf. 
203 Interview with Torbjørn Brataas, and Ivar Ørbeck. 
204 “Dagens Navn” in Aftenposten 02.09.86; Njølstad and Wicken 1997, p. 34. 
205 Ivar Mo: “Teleprinter Crypto machines with one-time key tape”, 2002. 
206 Mo 2002. 
207 It was called the ETCRRM - Electronic Teleprinter Cryptographic Regenerative Repeater 
Mixer, It was not sold to the United States, as it operated with a secret system, Mo 2002. 
208 Interview with Torbjørn Brataas and Ivar Ørbeck. 
209 Torbjørn Brataas, Ivar Ørbeck and Knut Berg all went to STL, and confirm this impres-
sion. Interview with Torbjørn Brataas, Ivar Ørbeck, and Knut Berg. Berg was in FA from 
1968-1980, Director of System 12 1980-1990. 
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quite opposite to the situation with the British R&D unit.210 A main mission, said 
Brataas in presenting FA in 1968, was to develop and enhance STK's absorptive 
capacity, so it could to tap into ITT's knowledge and technology base.211 A related 
activity was to adapt ITT's technology to Norwegian surroundings. This was in 
accordance with STK's perception of itself as a telecom company, i.e. a main mis-
sion was to diffuse technology developed within ITT. This reasoning was funda-
mental for the FA’s first development contract. 
 
The first development contract TF offered was for a trial installation of PCM, digital 
transmission, in the Norwegian network.212 This was natural pilot project for TF, as 
Knudtzon’s graduating thesis from the NTH was about PCM, and he had continued 
to work on this field afterwards.213 Even though the tender for the PCM contract 
was open, there was never any doubt that STK would receive it. This was because 
of STK's close ties with the STL, which was at the frontier in this technological 
field, as the STL’s Alec Harley Reeves had invented PCM in 1938.214 STK used the 
STL for what it was worth in fulfilling its contract with TF. Representatives from 
TF joined the trips to the STL, and they too benefited from the STL’s knowledge. 
Hence, STK became a door opener for TF and Televerket into ITT and the STL. On 
the other hand, it was valuable for the STL and ITT to use Norway as a test case for 
PCM.215  
 
The development contract was a positive experience for both TF and STK. Brataas 
and Knudtzon claim that it laid the foundation for a fruitful relationship between TF 
and the FA. Moreover, the PCM contract, and STK's old-time competence in cryp-
tology, paved the way for a new large contract with FFI in 1973, for creating a mo-
bile digital switch with a digital network - “the nodal-switch “ for the Norwegian 
military.216 This was the main project in the FA’s history. The nodal switch remains 
                                                          
210 Interview with Torbjørn Brataas; Ivar Ørbeck; Knut Berg. 
211 TBA: Torbjørn Brataas’s address to the “Cable Club” at STK 24/10-68. 
212 STK's annual report 1969 and 1970; Collett and Lossius 1993, p. 48. 
213 Collett and Lossius, 1993, p. 33; Nicolay Heinrich Knudtzon: “Theoretical comparison of 
fluctuation noise characteristics for various modulation methods with special view to multi-
channel system planning” DDRE report ; no. 20, Oslo, 1957. 
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the technological and commercial base for the Norwegian subsidiary of the interna-
tional defence company Thales even today. Hence, it proved how a subsidiary, by 
tapping into its mother company's technology base and adapting the technology to 
local requirements, could develop sustainable business. A necessary requirement for 
STK for doing this, however, was that the development was financed by other 
sources, so STK did not have the intellectual property rights. Thus it could not be 
exploited by other ITT units. Hence, it is no coincidence that the intellectual prop-
erty rights of STK's two successes on the export market, the nodal switch and the 
crypto-machine, were held by the Norwegian armed forces.  
 
ITT's General Agreement and its dominating ownership of STK explain why STK 
preferred to stress that it was one of several partners within ITT, rather than to em-
phasise its autonomy from it. Hence, the FA’s main mission was to diffuse technol-
ogy and products from ITT to Norway. By enlarging STK's absorptive capacity, it 
was to be a more effective technology and knowledge diffuser in Norway, and able 
to engage in fruitful interaction with Norwegian R&D milieus. Technical Director, 
Arve Rambøl, argued along these lines in trying to position STK towards the NTNF 
and the Ministry of Industry in 1972. He said that STK's access to ITT technology 
and know-how would be of great importance to the Norwegian R&D system. “In 
this relation I would like to refer to the enclosed study «Technology transfer by 
multinational companies».217 STK's focus on the benefits of multinationals, and its 
own mediating role, was very different from EB's strategy, which also was subjected 
to pressure from Ericsson and the Norwegian milieu. Bjørnstad also told LME that 
“we have detected a significant shift in the government attitudes toward EB after 
LME increased its share above 50 per cent, STK has been granted advantages, for-
merly EB was regarded as partly Norwegian, while we now both are regarded as 
foreigners”.218 
 
Like STK, EB had a sizeable business in domestic appliances and other types of 
electrical equipment, but Ericsson’s decided to divest itself of this in 1965.219 This 
business had been important in giving EB a sense of independence from Tele-
grafverket. In protesting to LME, it stated that after the divesture, 75 per cent of its 
sales would be to Telegrafverket, and “it will then be evident for everybody what 
profit EB extracts from the PTO, and the situation before the next price negotiations 
                                                          
217 RA-STKi: STK to NTNF and Ministry of Industry 04.01.72. James Brian Quinn: ”Tech-
nology transfer by multinational companies - Effective flow of technology among countries is 
perhaps the most important single factor in the worldwide economic development.” in Har-
vard Business Review, November-December 1969. 
218 Eilif Bjørnstad to Björn Lundvall 01.12.67, here after Collett 1986, p. 13. 
219 Meurling and Jeans, 2000. p. 232; Skogaas 1982, p. 111. 
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will not be pleasant”.220 Another damaging thing was a ‘share coup’ by LME. EB's 
share price gained 88 per cent in 1967, mainly due to the favourable long-term 
agreement.221 LME arranged a share issue in EB, and sold most of the B-shares, 
with only a 1/1000 voting right, to Norwegian investors. This was another way to 
extract money from the subsidiary, while still emphasising that LME was not ex-
tracting large dividends from EB.222 As the Arbeiderbladet complained, the “Swed-
ish share coup costs us 10 million”, and was paid for “by Norwegian telephone 
subscribers”.223 It provoked the Ministry of Industry, not least because LME or EB 
did not inform them properly; the issue was even discussed between the Swedish 
and Norwegian cabinets.224 
 
The complaints regarding LME's «share coup» happened at a time when Televerket 
and TF demanded and expected more R&D and a more active role in the evolving 
system of innovation in telecom.225 LME took a more positive stance towards EB's 
ambitions of developing its own products. It was not allowed, however, to establish 
a separate R&D unit, but it was to develop maritime products outside the license 
agreement. Its main project was to be the development of maritime satellite commu-
nications, in close cooperation with Nera and TF. In a meeting with LME and EB's 
top management in 1970, it was stated that it was in both companies’ “interest that 
EB develops own product areas outside the traditional license areas”.226 Collett 
claims that this was a new policy initiated by LME's CEO from 1965, Björn Lund-
vall.227 The main reason, however, was that it would give “EB the necessary stand-
ing with public authorities and research and development institutions”.228 Thus, 
when LME finally allowed EB to pursue an independent strategy, it was as a result 
from pressure from Norwegian authorities. It was not to exploit Norway’s positive 
locational advantages, but rather to comply with negative locational advantages.229 
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Thus, STK and EB's increased R&D from the 1960s was mainly to accommodate 
demands from Norwegian stakeholders.  
 
Conclusion 
The 1960s were pregnant with changes for the Norwegian telecom industry. First, 
STK's sales and profits increased as a result of the long-term agreements.230 The 
oligopolic grip was not particularly important in relation to this, as Telegrafverket 
never intended to change suppliers. Still, the employment card was a significant 
argument when Telegrafverket increased its orders. The main reason for the in-
creased orders, however, was to eliminate the telephone queues. There was a note-
worthy change in the oligopolic grip, however, in that Telegrafverket’s responsibil-
ity as an industry provider was heightened. Still, a more striking change was the 
highlighting of STK and EB's responsibilities in contributing to industrial develop-
ment, in the wake of the electronic revolution, and the increased apprehension of 
multinationals in general, and American multinationals in particular. As such, we 
may say that Doz’ negotiated environment was intensified. The negotiated environ-
ment differed from the oligopolic grip, in that both parties, governmental bodies and 
the industry, were more even standing, i.e. both had effective bargaining cards.  
 
STK's, or ITT's, main concession in the intensified negotiated environment, was the 
establishment of the FA. This was motivated by several interrelated factors. Firstly, 
it was a response to the more critical attitude towards multinationals, particularly 
those in high-tech industries, which lived off public procurement. In this sense, it 
was a concession to Norwegian stakeholders, not least, the evolving Norwegian 
system of innovation in telecom. As such, the FA was a concrete response to the 
establishment of the TF. Secondly, due to the electronic revolution, STK had to 
upgrade its competence to preserve its position as an equipment supplier. Thirdly, it 
was a result of the good economy in STK’s telecom business. Finally, it was a re-
sponse to the long-term agreements, in which it was a more or less tacit demand that 
STK and EB should undertake R&D. Even though the new R&D system in telecom 
was linked to the procurement regime through this tacit obligation, it was detached 
from the main products and technology in telecom, switching and cables.  
 
In this sense, the new R&D system diverted from a main characteristic of the system 
of innovation approach, namely that innovation takes place through user-producer 
interaction. Of course, there was such interaction with the development contracts, 
                                                                                                                                        
ucts”, (andra stora uppgift - men efter huvudupgiften - är att utveckla egna produkter), NTM-
EBi: LME's Bjørn Lundvall to EB's Eilif Bjørnstad 02.11.70. 
230 As Telegrafverket ordered more equipment, and enabled STK to produce more efficiently 
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such as PCM, but there was a difference. In the system of innovation literature, 
innovations are often described as incremental, a result of learning by doing, and 
trial and error.231 The activity, however, is not aimed at innovation in itself, but is a 
part of normal business activity, i.e. generating higher quality, lower cost products. 
“Innovation” is a label that is attached to the new processes afterwards, often by 
scholars or policy makers. In the Norwegian R&D system, however, innovation was 
the aim, in order to lay the foundation for future business, which could generate 
higher quality, lower cost products in a competitive manner. Thus, the new R&D 
system was designed to promote innovation, and thus perhaps it should be called the 
Norwegian system for innovation in telecom? 
 
Thus, the bulk of STK’s telecom business was not affected by the increased focus 
on R&D. So, the new institutional setting for telecom-related R&D was separated 
from the traditional procurer relationship. Thus around 1970, two institutional set-
tings existed side by side: a procurement relationship, characterised by the oli-
gopolic grip, and an institutional setting designed to promote innovation through 
R&D, characterised by the negotiated environment. This separation, let us say be-
tween operational telecom activities and R&D activities, was sharpened throughout 
the 1970s. The later chapters show that it contributed to divergent policies on the 
part of governmental bodies. Moreover, the separation was reflected in antagonisms 
between R&D units and operational units within STK, EB and Televerket.  
 
Still, STK's involvement in the R&D system through the FA bore fruit, not least 
through the PCM contract, which was also important in shaping STK and TF's per-
ception of multinationals. It was a prime example of how a subsidiary and a host 
country could tap technology and knowledge from a multinational, and how the 
subsidiary could develop independent capabilities based on this. Perhaps 
Knudtzon’s credo, of helping the subsidiaries in the internal MNC competition, was 
inspired by the PCM contract?232 STK stressed that multinationals were central in 
developing and diffusing technology, and that STK played an important role in 
mediating technology and knowledge between ITT and Norway. The FA was set up, 
it was argued, to make STK more able to tap into ITT's technical resources and 
adapt the technology to the Norwegian environment, rather than to free STK from 
ITT's dominance. EB, in contrast, played down its relationship with LME, and 
stressed its freedom to develop ‘Norwegian’ products, such as wireless communica-
tion, which later underpinned its maritime satellite communication activities in the 
                                                          
231 Lundvall et. al. 2002, p. 219-220. 
232 The PCM contract was signed in 1969, and Knudtzon’s statement about helping subsidiar-
ies was made in 1970. 
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1970s. The difference between STK and EB was reinforced by the appointment of 
new managing directors in the early 1970s, which will be elaborated in chapter 5. 
 
During the early 1970s, STK supplied Televerket with two new kinds of switches, 
one it had developed alone, and another delivered by BTM. In the latter, the multi-
nationals functioned as diffusers of technology, in line with STK's preferred percep-
tion. With the first switch, STK tried to attain a lead-house position within ITT, as 
an independent switch manufacturer. Both projects contributed to significant 
changes in STK's relationship with Televerket and ITT, as well as in the oligopolic 
grip, which is what the next chapter will address.  
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Chapter 4 STK's telecom business in pain 
Introduction 
In the early 1970s, electronic switches made their way into the Norwegian telecom 
network, and had a significant impact on Norwegian telecom. STK embarked on 
one of its largest-ever development projects in telecom, namely the finalising of a 
semi-electronic switch, the Metaconta 11B, on behalf of ITT. Thus, the project was 
perceived as a potential launch pad for future engagement in electronic switching, 
and thus becoming a fully-fledged telecom company. By taking advantage of its 
newly founded Research Department, STK hoped to attain a leading position in 
ITT's switching business, by exporting the 11B on the world market. Based on these 
assumptions, STK invited Televerket to participate on the project. Televerket wel-
comed STK's initiative, as the 11B was designed to automate rural areas, which was 
one of the major tasks Televerket had to embark on in the 1970s.  
 
Televerket had two other major challenges around 1970. Firstly, it was to resolve 
the problems in the Oslo network, which practically broke down in 1968. Secondly, 
it was to finalise the national automation, so one could make long-distance calls 
without assistance from an operator. The 8B switch seemed to create more problems 
than it solved, so Televerket decided to meet these two challenges by installing 
computerised, or Stored Program Control (SPC), switches in Oslo. In connection 
with this, Televerket amended its procurement routines by using competitive tenders 
between STK and EB. Televerket also arranged tenders for other switching projects, 
and it started to inspect STK and EB's books, to control the cost-based prices in the 
long-term agreements. This shows that the oligopolic grip had loosened. Thus, the 
chapter addresses how STK and Televerket met the early stages of digitalisation and 
liberalisation, not least in adjusting to new relations. 
 
The 1970s were a decade of closer cooperation between the PTOs and the equip-
ment suppliers in Europe; LME and the Swedish PTO formed a development pair, 
through the switching-development company, “ELLMTEL”.1 Close cooperation 
also took place in France, Britain and Germany.2 The European “development pairs” 
were formed to engage in the international competition to develop electronic and 
later digital switches. The electronics revolution created a window of opportunity, 
an opportunity to create new players in the international telecom industry. Some 
succeeded, like France with Alcatel, while others failed, particularly the United 
                                                          
1 Fridlund 2000. 
2 Noam 1992 and Chapuis 1990. 
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Kingdom with its prestigious TXE project.3 A central theme in this chapter is how 
STK and Televerket adapted themselves to handle these new challenges, and how a 
new relational setting was created in Norwegian telecom. The first sections present 
the development of SPC switches. 
 
Electronic switching - ITT's Metaconta 
John von Neumann’s stored program technique had a tremendous impact on com-
puter development from the mid-1940s, and on telecom from the mid-1960s. It 
implied that a computer could be programmed to do different tasks and operations, 
regardless of its hardware. This meant that instructions could be reprogrammed 
according to new tasks, but also, which was essential in telecom, according to dif-
ferent - and changing - surroundings. The SPC principles laid the ground for 
AT&T’s Stored Program Control (SPC) switch No. 1 ESS, introduced in 1965. 
According to Chapuis and Joel, SPC is “recognized as the single most important 
contribution to electronic switching”.4 It constituted the common feature for the new 
electronic switches that were developed from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s.  
 
Some hesitated, however, to label these switches electronic, preferring to call them 
quasi- or semi-electronic. The reason was that the contact was still mechanical. 
Telecom switches may be divided into two main parts: the control unit and the con-
tact system. The control part “monitors calls, identifies the caller, establishes contact 
with a free channel, holds the contact during the conversation, opens it when it is 
finished and measures the number of pulses to be charged”.5 The contact system 
establishes the physical link between the lines. In the SPC switch, the control part is 
computerised, whereas the contact is mechanical, which means that the signals 
transmitted are still analogue signals, i.e. electrical impulses.6 This is called space 
division switching. In the next generation of digital switches, from the late 1970s, 
the contact was computerised. This is time division switching, in which the com-
                                                          
3 In France it resulted in the E10 switch, Alcatel's launching pad in the telecom industry. The 
German joint project for developing a SPC switch was considered a disaster, as it took too 
long, and was not finished before the arrival of digital switches. “Minister Kurt Geschedidle 
pulled the plug on the development program. He declared that technical development hit the 
Bundespost and its suppliers like a «natural catastrophe» but that the Bundespost had learned 
from its mistakes, and as a result, it would now closely follow technical developments in the 
international telecommunication market. The large losses in the project were borne chiefly by 
the equipment supplier.” Noam 1992, p. 84-85. 
4 Chapuis and Joel, 1990, p. 154. 
5 Nguyen 1985, p. 100. 
6 The “ferreed” relay provided the technological bridge between the “high speed electronics 
and slower speed mechanical contact movements.” Chapuis and Joel 1990, p. 167. 
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puter translates the analogue signals into digital signals.7 Thus, the important dis-
tinction between electronic and digital switches is whether the contact is computer-
ised or digital, i.e. between analogue space division and digital time division.8 
 
Still, SPC represented a major improvement. The control, capacity and reliability 
increased substantially compared to earlier generations. A major improvement was 
that whereas electro-mechanical switches needed several controls “divided into 
groups by functions such as for originating and terminating traffic”, SPC reduced 
this to one control unit.9 The main point, however, was that it could be programmed 
to handle and manage different networks, with different features and idiosyncra-
sies.10 The SPC switch required less floor space, which was important for the met-
ropolitan switches. It increased the capacity of the switching stations; adjustments, 
such as adding or removing new subscribers, were a matter of reprogramming the 
software, not rewiring as with the electro-mechanical switches. Finally, it allowed 
for new services and equipment, such as push-button phones, automatic re-direction, 
wake-up calls, speed dialling (one button dials a complete number), and so forth.11 
 
It had a major impact on the industry. It manifested the convergence between IT and 
telecom, thus, the use of electronics (IT) in telecom and the use of the telecom net-
work for data communication made it difficult to distinguish between communicat-
ing and processing information. SPC changed switching development from hard-
ware to a software project; computers facilitated modernisation as new software was 
released, and thus allowed greater flexibility in use. Being less labour-intensive, and 
more knowledge-intensive, skilled labour replaced manual labour. Hence, it con-
tributed to the coming of the post-industrial society, which Daniel Bell described in 
1973.12 Furthermore, it was easier to create international standards, thus reducing 
the technological barriers that halted competition among the equipment suppliers. 
Finally, the R&D costs of the computerised switches were very high. AT&T's No. 1 
ESS was the first SPC switch in the world; it was one of Bell Labs biggest R&D 
                                                          
7 Nguyen, 1985, p. 100. 
8 Nguyen, 1985, p. 100. 
9 Chapuis and Joel 1990, p. 53. 
10 Not one network was alike; all had different types of switching and transmission 
equipment, and often “self-made” solutions to make the different technologies work together. 
We will return to these issues later, since the programming of the SPC switches for the 
Norwegian network plays a central part in this analysis. 
11 Some point to the fact that some of these services, such as wake-up calls and re-direction, 
re-appeared, since they were available with manual switches, the operators were given 
instructions. Thus, in a sense the intelligent switch returned with the SPC switch. Bestorp 
1990, 230. 
12 Daniel Bell: The coming of post-industrial society: a venture in social forecasting, 1973. 
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projects ever, lasting over 10 years, and costing $500 million (1965).13 AT&T was 
probably the only telecom company that could have engaged in such a project. The 
rest of the industry, except LME, was busy developing crossbar switches, when 
AT&T embarked on its SPC project in the 1950s. But, after AT&T had carried the 
initial costs, the rest of the industry followed the SPC path for the next generation of 
switches.14 
 
ITT strove to unite the subsidiaries' efforts to create a single SPC switch, as the 
company was anxious to avoid the hazardous internal competition that had occurred 
with the crossbar generation. ITT’s annual report for 1966, the year after AT&T had 
presented its SPC switch, stated that one of the firm’s main objectives was “the 
development of an integrated-circuit, computer-controlled, quasi-electronic ex-
change”, with the “promise of being competitive in price with present electrome-
chanical systems, while offering new service features, increased reliability and low 
maintenance costs”.15 The report referred to a single system, which was difficult to 
achieve, according to Chapuis and Joel, as the various research centres of the groups 
involved had “made several differing approaches towards achieving that objec-
tive”.16 They were engaged in domestic projects, initiated and funded by their na-
tional governments.  
 
In France, the PTO and the national centre for telecom research, the Centre National 
des Études Technologiques (CNET), launched several R&D projects in this period, 
and the French ITT subsidiaries were involved in these.17 The STC, together with 
five other British equipment suppliers, developed switches in the “Joint Electronics 
Research Committee”.18 Still, the many national projects made important contribu-
tions to “an entire family of ITT systems”.19 In total, ITT had five different versions 
of the SPC switch. Consequently, the results of ITT’s SPC efforts were not too 
                                                          
13 Chapuis and Joel 1990, p. 40 and 49. 
14 Chapuis and Joel 1990, p. 246. 
15 Quoted from Chapuis and Joel 1990, p. 226. The term “quasi electronic” refers to the fact 
that the SPC switch had mechanical devices, and was thus not purely electronic. 
16 Chapuis and Joel 1990, p. 226. 
17 They were called Plato, Aristotle, and Pericles. The Plato project resulted in the E10, the 
first time-division switch in the world that was put into service. “In January 1970 the world's 
first digital switch was put into service in France, the Plato (later version of which became 
known as the E10), developed by CNET”. Martin Fransman: Japan's Computer and Commu-
nications Industry, 1995, p. 52. 
18 Chapuis and Joel 1990, p. 227. 
19 Chapuis and Joel 1990, p. 227: “10AX and 10BX, on which research had been conducted 
in Paris since 1960 by LCT and CGCT respectively; 10CX, developed at Antwerp by BTM; 
10CXM, developed at Madrid by SESA; ZF-2, studied at Stuttgart by SEL.” 
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different from the crossbar efforts. In Germany, Siemens’s SPC switch was pre-
ferred at the expense of SEL’s version. BTM and the French subsidiaries operated 
with different versions. However, this time the French and Belgian versions had so 
much in common, “that a single generic name - Metaconta - was assigned to them 
all”.20 
 
It is an open question whether ITT's ability to present one “generic family” of the 
SPC switch on the world market, should be ascribed to ITT's efforts to integrate 
R&D efforts of the European subsidiaries, or if the SPC technique made such inte-
gration easier. The competition between the 8B and the Pentaconta had national 
overtones, but it was also a rivalry based on technology. This was never the case 
with ITT's different switching projects in the 1960s; AT&T had set the standard 
with the store program control. In principle, any SPC switch could be used in any 
network: the switch handled the idiosyncrasies of each network, i.e. communication, 
signalling, billing and so forth, by programming the software.21 SPC had turned 
switching into a software business, which was easier to coordinate and integrate 
from ITT-Europe's headquarters in Brussels. An example of the integration of ef-
forts was that the French ITT laboratory, LCT*, developed the processor used in 
ITT's SPC switches.  
 
Nevertheless, the common features that allowed for the common name applied only 
to the Metaconta No. 10 series. ITT would not have been ITT, if a competing ver-
sion - No. 11 - did not materialise.22 Once again, it was the French subsidiary, 
CGCT, which insisted on using its own technology. It was the electro-mechanical 
contact system that differed. The Metaconta 10 series, supported and developed by 
BTM, used reed-relays for contact, whereas the Metaconta 11 used mini-crossbar, or 
mini-bar, which was developed by CGCT.23 Hence, CGCT and BTM continued to 
                                                          
20 Chapuis and Joel 1990, p. 227. 
21 This, however, is only broadly speaking, since the complexity of programming, which 
included debugging the software, was a huge task. 
* Laboratoire Central de Télécommunications. 
22 Chapuis and Joel say: “As sometimes happens, there must have been «a miscarriage» since 
the numerical series of the different generations of ITT systems jumps from 8 to 10 and the 
authors have been unable to ascertain what was or should have been identified by the number 9.” 
The explanation is that the Pentaconta - CGCT’s crossbar-switch - was number 9, although it 
rarely described as such. It received another number than 8B, as it used another selector. 
Interview with Carl-Edward Joys. This is probably the only time where the author is able to 
supplement Chapuis and Joel’s knowledge on switching rarities. 
23 “The mini-crossbar or miniswitch which characterized the series 11 Metaconta exchanges (…) 
was designed in Paris by CGCT engineers. (…) was offered as a competitor of matrices 
consisting of reed relays”. Chapuis and Joel 1990, p. 228. The 11A was produced by CGCT 
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struggle for supremacy within ITT's telecom business. CGCT sold its Metaconta 
11A, a large urban SPC switch, to the French PTO, whereas BTM sold the 
Metaconta 10C, first in Belgium in 1968. A major international breakthrough for 
BTM’s 10C came in 1969, when it beat LME to win an open “tender for a large 
transit exchange” to handle international telephone traffic in Australia.24 The 
Metaconta became one of the largest SPC systems in use, and by 1975, it was in-
stalled on 7.5 million lines in different countries, including Norway.25 STK and 
Televerket played a major role in developing the Metaconta 10C through the instal-
lation in Oslo, as will described later. STK had higher hopes, however, in develop-
ing a smaller - rural - version of the Metaconta, using the CGCT contact system. 
The next section investigates how STK became engaged in its largest-ever telecom 
project - the Metaconta 11B.  
 
The 11B - STK's largest telecom project 
Most of the Norwegian cities had automatic networks in the 1960s, but the rural 
networks were still operated by manual switches. Thus, to complete the automation 
of the national network, Televerket, like most European PTOs, had to automate the 
rural areas. It was a shared understanding in the 1960s that the SPC switches would 
be economical only for urban areas. The fixed costs, particularly of the processor, 
were too high for small switches.26 Moreover, an important saving with the SPC 
switch was that it required less floor space, but this was less pertinent for smaller 
switches.27 Hence, the “existing crossbar system” would “be able to withstand com-
petition from electronic exchanges for a longer period”, claimed STK in 1968, and 
in “an intermediate period the miniaturization of electromechanical systems might 
show advantages in price”.28 The telecom industry and the PTOs had to make a 
strategic choice, either to upgrade the conventional crossbar switches with modern 
electronic equipment, or to introduce a new generation of electronic switches.29  
 
The Lillehammer agreement had favoured STK, since it allocated most of the large 
cities to STK, and most of the rural districts to EB. This was in line with ITT and 
                                                                                                                                        
and installed in Morocco, the 11E was installed in Austria, and the 11F throughout France. 
Interview with Ivar Mo; Chapuis and Joel 1990, 227-228. 
24 Meurling and Jeans, 2000, p. 274. 
25 6.3 million “mainlines” and 1.4 million trunk circuits. Chapuis and Joel 1990, p. 232. 
26 In 1963 an ITT aide in Holland said: “studies made at Bell Laboratories, showing that «full» 
processor controlled logic is justified only in case of very large office units”. ITT 1974, p. 25. 
27 “For small and medium exchanges the space-requirements are not so important”, STKs 
Business Plan 1968-1972. 
28 STKA: STKs Business Plan 1968-1972. 
29 Knudtzon 1972, p. 50; Jon B. Riisnæs: “Markedssituasjonen i Norge” in Ivar Mo 2000, p. 8. 
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LME's relative strengths: LME's rural switches were acclaimed. The Swedish PTO 
had manufactured its own urban switches, so LME had developed a global strategy 
for marketing rural switches, first the XY switch in the 1930s, and then the rural 
crossbar switch (KV), which was regarded as world class.30 ITT, on the other hand, 
had focused on large urban switches, and lacked a competitive rural switch. The 
French PTO's orders for crossbar switches in the late 1950s illustrated this: ITT’s 
Pentaconta was chosen for the urban networks, while the French variant of LME's 
KV was chosen for the rural networks. Moreover, LME developed an electronic 
rural switch in the second half of the 1960s, the AKK50, for which EB was given 
some manufacturing responsibility.31 
 
Televerket was reluctant, however, to leave the rural market to EB, as it wanted to 
force down prices by introducing limited competition. The problems of interaction 
between different types of switches still halted the possibility of introducing compe-
tition. The rural switches did not overcome this, i.e. switches installed as an exten-
sion of a local switch had to be from the same company as the “mother” switch. It 
was possible to make switches from LME and ITT work together, but this was re-
garded as too expensive. Thus, such rural switches were to be pre-allocated through 
the long-term agreements. However, the switches that were directly linked to the 
national network, through transit switches, could be either of LME or ITT make, so 
such projects could be put out for competition.32 Transit switches routed calls be-
tween switches, whereas local switches, or end switches routed calls to the sub-
scriber. Some local switches functioned as “mother” switches, routing both to sub-
scribers and smaller rural switches. The “competition projects” would serve as price 
setters for the pre-allocated projects. In order to achieve competition, Televerket 
encouraged STK to come up with a rural switch.33 
 
STK started a search for a rural switch so it could compete with EB for deliveries. 
An important point was that BTM did not develop rural switches; as Belgium was 
so densely populated, urban switches - the Pentaconta and later the Metaconta 10C - 
operated the entire national network. Thus, STK's traditional patron had no rural 
                                                          
30 The author of Ericsson’s centenary book, Ulf Olsson, claims that “Ericsson (...) produced 
the best finished (crossbar) product" in 
http://www.ericsson.com/about/publications/kon_con/contact/cont06_01/c06_20.shtml. 
Ericsson’s rural KV -switch from the late 1950s was the ARF 10. Jacobæus 1976, p. 114-115. 
31 NTM7: File: About EB's AKK50: “EB to Telegrafstyret 15.01.68” memo fra meeting about 
AKK50. 
32 The 11B and AKK50 could interact with other equipment on a “group/transit switch level”. 
NTM7-11Ba: “Nye automatsentraler 11B og AKK50, Notat til direktørmøte 10. januar 
1975”. 
33 Mo 2000. 
Chapter 4 STK's telecom business in pain 
 140
switch to offer. STK's response was to try to develop an 8B district-switch. An STK 
engineer, Arne Ruud, spent a year at BTM doing this. It was installed in some areas, 
but proved too heavy, complicated and expensive, especially for areas that required 
less than 100 lines.34 Moreover, it was an end-switch, which could operate only with 
support from a main 8B switch. Thus, it could not be used in the “competition pro-
jects”. Then STK presented a small Pentaconta switch, the PC-32, developed in 
France, which Televerket also rejected.35 From the late 1960s STK took a keen 
interest in a Swedish ITT project, to develop a semi-electronic rural switch, an elec-
tronic switch without a stored program, using a wired logic. LME followed the same 
strategy, with its AKK50.  
 
After an abortive attempt from the German SEL, to develop a rural switch with 
reed-relay contact, the Metaconta 10F, ITT-Europe wanted to exploit the Swedish 
competence in this field.36 ITT’s Swedish subsidiary, Standard Radio & Telefon 
(SRT), was based mainly on intercom systems.37 Nonetheless, encouraged by ITT, 
SRT started a “small exchange working party” in 1965. ITT was eager to develop a 
competitive rural switch, because several European countries went through the same 
process as Norway, i.e. an increased demand for automatic rural switches.38 Several 
engineers from the British ITT subsidiary, STC, followed the Swedish ITT project, 
because the UK was regarded as the largest potential market. Sweden was an impos-
sible market to penetrate due to LME's dominance; hence the project was moved to 
STC, to East Kilbride in Scotland, in 1967. STK followed the project closely in its 
search for a rural switch, and an STK engineer moved to Scotland in 1967. STC, 
however, had to abandon the project in 1969, because it won a large contract from 
the British PTO to develop an electronic switch, the TXE4.39  
 
ITT had a problem. Having spent five years on the 11B, it did not want to drop the 
project. The company had “a half finished system that needed a home”, and the 
project had turned into a “hot potato”.40 ITT-Europe pushed STK to host the com-
pletion of the Metaconta 11B.41 STK’s management was reluctant to take on the 
                                                          
34 Mo 2000, p. 6. 
35 Bergen District ordered a PC32, without a permit from Teledirektoratet. It concealed the 
order from CGCT in the budget by “placing it under” an order for PABX; Riisnæs 2000, p. 6. 
36 Mo, 2000., p. 4. 
37 Mo 2000, p. 4. SRT was established and owned by STK in the 1930s, and sold to ITT, or 
International Standard Electric Corporation, in 1948; STK's Annual Report 1938 and 1948. 
38 ITT 1974, p. 25. 
39 Young 1983, 169. 
40 Mo 2000, p. 8. 
41 Interview with Ivar Mo. 
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11B, but welcomed the opportunity to gain experience in electronics.42 STK's tele-
com division wanted to receive such a project. The long-term agreement provided a 
sound economic base for the division, and STK was in critical need of a rural 
switch. Moreover, some hoped that it could provide STK with export orders.43 BTM 
warned STK that the 11B concept would never function. BTM’s scepticism re-
flected the fact that the 11B used a mini-crossbar as a selector. Still, Ivar Mo, who 
had a switching degree from NTH, and eventually helmed the 11B project, was very 
keen on “cutting his teeth on the 11B”.44  
 
The 11B was the largest development project STK had considered.45 Braaten and 
Rambøl doubted its ability to handle a project of such a magnitude, but they agreed 
with the telecom division that it was important for STK to develop the capability of 
running such projects. The reasoning followed the same line as that for the estab-
lishment of the R&D department. STK had to undertake R&D in Norway, to avoid 
being criticised for simply extracting revenues on behalf of ITT. In this respect, it 
was important that ITT promised that it was prepared to market the 11B worldwide 
on behalf of STK.46 Hence, STK tried to gain product responsibility within ITT, i.e. 
to be a lead house in this market segment. STK had tried this in more peripheral 
market segments, such as cryptation for the military or maritime electronics, but the 
11B stood out, since switching development was at the core of the telecom industry. 
Thus, the project was perceived as a potential launch pad for becoming engaged in 
electronic switching, and thus becoming a fully-fledged telecom company.  
 
STK was eager to receive approbation from Televerket, and invited the PTO to 
Scotland to look at the project in 1969.47 The Head of Televerket's Switching Of-
fice, Nils Jonsson, was told that the 11B was the switch ITT-Europe would go for in 
this market segment. This was important for Televerket; still, it did not put to much 
emphasis on such promises, bearing the 8B in mind. Jonsson thought the project 
was promising, not least because the 11B could interact with different kinds of 
switches, and this was important if Televerket wanted to escape the technological 
deadlock that underpinned the Lillehammer agreement.48 Jonsson wanted to make 
an agreement for a trial switch, granted that STK would meet Televerket’s require-
ments in general, and that “interaction with our Norwegian specialty 8-B must be 
                                                          
42 STK's Annual Report 1971, p. 3. 
43 Interview with Ivar Ørbeck. 
44 Interview with Ivar Mo. 
45 NTM7-11Bb: Letter from STK to Teledirektoratet 20.10.71. 
46 Interview with Ivar Mo. 
47 NTM7-11Bb: Memo from Nils Jonsson til ”Linjeteknisk direktør” 24.04.69. 
48 NTM7-11Bb: Memo from Nils Jonsson til ”Linjeteknisk direktør” 24.04.69. 
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arranged in satisfactory manner”.49 Thus, Televerket ordered an 11B trial switch for 
Engelsrud, in Asker outside Oslo.50 
 
Claiming that the 11B “is one of the largest development projects in telecommunica-
tion” in Norway, STK invited Televerket to participate in the 11B project on a 
broader basis, for example inviting them to take part in several 11B committees.51 
Televerket did participate in such meetings, but never got carried away by STK's 
references to the project’s significance for the Norwegian telecom industry.52 In its 
communication with STK regarding the 11B, Televerket focused only on its role as 
a service provider, not as an industry provider. The 8B experience had vaccinated 
Televerket against such a role. Televerket's order for the 11B in 1970 arose from 
very different conditions to those when it was turned into a guinea pig with the 8B 
in the 1950s. The 8B problems in the Oslo network piled up in the late 1960s, and 
STK's reputation as a switching supplier diminished, as it proved unable to solve the 
problems.53 Televerket learned that STK was too small to handle problems of a 
certain magnitude. Thus, it is not surprising that Televerket handled STK's 11B 
offer on a market or arm’s-length basis. These factors concerned Televerket’s rela-
tionship with STK in particular, but there were other broader developments that had 
improved Televerket’s qualifications as a procurer of switches.  
 
The network as “a weed flora” 
Televerket had gone through a process of modernisation and corporatisation in the 
1960s, as it grew into one of the largest concerns in Norway.54 When the telephone 
queues were eliminated in 1968, the new Director General, Per Øvregard, broad-
ened the managerial scope, compared to Leif Larsen’s old mantra of doing away 
with the waiting lists. An organisational investigation laid the foundation for reor-
ganising the PTO. In 1969, Telegrafverket was changed to Televerket, and Tele-
grafstyret to Teledirektoratet. A board of external directors replaced the meetings of 
the in-house directors. The organisational structure was changed: the Economy 
Department was strengthened, among other things, through the establishment of an 
                                                          
49 NTM7-11Bb: Memo from Nils Jonsson til ”Linjeteknisk direktør” 24.04.69. (samkjøringen 
med vår norske spesialitet 8-B må ordnes på en tilfredsstillende måte). 
50 NTM7-11Bb: Letter from Teledirektoratet to STK 30.10.70. 
51 NTM7-11Bb: Letter from STK’s Riisnæs to Teledirektoratet 17.12.70 and STK til Teledir 
20.10.71. (ett av de største utviklingsprosjekter innen telekommunikasjonssektoren i landet). 
52 STK invited Televerket to participate in monthly meetings regarding the 11B, but it does 
not seem that Televerket participated. NTM7-11Bb: Letters from STK to Teledirektoratet 
17.12.70 and 20.10.71. 
53 TBD 15.10.69 and 03.12.69. 
54 Espeli 2005, p. 424. 
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independent section for procurement and supply.55 Consequently, STK was facing 
an ever-more professional and demanding procurer in the first half of the 1970s. An 
important thing that enabled Televerket to be a more demanding procurer was the 
process of installing equipment for national automation. 
 
National automation implied that one could call long-distance without assistance 
from a manual operator. It entailed national specifications on signalling, billing, 
transmission and directing. It also required a different kind of switch, which could 
route calls between local switches. Such switches were called transit or trunk 
switches. As an example, if a subscriber was to make a phone call from Sverresborg in 
Trondheim, to Stabekk outside Oslo, the request would be noted at Sverresborg’s 
local switch, which would route the call to Trondheim's transit switch; this would 
route it to Oslo's transit switch, which would in turn route it to Stabekk’s local 
switch, which would send the call to the receiving subscriber. The transit switches 
could interact with equipment from different suppliers: this was necessary to allow 
for an automatic call to be made from “EB-land”, as Trondheim was in, to “STK-
land”, which included Oslo and Stabekk. Thus, there were smaller technological 
barriers to using competitive tenders in the procurement of transit switches, or, 
which is important in this chapter, local switches that were to be linked with a tran-
sit switch.  
 
There was a rapid increase in international and long-distance calls during the 1960s, 
which affected the PTOs' relationship with the switching industry. The number of 
international calls rose tenfold between 1950 and 1970.56 This growth required 
international cooperation to agree on specifications, mainly in signalling. The in-
creasing international cooperation, within CCITT* and CEPT*, was crucial in loos-
ening the industry’s oligopolic grip on the switching market. Firstly, because coop-
eration, together with the new electronic and digital technology, eased the problems 
of technological interfaces, and secondly, because the international telecom organi-
sations became important sources of information and knowledge for Televerket. 
This was particularly important for switching, which reappeared in the international 
                                                          
55 St.prp. 30 (1971-1972): “Om ny administrativ oppbygging av Televerkets 
sentraladministrasjon - Teledirektoratet”. 
56 Billed minutes to and from Norway rose from 4670 in 1950, to 53,258 in 1970, St.prp. 30 
(1971-72). 
* Comitè Consultatif de International Telegraph et Telephone (The International Telephone 
and Telegraph Consultative Committee). 
* CEPT: Conference of European Posts and Telegraphs. 
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forums in 1960, after having been absent between 1920 and 1960.57 Hence, the 
equipment supplier no longer had a monopoly on knowledge and information re-
garding the development of switching technology.  
 
The increased R&D was also important in enhancing the PTOs' competence. There 
was a fruitful interaction between R&D and internationalisation. On the one hand, 
R&D increased the absorptive capacity of the PTOs, so they were able to compre-
hend and utilise the information and knowledge from the international cooperation. 
On the other hand, the international cooperation was important in setting R&D 
agendas. Helge Godø argues convincingly how the international cooperation, due to 
the need for common technological standards, stimulated innovations in telecom in 
the 1980s.58 There is every reason to believe that such fruitful interaction took place 
from the 1960s, and contributed to the increased competence of the PTOs. TF's role 
in terms of switching competence is disputed, however, as several actors claim that 
it contributed little in this field.59 Nevertheless, TF was important in providing 
Televerket with confidence in its meetings with the industry and in placing better 
planning on the agenda.60 
 
The most important development, however, was the national automation. Moreover, 
it turned the national network into one integrated technological system, which could 
no longer be seen as several local networks, bundled together by Televerket. It en-
tailed technological standards, particularly in signalling, which were decisive for 
transmission and billing. Another factor was that Televerket achieved full monopoly 
as a national operator: it took over the last private operator in Andebu in 1972.61 The 
permanent temporality had ended, and Televerket had total monopsonic procure-
ment power towards the suppliers. The monopoly and the national automation were 
the main reasons for centralising procurement of switches in Teledirektoratet. The 
responsibility for procuring switches before the long-term agreements was unclear. 
Telegrafstyret had the formal responsibility, in as much as it sanctioned the districts’ 
decisions, but it did not seem to have interfered much.62 From around 1970, invest-
                                                          
57 As mentioned in chapter II, CCITT undertook switching studies at its first meeting in India 
in 1960. Chapuis 1982, p. 190. 
58 Helge Godø: R&D and technological innovations telecommunication: Innovation regimes, 
1995; Helge Godø: “Innovation regimes, R&D and radical innovations in 
telecommunications”, 2000. 
59 Several of the central mangers in Televerket’s Technical Department play down TF’s role in 
switching. Interview with Bjørn Gladsø; Magnhild Slettbak, STK's Carl-Edward Joys fully 
supports this view. 
60 Slettbak points to the confidence TF gave Televerket. 
61 Espeli 2005, p. 276. 
62 Interview with Bjørn Gladsø; Magnhild Slettbak; Ivar Mo; Jon B. Riisnæs; Carl-Edward Joys. 
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ments in the network were made according to a national plan, accommodating sev-
eral factors, among them national automation. A natural consequence was that the 
monopsonic procurement power increased. The national automation called for more 
planning and control, and competence in switching, as did the developments within 
electronic switching.  
 
The electronic switches also required strategic forecasting, Televerket had to come 
up with a technological strategy, and it was a matter of choosing the right technol-
ogy at the right time. Nils Jonsson visited LME and several ITT units (BTM, CGCT 
and LCT) to study SPC switches, STC in London to study PCM switches, and East 
Kilbride to examine the 11B.63 After his return, in 1969, Televerket’s Switching 
office produced a report that mapped the switches in the Norwegian network. The 
document shows that Televerket had realised that switching - not transmission - was 
the essential component in the telecom network.64 The main message from the sta-
tion office was that the network was “a true weed flora of equipment variants, which 
creates problems both for planning and operations.”65 
 
The first generation of automatic switches was half a century old, and accounted for 
about 200,000 lines in the Norwegian network, in addition to some 100,000 lines 
from the Rotary 7D, installed in the 1930s. It is evident that the Norwegian network 
was not up to date, but it is worth mentioning that even in the US network, the first 
generation of automatic switches dominated as late as 1973.66 Nevertheless, these 
switches had “to be scrapped” within 10-20 years.67 Maintenance was labour-
intensive, 4-5 times as much as modern switches; the network provided poor ser-
vice; and would not be able to handle the expected increase in traffic in the 1970s. 
Thus, between 15,000 and 20,000 lines needed to be replaced each year, in addition 
to the annual extension of lines. It was a puzzle to decide which switches should be 
replaced first; this had to be done according to estimated increase in traffic, the 
national automation, and the competence of Televerket’s personnel. Moreover, the 
interface problem existed as long as there were electro-mechanical switches. Fur-
                                                          
63 NTM7-11Bb: “II.S. 69/Nj Draft for letter from Telegrafstyret to Ministry of 
Communication 12.02.69”. 
64 RA-LTP37a: ”R-Direktoratets org.unders. i Teledirektoratet; Bidrag til innstillingen fra 
Teledirektoratets kontorer; Innst. fra Arbeidsgruppe E - Langtidsplanlegging 20/8-69”. 
65 RA-LTP37a: Innst. fra Arbeidsgruppe E - Langtidsplanlegging 20/8-69, (en sann ugrasflora 
av utstyrsvarianter skaper problemer både for planlegging of drift). 
66 “Step-by-step switches served a peak of 24.4 million Bell System lines in 1973, fifty four 
years after the Bell System began using them. At that time more Bell System lines were 
served by Step-by-step switches than any other type of switch.” Gerald W. Brock: The Sec-
ond Information Revolution, 2003, p. 128. 
67 RA-LTP37A: Innst. fra Arbeidsgruppe E - Langtidsplanlegging 20/8-69. 
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thermore, electronic switches were “very sensitive to external influences”, and had 
to be modified to interact with old equipment.68 This raised the question of where 
modern, or old, switches would function best.  
 
A final complicating element was to assess the lifespan of the new switches. STK's 
11B and EB's AKK50 were hybrid switches, belonging both to the crossbar and the 
electronic generation. It was a matter of time before a less expensive processor 
would rule out the wired logic. This might explain why the 11B was a “hot potato” 
for ITT-Europe, and that no other subsidiary wanted to host the project. At this time, 
around 1970, other telecom companies, like Nokia for instance, was fully engaged 
in SPC switches, and CIT-Alcatel launched its digital switch in 1970; so 11B was 
not a very futuristic project.69 Another issue was when the future generation of 
switches would make its mark. Digital switches were expected in the foreseeable 
future. The report noted that PCM was used in transmission, “but an integration 
with the contact function seems to offer big advantages”.70 It raised the question of 
bandwidth, to account for new services, such as data transmission and picture te-
lephony. This had to be taken into consideration, according to the report, when the 
introduction of new switching equipment was to be planned.  
 
These arguments about digital switching and new services were raised throughout 
the 1970s by the TF's director, Nic. Knudtzon. He was a member of the committee 
that wrote the report.71 Knudtzon paid more attention to the new services a digital 
network could provide, than to Televerket’s problem with standard telephony. It is 
fair to call him a futurist in this context, as he wanted to replace the term “long-
term-planning” with the alternative “distant-time-planning”.72 His focus on other 
modern services caused a rift between the TF and Televerket’s Technical Depart-
ment (TA*). The TA was more concerned with present problems, than with distant-
time possibilities.73 It wanted the TF's support in its day-to-day challenges, but felt 
that the TF was too concerned with theoretical and abstract planning for a future 
digital network. A vision behind the TF's reflections was the seamless digital net-
work, abundant with new services. A seamless network was far-fetched for the TA, 
                                                          
68 RA-LTP37A: Innst. fra Arbeidsgruppe E - Langtidsplanlegging 20/8-69, (De nye systemer 
basert på elektronikk er svært følsomme for ytre påvirkning). 
69 Häikiö, 2002, p. 57. 
70 RA-LTP37A: Innst. fra Arbeidsgruppe E - Langtidsplanlegging 20/8-69, (Foreløpig er (PCM) 
i bruk for samband, men en integrering av koplingsfunksjonen synes å by på store fordeler). 
71 Several LPC-meetings. 
72 Collett and Lossius, 1993, p. 43. 
* Norwegian abbreviation for Teknisk Avdeling. 
73 RA-LTP, several meetings; and interview with Bjørn Gladsø. 
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which had to cope with a network that looked like a “weed flora”. This was espe-
cially true for the Oslo network, which practically broke down in 1968.74 
 
The Oslo problem 
The Oslo network was of particular significance to Televerket, because it was the 
hub in the national network. The bulk of the long-distance calls and all the interna-
tional calls went through Oslo. Hence, not only Oslo’s citizens, businesses and insti-
tutions depended on a functioning network, but the whole country did too. It was 
important in an organisational perspective, since Oslo District, which incorporated 
the suburban communes, was by far the strongest district within Televerket. It had 
gained substantial autonomy because of its size, but it was important for Teledirek-
toratet to have influence on the national hub. Oslo was also vital to STK, being the 
sole supplier of equipment to the capital’s network. STK's telecom department de-
veloped very close relations with Oslo District. It functioned as a showcase for the 
company, and it was the first procurer of Rotary switches in the 1920s, 8Bs in the 
1950s, and was to inaugurate the new generation of SPC switches in the 1970s.  
 
Oslo had been an overarching problem for Telegrafverket in terms of telephone 
queues, as nearly 50 per cent of the applicants for telephones belonged to the Oslo 
network, and the problem peaked in 1957, with over 27,000 people waiting for 
telephones. Televerket and Oslo District reached a milestone in 1968, when it fi-
nally eliminated the queues.75 The celebration did not last long; as the network 
nearly broke down the same year, the main problem was that the subscribers lost the 
dialling tone. One reason for the problem was that the installation of new lines, to 
get rid of the queues, had been at the expense of investments in equipment to handle 
the increased traffic.76 The 8B switches, in particular, were pushed to their limits in 
terms of numbers of lines to operate.77 Still, it was rather the increased traffic on 
existing lines that created the trouble.78  
 
                                                          
74 TBD 01.08.69, and Bestorp 1990, p. 179. 
75 Bestorp 1990, p. 373. 
76 An example was the concentrators that were used in the switching-stations. All subscribers 
could not phone at the same time, so before “arriving” at the switch, subscribers went through 
a concentrator, thus sharing incoming lines. The normal quota was 10:100, i.e. 100 
subscribers to a concentrator with 10 incoming lines. This quota was increased to 20:100, 
thus making the network more vulnerable to a breakdown during intense traffic. 
77 Interview with Ivar Mo. 
78 The bulk of the new lines was installed on the outskirts of the city. The problem in the late 
1960s originated in the centre of the city, where few lines had been installed the preceding 
years. Bestorp 1990, p. 179. 
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There were several reasons for the breakdown.79 The switches in the city centre 
were mostly old Rotary switches, covering over 120,000 lines or more than 50 per 
cent of the city’s lines, and these were not capable of operating “traffic intense” 
business subscribers.80 Another problem was an 8B transit switch, installed in 1965 
for automating national and international calls. The increased traffic on this switch 
created problems, as it was constantly being upgraded as the number of lines in-
creased from 2000 to 8600 lines in 1971.81 Due to signalling and direction, all the 
traffic to the transit switch was routed through a special switch, which became a 
bottleneck. Another bottleneck was a tandem switch that “interpreted” the traffic 
between all Rotary and 8B switches. Finally, from the late 1960s Televerket started 
to pay the price for being a lonely rider with the 8B, and complaints relating to the 
8B are standard in Televerket’s documents from that time.82 Other PTOs gained 
from what Brian W. Arthur has called increasing returns, meaning that “technolo-
gies become more attractive - more developed, more widespread, more useful - the 
more they are adopted”.83 With standard switches, the upgrading costs were shared 
with other countries, or were used in larger networks, and so the costs were smaller 
per line.84  
 
A central problem with the 8B was the multi-switch, which was made out of plastic 
to make it economical. It broke several times and caused much trouble. Another 
technological problem was the selenium diodes, which had rusted in Brazil. There 
were ten thousands of such components in each 8B switch. STK wanted to replace 
the selenium diodes, but “our demand”, Mo recalled, “was too small to make any 
semiconductor manufacturer interested in developing an entirely new kind of di-
ode”.85 STK had to develop its own circuits, to replace the matrices of the selenium 
diodes. This was expensive, and only applicable in new switches; STK had many 
problems in providing selenium diodes for the replacement of old switches. A simi-
lar problem arose when the semi-conductive material in the 8B’s transistors had to 
be changed from germanium to silicon. At first, the problems of the 8B were seen as 
initial weaknesses, but “proved after some years to be a wide, never-ending array of 
                                                          
79 This is based on Bestorp (1990, p. 192); his arguments are in line with the sources, conf. TBD 
from July 1969 to 1970; NTM8: File: ”Nord 3 Fremdrift - sluttoppgjør”: Bestorp to 
Teledirektoratet 25.09.72: “Utskifting av 8.000 nummer Nord 3/10C/ITT1600”; NTM9b: 
”T.IIS. 28/3-72: Innstilling om ny datamaskinstyrt fjernsentral til Oslo”. 
80 NTM8: II.S. Skinnes 6.10.71, “Instilling (nr. 1) om Ny Lokalautomatsentral Nord 3”. 
81 Bestorp 1990, 161. 
82 NTM7-11Bb: Memo from N. Jonsson til ”Linjeteknisk direktør” 24.04.69. TBD 15.10.69. 
83 Arthur 1988, p. 590. 
84 Arthur 1988, p. 590. 
85 Mo 2001. (Men vårt behov var for lite til å gjøre halvlederprodusenter interessert i å utvikle 
en helt ny diodetype). 
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technical faults”, says Helge Godø.86 The consequences were damaging,, “most of 
all, in the public image of the NT (Televerket) as an incompetent public utility”.87 
Thus, being a futuristic switch in the 1950s, the 8B suffered from its use of prema-
ture semiconductor components, and the small Norwegian network had to finance 
the upgrading costs. 
 
Some STK aides claim that the real problem was not the 8B switch, but the lack of 
systematic routines for reporting, maintenance and repair at Oslo District.88 The fact 
that the other cities using the 8B did not experience so much trouble lends weight to 
this argument. One of STK's switching directors in the 1970s, Carl-Edward Joys, 
stresses that Oslo District relied too much on STK, due to the spatial proximity, i.e. 
it was easier to call Økern than to fix the problem.89 Still, the many different 
switches turned the Oslo network into a patchwork of switches, and it was difficult 
to train personnel. Specialist craft skills were required for monitoring and repairing 
this system, which STK possessed but Oslo District lacked.90 This meant that Oslo 
District and Teledirektoratet were very reliant on STK. 
 
After several committees had analysed the problem, Oslo District and Teledirektor-
atet decided to start replacing the old Rotary switches, mainly because these 
switches demanded so much maintenance, and were thus costly in terms of wages. 
Each Rotary line cost 53 kroners per line, whereas each 8B line required only 19 
kroners.91 Other European cities that went through this process around 1970, i.e. 
replacing the first generation automatic switches from the interwar years, and gener-
ally did this with crossbar switches that were only a decade old. Neither Teledirek-
toratet nor Oslo District wanted to install more 8B switches than necessary, consid-
ering that the 8B was a main cause of Oslo's problem, and thought it futile to rely on 
this system.92 An upgrading of the 8B was considered too expensive, as Televerket 
would have to cover all development costs.93 In a Board Meeting in June 1970, 
Teledirektoratet decided to install two SPC switches in Oslo; a local switch to re-
                                                          
86 Godø 1995, p. 107. 
87 Godø 1995, p. 107. 
88 Interview with Carl-Edward Joys. 
89 It is true, as Joys says, that Bergen District had few problems with the 8B, but Bergen also 
had fewer lines and did not function as a national hub. Moreover, it is fair to view Joys’ 
appraisal of Bergen in the light of local and family patriotism, in as much as his father, 
Lorentz Angell Joys, was director of Bergen District for many years. Kåre Aarvik: Makt og 
avmakt: om organisasjon og ledelse i Televerket : fra "væsen" til "verk", 1993, p. 40. 
90 Interview with Gunnar Tidemann; Knut Berg; Carl Edvard Joys; Gladsø. 
91 Bestorp 1990, p. 193. 
92 TBD 15.10.69. 
93 Bestorp 1990, p. 231. 
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place Rotary switches in the town centre, at “Nord 3”, and a transit switch to replace 
the 8B transit switch from 1965.94 This was very early in a European context, and 
was a consequence of the troubles with the 8B. Thus, Televerket was a pioneer with 
SPC switches, since its pioneering role with crossbar switches was a failure.95 
 
The lucrative long-term agreements 
Teledirektoratet wanted competition for the two deliveries, but it realised, however, 
that BTM's 10C and LME’s versions were the only realistic alternatives.96 Still, this 
was to be the first time Televerket arranged a real competitive tender. In the first 
long-term agreement, in 1966-69, STK and EB competed for the installation of 
switches in Ålesund and Larvik, in 1966 and 1968, respectively, but the competition 
was not genuine. Both the projects were in STK areas, and STK won both, even 
though EB's prices were lower. The reason was that “direct traffic between two 
suppliers’ automatic systems creates problems that burden Telegrafverket”.97 It was 
possible to handle the interface problem, but it was expensive, particularly the issue 
of making EB's switches work with the old Rotary switches. Thus, it would be more 
expensive and troublesome to run the local telecom networks if there were two 
equipment suppliers involved.98 It required personnel who could handle both sys-
tems, and an STK switch was a safer bet in terms of avoiding communication prob-
lems with the incumbent switches. The same arguments were put forward for future 
deliveries, that future installation of STK switches would be more expensive to 
install if EB were chosen.99 Thus, these tenders did not escape the logic of the Lille-
hammer agreement.  
 
                                                          
94 TBD 09.06.70. Still, “Since there was a relatively long delivery time for computer-controlled 
switches, it will probably be necessary to order some 8-B equipment to extend Oslo's trunk 
switch in 1971 to cover the increase in traffic” (Da det er relativt lang leveringstid for 
datamaskinstyrte sentraler, vil det trolig bli nødvendig å bestille en del 8-B utstyr til utviding av 
Oslo fjernsentral i 1971 for å dekke trafikkveksten). 
95 Televerket wanted to wait until BTM and LME's SPC switches had been tested in other 
countries. “In Oslo, however, we have to order equipment for several switches. The 
alternative is to order 8B equipment and this we will advise against.” NTM8: ”II.S. Skinnes 
6.10.71, “Innstilling (nr. 1) om Ny Lokalautomatsentral Nord 3” and ”II.S. Skinnes 30.11.71: 
Innstilling nr. 2 om Ny Lokalautomatsentral Nord 3 I Oslo”. 
96 LME’s local SPCswitch was called the AKE, while its transit SPC switch was called the ARE. 
97 NTM-Å: Jonsson’s Innstilling to avd. direktør Lagset fra II.S. 18.01.68. (direkte samtrafikk 
mellom to leverandørers automatsystemer skaper problemer som belaster Telegrafverket). 
98 NTM-Å: Jonssons innstilling til avd. direktør Lagset fra II.S. 18.01.68. 
99 NTM-Å: Jonssons innstilling til avd. direktør Lagset fra II.S. 18.01.68. 
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EB's offer at Ålesund was recommended in Televerket’s first evaluation, but a later 
evaluation denounced EB's offer as dumping, since it did not use the fixed units 
prices from the long-term agreement.100  
 
“The present offers ascertain that if both offers were based on unit 
prices, EB's offer would be ½ million kroners more expensive than 
STK's offer. In later extensions at Ålesund we must expect to pay 
«normal» price, and then EB is more expensive than Standard, even if 
the first installation is offered at reduced price.”101  
 
The purpose of the competitions at Larvik and Ålesund was to compare STK and EB's 
unit prices in the long-term agreement, and how these affected the prices of com-
plete switches.102 There is no doubt that EB violated the conditions, but it is note-
worthy that Telegrafverket did not try to use EB's offer to reduce the unit prices in 
the long-term agreements. An explanation for the behaviour might be that Tele-
grafverket’s procurement was dominated by engineers, and thus the technical aspects, 
rather than economic conditions, prevailed. So, accusing EB of “dumping” might 
have been a substitute argument, to try to avoid mixing equipment from STK and 
EB. 
 
Consequently, the tenders for the SPC switches in 1971 were to be the first real 
competition. This was partly a result of external pressure. Besides an increased 
public interest in how Televerket's resources were allocated, the Auditor General 
stands out as a key institution. It started to inspect Telegrafverket in 1962, before 
that, the Ministry of Communication was responsible for its control. The Auditor 
General had several complaints throughout the 1960s, particularly regarding 
Televerket’s lack of control of its stocks of equipment and capital.103 Another recur-
rent issue was Telegrafverket’s payment routines; they were not under sufficient 
control, and not in accordance with the books. Still, Telegrafverket continued its 
slack bookkeeping, and managed to avoid action from the Auditor General. It is 
remarkable, says Harald Espeli, how Telegrafverket was able to impede and obstruct 
                                                          
100 NTM-Å: Jonssons innstilling til avd. direktør Lagset fra II.S. 18.01.68. 
101 NTM7, File: “Ny sentral Larvik 1966/67”: Jonsson’s Innstilling til avd. direktør Lagset fra 
II.S. 18.01.68. (De foreliggende tilbud slår fast at hvis begge tilbud var basert på 
enhetsprisene ville EB's tilbud være ½ mill. kroner dyrere enn STK's tilbud. Ved senere 
utvidelse av Ålesund må vi regne med å betale "normal" pris og da faller EB dyrere enn 
Standard, selv om det ved første utbygging er tilbudt til redusert pris.) 
102 Interview with Bjørn Gladsø. 
103 Riksarkivet’s information on the archive from the Auditory General (Riksrevisjonen). 
http://www.riksarkivet.no; The Auditor General’s report to Stortinget 1969; St. f. 5. 
dokumenter (1970/71), Samferdselsdepartementet 1969, III Televerket. 
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the Auditor General’s call for better control.104 A reason why the Auditor General’s 
influence was stronger from the late 1960s, was that its mandate towards state-
owned industries, not only the state administration, increased from 1965, and that it 
extended its control function from account revision, to the revision of procurement 
routines, contracts and administration.105 
 
The long-term agreements were very lucrative for STK and EB, since they reaped 
the benefits of rationalising in production.106 Telegrafverket ordered more equip-
ment from STK and EB than the long-term agreement for 1965-69 prescribed, and 
requested if this could lead to a price reduction. It resulted in a total discount of 
NOK 11 million, without any further documentation from the companies.107 The 
Auditor General was sceptical about this discount, because the “price reductions 
seemed (…) modest” and because there were no calculations substantiating it.108 
The Auditor General suspected that STK and EB overcharged Televerket in the 
existing procurement regime, and called for more competition.109 The Ministry in-
structed Televerket to invite tenders from foreign equipment suppliers whenever 
possible. Furthermore, limited competition was to be introduced between STK and 
EB. Another element that might have induced Televerket to decide on open tenders 
was a growing doubt of STK's abilities, since it proved unable to help Televerket 
sort out the problems in Oslo. An accompanying element was that Teledirektoratet 
and others felt that Oslo District was in the hands of STK.  
 
The Oslo tenders 
To arrange tenders, the procurer needs sufficient competence about the products 
offered. Televerket recognised that it lacked this, and there was “an urgent need” to 
acquire “better competence and insight in computer-controlled automatic switches”, 
as its Board admitted, “by placing engineers for training with potential suppliers of 
such equipment, to avoid being too dependent on the suppliers”.110 ‘Suppliers’ in 
                                                          
104 Espeli 2005, p. 454. 
105 Espen Thompson: Revisjon og politikk: Riksrevisjonen og fremveksten av 
forvaltningsrevisjon etter 1945, 2001. 
106 This the impression from STK's accounts, and is veried by most of the interviws, 
esepcially Fredrik Thoresen, Jens Gjerdsjø; who was director in Televerket's Procurement 
office 1973-82. Espeli 2005, p. 405. 
107 St. f. 5. Dokument nr 1. (1970/71), Samferdselsdepartementet 1969, III Televerket. 
108 St. f. 5. Dokument nr 1. (1970-71), Samferdselsdepartementet 1969, III Televerket. 
109 The Auditor General’s report to Stortinget 1969-1973. 
110 TBD 09.06.70. (påtrengende behov), (bedre kompetanse og innsikt i datamaskinstyrte 
automatsentraler), (ved å få plassert ingeniører til opplæring hos potensielle leverandører av 
slikt utstyr, slik at vi ikke blir for sterkt avhengig av leverandørene.) 
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this context did not mean the Norwegian subsidiaries, but LME and BTM. Johs 
Skinnes and Bjørn Gladsø from Teledirektoratet went to LME in Stockholm, and 
Alf Marhaug from Oslo District and Leiv Hanesand from Bergen District went to 
BTM in Antwerp. Televerket’s engineers had visited the STK and EB headquarters 
before, when inspecting switches. Still, the two projects were more complex than 
the earlier procurements: firstly because the switches involved were to handle a 
large amount of traffic, and in a complex networks, and secondly, because the ten-
der was competitive, Teledirektoratet had to compare the strengths and weaknesses 
of BTM and LME’s switches. 
 
STK and EB were invited to hand in offers for the two projects in 1971.111 The 
invitations stipulated that the computer switches “should be understood as Stored 
Program, as opposed to wired program”.112 It was a matter of great prestige to win 
the projects. The transit switch was to be the largest switch in Norway and the na-
tional hub, routing all international calls, and all long-distance calls passing through 
Oslo. It was to handle one million calls per day from the start, rising later to 4.5 
million calls. The local SPC switch was to be the largest-ever local switch in Nor-
way, with a final capacity of 20,000 lines, operating in the large and complex Oslo 
network. Moreover, even if it was not stated, it was assumed that the winner of the 
local SPC contract would deliver further SPC switches to the Oslo network. This 
was because it would be too expensive to train Televerket’s personnel in two 
switching systems. Televerket stressed that it was not obliged to accept any of the 
offers. 
 
Televerket rejected both of the first offers for local SPC switch for “Nord 3” in 
October 1971. It rejected LME’s ARE because of the excessive delivery time, the 
limited services offered, and modest experience with the processor. The 10C was 
considered too expensive, and with insufficient traffic capacity. Televerket asked 
both companies to return with better offers. EB had to inform Televerket about other 
PTOs that had expressed interest in LME’s local SPC switch, as the ARE switch 
was yet to be produced, and Televerket was cautious about a new 8B situation. STK 
was asked to reduce the price, and come up with a new solution that increased the 
capacity; it was not able to meet the requirements of a final capacity of 20,000 lines. 
It does not seem as if Televerket regretted turning down the offers and the resulting 
delay, as it was eager to get the best system. It was the first time Televerket used its 
                                                          
111 Decision at Televerket’s Board Meeting 25.01.71. 
112 The following is based on NTM8: ”II.S. Skinnes 6.10.71: Innstilling (nr. 1) om Ny 
Lokalautomatsentral Nord 3”; (Med datamaskinstyrte forstås “Lagret program” - [Stored 
program] i motsetning til “Kablet program” - [Wired Program] styring.) 
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procurement power in a concrete situation, by setting the equipment suppliers 
against each other. In an internal meeting, its Director General “praised the working 
group for the fine work it had done”.113 
 
Televerket chose STK/BTM’s 10C as the local switch in the second evaluation in 
November 1971. An important reason was that STK lowered the price by 10 per 
cent. Moreover, in their new offer, STK/BTM had replaced the ITT-1600 computer 
with the ITT-3200, which had larger capacity.114 Whereas the ITT-1600 could han-
dle only 86,000 calls per hour, the ITT-3200 could operate 200,000, and the latter 
computer’s storage capacity could be upgraded. The 10C was initially designed as a 
SPC switch, whereas LME's ARE was, in reality, only an upgraded crossbar switch. 
Thus, the 10C had “more facilities for the subscribers and in particular for adminis-
trative measures”, which was regarded as preferable.115 There are no signs in the 
report that the 10C was chosen because the rest of the Oslo network used BTM 
switches. It was important for STK to win the contract, to hold on to Oslo as its 
main market. As the report stated, the 10C order for Nord 3 “must be viewed as the 
choice of the 1970s local-switch system for Oslo”.116  
 
LME's electronic switches were developed in cooperation with the Swedish PTO, 
first in an “electronics council”; the next generation of digital switches was devel-
oped in a joint venture with the PTO, known as “ELLEMTEL”.117 The “electronics 
council” did not succeed in presenting a competitive local SPC switch; it actually 
argued that SPC switches were only economical for transit switches, not local 
switches.118 The “electronics council” did, however, develop a competitive transit 
                                                          
113 TBD 22.10.71., (Generaldirektøren komplimenterte arbeidsgruppa for det gode arbeidet 
den hadde gjort). 
114 The following is based on NTM8: ”II.S. Skinnes 30.11.71: Innstilling nr. 2 om Ny 
Lokalautomatsentral Nord 3 I Oslo”. 
115 NTM8: ”II.S. Skinnes 30.11.71: Innstilling nr. 2 om Ny Lokalautomatsentral Nord 3 I 
Oslo”. (mener vi at 10C, som har flere faciliteter for abonnentene og spesielt for 
administrative formål vil være å foretrekke). 
116 NTM8:”II.S. Skinnes 30.11.71: Innstilling nr. 2 om Ny Lokalautomatsentral Nord 3 I 
Oslo”. (bestillingene av 10 C-utstyr til Nord 3 også må sees som et valg av 70-årenes 
lokalsentralsystem i Oslo). 
117 “ELLEM” was based on the pronunciation of “LM” in “LM Ericsson” and “Tel” in 
Televerket, Fridlund 2000, p. 146. 
118 Meurling and Jeans say that “Ericsson had also learned that the current generation of SPC, 
as it existed in the late ‘60s, was expensive and complex - worthwhile in major national and 
international transit centres, but not obviously cost-effective for local exchanges in large 
numbers over wide areas. The disadvantages were above all in the high cost of handling - 
design, testing, modification, fault-correction, production, installation, and operation and 
maintenance.” Meurling and Jeans 2000, p. 278. Interview with Carl-Edward Joys. 
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switch in the SPC generation. Despite the loss to the Metaconta in Australia in 1969, 
LME's AKE13 was to be installed in Rotterdam, Copenhagen, Finland, and, need-
less to say, Stockholm. This broad acceptance was a main reason why Televerket 
chose the AKE13 as the transit switch for Oslo in March 1972. Televerket empha-
sised the possibilities of inter-Nordic cooperation on the AKE13.119 This was at a 
time when the cooperation between the Nordic PTOs, on data communication and 
mobile telephony, took off.120  
 
Televerket regarded the AKE13 as a more advanced transit switch than the 10C.121 
Moreover, the 10C was more expensive, both in terms of the actual equipment, but 
mainly because LME/EB offered future service and reprogramming free of charge. 
Repairs and troubleshooting in the Oslo network were among the main sources of 
revenues for STK's telecom business, and, thus, a major expenditure for 
Televerket.122 It was a central part of the intimate relationship between STK and 
Oslo District that Teledirektoratet wanted to revamp through competitive tenders. 
EB was well aware of this, and thus knew the value of offering service free of 
charge. 
 
A noteworthy thing is that the engineers visiting BTM, Marhaug and Hanesand, 
came from Televerket’s Districts, districts that used ITT/BTM systems. Hence, one 
may think that BTM won the local contract, since those inspecting BTM had a par-
ticular interest and insight in this. On the other hand, the engineers visiting LME, 
Skinnes and Gladsø, came from Teledirektoratet, and had more interest in and in-
sight into national automation and transit switches. Nonetheless, it was the first 
significant break in the Lillehammer agreement, and as such it was a serious blow 
for STK. It is probably no coincidence, however, that it was a transit switch that 
broke the cartel agreement. Most of the open tenders during these years, as in Aus-
tralia and Ålesund, were for transit switches that routed long-distance and interna-
tional calls between local networks. The problems of signalling were somewhat 
smaller, but most importantly these switches had to accommodate different switch-
ing systems anyway, thus, interaction was no hindrance for competition.  
 
                                                          
119 NTM9b: ”T.IIS. 28/3-72: Innstilling om ny datamaskinstyrt fjernsentral til Oslo”. 
120 Gard Paulsen: “Samarbeidets protokoll - Utviklingen av et nordisk datanett, 1971-1981”, 2004. 
121 AKE13 was modularised switch, which made it easier to locate and isolate errors. 
Moreover, two computers work parallel on each operation, if one fell out, the other replaced it. 
The was common for BTM’s local SPC switch, but was for some reason not chosen for the 
trunk switch. NTM9b: ”T.IIS. 28/3-72: Innstilling om ny datamaskinstyrt fjernsentral til Oslo”. 
122 Interview with Gunnar Tidemann, Carl-Edward Joys. 
Chapter 4 STK's telecom business in pain 
 156
STK was very disappointed, since Oslo was considered as its heartland. The Direc-
tor of STK's Telecom Department, Ernst Berentsen, was furious over Televerket’s 
choice. He played a central role in forming the relationship between STK and 
Televerket in these years, not least since STK's managing director from 1972, 
Fredrik Thoresen was a “cable man”, with modest knowledge of the field. Berentsen 
had an engineering degree from the University of Iowa, and started in STK's switch-
ing business in 1954, and replaced Sverre Ramstad as Director of the Telecom Divi-
sion in 1964.123 Berentsen wrote a memo to Televerket, expressing disapproval of 
the evaluation report, particularly its depiction of the AKE13 as more reliable and 
advanced than the Metaconta transit switch. He claimed this revealed that 
Televerket did not understand how BTM’s transit switch operated and functioned.124 
Underlying Berentsen’s statements was an allegation that Televerket lacked compe-
tence in computer-controlled switches in general.125 In a meeting with STK, 
Televerket rebuffed all of STK's complaints and allegations, clearly irritated by 
Berentsen’s attitude, and concluded that the meeting had yielded “no information… 
that could in any way alter the conclusion (…) concerning the choice of a computer-
controlled transit switch for Oslo”.126 It was not the last time Berentsen provoked 
Televerket. 
 
Televerket stressed the potential for Nordic cooperation, claiming that a “common 
Nordic effort” should yield “substantial advantages in terms of more economical 
program development, personnel and greater competence”.127 The Nordic argument 
was promising for EB, because of LME's strong position in these countries, but it 
was threatening to STK's future prospects. Berentsen tried to kill off the Nordic 
argument by reinstating the logic of the Lillehammer agreement. He accepted that 
Nordic cooperation had some advantages, but only for international calls, and 
claimed that local and national requirements were far more significant, as “the local 
and national software” would “always be larger than the international software”.128 
Berentsen added that Oslo District would meet “huge technological and economical 
                                                          
123 Ernst Berentsen 70 year in Aftenposten 24.08.99. 
124 NTM9a: Memo from Ernst Berentsen on “Oslo Fjern- og utenlandssentral FS 3” 17.04.74. 
125 Interview with Carl-Edward Joys. 
126 NTM9a: “T.II.S. 17.04.72” - Minute from meeting between STK og Televerket, (På møtet 
kom ikke fram opplysninger som på noen måte kan endre den konklusjon som er utformet i 
innstillingen om valg av datamaskinstyrt fjernsentral til Oslo). 
127 NTM9b: “Dok. 79/72 Til styremøte 20. april 1972 Sakslista post 5: Ny datamaskinstyrt 
fjernsentral til Oslo”.( Felles nordisk innsats (…) vesentlige fordeler i form av billigere pro-
gramutvikling, personalbesparelse og større samlet kompetanse.) 
128 NTM9a: Memo from Ernst Berentsen on “Oslo Fjern- og utenlandssentral FS 3” 17.04.74. 
(Den lokale og nasjonale programvaren programvare vil alltid være større enn den 
internasjonale programvaren.), 
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problems in relation to maintenance, personnel, training, storage of parts, and docu-
mentation by choosing one system for local switches and another for transit 
switches”.129 The consequence of Berentsen’s argument was to abandon competitive 
tenders all together. It goes without saying that this was unacceptable for 
Televerket.  
 
The competitive tenders for the SPC switches were a mixed experience for STK. 
The loss of the transit switch was acute for STK, partly because it lost its dominant 
position in Oslo, and because the Nordic argument was a serious threat to the com-
pany. Thus, LME/EB had most reason to celebrate, not least because EB was about 
to achieve a prominent standing as a high-tech company in Norway. It was expected 
that STK/BTM would win the tenders for a local SPC switch. Even though 
Televerket did not admit as much, it was obvious that the costs of installing a local 
LME switch, among the older ITT systems in the Oslo network, would be very high. 
Moreover, LME lacked a local SPC switch that could offer fair competition with the 
10C, hence, it seems that the main purpose of the open tender was to put pressure on 
STK/BTM’s offer. In as much as there was anything noteworthy in this competition, 
it was that Televerket rejected STK's first offer. At first sight it might seem that 
Televerket’s choice of the 10C cemented the intimate relationship with STK. Later 
we will see that the 10C project led to frequent and intimate contacts between 
Televerket and BTM, which altered the relational setting between Televerket and 
the industry. A pertinent question is why STK did not invest greater resources in 
building up competence in SPC switches. One reason was the magnitude of the 11B 
project, which the next sections look into. 
 
The 11B - an expensive experience 
Based on Televerket’s order of a trial switch at Engelsrud, and pressure from ITT-
Europe, STK decided to take over the 11B project from STC in 1971. Since the 
whole project was considered too big for STK, a part of the project was sent to 
SEL's office in Berlin.130 Several STC engineers, who had worked on the project, 
came to Oslo to support STK. ITT-Europe sent Dave Fisher, who was in charge of 
ITT-Europe’s switching operations. He was very anxious to complete the 11B pro-
ject, which had been running for five years without any tangible results, but ITT-
Europe was reluctant to cover more than $2 million of the project. It did not think 
                                                          
129 NTM9a: Memo from Ernst Berentsen on “Oslo Fjern- og utenlandssentral FS 3” 17.04.74. 
(store tekniske og økonomiske problemer i forbindelse med vedlikehold, personale, 
opplæring, lagerhold av deler, og dokumentasjon ved å velge et system for lokalsentraler og 
et annet system for fjernsentraler). 
130 Mo 2000, p. 9. 
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ITT's headquarters in New York would approve of a higher budget. Together with 
Ivar Mo, who was in charge of the project, Fisher cut down the budgets to exactly 
$2 million. This proved to be unrealistic, as the total costs of the 11B project, ac-
cording to Mo, amounted to $6 million. It was a heavy burden for STK to cover the 
additional costs, and resulted in substantial deficits for STK's Telecom Division 
from 1974 to 1976.131  
 
There were several reasons for the high costs and problems with the 11B project.132 
Firstly, ITT-Europe persuaded STK to budget too optimistically, to “save its own 
skin” from the New York head office. Secondly, the system specifications were far 
from completed, as promised, when the project was moved to Oslo. The initial 
prognoses were also too modest in terms of costs and required material, like circuits 
and development tools. Thirdly, STK lacked experience in running large develop-
ment projects, and it was difficult to organise STK's individualistic engineers. Mo 
was impressed when he witnessed the routines and plans SEL and STC worked 
according to, and the support they had from databases and libraries. STK lacked a 
corporate infrastructure for such projects. Furthermore, the wired logic entailed far 
more decoding than had been expected initially. STK had to design and manufacture 
key electronic components themselves; a larger project could have ordered these 
from suppliers. Finally, delays and time shortage increased the costs.133 It is worth 
recalling that this was the only switching project STK was engaged in, in which 
BTM did not participate. 
 
Still, STK gained valuable experience from handling such a large project. Firstly, in 
coordinating the work of 100 engineers, from different countries, in Norway.134 In 
gathering information from other ITT subsidiaries, STK engineers established valu-
able contacts with colleagues in Europe. The most significant, however, was the 
knowledge and understanding STK acquired in electronics and computer technol-
ogy, and in “CADEM (computer aided design, engineering, manufacturing)”.135 
Another important aspect was that in installing the 11B in EB's districts, STK at-
tained knowledge and experience from these areas, which proved valuable in work-
                                                          
131 “The telephone business will also run with deficits in 1975, since the development and 
start of the 11B still burdens the department.” (Telefoni-linjen vil også i 1975 gå med 
underskudd idet utvikling og oppstarting av 11B fortsatt tynger avdelingen) Thoresen’s 
orientation at STK's Board meeting 05.11.75. The telecom problems in general, and the 11B 
in particular, were discussed at every board meeting throughout 1976. 
132 This is based on Mo 2000 and interview with Ivar Mo. 
133 Mo 2000, p. 13. 
134 STK's Annual Report 1972. 
135 STK's Annual Report 1971, p. 3. 
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ing out the tenders for digital switches in 1982.136 As STK's former telecom director, 
Sverre Ramstad, recalled, “we lost money on the 11B, but we were left with market 
shares and a bunch of trained telecom engineers”.137 It benefited STK in terms of 
increased knowledge in telecom and electronics; on the other hand, it had a crowd-
ing out effect on the R&D department’s budget. At one point, the 11B project took 
up 24 per cent of FA’s funds.138 The problems and costs of the 11B had another 
significant consequence, which we will return to later: it contributed to Fredrik 
Thoresen’s scepticism towards telecom-related R&D.139 
 
STK had hoped that its engagement with the 11B would provide the company with 
export orders, but only one trial switch was sold to a Finnish private operator; and 
things were not much better on the national market. Sales were hampered by long 
delays from STK, and the high price. The trial switch at Engelsrud was ready for 
testing in May 1974, two years late; at that time Televerket changed its installation 
programme, due to the high cost of the 11B switch. 
 
Competition and inspections 
The procurement and installation of rural switches was on the agenda in 1973, when 
Televerket negotiated a new long-term agreement with STK and EB for 1974-77. A 
central topic in the negotiations was the request to inspect the books of STK and 
EB. It was too difficult and costly to achieve competition between STK and EB’s 
crossbar switches, since these were installed mainly as extensions of automated 
networks. To secure fair prices, the Auditor General wanted to introduce cost-
contracts, where the price was based on the companies’ costs and a reasonable 
profit, combined with a right to inspect the equipment suppliers’ books. Such con-
tracts were normal in the armed forces, as well as in other countries.140 STK and EB 
tried to avoid such contracts and inspections by all means. STK claimed that cost-
contracts would remove the incentive to rationalise production, and that “it was not 
desirable to lay out STK's books to the public gaze”.141 
 
                                                          
136 Interview with Ivar Mo. 
137 Interview with Ivar Mo (Vi tapte penger på 11B, men vi satt igjen med markedsandeler og 
en gjeng garvede telefoningeniører). 
138 For example, STK abandoned a large project on loudspeaking PABX due to the 11B 
project. RAUi: STK's Berentsen to Utviklingsfondet 07.01.74. Interview with Ivar Ørbeck. 
139 Interview with Fredrik Thorese, Ivar Ørbeck, Torbjørn Brataas. 
140 The Auditor General’s report to Stortinget 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1973. 
141 STK-LTA: Minute from meeting between STK and Teledirektoratet 27.06.73., (Det er 
ikke ønskelig å legge fram STK's bøker til almen beskuelse). 
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To avoid an inspection, STK sought assistance from ITT-Europe in Brussels, asking 
if this was normal in other countries, and what measures ITT-Europe advocated to 
avoid it.142 It also consulted the Federation of Norwegian Industries, together with 
EB's Olav Skeie.143 In a meeting with Televerket, Berentsen argued along constitu-
tional lines, claiming it “was a matter of principle between government and indus-
try” that Televerket could not decide itself, and that the issue should be forwarded 
“to higher instances”.144 Televerket said that it wanted inspections where competi-
tion was impossible, but as Berentsen complained, “both inspection and competition 
would be too much to ask”, as the company “could not operate only at marginal 
prices”.145 At first, this assertion seems awkward, that STK, operating in a market 
economy, should reject doing business based on marginal prices. Thus, the inspec-
tion issue is interesting in as much as it illuminates the prevailing conceptions of the 
industry and sector at the time. 
 
One interpretation of Berentsen’s statement is that STK needed some cash cows, to 
be able to invest in R&D. He sincerely believed that the long-term agreements im-
plied a duty for STK to conduct R&D, that this was an integral part of Televerket’s 
procurement regime.146 Another possible explanation is that STK had enjoyed lucra-
tive margins throughout its history, and that Berentsen simply did not accept that 
Televerket, or other public bodies, could close every loophole in STK's sales rela-
tionship with Televerket. Berentsen was perceived as a tough negotiator, and some-
what arrogant.147 He did not seem impressed by Televerket's newly acquired compe-
tence in switching, and he had problems adjusting to Televerket's new role as a 
demanding customer. He claimed that there was a sufficient degree of competition 
in the equipment market, using a negative definition of competition, i.e. that the 
supplying company did not set the price entirely by itself.148 This suggests that Ber-
                                                          
142 STK-LTA: Telegram from STK's Chris Harper to ITT-Europe’s S.L. Simons 29.06.73. 
143 STK-LTA: Memo from meeting between EB's Olav Skeie, STK's Harper and Jan 
Didriksen from Federation of Norwegian Industries 05.07.73. The Federation contacted the 
Ministry of Industry, and supported the subsidiaries for a few months, but then STK thought 
the support for their case was shallow. Memo from Harper to Thoresen 28.09.74. 
144 STK-LTA: Minute from meeting between STK and Teledirektoratet 08.08.73., (Det 
gjelder en prinsippsak mellom stat og industri, (...) og det må være høyere instansers sak å 
bestemme hvilken som her skal følges). 
145 STK-LTA: Minute from meeting between STK and Teledirektoratet 08.08.73., (både 
innsyn og konkurranse ville være for meget forlangt, bedriften kan ikke utelukkende basere 
seg på marginalpriser). 
146 NTM7-11Ba: Televerket’s report from meeting with STK about 11B, 03.07.74 
“Ø/5.7.1974/Jon”. 
147 It is pertinent to emphasise that most of the interviews give a favourable impression 
Berentsen, despite his toughness and arrogance. 
148 STK-LTA: Draft of letter to Federation of Norwegian Industries, undated. 
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entsen was out of touch with realities, not least the fact that Televerket was con-
stantly subjected to criticism from the Auditor General and the public. These inter-
pretations are not conflicting; hence, all the factors probably played a part. 
 
Televerket’s stance is also interesting, in that it refused to take an independent 
standpoint, telling STK and EB that inspections were a part of the negotiations be-
cause the Ministry and the Auditor General insisted on them.149 Why did Televerket 
not argue for this, after all, reasonable claim - the right to inspect STK’s and EB's 
real costs in market segments where competition was impossible? Did it also have 
problems accommodating to its new role as a demanding customer? Maybe it simply 
was not used to playing the role as a monopsonist, and needed time to adjust to its 
new role towards the equipment suppliers, which had had the upper hand towards 
the PTO since the 1930s. Or maybe Televerket just pushed the Auditor General out 
in front as a matter of negotiating tactics. Nevertheless, it is interesting that 
Televerket did not formulate an independent standpoint, or at least articulate it in 
meetings with the industry.150  
 
This seems to support the notion that it was the Auditor General that induced a 
change in Televerket's procurement policy, which is in accordance with Riisnæs’s 
version of STK's 11B story. He claims that it was an inspection at STK and EB that 
halted Televerket's procurement of the 11B.151 The sources do not support this view. 
Televerket signed a one-year agreement for 1974 with STK and EB in 1973; the 
four-year agreement was postponed for one year, as was the clause about inspec-
tion.152 Televerket's procurement of the 11B was amended in the first half of 1974, 
and the inspections did not take place before 1975. In STK's contract for 1974, 50 
per cent of the 11B switches were pre-allocated, and the rest were “competition 
projects”, for which STK and EB handed in closed offers on the 11B and 
                                                          
149 Televerket did not counter STK's arguments against inspection, just referred to the 
Auditory General and the government. STK-LTA: Minute from meeting between STK and 
Teledirektoratet 27.06.73., 08.08.73. 
150 This trait reappeared latter in the 1970s, when the Ministry of Industry asked Televerket to 
include industrial considerations when procuring, and the Auditory General and the Ministry 
of Finance asked the PTO to follow the rules for public procurement. These conflicting 
signals from the government gave Televerket room to manoeuvre, but it declined to take 
advantage of this. 
151 Riisnæs 2000, p. 8. 
152 STK-LTA: Letter from STK to Federation of Norwegian Industries 02.11.74; 
“Prolongasjon av Langtidsavtale datert 20. november 1969 mellom Televerket og Standard 
Telefon og Kabelfabrik A/S (STK) om leveranser under Televerkets langtidsplan 1970-73” 
The original agreement is dater 08.03.74. 
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AKK50.153 Both switches could interact with other equipment on a “group-
switch/transit-switch level”.154 The 11B could interact directly with local 8B and 
Rotary switches. It was considered too expensive, however, to make the AKK50 
able to interact with local 8B and Rotary switches. Thus, the installation of rural 
switches in 8B and Rotary networks was pre-allocated to the 11B.155 The “competi-
tion projects” were for automating rural networks that were directly linked to the 
national network through transit switches.  
 
The prices STK offered for the 11B were very volume-sensitive, as prices per line 
increased more than 20 per cent, if the orders were halved.156 Nevertheless, regard-
less of volume, the 11B did not stand a chance in the “competition projects”; it was 
far more expensive than EB's semi-electronic rural switch, the AKK50. Moreover, 
Televerket found that EB's old crossbar switch, the KV, was far more economical 
for rural areas than the AKK50.157 This was mainly due to the high development 
costs for the 11B and AKK50, and the KV was produced on a large scale in Swe-
den. In addition, the variable costs were higher for the 11B, as it used twice as much 
electricity as the AKK50, which meant that provision of electricity and ventilation 
was much more expensive. The AKK50, however, used three times more energy 
than the KV. The 11B and AKK50 required constant power consumption over 24 
hours, whereas the KV did not consume without traffic. Televerket concluded that 
the KV was substantially more economical in all the “competition projects”.  
 
The 11B was an alternative only in “typical” STK areas such as “Bergen, Drammen, 
and Tønsberg”. In these cases the 11B was “more reasonable than the 8B and in 
addition a considerably more advanced and trustworthy system”.158 This reflected 
the low status the 8B had within Televerket at the time, rather than the 11B’s com-
petitiveness. Still, STK did not have sufficient orders for the 11B to be able achieve 
                                                          
153 STK-LTA: “Prolongasjon av Langtidsavtale datert 20. november 1969 mellom Televerket 
og Standard Telefon og Kabelfabrik A/S (STK) om leveranser under Televerkets langtidsplan 
1970-73” The original agreement is dater 08.03.74. 
154 NTM7-11Ba: “Nye automatsentraler 11B og AKK50, Notat til direktørmøte 10. januar 
1975”. (gruppesentral/fjernsentralnivå). 
155 NTM7-11Ba: ”TAp 25.02.76.Lel, Notat Nj.: Bestilling av utstyr for 
konkurranseprosjektene på Langtidsavtalen 1975-77”. 
156 STK-LTA: “Prolongasjon av Langtidsavtale datert 20. november 1969 mellom Televerket 
og Standard Telefon og Kabelfabrik A/S (STK) om leveranser under Televerkets langtidsplan 
1970-73” 31.01.74. 
157 NTM7-11Ba: TAP/74/Bld, 7/6-74: ”Valg av automatsystemer for bestilling i 1974”. The 
remainder of the paragragraph is based on this. 
158 NTM7-11Ba: ”Teknisk direktør, ta 74/Nj, 20/6-74”.; (11B faller her billigere enn 8B og er 
i tillegg et betydelig mer avansert og tillitvekkende system). 
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reasonable economies of scale.159 A report produced by and for Televerket's Techni-
cal Department (TA*), warned against reducing the procurement from STK. The 
combination of this, and that the new systems, the 11B and 10C, were less labour-
intensive, had hit STK hard. The report stressed Televerket’s desire “that both sup-
pliers secure a volume of production that is large enough to underpin rational pro-
duction”, and the “creation and maintenance of system competence” and “system 
development”.160 Thus, TA repeated the equipment suppliers’ traditional arguments 
against competition, i.e. employment and competent equipment suppliers, to give 
STK a chance to adjust its prices.161  
 
Televerket's Economic Department protested against TA’s wish to negotiate with 
STK, as a comparison of the offers showed that “all competition projects should be 
given to EB.”162 The Economic Department claimed that the Auditor General was 
bound to react, since the reasons for re-negotiating with STK were related to em-
ployment and industrial policy, not to the price and quality of the product that the 
government was paying for. Moreover, since the competition was based on closed 
offers, it was unfair towards EB that only STK was allowed to adjust its offers 
through a re-negotiation. The Economic Department concluded that the Ministry of 
Communication had to be consulted before further negotiations with STK took 
place, since they were grounded on things other than price and quality. Director 
General Øvregard supported this conclusion. The Ministry accepted Televerket’s 
request, however, to re-negotiate with STK.163 Thus, STK was summoned to a meet-
ing in July 1974 to discuss the 11B problems. 
                                                          
159 NTM7-11Ba: ”Teknisk direktør, ta 74/Nj, 20/6-74”. “If we only buy 11B equipment in 
those cases where the 8B is a worse alternative, the volume of the 11B, allegedly, will be too 
small for STK to attain fairly rational production, i.e. the system will be too expensive.” 
(Dersom vi kjøper 11B-utstyr bare i de tilfellene 8B er et dårligere alternativ, vil volumet av 
11B angivelig bli for lite til at STK kan få en noenlunde rasjonell produksjon, dvs. systemet 
blir for dyrt). 
* Norwegian abbreviation for Teknisk Avdeling. 
160 NTM7-11Ba: ”Teknisk direktør, ta 74/Nj, 20/6-74”., (Televerket er interessert i at begge 
leverandører får et produksjonsvolum som er stort nok til å danne grunnlag for rasjonell 
produksjon, oppbygging og vedlikehold av systemkompetanse samt systemutvikling). 
161 TA's preliminary re-negotiation with STK was focused on flattening out the volume-
dependent price curve, so Televerket could justify giving STK more orders. STK and 
Berentsen’s confident tone, while refusing to modify the original price curve, is noteworthy. 
“STK has not been willing to flat out its volume-dependent price curve before, and has not 
indicated any accommodation on this point.” (STK har tidligere ikke vært villig til å flate ut 
sin volumavhengige priskurve og har heller ikke nå antydet noen imøtekommenhet på dette 
punkt). NTM7-11Ba: ”Teknisk direktør, ta 74/Nj, 20/6-74”. 
162 NTM7-11Ba: ” Økonomisk direktør, ØFK 26/6-74/Jeg”. The follwing is based on this. 
163 NTM7-11Ba: Televerket’s report from meeting with STK about 11B, 03.07.74 
“Ø/5.7.1974/Jon”. 
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Televerket started the meeting by informing STK that the 11B was so much more 
expensive than EB's AKK50 “that it was not competitive”, but Televerket was will-
ing to give STK some of the “competition projects” if STK would reduce its price 
by “around. 7 million Kroners” (around 12.7 per cent) compared to STK's original 
price curve.164 Berentsen called this an ultimatum, but Televerket said it was “an 
offer, a helping hand to STK”.165 Berentsen said it was a shock that the 11B was not 
competitive with the AKK50, and that Teledirektoratet should have informed STK 
before. Televerket replied that it was impossible to do that before the offers had 
been submitted. Berentsen could not conceive of the price difference, and accused 
LME of dumping in the Norwegian market. Televerket responded that EB's prices 
were in accordance with previous offers. Berentsen wanted a larger share of the 
“competition projects”. When Televerket refused, he demanded that the issue be 
forwarded to the Ministry of Communication so it could “decide whether Televerket 
should procure Norwegian-produced equipment (11B) or Swedish-produced 
(AKK)”.166  
 
Then Berentsen claimed that “STK had sacrificed money on developing the 11B 
system” only after Televerket has encouraged it to do so.167 He stressed that “during 
the negotiation on the long-term agreements for 1966-69”, Televerket had de-
manded, “that STK should conduct R&D.”168 Televerket replied that it never had 
encouraged the 11B project; it was ITT that sent the project to Norway. Televerket 
stressed that in 1965, it had asked STK to “develop system competence on the 8B”, 
and added that STK had “evidently failed” to do so.169 Berentsen said that STK had 
made a mistake in opening for “competition projects” in the prolongation agreement 
for 1974. After further more deliberation, STK was asked to respond to Televerket’s 
offer. Berentsen wanted to await an answer, but STK's Director of Economics, 
Svein Falck-Pedersen, said that STK accepted the offer, adding that he fully under-
                                                          
164 NTM7-11Ba: “Ø/5.7.1974/Jon”, (ikke var konkurransedyktige) and (ca. 7 mill. kroner [ca. 
12,7% prisreduksjon]). 
165 NTM7-11Ba: “Ø/5.7.1974/Jon”, (men et tilbud og utstrakt hånd til STK). 
166 NTM7-11Ba: “Ø/5.7.1974/Jon”, (avgjort om Televerket skulle kjøpe norskprodusert utstyr 
[11B] eller svenskprodusert [AKK]). 
167 NTM7-11Ba: “Ø/5.7.1974/Jon”, (Berentsen hevdet at det var etter tilskyndelse fra 
Televerket at STK hadde ofret penger på å utvikle 11B-systemet). 
168 This demand was mentioned in chapter 3, NTM’s EB-archive: Long term-agreements: 
Larsen/Telegrafstyret to EB 08.05.65 (Han henviste her til Televerkets krav under 
forhandlingene om langtidsavtalen 1966-69 om at STK måte drive forskning og 
utviklingsarbeid). 
169 NTM7-11Ba: “Ø/5.7.1974/Jon” (1965 var at STK skulle utvikle sin systemkompetanse når 
det gjaldt 8B-utstyr. Og dette har STK åpenbart ikke klart). 
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stood Televerket’s point of view, and thanked Televerket for its “offer”. Berentsen 
still hesitated, but after STK's representatives had re-grouped, Berentsen accepted as 
well. 
 
STK was given the allocated projects from the 1974 contracts, and some of the 
“competition projects”, after the re-negotiations with Televerket. The Auditor Gen-
eral protested, as did TF's Knudtzon.170 He said that ITT had troubles selling the 
11B abroad, and feared the 11B could be “a new and unfortunate peculiar system in 
Norway”.171 Øvregard asked for a thorough memo regarding the 11B, and stressed 
that “we ought not to preoccupy ourselves with any considerations regarding indus-
trial policy while comparing the 11B with other solutions”.172 Nils Jonsson wrote 
the memo, and warned that Televerket could be the only user of the 11B, but main-
tained that the 11B was competitive in the 8B and Rotary areas, and some other 
areas.173 Televerket and STK hoped that the 11B would be more reasonable after the 
production reached some scale and maturity, and this was an argument for providing 
STK with some of the “competition projects”. However, the inspections of the 
books of STK and EB ruined all these hopes. 
 
In the negotiations for the long-term agreement for 1975-1978, the Ministry of 
Communication ordered that STK and EB had to accept inspection on products that 
were not sold on a competitive basis.174 These included the crossbar switches, the 
8B and KV. The Armed Forces Procurement Department (KRK*), with considerable 
experience in this respect, conducted the inspections. Televerket had good contacts 
there, since the head of the newly established Supply Office, Kjell Arvidsen, and his 
second in command, Jens Gjerdsjø, were both recruited from supply offices in the 
armed forces.175 The inspectors concluded that STK's price for the 8B was fair, but 
EB was severely criticised for overcharging for its KV switch.176 As they stressed, 
“EB had set the prices of the KV much higher than the costs and a reasonable profit 
                                                          
170 NTM7-11Ba: ”T, 18.12.1974, Pm. Fortsatt kjøp av 11B”. 
171 NTM7-11Ba: ”Memo from Knudtzon til Øvregard og Jonsson 16.12.74. - 11B-sentraler”; 
(et nytt og lite heldig særsystem for Norge). 
172 NTM7-11Ba: Øvregard til Avd. T, 19.12.74 - Televerket bestilling av 11B-utstyr; (Vi bør 
neppe tillegge oss sjøl særlig industripolitiske vurderinger når vi sammenlikner bruk av 11B 
med andre løsninger). 
173 NTM7-11Ba “Nye automatsentraler 11B og AKK50, Notat til direktørmøte 10. januar 
1975”. 
174 RA-28: Ministry of Communication to Televerket 12.11.74. 
* Norwegian abbreviation (Forsvarets felles Materielltjeneste), Kontraktsrevisjonskontoret. 
175 Interview with Jens Gjerdsjø. 
176 Mo 2000., 8, BGA: Riksrevisjonen to Teledirektoratet 25.10.76. 
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implied”.177 The KV was not more expensive than the 8B, but it was an established 
switch in LME's portfolio, hence, the marginal costs were driven down to a mini-
mum, in sharp contrast to STK's 8B. 
 
Consequently, EB was blamed for not offering Televerket a fair price, at the level of 
EB’s and LME's manufacturing cost, and for tampering with the price calculations. 
EB was ordered to lower the price of the KV switch by 40 per cent.178 This did not 
affect future installations of the 8B, since its market segments were protected by the 
logic of the Lillehammer agreement, i.e. technological interfaces. A serious effect 
for STK, however, was that the 11B became comparatively more expensive than the 
KV, and did not stand a chance in the forthcoming “competition projects” for the 
rural areas. Televerket noted the emergence of “a totally new situation”, and con-
cluded that if the “price pattern we now have is correct and durable, then we have 
plotted the wrong course with our equipment procurement during the last years”.179  
 
The KV won every “competition project” for the next long-term agreement in 1975-
1977. Thus, the 11B was installed only in 8B and Rotary areas, which could not 
even cover the development costs. Televerket reaped the benefits of standardising 
its rural switches, by using the KV. It was more economical and easy in terms of 
training and allocating personnel, and made the final automation projects much 
easier. STK maintained that the 11B was a good product, and argued that it needed a 
home market to succeed on the export market.180 However, the time horizon for 
semi-electronic switches was shortened by the development of digital switches. A 
key element in the choice of the electro-mechanical KV was that Televerket ex-
pected the arrival of digital switches in the 1980s. It did not make sense to modern-
ise the rural networks with expensive semi-electronic switches, which would be 
outdated within a decade.181 The aforementioned reason for developing the 11B was 
that the expensive processor in the SPC switches was not economical in rural areas; 
it cost STK dearly to learn that the same could be said of the 11B. 
                                                          
177 NTM7-11Ba ”TA 12/3-76. Nj.: Bestilling av automatutstyr etter langtidsavtalen 1975-77”, 
(Regnskapsinnsynet visste at EB hadde satt prisene på KV meget høyere enn kostnadene og en 
rimelig fortjeneste skulle tilsi). 
178 NTM7-11Ba: ”TA 12/3-76. Nj.: Bestilling av automatutstyr etter langtidsavtalen 1975-
77”. 
179 NTM7-11Ba: ”TA 12/3-76. Nj.: Bestilling av automatutstyr etter langtidsavtalen 1975-
77”, (helt ny situasjon er oppstått. Dersom det prismønster vi nå har fått er korrekt og varig, 
har vi lagt opp til feil kurs med våre utstyrsinnkjøp i de senere år). 
180 NTM7-11Ba: ”T.20.04.76/Pm: Kort notat fra møte med STK 9. april 1976 om 11B-
problemet. 
181 Mo 2000., 8, Interview with Jon B. Riisnæs; NTM7-11Ba: ”TA 12/3-76. Nj.: Bestilling av 
automatutstyr etter langtidsavtalen 1975-77”. 
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STK's telecom business in pain 
The mid-1970s were a painful period for STK's telecom business, and it was more 
than a question of losing money. Berentsen’s behaviour in meetings and negotia-
tions with Televerket had been an irritant for a long time, and the 11B meeting in 
July 1974 was the last straw. Director General Øvregard made a phone call to 
Thoresen, and asked him to fire Berentsen. Thoresen says that when he became a 
part of STK's management in 1968, he realised how poorly the telecom department 
was managed. Berentsen was a good telecom engineer, Thoresen recalled, but he 
did not know the first thing about running a plant.182 Hence, Thoresen had already 
planned to remove Berentsen, before Øvregaard asked him to do so. Berentsen was 
replaced by the head of STK's Cable Department, Gunnar Tidemann.183 STK had 
developed a serious image problem as far as Televerket was concerned, so Tide-
mann put a lot of effort into turning STK's telecom department into a more service-
minded institution. It needed to accommodate itself to Televerket’s new role as a 
demanding customer.184  
 
A strike by the telephone installers in 1974/75 worsened the situation; this was the 
first industrial conflict at STK since the interwar period.185 The installers’ union was 
controlled by the Workers Communist Party (AKP*),186 and caused much trouble for 
STK and Televerket. Televerket had to pay the workers twice as much as it paid its 
own installers.187 This also caused a lot of trouble for STK, which as an ITT com-
pany was an attractive whipping boy for the union. A phrase from a song composed 
by the strikers is indicative: “Who dares to defy the ones that strike down everything 
that threatens the super-profit with its salaried murder army? Who dares to defy 
ITT?” 188 The climate for solving the conflict was worsened by STK's employment 
situation. Due to reduced orders for the 11B and the labour-intensive 8B, the tele-
com department faced laying off 400 out of 1200 workers.189 This time the situation 
was serious, and thus it was more than a bargaining card in the negotiations. STK 
                                                          
182 Interview with Fredrik Thoresen. 
183 Interview with Bjørn Gladsø, Gunnar Tidemann. 
184 Interview with Gunnar Tidemann. 
185 Fjeldbo 1983; STK’s Annual Report 1974; Board meeting Televerket 03.01.75. 
* Norwegian abbreviation for Arbeidernes Kommunistiske Parti. 
186 The reason for AKP's control, allegedly, was that since the installers were not located at 
Økern, but travelled around to install switches, it was easier to take control over the union. 
187 RA-LTP37b, Minute from meeting in the LP-komitéen 3/4.9.73. 
188 Fjeldbo 1983, p. 147 (Hvem våger trosse den som slår ned på alt som truer superprofitten 
med sin betalte morderarme? Hvem våger trosse ITT?). 
189 NTM7-11Ba: ”TA 26/3-76 Nj.: Bestilling av automatutstyr etter langtidsavtalen 1975-77”. 
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seriously considered producing KV equipment for EB, as an emergency solution for 
the employers.190 Instead it managed to get more orders for its PABX - the Mini-
mat.191 
 
It was one thing that the telecom department’s image was harmed in terms of cus-
tomer relations, but another problem was that STK was caught up with 8B and 11B, 
which were soon to be outdated. Moreover, Televerket questioned STK's technical 
competence. Firstly, because the delivery of the 11B switches ordered in 1974 was 
highly delayed,192 and then because of the recurrent problem with the Oslo network 
and the 8B. Teledirektoratet, Oslo District and STK had worked with the 8B prob-
lems since the late 1960s, without finding a solution. In 1972 TF initiated a project, 
called ARON, to rectify the 8B switches.193 It was huge project, engaging 20 people 
from Oslo District, TA and TF. It was a prestige project for Knudtzon and TF. 
Knudtzon was personally engaged, wanting to prove that TF was useful for solving 
Televerket’s concrete problems, and wanting to refute the accusations that he was 
too ‘futuristic’ in his thinking. A mathematician was engaged to solve the problem 
through traffic theory, but without any success.194 The project lasted for 3 years, and 
cost millions, but neither TF nor STK was able to solve the problems. It was an 
important project, in as much as it shaped TA's relationship with and attitude to-
wards TF for years. For TA, it was the ultimate proof of TF's inability to help 
Televerket with its pressing day-to-day problems.195 ARON was important also in 
forming TA's attitude towards STK: it proved that the company was not able to 
upgrade and maintain its own switches.  
 
As mentioned above, there was a clear pattern of intensified cooperation between 
PTOs and the equipment suppliers in the 1970s.196 TF followed the same pattern in 
Norway, cooperating closely with STK, EB and Nera. Televerket and TA chose a 
different route. The mid-1970s had demonstrated that STK and EB were not ideal 
partners to manage the technological transition. The relationship with EB was 
harmed by moral hazard, since EB had overcharged Televerket for years, and STK 
                                                          
190 NTM7-11Ba: ”TA 26/3-76 Nj.: Bestilling av automatutstyr etter langtidsavtalen 1975-77”. 
191 NTM7-11Ba: ”TAA 19.03.76. Hli.: Behovet for hussentraler av typen Minimat” and ”Dok 
47/76 til styremøte 29.03.76: “Bestilling av automatutstyr etter langtidsavtalen 1975-77”; Ivar 
Mo: “Historien om Minimat”, 2000a. 
192 NTM7-11Ba: ”TAP/77/Bld, 14/6-77, Notat teknisk direktør”. 
193 ARON was an abbreviation for Analyse og Registrering av Oslo Nettet. 
194 Interview with Bjørn Gladsø and Magnhild Slettbak.  
195 Helge Godø claims that TF was able to come up with substantial improvements in “1980-
81 (so) “the 8-B was radically improved”, Godø 1995, p. 109. Ivar Mo, Carl-Edward Joys and 
Bjørn Gladsø refutes this. 
196 Fridlund 2000, Llerena 2000, Noam 1992, p. 84f. and 128. 
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had proved that it lacked competence to support Televerket. Thus, TA had to find 
other partners to work with in modernising and upgrading the network, and in com-
ing to grips with the technological development of electronics and computers. 
 
Televerket - BTM 
After the contract for STK's local SPC switch in Oslo, the Nord 3, was signed, BTM 
invited Televerket to send personnel to Antwerp, to be trained in installing and 
operating the Metaconta 10C, and also to cooperate on programming and accommo-
dating the switch for the Oslo network. Televerket had had contact with BTM since 
the instalment of Rotary switches in the 1920s. Still, the visits regarding the SPC 
switches were different, as they inaugurated an independent relationship between 
Televerket and BTM. Hence, Televerket established a relationship with BTM, 
which was not reliant on STK.  
 
There were different reasons why this contact was established. Televerket simply 
wanted to learn about the product it was considering, and felt it could do this best by 
visiting the companies that had developed and manufactured the products. In this 
sense, it did not differ from Televerket’s previous liaisons with LME and BTM 
when procuring the 8B and EB's KV. The SPC switches differed from the older 
mechanical switches, however, in that they were more knowledge-intensive.197 The 
computer programming required a new sort of competence that Televerket lacked. 
The same went for STK: their best man in the area, some would claim their only 
man, was Carl-Edward Joys.198 He had spent three months at BTM while finishing 
his thesis on electronic switching at NTH. He started at STK in 1970. After three 
months tuition at Økern with Ivar Mo, he was sent to Antwerp to join the 10C team 
there.199 Why did STK not send more people to BTM to learn about the SPC 
switches in general, and computer programming and software handling in particu-
lar? This was, after all, expected to be the future of telecom. Thoresen accepted that 
Televerket wanted direct contact with the “source”, and probably considered the 
cost to be too high for STK. Televerket, however, invested heavily in this field. 
 
                                                          
197 One should hesitate to call them more complex, in some ways it was quite the contrary; 
the SPC switch reduced the number of control units, and changing instructions was only a 
matter of reprogramming the software, not rewiring physical links. 
198 Interview with Ivar Mo; this opinion is confirmed by Alf Ivar Nilsen. Nilsen had leading 
positions in Televerket's Technical Department, most notably Station (switching) office. 
1971-, member of the INDIG-team. 
199 Interview with Carl-Edward Joys. 
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Kjell Christensen and Alf Ivar Nilsen both graduated from NTH in 1971, in tele-
com-related fields. They started at Televerket the same year. After a year’s internal 
training, they were sent to Antwerp in 1972 to work on the Nord 3 project. There 
were several other engineers from Televerket in Belgium at the time, but only Chris-
tensen and Nilsen stayed for a consecutive 18 months. They cooperated closely with 
Oslo District’s Alf Marhaug and Nils Maurtvedt, and became as much affiliated 
with Oslo District as with Teledirektoratet. An essential aspect of Christensen and 
Nilsen’s stay in Antwerp was that they had access to BTM’s best switching person-
nel. This was in contrast to Televerket’s experience with LME. A shared impression 
from those who visited Ericsson’s headquarters in Stockholm was that the feeling 
that they were bothering LME's people. As Knudtzon remarked, “it was difficult to 
dance with LME”.200 Christensen and Nilsen duly acknowledge the Belgians’ hospi-
tality, and the respect with which they were treated. Nilsen’s social skills helped to 
make the Antwerp stay a success.201 The Nord 3 project was important for BTM as 
well, since it would be a showcase for the Metaconta 10C.  
 
The essential element in this partnership was to be able to program all relevant fea-
tures of the Oslo network into the 10C software. The program possessed no artificial 
intelligence, so even minor mistakes could cause trouble, and it was generally diffi-
cult to locate the origins of the problem when the program failed.202 Thus, 
Televerket had to systematise and register all general and specific traits and features 
of the network. Such specifications, concerning signalling, billing, transmission and 
directing, had been worked out for the mechanical switches in the local networks, 
and were hand-written schemes.203 The specification work was further developed 
with the national automation, and the investigations following the breakdown of the 
Oslo network. The “mechanical” specifications, which the telecom engineers used 
as instructions for wiring and rewiring switches, had to be transformed into manuals 
the computer engineer could use for programming the software in the SPC switches.  
 
Thus, the old “mechanical” handbooks had to be transformed into manuals for com-
puter programming. A key figure in this work was Televerket’s Johs. Skinnes.204 
Skinnes had worked with transmission, and at Televerket’s laboratory in the early 
1960s. He became Televerket’s guru in signalling, and acquired substantial knowl-
                                                          
200 This is actually Knudtzon’s phrase, but is shared by TA's people. 
201 Interview with Magnhild Slettbak and Kjell Christensen. Christensen had leading positions 
in Televerket's Technical Department, most notably the Station (switching) office. 1971-
20??. Member of the INDIG-group. 
202 Interview with Bjørn Gladsø, Alf Ivar Nilsen, and Kjell Christensen, Fridlund 2002, p. 153. 
203 Interview with Alf Ivar Nilsen. 
204 Interview with Alf Ivar Nilsen, Kjell Christensen, and Magnhild Slettbak. 
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edge of computers and programming as well. He had no education, and thus he was 
an autodidact in both signalling and programming. Most of the engineers Televerket 
recruited in the 1970s, started their tenure with a visit to Skinnes, and he became the 
door opener to Televerket’s world. Theoretical knowledge of how electronic 
switches operated in an optimal and seamless network had meagre value for 
Televerket in this phase. The real task was to implement electronics in the Norwe-
gian “weed-flora”. Thus, Skinnes played an important role in introducing the young 
academics to Televerket’s concrete challenges.205 TF's approach to SPC-switches 
was different, they sent a mathematician to BTM. His attempt to comprehend SPC 
switches through mathematics did not bear many fruits according to the infor-
mants.206 
 
Skinnes was dominant in forming Televerket’s transition from mechanical, via elec-
tronic, to digital technology.207 The term ‘dominant’ gives a wrong impression, as 
he was very shy, and something of a loner. Alf Ivar Nilsen was instrumental in in-
cluding and socialising Skinnes, so Televerket got the best out of him.208 Nilsen 
describes Skinnes as Televerket’s “lighthouse”, i.e. one that stood out in comparison 
with the rest. One thing was that Skinnes tutored the personnel, preparing them for 
the technological transition; another thing was that he was essential in the actual 
technological transition, i.e. in “translating” the old mechanical specifications into 
specifications for computers. He knew the Norwegian network “to his fingertips”, 
says Nilsen, and was “quite a sight at BTM, when the large schemes were scattered 
over the table, and all the data were to be plotted into the 10C - he never lost 
track”.209 This might be one of the most concrete signs and examples of the comput-
erisation, or digitalisation of the Norwegian network and society, i.e. Skinnes stand-
ing at the table in BTM’s office, explaining to Televerket and BTM engineers how 
to translate the electro-mechanical specifications into manuals for programming the 
computer software.  
 
Conclusion 
The 11B had the potential to be an important project for STK. It could have incor-
porated the Research Department’s activity into STK's role as an equipment sup-
plier. Moreover, it could have merged the two relational settings in the Norwegian 
                                                          
205 Interview with Magnhild Slettbak. 
206 He wrote a dissertation on the subject, that Joys, who many will consider an expert in the 
field, did not understand the meaning of. Interview with Carl-Edward Joys. 
207 Interview with Alf Ivar Nilsen, Kjell Christensen, and Magnhild Slettbak. 
208 Interview with Kjell Christensen, Magnhild Slettbak. 
209 Interview with Alf Ivar Nilsen. 
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telecom industry, i.e. the R&D system and the procurement regime. So, when STK 
invited Televerket to take an active part in the 11B project, the move could - in a 
theoretical perspective - have been seen as an invitation to create an innovative user-
producer relationship. This would have differed from the 8B relationship, which did 
not contain any noteworthy user-producer interaction, as Televerket - especially 
Oslo District - simply relied on STK's craftsmanlike competence. Televerket de-
clined the invitation, because it wanted to maintain the freedom to reject the switch 
in the future, something it eventually did. Moreover, Televerket did not want a 
“cosy” relationship with the Norwegian subsidiaries. In the same period, however, 
other European PTOs created more or less formalised “development pairs” with 
national suppliers. Why did Norway stand out in this respect, i.e. why did 
Televerket prefer an arm's-length relationship with its suppliers?  
 
Firstly, it was apprehensive of the equipment suppliers’ opportunistic behaviour. 
The apprehension was proven well founded when the cost-inspections showed that 
EB had over-charged Televerket, and there was no reason to suppose that this was a 
one-time accident. The ironic consequence, however, was that EB, by automating of 
rural areas with its KV switch, increased its market share from 33 per cent in 1970, 
to 67 per cent in 1978. Secondly, STK did not stand out as an attractive partner in 
terms of competence. The delays and high costs of the 11B, and the failure to up-
grade the 8B, injured STK's relationship with Televerket, particularly with the TA. 
Moreover, 11B incurred great losses for STK's telecom business. There are unfortu-
nately no sources available to illustrate the magnitude of the losses, only minutes 
from the Board of Directors, which in November 1975 stated that “the telephone 
business” would still be in deficit for this year as “the development and start of the 
11B still burdens the department”.210 Thus, STK's telecom business was in pain this 
period. The troubles related to Berentsen's behaviour and attitude contributed to this, 
this also prompted Televerket's eagerness to free itself from the oligopolic grip, and 
rely on other partners. 
 
Televerket's arm’s-length strategy was also brought about by a weaker oligopolic 
grip. If digitalisation and liberalisation were in an embryonic stage in the 1960s, we 
might suggest that they were was in their infancy in the early 1970s. Electronic 
switches eased the problem of interfaces between different kinds of equipment, 
which in turned weakened the oligopolic grip. The demand for transit switches also 
                                                          
210 (Telefoni-linjen vil også i 1975 gå med underskudd idet utvikling og oppstarting av 11B 
fortsatt tynger avdelingen.) Thoresen’s orientation at STK's Board meeting 05.11.75. The 
telecom problems in general, and the 11B in particular, were discussed at every board 
meeting throughout 1976. 
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spurred competition. Moreover, the political authorities made Televerket focus more 
on cost efficiency in its procurement. This was not a token of liberalisation, rather a 
matter of wariness of the resource allocation within public utilities. Nevertheless, it 
made Televerket adopt a more demanding and competitive approach towards its 
suppliers. Moreover, Televerket attained better control and oversight over its own 
network, which was a key finger in the oligopolic grip. The process related to na-
tional automation strongly contributed to this, as did the ever more extensive plan-
ning and mapping of the telecom network. The cooperation with BTM, regarding 
the SPC switches, took this a step further, and eventually positioned Televerket as 
one of the most demanding PTOs in Europe.  
 
STK, for its part, experienced a paradoxical development in the early 1970s. On the 
one hand, it became more of a large national high-tech company with substantial 
R&D in electronics and telecom. At the same time, its patron BTM replaced it as 
Televerket's partner in switching, not least in handling the large and complex Oslo 
network. It was one thing that Televerket disapproved of STK's ability to handle its 
system responsibility with the 8B and 11B, another was that STK lacked the capa-
bility and capacity to assist Televerket in installing computerised switches in Oslo. 
Its CEO, Fredrik Thoresen, had no intentions of enhancing STK's standing in this 
field, and he did not consider it a problem that Televerket wanted to go directly to 
the source, i.e. BTM. Hence, the electronic revolution enabled STK to become a 
Norwegian high-tech company in terms of R&D projects for the TF and FFI, but the 
same revolution’s impact on switching, i.e. SPC switches, diminished STK's role as 
a switching supplier. Its lucrative role, as a mediator between BTM and Televerket 
in a linear relationship, was threatened by Televerket's independent link with BTM. 
The linear relationship was replaced by a triangle, in which all three parties had 
contact with each other.  
 
Televerket 
Ò Ñ 
Ó Ô 
BTM   Í     Î   STK 
 
STK did not attain a lead-house position in the relational setting, and instead 
Televerket became BTM's lead market for the Metaconta 10C, and later for the 
System 12 in the 1980s. The reason for this was the fact that Televerket had such 
control over its network and such well-documented specifications, which were es-
sential for a successful inauguration of a computer-based switch. STK, however, 
Chapter 4 STK's telecom business in pain 
 174
had little to do with Televerket and Norway’s developing into BTM's lead market. 
Regarding the different perceptions of multinational companies, as discussed in 
chapter 3, Televerket looked upon ITT, i.e. BTM, as a diffuser of technology and 
competence, to be exploited for its own means. The next chapter returns to the is-
sues raised in chapter 3, that is STK and EB as high-tech companies in Norway, and 
how multinationals and their subsidiaries were perceived by Norwegian policy mak-
ers.  
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Chapter 5 STK as an innovative enterprise 
Introduction 
Despite STK's problem with the 8B and 11B switches, it had no plans to give up 
switching as a main line of production. STK's most prestigious R&D project in the 
1970s was a digital switch for the armed forces, the nodal switch. STK won ITT's 
Geneen Award for the switch in 1982.1 It still forms the technological and commer-
cial basis for the Norwegian subsidiary of the international defence company 
Thales.2 In 1998, many old-timers from STK, the TF and FFI gathered to celebrate 
the 25th anniversary of the nodal switch, one of the few industrial achievements in 
Norwegian telecom. STK's former CEO Fredrik Thoresen was asked to give the 
after-dinner toast. Even on this occasion he considered it opportune to stress how 
expensive the nodal project had been, and that the money invested had never paid 
off.3 He had always been hostile towards R&D in telecom, and sceptical about the 
ambitions to create a Norwegian Ericsson. He felt that a small country like Norway 
ought to rely on multinationals in this field. This chapter asks how STK developed 
as an innovative enterprise, as a subsidiary of a multinational, and as a Norwegian 
high-tech company in the late 1970s. 
 
STK's relational setting, between ITT and Televerket, was about to change when 
Televerket decided to install BTM's computerised switches in the Oslo network. 
Other governmental bodies tried to influence the relational setting of the telecom 
industry. This was part of an interventionist policy towards the Norwegian electron-
ics industry. The main rationale behind this policy was to lay an institutional and 
corporate foundation for a more R&D-intensive electronics industry. Hence, this 
chapter takes up the theme from chapter 3; i.e. how the relational setting evolved. 
More precisely, it elaborates on the roles of STK and EB as foreign high-tech com-
panies in Norway.  
 
STK and EB operated with different conceptions of multinationals, and used these 
conceptions towards Norwegian policy makers. EB's strategy, i.e. accentuating its 
independence from LME, was politically sanctioned and rewarded in 1976, when 
EB was picked as one of three cornerstone companies in the electronics industry. 
The chapter seeks to explain why EB was chosen, and not STK. The cornerstone 
plan was not all that important, but the issue is well-suited for comparing STK and 
                                                          
1 ”Heder til STK-utvikling” in Ingeniør-Nytt nr. 80/83. 
2 In 2003, Thales’ Jens Gjerløw received another award for his central role in developing the 
«nodal switch». ”Ærespris til Jens Gjerløw” in Teknisk Ukeblad 12.06.03. 
3 Interview with Jest Braathen; Fredrik Thoresen. 
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EB, and sheds light on the Norwegian telecom industry in the second half of the 
1970s. The comparison is on the personnel level, between the managing directors of 
STK and EB, Fredrik Thoresen and Kjell Kveim; on the company level, as foreign 
high-tech companies in Norway; and on a multinational level, comparing the differ-
ent impact ITT and LME had on the two companies. An important issue is divergent 
corporate governance systems. 
 
The development in the 1960s nurtured two competing corporate governance sys-
tems, and STK had to balance between the two in the 1970s. The establishment of 
the Research Department (FA) in 1968, and the 11B project in 1969, were conces-
sions to national stakeholders. They were responses to a system of innovation in 
telecom and the TF, the lucrative long-term agreements, and the criticism of multi-
nationals in general and of ITT in particular. These developments nurtured a stake-
holder variant of corporate governance, with a technological and long-term perspec-
tive on business, and so did the governmental development contracts, based on Ar-
row’s underinvestment rationale and Solow’s residual factor. The many R&D pro-
jects STK took part in augmented the number and importance of the national stake-
holders.4 Then again, ITT's Geneenism promoted a shareholder corporate govern-
ance system, with a financial and short-term perspective on business. Hence, it was 
not only the importance of the national stakeholders that increased, but the preroga-
tive of STK's owner, ITT, was also strengthened. And STK made a very important 
concession to ITT. 
 
Thoresen - STK's managing Director 
Around 1970, STK was looking for Amund Braaten's successor. During these years, 
a new generation took up leading positions in the electronics industry in Norway. 
Kjell Kveim became EB’s Managing Director in 1973; Peder Th. Hiis was ap-
pointed Nera's CEO in 1971; Nic. Knudtzon became Director of TF; Torbjørn 
Brataas became STK’s first Research Director in 1968 and Ivar Ørbeck became 
STK's Technical Director in 1974. This generation was too young to have any cor-
porate experience from before the war, and its education and competence was based 
on scientific breakthroughs from World War II, such as the radar, radiolink and 
sonar.5 All of them had engineering degrees, mainly from the Norwegian Institute of 
                                                          
4 Alf Chaiton et al. suggests that the “«globalization of competition» fosters a shareholder 
perspective, while the «localization of competitive advantage» fosters the stakeholder view”. 
Alf Chaiton et. al.: ”The Schizophrenic Corporation: Corporate Governance in a Clustered 
World” A paper presented to The Competitiveness Institute, 3rdAnnual Conference, Clusters 
in the New Millennium, (Glasgow, Scotland, October 4-6, 2000) 
(http://www.competitiveness.org/00ac/Papers/achaiton.pdf) 
5 Wicken 1993; Njølstad and Wicken 1997, p. 242f. 
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Technology (NTH*); several had started their careers as research assistants in insti-
tutions like FFI, ELAB, NTH and Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk.6 Braaten wanted a 
replacement in line with this; his candidate was STK's Technical Director, Arve 
Rambøl.7 He was recruited from FFI, where he had worked with radiolink. He had 
every qualification to guide STK through the electronic and digital revolutions. This 
would also have been a breach with STK's tradition of choosing a cable man for the 
top position. ITT stepped in, however, and chose Fredrik Thoresen as STK's new 
managing director.8  
 
Thoresen completed a degree in Chemical Engineering from Birmingham Univer-
sity in 1953; he had several top positions in STK's Cable Division, before he be-
came assistant Managing Director in 1971.9 Thoresen’s capabilities in cables were 
important for ITT's choice; he had a leading role in STK's own development of 
rubber while he headed the chemical office in the late 1950s.10 Nevertheless, it ap-
pears for ITT, his key qualification was his ability to implement ITT’s corporate 
principles. He was very much in favour of Geneen's principles, and shared his doc-
trine that “business was not about making products, but money”.11 While Braaten 
complained about the time-consuming report system, Thoresen was first in line to 
praise Geneen's fact-based management.12 Thus, in Fligstein’s terminology, Thore-
sen shared Geneen's financial conception of the firm.13 The differences between 
Braaten and Thoresen must not be exaggerated, but were only a matter of nuances. 
Still, Thoresen was an exception among the other managers in the telecom industry, 
as he had little knowledge and understanding of electronics and telecom, and he was 
also rather sceptical of prestigious and costly R&D projects.  
 
It is important to bear in mind, however, that he was a cable man, STK's most prof-
itable line of business. He had great ambitions for STK in submarine cables, and 
succeeded in this. STK won a large contract for laying a cable across the Skagerak 
                                                          
* Norwegian abbreviation for Norges Tekniske Høyskole. 
6 Sogner 1994. 
7 Former Legal Director Christopher Harper, and Braaten's son Jest Braaten, both claim Braaten 
preferred Rambøl as his successor. It is important to emphasise, however, that Braaten had 
the highest regard for Thoresen, and never had any problem accepting him as his successor. 
8 Thoresen says it was a German ITT man, working for ITT Scandinavia, who recommended 
Thoresen to Geneen. Interview with Fredrik Thoresen. 
9 Interview with Fredrik Thoresen, and STK's Board meeting, 25.02.71. 
10 Interview with Fredrik Thoresen. 
11 Interview with Fredrik Thoresen. 
12 Fredrik Thoresen in Norges Industri No. 4 1973, “Ingen ulempe å være utenlandsk bedrift i 
Norge.” 
13 Fligstein 1990, p. 226. 
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in 1973, which was the longest and heaviest sea-cable ever laid.14 It was a major 
technical achievement, and won praise for STK around the world. On this basis, 
STK became a lead house in ITT for submarine cables. In 1976, STK, with Pirelli, 
won a contract for laying the Vancouver Cable, which underlined STK’s position as 
a world leader in this business. It was the largest export contract any Norwegian 
company had attained and fulfilled outside the oil business at the time. Thoresen 
was well respected in ITT for STK's accomplishments in cable. At a general meet-
ing in Brussels, he was criticised by Rand V. Araskog, ITT’s CEO since 1979, for 
buying a cable ship, without requesting permission. When Araskog asked, ”Why did 
you buy the boat?” Thoresen simply replied: ”Because I needed it!” The answer was 
not standard procedure, but Araskog smiled and accepted.15 Thoresen standing in 
ITT allowed him to respond in such a manner. Despite this success in cables, the 
telecom business had become STK's largest in terms of employees. 
 
Table 5.1: STK's employees, 1973-1980. 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
Telecom 1534 1490 1466 1367 1423 1473 1445 1541
Cabels and Lines 1021 1094 1076 1033 1023 1017 1158 1148
Consumer/retailers 690 737 635 551 492 294 254 260
Concern/others 607 682 608 584 551 508 149 148
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Source: STK's annual, reports 1977-1980. 
 
                                                          
14 Information on STK's cables business in general and submarine cables in particular is based 
on Bjørhovde 1990, p. 18 and 28; Interview with Fredrik Thoresen, Gunnar Tidemann, and 
Ingvild Myhre. Myhre was head of Alcatel Telecom Norway until 2000, when she became 
head of Telenor Mobile. 
15 Interview with Hans Jørgen Blomseth, who worked at ITT-Europe in Brussels 1976-83, 
was Director of finance at (Alcatel) STK 1986-1992. 
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It is important to note that in the above table, “Telecom” includes technical and 
maritime electronics, and that “Cables and Lines” includes tele-cables. Thus, in one 
form or another, more than half of STK's employees were engaged in telecom. Nev-
ertheless, cable still dominated in terms of sales. 
Table 5.2: STK's sales, 1973-1980 (NOK millions) 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
Cabels and Lines 311 457 463 546 576 567 572 673
Telecom 250 255 309 335 394 441 442 472
Consumer/retailers 238 294 274 313 289 284 287 324
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
STK's annual reports, 1977-1980. 
 
Even if we do not have figures for net income for each product line, we know that 
the telecom division lost money in the mid-1970s, particularly on the 11B. More-
over, STK's supply of the Metaconta 10C also incurred losses, as this was severely 
delayed and STK had to pay penalty fines to Televerket.16 Thus, from the outset, 
Thoresen experienced troubles with the telecom business. The development projects 
were one thing; another was the fact that Berentsen had not been able to turn STK's 
manufacture of equipment into an efficient line of business. Production was halted 
frequently due to poor logistics and the lack of vital components, resulting in heavy 
financial costs.17 A main reason for this, probably, was the high margins the telecom 
department had on supplies to Televerket the oligopolic grip created few incentives 
for greater efficiency and productivity. Even if Gunnar Tidemann was able to shore 
up some flaws, according to Thoresen, he was never able to eliminate the slack and 
relaxed attitudes in STK's telecom department. The state of affairs in the telecom 
                                                          
16 NTM8: File: ”Nord 3 Fremdrift - sluttoppgjør”: Memo signed ”TA 22/11-74”; NTM7-
11Bb: Memo signed “TA/79/Nj 20.09.79”. Interview with Nils Kåre Myklebust; STK's Re-
search Department 1971-76, worked on Metaconta 1976-80. 
17 Interview with Fredrik Thoresen. 
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division stood in stark contrast to the cable unit, Thoresen claims, thus he was con-
stantly reminded of the loss-making telecom business.  
 
Thoresen’s regard of telecom-related R&D was not much better. He did not see any 
profitable business coming out of all the efforts, just the money they required. This 
was in contrast to the cable business, were STK carried out important innovations in 
developing long-distance submarine cables.18 STK's largest development project, 
the 11B, was not a success. It drained STK of financial resources for several years, 
and absorbed much of the FA’s resources and personnel that could have been allo-
cated to other R&D projects; it served STK badly in terms of its relationship with 
Televerket, and finally, it contributed strongly to Thoresen’s scepticism towards 
telecom-related R&D.19 Thus, Braaten and Rambøl's ambitious hopes, that the 11B, 
being a switching project, could turn STK into fully fledged telecom company, 
failed.  
 
The PCM contract with TF from 1969, however, was a positive experience for STK 
and for TF. As already mentioned, it paved the way for a large contract with FFI in 
1973, for creating a mobile digital switch - “the nodal-switch”.20 The digital compe-
tence STK developed through the PCM contract was essential for the «nodal-
contract». Another important asset was STK’s long cooperation with FFI in military 
communication, particularly on cryptation from the 1950s.21 We shall not follow the 
development of the nodal switch; it was launched in 1977, and was, according to 
Brataas, the first digital network in Europe.22 It became STK's most prestigious and 
successful R&D project. Thus, TF's PCM contract was one of the few contracts that 
led to sustainable business, through the Norwegian subsidiary of the defence com-
pany Thales.  
 
The nodal switch also formed the technological basis for STK's Digimat 2000, a 
Private Automatic Branch Exchange (PABX). In a simple form, it was merely a 
private switchboard; in an advanced form it became a key product in establishing an 
intelligent network within a company or an organisation. While discussing the fu-
ture digital network in the mid-1970s, one scenario was to let the PABX give access 
                                                          
18 Interview with Fredrik Thoresen.  
19 Interview with Fredrik Thoresen, Ivar Ørbeck, and Torbjørn Brataas. 
20 TBA: Torbjørn Brataas: “Knutepunkt virksomhet 1973-93 Et industrielt 20-års jubileum” 
1993. 
21 Mo 2002. 
22 Interview with Torbjørn Brataas; STK's annual report 1977. 
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to future digital services, most notably data communication.23 It was regarded as an 
important product and market for STK and EB, and for other subsidiaries that did 
not develop public switches; it was a sort of a switching-light industry. In general, 
the mother companies let the subsidiaries enter this area, thus it more or less became 
a zero-sum game in terms of export. It was also the first market segment in the tele-
com industry that was liberalised, and the first large product segment in which the 
PTOs did not dominate as the customer. The Digimat was STK's warhorse in this 
market segment, and was sold to most of the Norwegian oil companies operating in 
the North Sea, thus reflecting Knut Sogner’s point about the oil industry’s signifi-
cance for the Norwegian electronic industry.24 STK won an award for the Digimat, 
recalls Thoresen, “but we never made any money on it”.25 
 
In addition to these two technologically successful projects/products, the nodal 
switch and Digimat, there were numerous other activities in STK's Research De-
partment. It employed 39 engineers in 1978, and STK's technical departments em-
ployed 400, who worked closely with the FA. The R&D investments accounted for 
NOK 87 million in 1979, 6.7 per cent of STK's total sales.26 The bulk of the projects 
were in telecom, so, more than ever, STK could be termed a high-tech company. 
STK did play a significant role in cooperating with TF, not only on PCM, but on 
data communication, “network planning”, and other areas as well. As such, it did 
function as a door opener to ITT's technology and competence on PCM, in TF's 
quest to prepare Televerket for digitalisation. Notwithstanding, STK's R&D activi-
ties suffered from a lack of a technological strategy, or an overriding principle. One 
reason was that the projects did not develop as a result of business strategy, but as a 
result of funding.  
 
Most of the FA's projects were detached from STK's cash-generating business, and 
conducted according to varying rationales. Some of the projects were market-
oriented, seeking either incremental improvement of established products, develop-
ing new products, or upgrading STK's competence as an equipment supplier. There 
was also a national rationale, of contributing to technological and industrial devel-
opment in Norway. In line this with this, it was a strong element of political econ-
omy, i.e. to secure STK's position as an equipment supplier. The motives and ration-
                                                          
23 RA-LTP 23.-24.03.76. “that new facilities and services for instance can be put into PABXs” 
(at nye faciliteter og nye tjenester f.eks. legges inn i PABXer). 
24 Mo “Historien om DIGIMAT 2000”, 1999; ”STK vil satse på telekommunikasjon” in 
Dagens Næringsliv 01.10.88; Sogner 2002, p. 62. 
25 Interview with Fredrik Thoresen. 
26 IØPA; Box: “Div. Notater 1975-82 I. Ørbeck” (IØPAi): “STK RDE expenditures B.P. 
1979” STK 3.11.79” and “STK er en produksjonsbedrift” 28.2.78. 
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ales for most projects were a mixture of the above-mentioned. Moreover, there was 
little cooperation across the different R&D projects. Different fractions developed 
within the FA, where the “nodal group” was particularly strong, and isolated from 
STK's other telecom activities.27 The same holds for other R&D projects in the FA, 
but the tendency was especially strong within switching. STK had three switching 
camps: the “nodal group”, the analogue group, the 11B group, and later the System 
12 group. As Knut Berg recalled, when he left the nodal project to lead the System 
12 project in 1979, he felt excluded by his old “nodal friends”.28 
 
A characteristic feature of STK's R&D, or RDE (research, development and engi-
neering) as STK and ITT called it, was the meagre communication and interaction 
between the projects. A reason for the fragmentation was that Thoresen and Tide-
mann were both cable men, and neither had the capability to pull together the many 
switching projects, which would have allowed valuable spillovers. They lacked the 
sufficient technological insight to monitor and manage the differing telecom pro-
jects according to a technological strategy.29 Consequently, STK's R&D efforts 
lacked organisational integration, which William Lazonick, based on Mary 
O’Sullivan’s work, highlights as the “critical determinant of the success of an inno-
vative strategy“.30 His main focus is the vertical or hierarchical integration within 
the firm, i.e. between top management, middle management and workers. Still, I 
find his point applicable to STK's research activity, especially given that Lazonick 
sees this as “a set of social relations that provides participants in a complex division 
of labor with the incentives to cooperate in contributing their skills and efforts to-
ward the achievement of common goal.”31 Such social relations and incentives were 
missing in STK, Thoresen’s attitudes and the nodal group’s rejection of Berg shows 
this. 
 
The second social condition is strategic control, which is crucial in transforming 
individual learning into organisational learning. It is derived from the uncertain 
character of innovation. This is different from the financial perspective, were “opti-
mal resource allocation” accepts technological and market constraints, and tries to 
optimise within these limits. This is in contrast to “strategic decisions”, claims 
O’Sullivan, which “are a creative response to existing conditions.”32 The main point 
                                                          
27 Interview with Ivar Mo, and Knut Berg. 
28 Interview with Knut Berg. 
29 Interview with Gunnar Tidemann, and Ivar Ørbeck. 
30 Lazonick 2002, p. 14. 
31 Lazonick 2002, p. 14. 
32 O'Sullivan 2000, p. 409. 
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here is the uncertainty, as O’Sullivan claims: “there are no objective guidelines for 
making these decisions”.33 Still, the uncertainty can be reduced by attaining knowl-
edge of markets, politics, and technology. Such strategic control was absent in 
STK's telecom business and R&D activities. The lines of responsibility were blurred 
in the FA. Different directors led different projects, some in cooperation with the 
British ITT laboratory STL, some with BTM, some with TF and others with FFI. 
Neither Thoresen, nor Brataas or Tidemann pulled the strings together; so there was 
no overarching strategy behind the projects. Even if STK did not have strategic 
control, it definitely had financial control. All projects were, in line with Geneen's 
principle, subjected to punctilious and meticulous control, reporting every delay and 
exceeding of budgets. One consequence was that Thoresen was reminded constantly 
of the costs related to R&D, and what he perceived as a lack of financial 
understanding from the researchers. 
 
The researchers lacked economic sense, says Thoresen, and the management did not 
have technological understanding.34 Even if Brataas recognised the problem, he did 
not have sufficient authority to stop “dead end” projects, according to Thoresen. 
This leads us to Lazonick’s third condition for an innovative enterprise: financial 
commitment, which is derived “directly from the cumulative character of the innova-
tion process.”35 Such commitment was blurred, as most of STK's projects were a 
means to an end, an end often unrelated to the innovation process. Lazonick’s rea-
soning encapsulates a main reason why STK's R&D projects did not materialise in a 
different way. TF and FFI had no troubles cooperating with STK's engineers, and 
the ones that were responsible for any given project. But STK's heart and soul, 
Thoresen and its financial commitment to ITT, were not in it. “He did not compre-
hend the technical issues”, Ørbeck recalls, “he just saw the money that drained 
away.”36 Thoresen’s understanding of telecom was in stark contrast to his understand-
ing of cable. In the management meetings, he excelled when cable was on the 
agenda. He asked detailed questions, and mastered the cable area, whereas he was 
rather passive and hesitant when telecom was discussed.  
 
Thoresen maintains that development contracts rarely pay off, as he stressed at the 
celebration of the nodal switch. He claims that the researchers had problems in see-
ing the relationship between the development costs and the commercial possibilities. 
Thus, his assessment of R&D was product-oriented, financial and limited to the 
                                                          
33 O'Sullivan 2000, p. 409. 
34 Interview with Fredrik Thoresen. 
35 Lazonick 2001, p. 20. 
36 Interview with Ivar Ørbeck. 
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boundaries of the firm. He was caught up in what Martin Fransman calls the R&D 
Conundrum: “Why allocate scarce company resources to R&D, whose benefits are 
uncertain and only accrue in the future?”37 Thoresen did, or does, not recognise the 
broader rationale for conducting R&D: that it has benefits other than the business 
possibilities of any concrete projects. It also increases the absorptive capacity of the 
firm,38 and potentially, it equips a management with technological understanding 
that can be indispensable while trying to navigate a company in uncertain surround-
ings. It is often a key condition for performing what Lazonick calls strategic control.  
 
Thus, when Thoresen did not put more resources into building competence in com-
puter-controlled switches, and programming and software handling, it was because 
he did not see any products coming from STK at the other end. The company's lack 
of computer capability had cost dearly with the 11B, and it was going to cost them 
even more with System 12. Another reason was that there were rather unrealistic 
ambitious goals within the FA, particularly the nodal camp, of turning the nodal 
switch into a public digital switch.39 For these influential engineers, it seemed al-
most unpatriotic to engage in foreign switches, as Joys and Berg did. It is illuminat-
ing that when STK spent time and money on the nodal switch, Nokia decided to 
start development of a digital switch, as they considered it decisive to stay in the 
telecom business.40 
 
Still, Thoresen accepted that R&D in telecom was compulsory to combat the criti-
cism directed towards ITT and STK in the 1970s, but it was a concession to Norwe-
gian stakeholders he did not like to give. Still, it is important to distinguish between 
two sorts of stakeholding: the responsibility to contribute to national technological 
and industrial development, and the responsibility for social issues, such as the wel-
fare of employees. Even if Thoresen adhered to Geneenism, and did not consider the 
future of Norwegian high-tech industry as his prime responsibility, he did care very 
much for the wellbeing of STK's employees. He invested heavily in different forms 
of industrial relations efforts. In fact, a major reason for why STK was designated 
company of the year in 1982 was the good industrial relations it had established, 
which among other things ensured one of the lowest sickness absence rates in Nor-
way. 
                                                          
37 Fransman 2002, p. 215-216. 
38 Wesley M. Cohen & Daniel A. Levinthal, “Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on 
Learning and Innovation”, 1990. Cohen and Levinthal define absorptive capacity as the 
“ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial 
ends”. (p. 128). 
39 Interview with Ivar Mo. 
40 Häikiö 2002, p. 57. 
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Nevertheless, our main point here is that Thoresen regarded telecom related R&D 
first and foremost as a necessary activity for preserving STK's position as 
Televerket's equipment supplier. For EB's Managing Director Kveim, it was just the 
opposite: the main reason for him and EB to supply Televerket with Ericsson's 
equipment, was to finance R&D and innovation, to fulfil the strategy of turning EB 
into an independent Norwegian (tele)communication company.41 The next section 
looks at EB's ambitions in this matter. 
 
Kveim, EB and Nera 
Kjell Kveim replaced Eilif Bjørnstad as Managing Director in 1973. Kveim’s aca-
demic credentials and technological competence were impeccable, so he was ex-
pected to be the right man to take EB through the digital transition that the industry 
was about to enter.42 As a former researcher he had intimate knowledge of the R&D 
system in electronics. He faced big challenges, however, as EB's expansion during 
the 1960s had almost led to a breakdown in manufacturing in 1970, with 30% of the 
deliveries hampered by delays or faults. An internal memo concluded that the bot-
tleneck was not in the market, but in EB's ability to produce.43 LME's CEO, Bjørn 
Lundvall, thought the reason was that Bjørnstad had focused too much on own 
product areas.44 He stressed that EB's main task was to supply Televerket with tele-
com equipment, and its “second large task - but after its main task - was to develop 
its own products”.45 Lundvall stressed that EB had to succeed in the main area to be 
able to develop independently. Kveim learned that he needed to serve both LME 
and Televerket close to perfection, in order to develop a Norwegian telecom com-
pany. 
 
Shortly after taking the helm of EB, Kveim contacted Knut Getz Wold in the Nor-
wegian Central Bank about a new share issue to double EB’s share capital. Kveim 
was anxious not to provoke the government, as LME and EB had done with the 
“share coup” in 1967. Wold said that he did not want EB to issue B-shares, but only 
shares with full voting rights. If LME wanted to hold to its majority position, it 
would have to invest in EB, and if they “wanted to sell them to Norway, it would 
                                                          
41 Interview with Kjell Kveim. 
42 Interview with Kveim, and with Stenberg. 
43 LEBA: LTP meeting 11.02.72, in. 
44 NTM-EB: LME's Bjørn Lundvall to EB's Eilif Bjørnstad 02.11.70. 
45 NTM-EB: LME's Bjørn Lundvall to EB's Eilif Bjørnstad 02.11.70. (andra stora uppgift - 
men efter huvudupgiften - är att utveckla egna produkter). 
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not meet any objections”.46 LME did not need a majority position to consolidate EB 
in its accounts anymore, Wold claimed, as it had become normal to do this on an 
“equity basis”, where the firm consolidated the figures from the subsidiaries in pro-
portion to the ownership share.47 Wold concluded that “L. M. Ericsson control” over 
EB did not “rest primarily on its share majority, but on its know-how and its pat-
ents”.48 Wold wanted to eliminate EB's B-shares, giving them full voting rights, 
which would reduce LME’s majority share in EB to around 43 per cent. He noted 
that Kveim was content with this conclusion, even though it was evident that his 
mission from LME was to seek other solutions.49 Thus, Wold thought Kveim was 
keener on strengthening the Norwegian influence in EB, than on fulfilling his obli-
gations towards LME. 
 
LME agreed to convert the B-shares into A-shares, thus reducing its ownership to 
40 per cent, which sanctioned EB's strategy of loosening its ties to LME.50 Collett 
presents this as a requirement from Kveim, who saw it “as one his first tasks to try 
to reduce LME’s share to below 50 per cent”.51 Kveim, on the other hand, says that 
there was no drama in this, and that Wallenberg simply wanted to “give him a flying 
start”.52 It was not as if LME was forced to reduce its share in EB, and allow such 
an autonomous strategy for EB. Surely, it recognised that it had to loosen its grip on 
EB, but LME also saw a golden opportunity to turn EB into the major telecom com-
pany in Norway. LME's acceptance was a matter of strategic national responsive-
ness, in a changing «negotiated environment». Even if LME allowed EB to pursue 
its own strategy, it was not allowed to do this within the license area, within the core 
of telecom. Hence, LME did not pursue an integrated strategy; it did not want EB to 
intrude into LME’s domain with its autonomous strategy. EB should develop “Nor-
wegian” products, based on locational advantages, but not in LME's main area.  
 
EB's economic performance was poor during the early 1970s, due to the production 
problems and high costs of the Norwegian products.53 The only products with prof-
                                                          
46 RA-EBi: Memo from Knut Getz Wold’s meeting with Kveim - 31/10-73 KGW/SAn Knut 
Getz Wold: “Aksjeutvidelse i Elektrisk Bureau”. (solgte dem til Norge, ville dette ikke støte 
på noen innvendinger.) 
47 RA-EBi: 31/10-73 KGW/San. 
48 RA-EBi: 31/10-73 KGW/San: (L. M. Ericsson’s kontroll med Elektrisk Bureau hviler for 
øvrig ikke primært på aksjemajoriteten, men på den know-how og de patenter). 
49 RA-EBi: 31/10-73 KGW/San. 
50 Collett 1986, p. 18; Kveim supports Collett’s interpretation of this. 
51 Collett 1986, p. 18. 
52 Interview with Kjell Kveim. 
53 RA-EBi: LME's Bjørn Lundvall to EB's Eilif Bjørnstad 02.11.70; LEBA:: LTP meeting 
11.02.72; Collett 1986, p. 17f. 
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its were those within the license agreement with LME.54 Its greatest losses were in 
ship radio, largely due to competition with Nera.55 Despite the problems, both Skeie 
and Kveim meant that maritime electronics were destined to be the core area in EB's 
emancipative strategy from LME. It had to increase its export of maritime products 
to bear the high development and fixed costs. In trying to attain a mandatory posi-
tion within LME, in 1972 EB proposed to set up “Ericsson marine” in Oslo. LME 
turned the request down, but allowed EB to take over LME’s sales office in Ham-
burg and establish an office in London.56 Despite Kveim’s marketing and sales ef-
forts, the maritime products burdened EB's sheets. EB's board said it was “vital that 
these products are made profitable” and wanted “new efforts to coordinate prices 
among other producers and suppliers”.57 This meant starting talks with Nera, aiming 
at a market agreement for ships’ radios, or even a broader cooperation within mari-
time electronics. To comprehend this development, a closer look at Nera is neces-
sary. 
 
* 
 
Nera suffered from economic problems in the 1960s. Being interested in its radio-
link technology, Ericsson and EB tried to acquire the only Norwegian-owned tele-
com company in the late 1960s.58 The government never considered this, wanting a 
Norwegian solution to the problems. To enhance its R&D capacity, Nera recruited 
Peder Th. Hiis from FFI, and he became Nera’s CEO in 1971.59 Many considered 
that Norwegian high-tech companies were too small, and lacking the scale to con-
duct R&D. Thus, there were several attempts to merge Nera with Simrad. The two 
companies’ joint offer to win a contract within maritime satellite communication 
fuelled aspirations to create Norwegian United Electronics.60 TF's Knudtzon 
doubted Nera-Simrad's capacity to pull through such a large project, and wanted 
them to cooperate with STK and EB.61 He thought it was necessary to involve the 
                                                          
54 Collett 1986, p. 17. 
55 LEBA: Minutes from EB's board meeting 09.03.72. 
56 LEBA: Minutes from EB's board meeting 09.03.72. 
57 LEBA: Minutes from EB’s board meeting 25.09.73., (det er vitalt for disse varegrupper at 
de kan gjøres rentable. (…) gjøre nye tiltak for å koordinere prisene blant aktuelle produsen-
ter og leverandører.) 
58 Lundvall had had conversations with chairman of the board in Nera, Bernt Ingvaldsen, who 
also was Stortinget’s President, concerning cooperation between EB and Nera. NTM-EB: 
LME's Bjørn Lundvall to EB's Eilif Bjørnstad 09.01.68 about Lundvall’s meeting with Rost-
oft 3. January 1968. 
59 Johannes Ripman: Bølger - Glimt fra NERAs historie, 1997, side 21. 
60 Sogner 1994, p. 51. 
61 TF’s annual report 1970, here from Lossius 1991, p. 91. 
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large subsidiaries.62 Nera-Simrad refused to cooperate, as the other two belonged to 
multinational concerns with their own “business and market policies”.63 STK and 
EB handed in a joint offer, which was turned down, in favour of Nera-Simrad’s 
national offer. Knudtzon’s doubts regarding Nera-Simrad were proven correct, as it 
had to give up the contract, and the ambitions to create a large national unit in elec-
tronics faded away. 
 
Simrad's influential CEO, Willy Simonsen, left the company in 1967 because he did 
not feel that the Mustad family, which controlled Simrad, gave him enough free-
dom. He established Simonsen Elektro.64 Nera became part of another holding com-
pany when its owner, Bergen Industriinvestering, was taken over by Investa in 
1970.65 Investa was an investment company from Bergen, known for its financial 
orientation, and was influential in introducing the shareholder value principle in 
Norway. The restructuring was coordinated with the Ministry of Industry, and in-
cluded the creation of a holding company, Elektro Union, which was to own and 
organise Investa's companies in the electronics and electrical fields. The ambition 
was to create a robust Norwegian concern in the strong current area, trying to offset 
the disadvantage of the small-scale industry.66 The restructuring did not offset 
Nera’s economic problems, but saddled the company with owners that did not ac-
cept loss-bringing business, not least the draining competition on ships’ radios with 
EB. Investa's Oskar A. Munch was CEO of Elektro Union and chairman of Nera; he 
invited EB to merge the ship radio units of the two companies in the autumn of 
1973.67 
 
The climate for the EB-Nera negotiations was good; Kveim and Hiis were friends 
from NTH, and Munch and EB's chairman Halvdan Bjørum were acquainted from 
business and social life. It was the first of several encounters between these persons 
and companies, but the only meeting where the parties were on equal footing. 
                                                          
62 Knudtzon genuinely believed a development contract could earn STK and EB a mandatory 
position in satellite communication in ITT and/or LME. 
63 Lossius 1991, p. 204. 
64 Sogner 1994, p. 50. 
65 Investa increased its ownership in BII from 30 per cent to 100 per cent. Investa was re-
garded as the hub in Bergen’s bourgeois, and Einar Falck, the CEO was called the godfather 
of Bergen’s business. ”Vesta vinden har stilnet” in Dagens Næringsliv: 05.11.94, Obituary 
for Einar Falck. and “Av de harde negler i næringslivet” in Aftenposten 20.01.91. Conf. Fritz 
W. Loy: Vesta i vekst gjennom 100 år : 1880-1980, Bergen Vesta-Hygea 1980. 
66 St. prp. 107 1972-73: ”Om Elektro Union A/S, Elekto-Generator Aksjeselskap (EGA), A/S 
National Industri og A/S Nera.”; Sogner 1994, p. 52. 
67 Interview with Oskar A. Munch, who had leading positions in Bergen Industriinvester-
ing/Elektro Union/Investa, Chairman of the Board in Nera and Elektrisk Bureau 1986-1989. 
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United Marine Electronics was established in 1974, and was located at EB's new 
headquarters, at Billingstad outside Oslo. Nera’s 51 per cent stake secured Norwe-
gian ownership.68 It was no coincidence that the name did not include the term 
communication; the plan included ship automation, and in many ways it replaced the 
old plans for Norwegian United Electronics.69 The vision was to create “a maritime 
electronics group that was a global leader”.70 Thus, EB had a national institutional 
arrangement as a launching pad for its independent strategy. Knudtzon was also 
satisfied, as the joint company allowed EB to become the dominant industrial part-
ner in the project for maritime satellite communication. It became EB's main R&D 
project in the 1970s. The satellite technology was regarded as suitable for EB's 
national strategy, as it would equip EB with valuable competence and capability for 
the future.71  
 
United Marine Electronics did not resolve Nera’s financial problems. Its Oslo divi-
sion, which did license work for RCA and included broadcasting and instrument 
landing systems, constantly lost money.72 Therefore, Hiis was dismissed in 1975. 
“He was a fine engineer”, Munch recalls, but given the lack of financial understand-
ing, he was “unable to lead a company in a crisis”.73 One of the applicants for the 
top job in Nera Oslo was Kjell Almskog, who had been with Simrad and STK, and 
with Proctor Gamble in the United States, a company with its own strict variant of 
Geneenism.74 Almskog did not impress Munch much at first, but when he was asked 
to come up with a solution for Nera Oslo, he impressed Munch. Almskog’s solution 
was to “shut it down”.75 Munch liked the idea, and hired him. His solution was im-
                                                          
68 Nera-A; Box: “21: Nera II”: “Nera til Industrifondet 5.9.74”, Sogner 1994, p. 51. 
69 The appointment of Erik Gjeruldsen from Norcontrol underscores this, Lossius, 1991, p. 95 
f. In an application to the Industry Fund, Nera put forward a vision of maritime electronics 
packages. In this, satellite communication and new control systems for ships would lead to an 
integrated electronics system onboard. Ship constructors or shipping companies would prefer 
to procure an integrated system from a single responsible supplier. Thus, UME said it would 
work towards a merger with Simrad and Norcontrol. Nera-A; Box: “21: Nera II”: “Nera til 
Industrifondet 5.9.74” 
70 Nera-A; Box: “21: Nera II”: “Nera til Industrifondet 5.9.74”, (en maritim elektronikkgruppe 
som vil bli den ledende i verden.) 
71 Interview with Harald Erichsen, director in Nera.. 
72 It had an accumulated deficit of 24 million NOK between 1972 and 1975. Nera-A; Box: 
EUN - 1975: “Meeting I 10.11.75 referat fra AD-møtet.” 
73 Interview with Oskar A. Munch. 
74 Interview with Kjell Almskog, who held leading positions in Nera and Elektro Union. He 
was Managing Director of Elektrisk Bureau in the mid-1980s, and later in ABB's Norwegian 
subsidiary. 
75 Interview with Oskar A. Munch. 
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possible, however, due to the economic crisis, employment issues, the strength of 
the unions and a revitalised and radicalised Labour Party.76  
 
Nera's problems continued, though Televerket did give the company some extra 
orders to help. In considering giving Nera a development contract for radio 
transmitters for the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK*), Televerket com-
plained that the company had not provided it with information, as requested, which 
would verify that such a contract from Televerket “would save the company, and 
not merely lead to a postponement «of the funeral»”.77 TF participated in the attempt 
to establish Nera as dominant actor in Norwegian telecom, and in 1976 Nera re-
ceived development contracts worth NOK 7 million, twice as much as EB, and three 
times as much as STK.78 Nera's problem had another significant consequence, 
namely that it had to cancel a contract for developing 150 mobile telephones. This 
was given to Willy Simonsen’s company instead, Simonsen Elektro. Thus, Nera was 
in crisis, and Munch was destined to solve the problem on behalf of the demanding 
owner, Investa.79 One alternative was to sell Nera to EB, but this required that EB 
be nationalised, which happened in 1976, when EB was selected as a «national 
champion» by the Labour government.  
 
The cornerstone plan 
In December 1976, the Ministry of Industry announced its cornerstone plan for the 
Norwegian electronics industry. It was the influential Labour member, Jens Chr. 
Hauge, who came up with the idea and saw it through. Hauge, who held leading 
positions in Norwegian politics and industry, operated as a consultant for the Minis-
ter of Industry, Bjartmar Gjerde.80 Hauge picked out three cornerstone companies: 
EB, Tandbergs Radiofabrikker and Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk. He wanted to concen-
trate public resources on these companies, and hoped they could benefit through 
cooperation. After several meetings with the companies, he said they were “moti-
                                                          
76 Tonje Tveite: ”Forvaltningsselskap for statsindustri?” in Grøndahl og Grønlie (ed.), 1995, 
p. 153 f.; Christensen 2003, p. 111 f.; Harald Espeli: Industripolitikk på avveie, 1992. 
* Norwegian abbreviation for Norsk Rikskringkasting. 
77 RA, Teledirektoratets archive: RA-28: ØF. 26.11.75 To The Director General: “Ad 
etasjefmøte hos Samferdselsministeren 1. desember 1975 - pkt. 2 i departementets brev av 10 
ds. (fra Televerket (NRK) vil redde bedriften og ikke bare føre til en utsettelse ‘av begravel-
sen’). 
78 Thue 2006. 
79 Interview with Oskar A. Munch. 
80 Jens Chr. Hauge was leader of the leadership of the Norwegian resistance movement 
"Milorg", Minister of Defence 1945-52, Minister of Justice in 1955, chairman of the Norwe-
gian part of Scandinavian Airlines System and Statoil, and member of Kongsberg Våpen-
fabrikk’s Board. 
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vated to join in committed cooperation on development, marketing and manufactur-
ing”, and “that joint efforts (…) could yield significant results”.81 The plan can be 
seen as a continuance of the vision of creating Norwegian United Electronics, or an 
electronics variant of Elektro Union, trying to attain scale and scope for smaller 
industries through cooperation. It was a response to the crisis in the electronics 
industry at the time, which was documented in a Public Report (NOU*) on the in-
dustry from 1976.82 This section does not analyse the general background to the 
plan, but only why EB was chosen, rather than STK.  
 
An important consequence, and pre-condition for choosing EB, was that Ericsson's 
ownership in EB was reduced from just below 50 per cent to 25 per cent. Thus, a 
main reason for picking EB, and not STK, was that ITT's ownership was too high in 
STK.83 Unlike EB, it seemed unrealistic to acquire a national majority in STK. 
Thoresen wanted STK to be a part of the plan, and told Hauge that ITT would ac-
cept a reduced ownership in STK, but Hauge declined, saying it “was not natural to 
include the company in a national group”.84 Hauge and Gjerde advised STK to con-
tact the chosen companies, and said that such an approach would “clarify to what 
degree STK could cooperate with national companies”.85 ITT did consider buying 
back Kreditkassen’s preference share in STK, and sell it as ordinary shares on the 
Norwegian market in 1977. Nothing came out this, however, as the Norwegian 
stock market was down, leaving little to gain for ITT. Moreover, the Labour gov-
                                                          
81 Nærings- og Handelsdepartementets arkiv, 464 Elektrisk Bureau, File: ”Lån i utlandet 
(1977-): Memo from Jens Chr. Hauge 12.10.76: "Samtale med Industriministeren om mitt 
arbeide med strukturen i elektronikkindustrien 11.07.76.", (motivert til å inngå et forpliktende 
samarbeide som dekker utvikling, markedsføring og produksjonssamvirke. Det er klart at et 
samarbeide som både felles tiltak og arbeidsdeling vil kunne gi betydelig resultater). Here 
from Gard Paulsen’s private achieve, his copy of this document is borrowed with permission 
from Nærings- og Handelsdepartementet. 
* Norwegian abbreviation for Norsk Offentlig Utredning. 
82 NOU 1976: 30 Elektronikkindustri. En perspektivanalyse for norsk elektronikkindustri; 
Sogner 1994, p. 65. 
83 Nærings- og Handelsdepartementets arkiv, 464 Elektrisk Bureau, File: ”Lån i utlandet 
(1977-): Memo from Jens Chr. Hauge 02.11.76 from Meeting with Permanent Secretary 
(Departementsråd) Oluf C. Müller. Here from Gard Paulsen’s private achieve, he a copy of 
this document, with permission from Nærings- og Handelsdepartementet. 
84 RA-STKii: Minute from meeting between STK, Minister of Industry Bjartmar Gjerde, Jens 
Chr. Hauge, and Ivar Jachwitz, ”14.1.77 IJ/bj” (ikke vært naturlig å ta denne bedriften med i 
en nasjonal gruppe). 
85 RA-STKii: Minute from meeting between STK, Minister of Industry Bjartmar Gjerde, Jens 
Chr. Hauge, and Ivar Jachwitz, ”14.1.77 IJ/bj” (en tilnærmelse her ville bidra til å belyse i 
hvilken grad STK kan samarbeide med nasjonale selskaper). 
Chapter 5 STK as an innovative enterprise 
 192
ernment did not want ITT to buy “cheap” preference shares from Kreditkassen, and 
profit from floating them.86  
 
EB stood out as the healthier and more potent company in 1976, not least in tele-
com. Hauge negotiated with LME's main owner, Marcus Wallenberg, and arranged 
for LME to reduce its ownership in EB from just below 50 per cent to 25 per cent.87 
An important background to this negotiation was the Nordic cooperation on data 
communication. LME was given a large contract in relation to this in May 1976, 
despite the opposition of Televerket and Ministry of Communication, but the Minis-
try of Industry supported it in exchange for LME reducing its holding in EB.88 
These negotiations created an opportunity, but were not alone sufficient to induce 
the wish to nationalise EB.  
 
Another factor, explaining why EB was picked as a cornerstone, was that LME was 
Swedish. It was easier for the Norwegian authorities to get in contact with LME's 
management and owners to discuss industrial issues. The Norwegian authorities had 
several meetings with Wallenberg, concerning EB and other topics, whereas there 
are no records of such meetings with ITT.89 Even if the apprehension of Swedish 
dominance was clear, there were also several attempts to induce industrial coopera-
tion between Sweden and Norway in these years.90 The cornerstone plan was actu-
ally presented as a part of a plan to induce cooperation between Norwegian and 
Swedish firms.91 Kveim asserts that when Wallenberg accepted the need to reduce 
LME’s stake in EB, it was because he understood and had sympathy with the desire 
to create and promote a Norwegian telecom industry.92 Moreover, LME welcomed 
EB's role as a cornerstone company, and felt that it affirmed LME's strong position 
in Norway.93 It probably hoped that it had taken a major step towards securing the 
Norwegian market for the next generation of digital switches.  
                                                          
86 STKJA; Box 57; File: Lov 13 STK Eierforhold: Correspondence between STK and ITTE 
in 1977, regarding a stock listing of STK in Norway. 
87 The insurance company Storebrand Norden, Kongsberg Våpenfabrikker and Årdal Verk 
bought the shares. It is uncertain whether the government considered taking a stake as well, in 
order to assure national ownership. 
88 RA-28: Dok 11/77 to Televerket Board of Directors 21.01.77; Odd Chr. Gøthe: Ærlig Talt! 
Om industriskandaler, statsråder og annet, 1988. p. 133; Paulsen 2004. 
89 NTM-EB: LMEs Svein Åberg to Eilif Bjørnstad 11.09.62 about Holler’s visit to Ericsson; 
LME's Bjørn Lundvall to EB's Eilif Bjørnstad 09.01.68 about Lundvall’s meeting with Rost-
oft 3. January 1968. 
90 An example was the abortive “Volvo-agreement” in 1978. 
91 RA-EBii: Press release 03.12.76 “Uttalelse fra industriministeren i forbindelse med prinsipp-
avtalen om samarbeid mellom Elektrisk Bureau, Kongsberg Våpen og Tandberg Oslo”. 
92 Interview with Kjell Kveim. 
93 Interview with Kjell Kveim. 
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The cornerstone plan was also a rescue plan; Hauge hoped it could save Tandberg, 
which was in severe trouble.94 Another integral part of the plan was that Kongsberg 
Våpenfabrikk took over Norcontrol, which was in a crisis of its own.95 Moreover, 
EB was to save Nera. Investa wanted to sell Nera, and a nationalised EB was re-
garded as suitable to take over Nera.96 EB and Elektro Union negotiated the sale of 
Nera in the first months of 1977. Munch tried to get some money out of the sale, but 
Kveim refused. EB paid only NOK 1 for Nera, but took over NOK 124 million of 
Nera’s debt.97 The government remitted NOK 13 million of Nera's public debt, and 
assisted EB in financing the takeover. In hindsight, Kveim denies that the acquisi-
tion was a result of political pressure, as EB had craved Nera's radiolink business for 
decades.98 If this is true, then Kveim was in opposition to his board, which stated 
that it did not see any “profit possibilities in buying Nera”, and considered it a “res-
cue operation”.99  
 
Operating in a politicised business, the board concluded that EB did not have a 
choice: “it would be very unwise to go against the government’s strong wish”, even 
if it “opposed strongly with what a business consideration would suggest”.100 A few 
months later, EB found more skeletons in Nera’s closet. Kveim wanted Elektro 
Union to compensate for this, but Munch refused, claiming it was EB's problem that 
it did not know how to perform a due diligence.101 Some would conclude that 
Kveim and Munch had different codes of morals, though others might suggest they 
had different degrees of naiveté.  
 
Kveim put considerable efforts into integrating Nera into EB, and nurturing its tech-
nical milieu. He thought its main problem was that it had been drifting without 
proper management. He was certain of Nera's technological and commercial poten-
tial, and felt it only needed to be released. One of the first things he did was to give 
Nera a ‘present’, by financing a new site for the radiolink division in Bergen. “This 
                                                          
94 Knut Sogner: Veksten mot idealfabrikken: Tandberg radiofabrikk i 1970-årene, 1989. 
95 Sogner 2002, p. 71. 
96 Interview with Oskar A. Munch. 
97 RA-EBiii: EB to Ivar Jachwitz in the Ministry of Industry 16.03.77. The acquisition in-
cluded a comical and paternalistic touch from Kveim, who, during the final meeting, pushed 
the coin over the table to Munch, Interview with Kjell Kveim. 
98 Interview with Kjell Kveim. 
99 LEBA: EBs first board meeting 1976, (fortjenestemulighet ved å kjøpe Nera (...) rednings-
aksjon). 
100 LEBA: EBs first board meeting 1976, (det ville være uklokt å gå imot myndighetenes sterke 
ønske (…) meget imot hva en forretningsmessige vurdering skulle tilsi). 
101 Interview with Oskar A. Munch. 
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was to show that EB appreciated and backed Nera's employees”, Kveim recalled.102 
Moreover, it was to stimulate innovation, as Kveim thought innovative capability 
depended on a good environment and facilities. It goes without saying that Kveim 
became very popular in Bergen, and the ‘gift’ helped create an image of him as a 
“white knight”.103 It said something about his economic orientation, as the costs of 
the ‘present’ were far greater than Nera, with any reasonable forecasting, could be 
expected to bear. Thoresen was never conceived as a “knight”, or as a generous 
spender. Thus, there were clear differences between Thoresen and Kveim.  
 
Both STK and EB were engaged in R&D and innovative activities in the 1970s, but 
while these were essential in Kveim’s strategy, they were only a means to an end for 
Thoresen. The two men operated with different conceptions of their companies,104 
and also with different corporate governance principles, or more precisely, with 
different regard for their respective stakeholders. Thoresen was raised in Geneen’s 
corporate school, in which R&D was only one of several methods of pursuing a 
profit. For Kveim, however, it was essential for EB to develop “Norwegian” prod-
ucts, and contribute to industrial development in Norway. It is fair to say that for 
Thoresen, technology and innovation were subordinated to finance, while it was the 
opposite for Kveim. Besides, EB was perceived as more nationally oriented than 
STK, and the Ministry of Industry said it needed proof of STK's willingness to co-
operate with Norwegian companies.105 Thus, the difference between Thoresen and 
Kveim, and between STK and EB as innovative enterprises mattered in explaining 
why EB was given political preference. In turn, these differences were to a large 
degree a consequence of the different natures of ITT and LME.106  
 
ITT vs. LME 
ITT differed from LME in that it did not pursue a leadership based on technology or 
a technological strategy. ITT-Europe in Brussels did try to coordinate the business 
and R&D of the European houses, but was not very successful, as the need for na-
tional responsiveness was too important. Thus, instead of pursuing a technological 
strategy, ITT was very attentive to the subsidiaries’ day-to-day business, including 
                                                          
102 Interview with Kjell Kveim. 
103 Interview with Harald Erichsen, and Jon Erik Stenberg. 
104 Niel Fligstein talks of different conceptions of the firm, where each conception, i.e. manu-
facturing, sales and marketing, and finance, has had its strong periods in the 20th century. 
Fligstein, 1990, p. 18. 
105 RA-STKii: Minute from meeting between STK, Minister of Industry Bjartmar Gjerde, 
Jens Chr. Hauge, and Ivar Jachwitz, ”14.1.77 IJ/bj” 
106 Both in the sense that Thoresen and Kveim were chosen as Managing Directors, and in the 
sense that ITT and LME shaped them as managers.  
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R&D. ITT demanded strict reports and evaluations, before giving approval to par-
ticipate in R&D projects. Ongoing projects had to report monthly, and as soon as a 
problem arose, the subsidiary concerned had to post a «red flag» in its report to 
ITT.107 In principle, a subsidiary could enter any project it liked, as long as the plans 
were financially sound. So, while Geneen did not want ‘proud guys entering their 
own Vietnams’, he limited only the financial freedom of the subsidiaries. “We could 
make cars if we wanted and held the budgets” says a BTM aide.108 This was very 
different from LME, which operated with a more lenient financial control, but re-
strained what technological areas EB was to enter. LME would, for instance, not 
have allowed EB to enter a switching project like the 11B, and perhaps not a project 
like the nodal-point switch either. It paid less attention, however, to EB's “own” 
projects, like maritime communication, because these were not core areas in tele-
com.  
 
With considerable assistance from LME, Kveim succeeded in making EB's supply 
of equipment to Televerket much more efficient in the 1970s.109 He invested heavily 
in better planning, rationalising, and organising production, and lowering capital 
costs. He linked this to a comprehensive strategy process. This was necessary to 
manage EB's growth during these years, when sales rose from NOK 400 million in 
1973 to NOK 1 billion in 1977. The key figure in turning around EB's telecom busi-
ness was Tor Egil Holte, who came to EB in 1973.110 He was director of production 
until 1982, when he became director of telecom. His strong character helped EB 
achieve greater efficiency in manufacturing and better control over the capital stock. 
Two camps developed at EB: one product-oriented group lead by Holte, and one 
R&D-oriented, which allegedly lacked any sense of budgetary discipline. The 
groups operated with different corporate understandings. Kveim never succeeded in 
reconciling the groups, or in introducing a sense of financial understanding to the 
R&D group.111 
 
A swift look at EB's financial figures in the 1970s illuminates the point. EB's export 
of Norwegian products rose from 10 per cent to 30 per cent during the 1970s, and 
thus, in this sense, Kveim was fairly successful with his strategy.112 The economic 
results in EB's own areas, however, were disastrous. According to EB's former di-
                                                          
107 Interview with Fredrik Thoresen. 
108 Interview with Rudy Scholliers. 
109 Interview with Kjell Kveim, Jon Erik Stenberg, and Peter Pay. Pay held leading positions 
in EB telecom business from 1970-1989, leading positions in Telenor from 1993-2000. 
110 Interview with Peter Pay. 
111 Interview with Peter Pay. 
112 Collett 1986, p. 18. 
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rector of human relations, Jon Erik Stenberg, it had an annual deficit of NOK 20 
million between 1974 and 1978.113 Taking into account that EB's net profits in 1974 
and 1977 were 16 million and 20 million NOK, respectively, these were big defi-
cits.114 These figures were not revealed in EB's annual reports, thus the profits ob-
tained from sales to Televerket were also concealed. So, the large margins EB en-
joyed as an equipment supplier subsidised the other lines of business, and gave 
LME a good profit. Within this regime, Kveim could allocate resources to risky 
R&D projects with a long-term horizon, such as maritime satellite communication, 
as long as this did not interfere with LME's technological strategy. STK, on the 
other hand, had to evaluate the realism in every project. In this sense, STK had less 
“financial” room to pursue ambitions of autonomy within ITT, while EB had less 
“technological” room within LME. 
 
This difference between ITT and LME corresponds to a diverse dividend policy. 
LME took out a modest dividend from EB. LME’s income was based on licence 
payments,115 and EB's acquisition of equipment from LME. As mentioned before, 
Kveim’s predecessor, Eilif Bjørnstad, called these “hidden dividends”.116 High divi-
dends were not good for public relations, thus, LME often emphasised in its dealing 
with the Norwegian authorities that it received only small dividends from EB.117 
Moreover, by channelling the dividends through royalties or revenues from internal 
sales, LME did not have to share them with other shareholders.118 This was very 
different from ITT, which pursued a policy of high dividends from STK, sometimes 
demanding 50 per cent of STK's net operating profit.119 It is very difficult to com-
pare the level of dividends for companies, however, for all practical purposes; 50 
per cent of net income was very high in a Norwegian business context, and added to 
the picture of ITT as the epitome of a capitalistic enterprise, and STK as its Norwe-
                                                          
113 Interview with Jon Erik Stenberg. Stenberg checked these numbers in an unofficial ac-
count. Peter Pay did not confirm the exact numbers, but fully supported the impression Sten-
berg gave. 
114 That is after taxes and amortizations, EB's annual report 1977. 
115 “Comparing the major firms, STK and EB, we see that EB had much higher license payments 
than STK.” in Bjørn L. Basberg: ”R&D performance in Norwegian electronics companies, 
1960-1975”, 1986, p. 32. 
116 RA-EBi: Memo 24/8-1962 JJ/MF (Jens Johansen): “Konsesjonssøknad fra A.B. Aulis, 
Stockholm, om kjøp av aksjer i A/S Tai Investering, Oslo”. 
117 LME's CEO Bjørn Lundvall, in a memo concerning LME's activities in Norway 08.04.69, 
here from Collett 1986 p. 14. 
118 After its financial crisis in the 1930, LME pursued a strategy of financing the subsidiaries 
in the host countries, and thus there was a substantial block of minority owners in LME’s 
subsidiaries. 
119 STKA; Board Meetings: Letter from STK to STK’s Board of Directors 25.09.72; Board 
Meeting 19.02.76. 
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gian cash-cow.120 Moreover, it was well known that Thoresen was the best-paid 
executive in Norway, and that the managerial salaries were far higher in STK than 
EB.121 This did not give STK the required legitimacy to be a national champion in 
telecom.  
 
It is important not to exaggerate the differences between Thoresen and Kveim, or 
STK and EB. Kveim was dedicated to innovation, but he was very attentive to 
manufacturing, sales and finance. And even if Thoresen adhered to Geneen’s finan-
cial conception of the firm, it did not dominate STK totally. Some members of the 
management had other priorities, such as innovative or industrial conceptions of the 
firm, and some regarded Norwegian industry or TF/Televerket as STK's main stake-
holders.122 Moreover, the positions of Thoresen and Kveim were reinforced by their 
endorsement of conflicting conceptions and corporate governance systems; hence, 
the cornerstone plan further cemented these positions. When it failed to become a 
part of the plan, STK chose to fight the whole idea. One of the things STK regretted 
was the plan’s discriminatory aspect, meaning that the government would favour 
selected companies in different ways. It was very much like the nurturing and fos-
tering of «national champions», which was so much in vogue in the 1970s, particu-
larly in France. Hauge made no secret of the French inspiration behind his plan.123  
 
Colbertism vs. ITT 
The French “policy was directed towards the development of an autonomous tech-
nological capability in the field of telecommunication” and the creation of a «na-
tional champion».124 The policy has been labelled "Colbertism high-tech".125 The 
basic idea of Colbertism is “that some knowledge was more valuable than other. 
                                                          
120 A radical lexicon - Pax - wrote that most of STK’s profit came from sale in Norway, and 
that a major part of this profit was sent out of the country as dividends to ITT. “In 1977 the 
dividend was 33%, and not many Norwegian companies can present anything like it.” in 
http://lotus.uib.no/norgeslexi/paxlex/alfabetet/s/s20.html. 
121 Interview with Ivar Ørbeck; ”Bjarne Aamodt ny STKsjef” in Aftenposten 27.08.87, The 
difference in salary among STK and EB might also reflect that ITT operated with US stan-
dards in salaries, while EB and LME adhered to the Scandinavian tradition. 
122 This variation corresponds to STK's lack of organisational integration that was asserted 
above. 
123 RA-STKii: Minute from meeting between STK, Minister of Industry Bjartmar Gjerde, 
Jens Chr. Hauge, and Ivar Jachwitz, ”14.1.77 IJ/bj”. 
124 Llerena et al. 2002, p. 204. 
125 Élie Cohen’s: Le colbertism "High Tech", Économies des Telecom et du Grand Projet. 
Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683) was King Louis XIV’s minister of finance, known for his 
focus on improving French manufacturing, by subsidising industries and importing technology 
and craftsmen. 
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Consequently, it was in the interest of the State to create and protect such knowl-
edge.”126 This allowed for selective government policies, selecting technological 
fields (electronic), industries (computer and telecom) and companies (CGE/Alcatel). 
Moreover, the policy was based on a rather negative perception of multinationals, 
that they obstructed national industrial development, and that one could not base a 
country’s future on imports of technology and products from multinationals. It is 
illuminating that Servan-Schreiber’s book, The American Challenge, starts with a 
Chinese proverb: “If you give a man a fish, he will have a single meal. If you teach 
him how to fish, he will eat all his life.”127  
 
The conglomerate CGE was central to this eco-politico game. Its telecom activities 
were organised under the subsidiary, the Compagnie Industrielle de Télécommuni-
cation (CIT), and it started to acquire other French telecom companies in the 
1960s.128 In 1965 it took over the cable and telecom activities of a French conglom-
erate, Hispano-Alsacienne, which included the original Alcatel.129 Thus was created 
CIT-Alcatel, which cooperated closely with the national R&D institute in telecom, 
the Centre National d'Etudes des Télécommunications (CNET), “in the design and 
development of the first fully digital switch, the E10, ready for service in 1970”.130 
Besides improving the French economy, it was also a matter of Gaullism. President 
Valery Giscard D'Estaing warned that ”the American domination of telecommunica-
tions and computers” was a threat to France’s independence.131 While procuring 
SPC switches for urban areas in 1976, the French PTO pressured ITT to sell one of 
its subsidiaries, Le Materiél Téléphone (LMT), and persuaded Ericsson to sell its 
French subsidiary to Thomson. This was to get rid of the foreign dominance, but 
also because the PTO wanted Thomson as a “major force” which would “provide a 
competitive spur to Alcatel”.132 
 
                                                          
126 Erik S. Reinert et al.: “Exploring the Genesis of Economic Innovations: The Religious 
Gestalt-Switch and the Duty to Invent as Preconditions for Growth.” 1997. 
127 Kuan Tzu, here after Servan-Schreiber 1968. Another version of the quote goes like this: 
“If you give a man a fish, he will be hungry again tomorrow, but if you teach him to fish, he 
becomes prosperous and teaches others to fish. Giving a man a fish creates dependency, 
whereas teaching a man to fish brings him the lasting happiness of being a producer.” 
128 It acquired Télic (Téléphone Industrielle and Commerciale) in 1965. 
129 Alcatel was an abbreviation for “Société Alsacienne de Constructions Atomiques, de 
Télécommunications et d’Electronique.” 
130 Sally 1993, p. 69. 
131 Cats-Baril et al., “The French videotex system Minitel: A successful implementation of a 
national information technology infrastructure”, 1994. 
132 Sally 1993, p. 69. 
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Colbertism and the nationalisations in France were an interventionist industrial 
policy, based on selection, i.e. on “picking winners” or creating «national champi-
ons». This was at the heart of the cornerstone plan. EB had proved a willingness to 
liberate itself from LME, and Hauge hoped it could develop into a Norwegian tele-
com company of significance. When STK failed to become a part of the plan, it 
mobilised arguments against it, saying it did not believe in a strong national telecom 
company in Norway. The country was too small to foster anything like Ericsson, as 
there were insufficient resources, and the home market was too small.133 Ørbeck 
wrote a memo praising the importance of multinationals in general, and ITT in par-
ticular. He stressed that Norway was not self-sufficient, either in consumer goods, 
or in know-how. Norway had to exploit the world’s technological innovations, in-
stead of developing its own technology and capability; the country had to “surfride 
the technological tides”.134 Instead of protecting national companies, he claimed 
Norway ought to induce international flows of technology and competence, and this 
entailed the presence of MNCs in Norway.  
 
“Multinational corporations play a significant role”, claimed Ørbeck, “in spreading 
technology across the national borders.”135 And ITT was a prime diffuser of tech-
nology, not least because it did not have a traditional head office in a home market. 
Thus, ITT's trait as a freestanding company was an advantage: “We are not a filial 
of a larger concern” said Ørbeck, “which has its main business in a large industrial 
country, and which has as its intention to sell or reproduce this country’s prod-
ucts.”136 Hence, there was no national agenda behind ITT. There is little doubt that 
Ørbeck implied that EB was a filial, LME the large concern, and Sweden the large 
industrial country. Therefore, Ørbeck regretted the fact that STK was regarded as 
less Norwegian “than those companies that might have a larger Norwegian share of 
ownership” than STK.137 He claimed STK, as opposed to EB, was one of several 
“equally autonomous companies” within ITT.138 ITT was to be regarded as a con-
federation of independent companies, which pooled their competence and technol-
                                                          
133 IØPAi: “STK - norsk deltager i det verdensomfattende multinasjonale selskapet ITT”, 
27.09.78; Interview with Fredrik Thoresen, Ivar Ørbeck, Torbjørn Brataas. 
134 IØPAi: Ørbeck 27.09.78. (drive surfriding på de teknologiske tidevannsbølger). 
135 IØPAi: Ørbeck 27.09.78. (De moderne multinasjonale selskaper spiller en vesentlig rolle i 
spredning av teknologi over landegrensene.) 
136 IØPAi: Ørbeck 27.09.78. (Vi er ikke filial av et større konsern som har sin hovedaktivitet 
forankret i et enkelt større industriland, og som har til hensikt å selge videre eller reprodusere 
dette lands produkter.) 
137 IØPAi: Ørbeck 27.09.78. (enn de bedrifter som kan ha en større norsk eierandel enn det vi 
opererer med.) 
138 IØPAi: Ørbeck 27.09.78. (STK et av mange likestilte autonome bedrifter). 
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ogy, and as a member on an equal footing, STK was a vital importer and adapter of 
technology for Norway.  
 
A central argument for the cornerstone plan was the fear of losing the results of 
R&D projects to foreign companies, and Ørbeck had observed that STK had been 
given fewer development contracts because of this fear. He thought this was a futile 
way of approaching the issue. The essential point was that when STK got a devel-
opment contract, it could utilise ITT's R&D results to fulfil its contract. Through 
this “the Norwegian companies and institutions with which we cooperate shall re-
ceive technology”.139 Moreover, Ørbeck thought the authorities exaggerated this 
issue; there were limits to what a small company like STK could equip the larger 
ITT companies with. “The relation between what we can hand over, and what we 
are given the opportunity to make use of, suggests a clear competence drain to Nor-
way.”140 STK's fruitful relationship with the STL, ITT's British R&D Laboratory, 
underpinned his argument. Many of FA's engineers started their tenure with a learn-
ing period at the STL, and the PCM contract, as well as STK's work on fibre optics 
in the 1970s, was based on this relationship.141 STL's policy towards STK was in 
line with British attitudes towards foreign direct investment and multinationals, 
which was quite different from French policy.142  
 
The French ITT laboratory, LCT, was much more reluctant to share with STK.143 It 
did not want to share knowledge and technology with other ITT subsidiaries, which 
is interesting in light of the nationalisations that took place in the 1970s. Nationali-
sations of companies are often triggered by transitions of ownership advantages 
from mother companies to subsidiaries.144 This was the case with the French nation-
alisation of the ITT and LME subsidiaries in 1976; France had developed independ-
ent competence in telecom, not least with its digital switch, the E10. This puts the 
policy of LCT, of not sharing technology and knowledge with its sister companies 
within ITT, in an interesting perspective: it did not want to share its ownership ad-
vantages with others. Thus, to make a suggestive point: while STK and STC saw 
ITT's confederate structure as an opportunity to share and diffuse competence and 
                                                          
139 IØPAi: Ørbeck 27.09.78. (de norske bedrifter og institusjoner vi samarbeider med, skal 
tilføres teknologi).  
140 IØPAi: Ørbeck 27.09.78. (Forholdet mellom det vi selv kan avgi og det vi har anledning 
til å anvende, tilsier en klar kompetanse-”drain” til Norge.) 
141 Interview with Ivar Ørbeck, Torbjørn Brataas, and Knut Berg. 
142 Jones 1996, p. 270-271 and 277 f. 
143 Interview with Ivar Ørbeck, Torbjørn Brataas, and Knut Berg. 
144 Christensen 2003, p. 91. 
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technology, the French saw it as a weakness to be exploited for national interests, 
eventually leading to the formation of Alcatel.  
 
Another interesting point is that such a transfer of ownership advantages did not 
precede the nationalisation of EB, as the company was to rely on LME's switching 
technology. This partly explains why so little came out of the nationalisation of EB. 
Moreover, little or nothing came out of the cornerstone plan. The three chosen com-
panies did sign an intentional agreement to cooperate, but they rarely met.145 An 
important reason why the plan never had any significant impact on EB was that it 
had little effect on Televerket's procurement policy.  
 
Public procurement policy 
Televerket had nothing to do with the cornerstone plan, or the nationalisation of EB, 
and neither did the Ministry of Communication. In fact, Televerket protested when 
it had to procure the data communication equipment from Ericsson, which opened 
up the way for the nationalisation of EB.146 Televerket wanted to procure this from 
STK and Siemens instead, as they thought Ericsson's equipment was technologically 
inferior. Thus, political considerations outweighed technological issues, and 
Televerket was forced to be an industry provider, rather than a proficient service 
provider. Furthermore, several managers, among them Knudtzon, complained that it 
was “unclear who had the last say when it comes to the policy regarding the telecom 
industry in this country”147 They felt shuffled around by the Ministry’s industrial 
planners, who did not know the first thing about telecom. 
 
When Televerket's procurement policy was accentuated in the report from the 
Committee of Electronics in 1964, it never really caught the interest of people out-
side the R&D system; this was different in the mid-1970s. One reason was that it 
became evident to most people that electronics was a key industry and a general-
purpose technology. Another was the economic crisis, which had caused employ-
ment problems, not least in the electronics industry. The NOU documented that 
income and debt-equity ratios in the industry were very poor.148 The Association of 
                                                          
145 RA-EBii: ”Prinsippavtale mellom A/S Elektrisk Bureau (EB) A/S Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk 
(KV) og Tandberg Radiofabrikk A/S (TR)” 30.11.77; and Memo from meeting Ministry of 
Industry and Kjell Kveim: ”Orientering om hjørnesteins-samarbeidet” 27.04.77. 
146 Paulsen 2004, p. 95 f., and RA-28: Knudtzon to Øvregaard 02.08.76: “Norsk teleindustri-
politikk”. 
147 RA-28: Knudtzon to Øvregaard 02.08.76: “Norsk teleindustri-politikk”, (uklarhet om 
hvem som har det avgjørende ord når det gjelder teleindustri-politikk her i landet). 
148 NOU 1976, here after Sogner 1994, p. 65. 
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Electronics Industry called for more support, not least for a national procurement 
policy from Televerket.149 
 
Televerket was prepared to take industrial and national considerations into account 
in its procurement policy, but it wanted clear directives from the political authori-
ties, and it did not receive these. In 1974, the Ministry of Communication demanded 
more price-conscious procurement routines, with international competition when-
ever possible, and, if not, inspections of the suppliers’ books.150 In 1975, the Audi-
tor General sent a letter to Televerket to enjoin these rules, while later the same 
year, the Ministry of Communication asked Televerket to take greater account of 
national considerations.151 While the Ministry of Industry wanted Televerket to act 
as an industry provider, the Ministry of Finance wanted a price-oriented procurement 
policy.152 A reason for these conflicting instructions was that the public bodies had 
diverging interests and responsibilities; another was that there were different issues 
at stake. On the one hand, Televerket had to make sure that foreign companies did 
not dump prices; a normal way was to exclude development costs in the prices, 
which would make it impossible for Norwegian firms to compete.153 On the other 
hand, it seemed obvious that STK and EB had charged Televerket too much in the 
long-term agreements.154 Thus, Televerket was caught in crossfire: accused of being 
in the hands of the industry, while at the same time it was condemned for not using 
its procurement to support Norwegian industry.  
 
It was one thing for different issues to be at stake, but such ambiguities were normal 
in most countries. Competition in public procurement was a means to achieve low 
and fair pricing, but it was also important to depict the national market as open, so 
domestic suppliers could export. For instance, if Televerket bought radio link 
equipment only from Nera, Norway would have a hard time arguing that other coun-
tries should open their market to Nera’s equipment. One mode of public procure-
ment, which allegedly was normal in Germany, was to arrange open tenders, but to 
                                                          
149 RA-28: Elektronikkindustriens Bransjeforening to Televerket: Forholdet mellom Telever-
ket og Norsk Teleteknisk Industri, 09.03.76. Minutes from meeting between the Ministry of 
Industry, Televerket and Elektronikkindustriens Bransjeforening 15. and 24.06.76. 
150 RA-28: Ministry of Communication to Televerket 12.11.74. 
151 RA-28: Dok 11/77 to Televerket Board of Directors 21.01.77. 
152 RA-28: Øvregard to Finn Lied, vice-chairman of Televerket's Board of Directors: 06.0177: 
“Forholdet mellom norsk industri og Televerket”. 
153 It was recognised that foreign suppliers, mainly Siemens, operated with higher prices in 
their home markets than abroad, so the development costs were covered in the home market. 
154 RA-28: Elektronikkindustriens Bransjeforening to Televerket: Forholdet mellom Telever-
ket og Norsk Teleteknisk Industri, 09.03.76. Minutes from meeting between the Ministry of 
Industry, Televerket and Elektronikkindustriens Bransjeforening 15. and 24.06.76. 
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make the technical specifications so distinct, that only the national supplier, i.e. 
Siemens, could win the contract.155 The trick was to depict the national market as 
open, but to continue protecting and nurturing national industry. One way of achiev-
ing this was to let the procuring bodies, like the PTOs, handle the delicate situation. 
The PTOs could always find reasons for procuring national equipment, and still 
claim that the market was open. The ambiguous political signals Televerket received 
should also be seen in this light. 
 
Thus, the Ministry of Industry and Communication gave Televerket room to ma-
noeuvre, to interpret the rules for itself. It could either perform industrial statesman-
ship by being an industry provider, it could strive to be a proficient service provider, 
or it could have different roles in different product segments, i.e. support Nera's 
transmission equipment, but let STK and EB compete fiercely on switches. 
Televerket had never appreciated such a role, and had always asked for unambigu-
ous political signals regarding procurement. Ever since the radio link issue in the 
1950s, it demanded transparent guidelines from the political bodies. Øvregaard 
complained to the Board of Directors in 1977, that Televerket received “conflicting 
guidelines” regarding public procurement from the ministries.156 Several meetings 
were held with different political bodies, all wanting Televerket to interpret the 
guidelines itself, and to support Norwegian industry within this framework of these 
guidelines.  
 
Televerket refused to play such a role, and wanted clear instructions. It was possible 
to avoid the rules for public procurement, i.e. to prefer a Norwegian firm even in the 
face of a better foreign offer, but this required a written statement from the political 
bodies. As Televerket complained, “everybody speaks about procuring from Nor-
wegian suppliers”, but the appropriate authorities were not willing to “put anything 
down on paper”.157 Televerket reasoned that if the ministries were not willing to 
provide a written statement, then it was not willing to run the risk of acquiring ex-
pensive and low quality equipment, and maybe incurring the wrath of the Auditor 
                                                          
155 Interview with Harald Erichsen and Håkon Otterlei. Otterlei was Director of Elektrisk 
Bureau’s activities in maritime satellite communication. 
156 RA-28: Øvregard to Finn Lied 06.01.76 ”Forholdet mellom norsk industri og Televerket”; 
Minutes from Meeting of Televerket's Board of Directors 26.08.76.; Dok 11/77 “ Forholdet 
mellom industrien og Televerket”, document for Meeting of Televerket's Board of Directors 
21.01.77. 
157 RA-28: ØF. 26.11.75 To The Director General: “Ad etasjefmøte hos Samferdselsministe-
ren 1. desember 1975 - pkt. 2 i departementets brev av 10 ds., (Saken er at alle snakker om 
kjøp fra norske leverandører, men de myndigheter som har fullmakt til det, vil ikke sette noe 
på papiret). 
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General. The issue was never resolved; Televerket's procurement of Norwegian 
equipment remained based on ad hoc initiatives.  
 
The whole question of Televerket's procurement policy was obscured by the dubi-
ous identity of STK and EB; were they Norwegian or not? The perception of na-
tionality varied according to product lines, when STK sold its Digimat, it was re-
garded as Norwegian. When it sold the Metaconta, it was foreign, and when it sold 
the 8B and 11B, it was both. Nevertheless, it was difficult for Televerket to relate to 
STK and EB in these issues. As the companies had very high margins on their sup-
ply to Televerket, particularly EB, it also appealed to Televerket's stakeholder re-
sponsibilities when it had employment problems.158 EB asked Televerket for support 
to avoid laying off workers in 1973, but at the same it operated with bogus costs on 
its KV switches. Thus, it was difficult for Televerket to ascertain if it was a straight 
game when STK and EB played their “employment card”. These things are difficult 
to analyse, but the next chapter clearly shows that Televerket, and particularly TA, 
was starting to get fed up with STK and EB as switching suppliers.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explained why EB was chosen as a cornerstone company in the 
telecom industry, and not STK. The main precondition was that it was possible to 
attain a Norwegian majority in EB, while the most important industrial reason was 
to save Nera. Nevertheless, EB's willingness to pursue an independent national 
strategy, i.e. freeing itself from LME, was the main reason. EB was willing to de-
velop into a Norwegian telecom company of consequence, while STK never be-
lieved in this vision of creating a large Norwegian telecom company. A vital factor 
was the different conceptions Thoresen and Kveim had of the telecom industry, 
particularly how they looked upon R&D and strategies for innovation in telecom. 
For Thoresen, STK's R&D activities were above all a means to preserve its position 
as an equipment supplier to Televerket. For Kveim it was exactly the opposite: its 
supply of telecom equipment was above all a means to engage in R&D and innova-
tion.  
 
Still, little came out of the cornerstone plan. “Hauge’s plan in the second half of the 
1970s”, says Olav Wicken, signified the end of a technocratic rationality in the indus-
                                                          
158 EB asked for an increased supply of equipment in 1973, fearing unemployment, RA-28: 
Dok 11/77 to Televerket Board of Directors 21.01.77; STK held several meetings with the 
Televerket and the government regarding employment problems, for instance RA, Ministry of 
Industry; Box: St 273; File: Standard Telefon og Kabelfabrik tidsrom 1969-77: Minutes from 
the meeting between STK and the Ministry of Employment “7.10.75 IJ/BJ”. 
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trial policy.159 Moreover, it was based on substantial public funding, to save 
Tandberg, Norcontrol and Nera, and such policies, based on public expenditure, 
were soon to go out of fashion.160 Thus ‘Colbertism high-tech’ had a short and in-
significant history in Norwegian telecom, unlike in France. A main difference was 
that the French based their telecom policy on developing a digital switch. In 1978, 
one year after the cornerstone plan was launched, Nokia formed a joint venture with 
the state-owned telecom equipment supplier, Televa Oy, to develop a digital switch. 
Nokia's CEO, Kari Kairamo, said that developing a digital switch was a “question of 
whether Nokia wanted to be in the telecommunication business in the long run”.161 It 
is agreed that history proved this assertion to be correct. Thus, in hindsight it seems 
evident that the cornerstone plan was futile for telecom, without a digital switch 
underpinning it. Then again, Ørbeck's perception of multinational companies did 
prevail in Televerket, as demonstrated by the TA's close cooperation with BTM. 
This pattern will be documented further in the next chapter. 
 
This chapter also suggests why so little came out of the substantial R&D STK con-
ducted; namely that Lazonick’s conditions for an innovative enterprise were lack-
ing. The most important, perhaps, was the lack of strategic control that could have 
pulled the many projects together. This part of the analysis is by no means compre-
hensive, only suggestive. The analysis of Thoresen’s impact on STK's telecom busi-
ness, however, purports to be conclusive. The next chapters will demonstrate how 
Thoresen’s corporate governance principles and lack of telecom knowledge had 
wide-reaching implications for the development of the Norwegian telecom industry.  
                                                          
159 Wicken 1993, p. 246-272. 
160 Sogner 2002, p. 65. 
161 Häikiö 2002, p. 58. 
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Chapter 6 Digitalisation and liberalisation 
Introduction 
From the mid-1970s, most telecom actors were preoccupied with strategies regard-
ing digital switches, and Televerket, STK and BTM/ITT were no exceptions. More-
over, these strategies were formed by the liberalisation that swept over the western 
hemisphere. The telecom sector was a key target for Ronald Reagan and Margaret 
Thatcher's liberal policies in the 1980s. In Norway, the digitalisation and liberalisa-
tion of the telecom industry were manifested through Televerket's tender for digital 
switches in 1982. Foreign suppliers were invited to participate in the tender, and 
only one company was to win the contract for installing over 500,000 digital lines. 
The decision to order only one system was dramatic, since either STK or EB had to 
lose. The open tender, i.e. inviting foreign suppliers, was also controversial as both 
STK and EB could lose out. Furthermore, it was the largest industrial contract on 
the Norwegian mainland until that time, and had the potential to create radical 
changes in the Norwegian telecom industry. 
 
The tender came about as the telecom industry’s oligopolic grip on Televerket had 
lost its strength. This chapter shows how former path dependencies and stakehold-
ing had lost their weight. Nevertheless, an interesting question is why Televerket 
was a frontrunner in digitising its network, and liberalising its procurement policy. 
In many other countries, the government used its procurement power to restructure 
its national telecom industry. Televerket considered this before arranging the tender, 
and invited STK and EB to take part in such discussions. The chapter looks into 
why such a policy did not materialise in Norway. Another reason why the oligopolic 
grip loosened earlier in Norway than in other countries was the competence and 
standing Televerket had attained. This was not least due to its relationship with 
BTM on the further development of the Metaconta 10C, which earned it a rank as a 
lead market for ITT's System 12. Hence, Televerket had made the transition from 
being BTM's guinea pig in the 1950s to being ITT's lead market in the 1980s. 
 
Nevertheless, taking the negative impact of the 8B switch into account, it is surpris-
ing that Televerket chose to be the first installer of ITT's System 12. Moreover, EB 
was regarded as the more likely candidate to win the tender, with its large market 
share for switches, and its status as a cornerstone company. A decisive factor was 
that different corporate governance principles underpinned the actions of Thoresen 
and STK on the one side, and Kveim and EB on the other. In line with Geneenism, 
Thoresen was loyal to the strategy of his main shareholder, ITT, whereas Kveim 
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stuck to the stakeholder variant of the corporate governance system, which he 
thought had been sanctioned by EB's role as a cornerstone company. 
 
Before we embark on the analysis, we need to make some introductory comments 
regarding digital switches, and why they were superior to the old electro-mechanical 
and analogue switches.1 Firstly, digital switches increased the capacity tremen-
dously, and were thus able to eliminate the telephone queues. The network would be 
much more economical, because digital switches cost much less per line, and be-
cause a digital - seamless - network was more efficient to operate then the old 
“weed-flora”. Finally, they would allow for and facilitate a whole range of new 
services. Some related to telephony, but equally important was the fact that they 
would enable non-voice transmission, leading eventually to the Integrated Service 
Digital Network (ISDN). Being more like a computer than an old-fashioned tele-
phone switch, the digital switch was one of the most important outcomes of the 
convergence between communication and information technologies. In service, 
digital switches became one of the major facilitators of the same convergence. 
 
As mentioned before, digital switches differ from SPC switches in that the contact 
system is computerised. Thus, in this generation, there is no electromechanical com-
ponent; there is only hardware and software as in any other computer. This implies 
that these switches are even less labour-intensive, and more R&D- and knowledge-
intensive. Another key element is that the transmitted signals are digital. First, this 
increases the capacity substantially, by use of time-division switching; one medium 
can provide several channels simultaneously, by sending digital signals in different 
time-slots. Digital switching also means that non-voice transmission is accommo-
dated in a better way. There were different generations of digital switches: some, 
like ITT's System 12, were totally computerised, exploiting the most modern 
achievements in microelectronics. Others were semi-digital, like the first versions of 
LME’s AXE, which had digital contact only on the group-selector, thus it was a 
physical link that connected the local subscriber. Hence, in the latter half of the 
1970s, the distinctions between SPC switches and digital switches were not crystal 
clear. Nevertheless, the computer-based equipment made Televerket reconsider its 
procurement policy.  
 
A dual regime 
Chapter 4 demonstrated how the PTOs in general and Televerket in particular at-
tained more control and knowledge over their own networks. This process of com-
                                                          
1 This based mainly on Chapuis 1990, p. 369f. 
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petence building continued in the 1970s. An important forum for expanding and 
diffusing this knowledge within Televerket was the “Long-term Planning Commit-
tee” (LPC). This was set up after the reorganisation(s) around 1970 “to strengthen 
planning and develop a long-term perspective”.2 One should not exaggerate the 
LPC's influence on Televerket's decision making, but it was important as it initiated 
several projects, which laid the foundation for future actions and policies. The TF 
and TA had important roles and were engaged in several projects concerning how 
the future network would be. The TA produced a large report in 1974, on how the 
network would be in 1982; this contained a thorough mapping of all the switches 
and features in the network.3 The LPC praised the document, which suggested that 
Televerket had finally attained control over its own network, and stressed its peda-
gogical value. The document was accordingly distributed throughout the entire 
institution.4 
 
The only critic of the report came from Oslo District’s Bestorp, who “feared that the 
8B was given a too favourable account in the report - the historical verdict must not 
be that the 8B was a good system.”5 Bestorp was also anxious that Televerket had 
installed too many different kinds of electronic switches, which made it difficult to 
train personnel.6 This was an argument for standardising the switches in the net-
work, which would have consequences for the procurement policy. Another factor 
was the presumed economy of scale with electronic and digital switches: The “Nor-
wegian market is too small to be shared by two suppliers”, said one aide, “there will 
therefore be large savings by opting for one supplier.”7 This was a controversial 
issue: “To state it extremely”, said another “one could ask: Which of the suppliers 
should be ousted.”8 
 
In 1976, Televerket's Technical Director, Per Mortensen, said it would be difficult 
to get in a position with only one supplier, because “it would be unfortunate if STK 
                                                          
2 LPC-A: Box 38, File: 012.513, 3. “Foredrag av O. Skaalen, leder av LP-sekretariatet, på 
Telesjefmøte, Sør og Øst distrikt 1974.” (styrke planleggingen og utvikle langtidsperspektivet.) 
3 LPC-M 2-3.9.74: “Beskrivelsene av sentralene i det automatiske telefonnettet i Norge frem 
til omkring 1982” and “Beskrivelse av det automatiske telefonnettet i Norge omkring 1982”. 
4 LPC-M 2-3.9.74. 
5 LPC-M 2-3.9.74. (Han var redd 8B-systemet var gitt for god omtale i rapporten - historiens 
dom må ikke bli at 8B var et godt system.) 
6 LPC-M 2-3.9.74. 
7 LPC-M 2-3.9.74. A problem with one supplier, however, was that Televerket would have to 
establish a rigorous control system to avoid moral hazard from the chosen supplier. (Det nors-
ke marked er for lite til å deles på to leverandører. (…) Det vil derfor være store besparelser å 
hente ved å satse på én leverandør.) 
8 LPC-M 2-3.9.74. (Satt på spissen kan en stille spørsmålet: Hvem av leverandørene skal ut?) 
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were to close down its telecom department”, and with the industrial democracy that 
was introduced, it would be difficult to lay off 500 employees.9 Hence, Mortensen, 
and many others, took it for granted that EB would be the selected supplier. A 
much-debated alternative was to merge STK and EB, or at least make them cooper-
ate closely. One line of thought, in accordance with the cornerstone plan, was to 
create a strong Norwegian telecom company. It could for instance have license-
agreements with LME and/or ITT, like the former French subsidiaries of ITT and 
LME did.10 This gave rise to the question of a Norwegian development of digital 
switches. Nic. Knudtzon had stressed, since the establishment of TF in 1967, that 
Norway was too small to develop a digital switch; he repeated this at an LPC meet-
ing in 1975.11  
 
Televerket's old switching expert, Nils Jonsson, also ruled this out: “It must be clear 
that the Norwegian market in itself is too small to form an economic foundation for 
the development and rational production of a complete automat system of a modern 
kind”.12 But, then, how could Nokia develop a digital switch in Finland, which was 
no bigger than Norway? A key condition for Nokia, was that unlike other potential 
new entrants into the telecom industry, it had a large and fairly secure market in the 
Soviet Union.13 Moreover, not being owned by foreigners, it had complete strategic 
control. In 1980, it succeeded in halting Ericsson's strategic move into its sphere of 
influence. First, Ericsson tried to obtain an export license to the Soviet Union 
through its Finnish subsidiary, but Nokia was instrumental in stopping this. Second, 
it stopped Ericsson from acquiring its state owned partner, Televa Oy; Nokia itself 
acquired a majority stake in Televa in 1981, “and bought the state out altogether in 
1987”.14 
 
STK and EB were not in a position to take such steps. However, Norway's small 
size did not have to mean modest ambitions, as shown by the quest for automatic 
and nuclear-driven ships, Nera-FFI's radio-link endeavour, Norsk Data’s attempt to 
be a global manufacturer of mainframe computers, and Tandberg’s ambitions to 
                                                          
9 LPC-M 23-24.3.76. (det ville være uheldig om STK skulle velge å nedlegge sin telefondivi-
sjon.) 
10 LPC-M 23.-24.3.76: TA 20/2-76 Nj: Anskaffelse av automatutstyr - alternative strategier“. 
11 Knudtzon in LPC-M 11-13.3.75. 
12 LPC-M: 23.-24.3.76: TA 20/2-76 Nj: “Anskaffelse av automatutstyr - alternative strategier“. 
The lifespan of modern switches was expected to be very short, thus to be able write off the 
high costs, modern switches required large sales volumes. (Det må være klart at det norske 
markedet alene er for lite til å gi økonomisk grunnlag for utvikling og rasjonell produksjon av 
et komplett automatsystem av moderne type.)  
13 Palmberg 2002, Häikiö 2002, p. 68. 
14 Häikiö 2002, p. 59. 
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produce television sets for the world market; most notable of all was the establish-
ment of the state-owned oil company, Statoil, in 1972, which was to embark on 
huge technological and commercial endeavours. Yet, the reservations are not sur-
prising taking into account how difficult it was to export telecom equipment. It is 
worth mentioning, however, that Televerket rejected the possibility time and time 
again in the 1970s, when there was a technological window of opportunity.15 An-
other main reason was that it would require a close cooperation with STK and EB; 
Televerket did not think the subsidiaries, voluntarily and wholeheartedly, would 
engage in such a partnership with Televerket.16  
 
Jonsson’s main argument against Norwegian digital switches was that: “Televerket 
has few good experiences with maintenance and upgrading of special Norwegian 
types”.17 Thus, once again the formative character of STK's 8B and 11B is illus-
trated. Accordingly, Jonsson stressed that a supplier must be part of an international 
concern, and that the equipment used is a standard commodity, used in markets 
other than Norway. At the same time, he refused to invite other suppliers than STK 
and EB in a tender, since Televerket’s main problem was too many different sys-
tems in the network. Consequently, Jonsson could not conceive of a procurement 
regime without EB and/or STK. Still, changes were needed; his main message was 
that history had taught Televerket that it was “expensive to entrust the suppliers to 
hold the competence”.18 One thing was that STK, for instance, was not able to solve 
the problems with the 8B switch, another was that Televerket was vulnerable in 
contractual issues. It constantly suffered price increases, delays, and poor quality 
and uncompleted systems.  
 
The use of fines for delays had helped, and had compensated for the losses, but it 
was emphasised that Televerket needed to be much tougher in contractual rela-
tions.19 Televerket's problem was that it lacked competence to decide whether the 
surcharges on equipment were a result of inflation or the suppliers’ tampering with 
                                                          
15 Several others besides Knudtzon rejected the idea of Norwegian development and manu-
facturing of digital switches at the LPC-M of 11-13.3.75. One aide said it was “off target”; 
see also LPC-M: 23.-24.3.76: TA 20/2-76 Nj: “Anskaffelse av automatutstyr - alternative 
strategier“; and Dok LP: 13/80 for LPC-M 9.-11.9-80. 
16 LPC-M: 23.-24.3.76: TA 20/2-76 Nj: “Anskaffelse av automatutstyr - alternative strategier“. 
17 LPC-M: 23.-24.3.76: TA 20/2-76 Nj: “Anskaffelse av automatutstyr - alternative strategier“. 
(Televerket har da også mindre gode erfaringer med hensyn til systemvedlikehold og oppda-
tering av særnorske utgaver.) 
18 LPC-M: 23.-24.3.76: TA 20/2-76 Nj: “Anskaffelse av automatutstyr - alternative strategier“. 
(dyrt å overlate til leverandørene å sitte med kompetansen) 
19 LPC-M 7.-8.9.76.: Dok LP. 8/76: TA: “Televerkets situasjon og hovedproblemer i dag. 
Teknisk sektor”.  
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price calculations.20 Moreover, it needed increased knowledge to assess the causes 
for the delays, the poor quality and/or shortcomings, as the equipment suppliers 
often claimed it was Televerket's own fault.21 It was not enough to be at the suppli-
ers’ competence level, said Jonsson, Televerket had to be beyond this. Jonsson, and 
most of the LPC -delegates, had experience with the supply of electro-mechanical 
switches from STK and EB. In this regime, Televerket suffered from being in the 
supplier’s hands. The skills required for installing and repairing electro-mechanical 
switches, were craft skills involving tacit knowledge, which was difficult to codify 
and standardise. If a problem surfaced in the network, STK and EB would often fix 
it with some “home-made” solution.22 Televerket's dependence on the suppliers in 
this regime was very expensive.  
 
Thus, Jonsson’s anxiety was understandable for the 8B and KV, but the 1970s were 
a transitional phase in the relationship between Televerket and STK, as there was a 
dual regime. STK had the upper hand with the 8B, while Televerket had the same 
with the new SPC switches. Thus, what Jonsson had called for - tougher contracts 
and more competence from Televerket - was already on its way, with the installation 
of the Metaconta switches in Oslo. Based on its contact with BTM, international 
bodies, and in-house studies, Televerket's expertise in computerised switching went 
beyond that of STK. Alf Ivar Nilsen and Kjell Christensen led the installations on 
behalf of Televerket. They had spent considerable time at BTM, studying the 
Metaconta 10C, and reached an agreement with BTM to install it in Oslo in 1977. 
Nils Kåre Myklebust was responsible for the installation on behalf of STK; he says 
BTM pushed a half-finished product on Televerket. Another way of looking at it, 
and the one that BTM emphasises, was that Televerket and Norway was chosen as a 
lead market. The BTM aides participating in the installation characterise Televerket 
as one of the most professional and demanding PTOs in Europe in the late 1970s.23 
Jonsson and BTM's conflicting depictions of Televerket are both true, given the dual 
regime.  
 
Christensen and Nilsen worked closely with Alf Marhaug and Nils Maurtvedt from 
Oslo District in installing the first 10C in Oslo, a Medium Local switch at “Nord 3”. 
                                                          
20 LPC-M 7.-8.9.76.: Dok LP. 8/76: TA: “Televerkets situasjon og hovedproblemer i dag. 
Teknisk sektor”. 
21 NTM8, File: “N4 og C7 10CLL tilbud kontrakt m.m.”: TAP/72/Nj, comments to Personal 
letter from Thoresen to Øvregaard 07.09.73. 
22 Interview with Gunnar Tidemann, Knut Berg, and Jon Stenberg. 
23 Interview with Hugo Wuyts, Ludo Pignet, Toon Govers, and Rudy Scholliers. All four had 
leading positions in BTM's switching business, and worked with Metaconta and System 12 in 
Norway. 
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This was ordered in 1971, and should have been completed by 1974, but was de-
layed until 1976. After this, the four worked on installing the 10C Large Local at 
“Nord 4” and “Centrum 7”, and they set up very demanding specifications and 
tough contracts for STK and BTM. One important aspect was the centralised control 
system at Nord 3, so all Metaconta switches in Oslo could be controlled from one 
centre; this became an important feature in the later System 12 network. Moreover, 
Televerket wanted all the features of the SPC switches up and running, like auto-
matic re-direction, wake-up calls, and speed dialling.24 Along with meeting the 
many specifications in the network, this required intense programming and in-
creased memory on the Metaconta computer. STK's Myklebust thought Televerket's 
priorities were awkward, as why would someone expend resources on speed-
dialling and wake-up calls when Televerket had problems providing the dialling 
tone.25  
 
Bjørn Gladsø sanctioned these priorities; it was as much about learning and studying 
SPC switches, as it was about providing new services. Instead of focusing on the 
problems with the 8B, the TA wanted to become experts on the future generations 
of switches; preparing themselves for the digital revolution and meeting Jonsson’s 
quest to not be in the hands of the suppliers. BTM, on its side, was happy with 
Televerket's demands, reasoning that Oslo was a perfect place to test the Metaconta 
in practice. In this sense, and according to BTM, Televerket was a pioneer with the 
Metaconta 10C, as it had been with the 8B. The Large Local switch installed at 
“Centrum 7”, had the equivalent of 60,000 lines, and was the largest switch BTM 
had ever delivered.26 After this, in 1980-81, BTM/STK installed Metaconta switches 
in Bergen, Ålesund and Drammen. Televerket and BTM developed the switch fur-
ther during the actual installation, by trying out new solutions and modes of solving 
problems. Hence, this is a good example of learning by doing, and innovation 
through trial and error. 
 
STK was allowed to raise the price per line somewhat compared to its initial offer 
on the 10C in 1971.27 Still, it lost money on the projects, as it was not able to meet 
the deadlines and specifications, and had to pay a considerable amount of money in 
fines.28 Thoresen saw this as just another sign of the telecom department’s inability; 
                                                          
24 Interview with Nils Kåre Myklebust. 
25 Interview with Nils Kåre Myklebust. 
26 Interview with Kjell Christensen, and Carl-Edward Joys. 
27 NTM8, File: “N4 og C7 10CLL tilbud kontrakt m.m.”: Memo from Nils Maurtvedt MAU 
06.02.75”. 
28 NTM8, File: “N4 og C7 10CLL tilbud kontrakt m.m.”; and Interview with Nils Kåre Myk-
lebust and Carl-Edward Joys. 
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Myklebust, on the other hand, says Televerket squeezed STK with these contracts. 
He claimed it wanted to pay low prices, as for commodity products, but it did not 
want to pay for the customisation of the product.29 As a result, STK paid for the 
customisation. BTM was more than happy, having a professional partner to cooper-
ate with on its switch. The large cable revenues covered STK’s financial losses on 
the Metaconta installations.30 There was a human price to be paid for the squeezing 
as well, as Myklebust left STK in distress in 1980, returning home to Bergen. Chris-
tensen and Nilsen also left Oslo, as the work with the Metaconta had taken too much 
time, and their wives demanded to see more of them. So they moved back to their 
university town, to have more relaxing jobs with Televerket in Trondheim District. 
The work in the LPC, however, continued with little reference to the Metaconta 
projects in Oslo.  
 
* 
 
The largest project in the Long-term Planning Committee was: “Which automatic 
(switching) technique should Televerket aim for in the future?”31 In 1978, it con-
cluded that Televerket should install digital switches, and that this should com-
mence in 1984-85.32 Teledirektoratet endorsed the decision, and decided that 1982 
would be the first year of ordering digital switches for use in the network.33 In order 
to prepare this, to learn about the equipment suppliers’ systems, test prices and see 
how Televerket's employees coped with the new technology, Teledirektoratet de-
cided to set up a trial network in Porsgrunn, in 1979. STK and EB were asked to 
submit tenders for a digital switch. In addition, the TA and TF were asked to come 
up with a series of clarifications and reports on the issue.34 The reports dealt with 
many aspects: where and when to install switches; traffic planning, routing and 
traffic direction; questions related to digital services; consequences for Televerket's 
personnel; and not least, related to procurement, or the “supplier-situation”. 
 
In November 1978 Jonsson wrote a document for Televerket's Board of Directors, 
discussing different factors regarding Televerket's procurement of digital switches 
from STK or EB. One factor was that Televerket would be dependent on the old 
                                                          
29 Interview with Nils Kåre Myklebust. 
30 Interview with Nils Kåre Myklebust. 
31 LPC-M 3-4.9.73. (Hvilken automatteknikk skal Televerket ta sikte på i fremtiden?) 
32 LPC-M 15-16.3.77. An important item of advice from the group was that Televerket had to 
be assured that it was not left alone with a switching system, but should order a system only 
after it was in use by other PTOs. 
33 TBD 06.11.78. 
34 Minute from LPC-M 15-16.3.77. 
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switches from STK and EB for a long time after ordering digital switches.35 
Televerket was more reliant on STK, since it was the only company with system 
competence on the 8B and 11B, whereas EB's KV could be supplied and maintained 
by LME. Another problem with one supplier was to secure fair pricing. The main 
issue, however, was related to industrial politics. Jonsson assumed that it was unrea-
sonable that EB, after being chosen as a Cornerstone Company, could be excluded 
from supplying digital switches, which was a key technology in its sector. Thus, 
there were two solutions, EB as the sole supplier, or EB and STK - which would 
give two systems. Jonsson was crystal-clear, however, that we “must avoid two 
systems”.36 The reason was not the traditional one of problems with interfaces, i.e. 
interaction between ITT and LME’s equipment. It was due to economics, as there 
were sinking marginal costs with digital switches, and the problems related to keep-
ing Televerket's personnel up to date on two systems. 
 
Based on this, there was no room for a competitive tender; EB would have to be 
given the order. One could secure reasonable prices through inspections, which after 
all had proved more effective in reducing prices than the attempts to have tenders 
between STK and EB. The TA was sure that the AXE would meet Televerket's 
requirements, and an order from LME could contain a demand that EB was given a 
role in the future development and manufacturing of the AXE. Maybe the TA was 
inspired by the Australians’ procurement of the AXE in 1977. LME's Australian 
subsidiary had contributed significantly to the development of the AXE.37 It was 
backed by the “government in Canberra” that “insisted on a strong local technical 
capability as a condition for access to market”.38 We do not know whether Jonsson 
reasoned along these lines, or if it was just lip service to the Board of Directors. The 
TF, allegedly, wanted to use Televerket's procurement to secure Norwegian system 
development. This issue is hard to decide, however, since there is a blurred line 
between Norwegian development and Norwegian manufacturing. We do not know 
the TA’s stance in this issue at all times, but after a while, it developed a clear posi-
tion against demanding Norwegian system development, settling for Norwegian 
manufacturing.39 
                                                          
35 NTM5: TA/78/Nj.: “Innføring av digitale sentraler. Leverandørsituasjonen”, Memo from 
TA to TBD 15.11.78. 
36 NTM5: TA/78/Nj.: ”Innføring av digitale sentraler. Leverandørsituasjonen”, 15.11.78, (Vi 
må unngå to digitalsystemer.) 
37 Fridlund, 2000, p. 148. 
38 C. A. Bartlett and S. Ghoshal: “Tap your subsidiaries for global reach” in Harvard Busi-
ness Review, 1986 64(6), 87-94. 
39 Interview with Thor A. Halvorsen, who held leading positions in Televerket's Technical 
Department, most notably Station (switching) office. 1973-, Member of the INDIG-group. 
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Jonsson asked the board to contact the Ministry of Communication to clarify the 
industrial issues, and he recommended starting negotiations with EB. In this rela-
tion, it is important to note that the TA contained of several people who reflected the 
dual regimes that existed in the 1970s. Jonsson was brought up in the old electro-
mechanical regime, in which STK had proved its incompetence, and he thus saw EB 
as a natural choice for digital switches. On the other hand, Gladsø and Skinnes had 
experienced a fruitful relationship with BTM. Little came out of Jonsson’s docu-
ment; instead, Televerket prepared itself for setting up a trial digital network in 
Porsgrunn, where STK and EB were to hand in offers for a digital switch. EB was to 
offer LME's AXE, whereas STK would offer ITT's System 12. Before we follow the 
digitalisation process in Televerket further, we need to look into how the System 12 
came into being, which entails a closer look at ITT's situation in the 1970s.  
 
The System 12, ITT's last rope 
From the mid-1970s, ITT entered a crisis, in the sense that its previous business 
strategies, the supply of telecom equipment to foreign markets and conglomerations, 
ceased to furnish adequate returns. One explanation for this development is that the 
ownership advantages that had underpinned ITT's business strategies had either 
evaporated or no longer proved profitable. The poor macro-economic development, 
as well as the fact that «Geneenism» had become almost standard managerial proce-
dure in many firms, undermined ITT's conglomerate structure. As a result of ITT's 
weak financial development, the stock’s poor performance, and Geneen’s age, ITT 
had a change of leadership. After leading the company for 21 years, Geneen stepped 
down as CEO in 1977, and after a short interregnum, Rand V. Araskog became 
CEO and President in 1980.40 He started the process of divesting companies, and 
positioning the telecom business for a new era, and for the whole time had to fight 
off corporate raiders.  
 
We will return to ITT's general problems, i.e. its conglomerate structure and corpo-
rate raids, in the next chapter, for now we will concentrate on its telecom business. 
ITT's initial ownership advantages, as stated in Chapter 1, were based on the Ameri-
can superiority in telecom in general, and Western Electric’s technological capabil-
ity in particular. An additional ownership advantage was Sosthenes Behn’s personal 
qualifications, which allowed him to get access to foreign markets, most notably the 
French market with Western Electric’s Rotary switch in the 1920s. Behn and ITT's 
                                                          
40 Lyman Hamilton became CEO after Geneen, but had to step down after being outmanoeuvred 
by Geneen in a power struggle, which gave way for Araskog. 
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ability to perform a policy of national responsiveness, i.e. allowing its subsidiaries 
to operate with substantial national identity, had proved lucrative for the freestand-
ing company. These ownership advantages, however, were diluted by digitalisation 
and liberalisation.  
 
ITT had already struggled with increased R&D costs for the SPC switches, and this 
problem was much bigger with digital switches, where the R&D costs rocketed 
compared to the earlier switching generations. Most of the companies that devel-
oped digital switches, AT&T, LME, CIT-Alcatel Siemens and Nokia, did this in 
cooperation with their domestic governments, within the framework of national 
systems of innovation, with a secure home market, and last but not least, with sub-
stantial governmental funding of R&D. ITT did not benefit from any of these vital 
factors, and it lacked a domestic PTO to cooperate with. The other competitors en-
gaged in close cooperation with their domestic PTOs while developing digital 
switches, thus benefiting from the user-producer, or buyer-supplier, interaction. In 
the literature on national systems of innovations, this has been accentuated as a 
major source of innovation.41 The biggest concern were the high costs related to 
developing, designing and eventually manufacturing these switches. For ITT, which 
was burdened by a high debt, increasing interest rates and relatively poor cash flow 
from the mid-1970s, it was far from attractive to pour millions of dollars into uncer-
tain switching projects.42 The financial aspect rendered it compulsory to facilitate 
cooperation between the European subsidiaries, in order to share the R&D costs. 
 
The development of international standards in transmission, signalling and on tech-
nological interfaces facilitated international communication, but it also laid the 
foundation for increased competition between suppliers of telecom equipment. 
Hence, the process of digitalisation and liberalisation were closely intertwined. This 
standardisation loosened the oligopolic grip that the telecom industry had held on 
the national equipment markets, namely the difficulties of technological interfaces. 
The local differentiation had been one of the main sources of riches for ITT, and for 
LME for that matter. This dried up when telecom equipment went from being a 
local to a global product. Hence, lacking a mother company in telecom, ITT had to 
depend on cooperation between the European subsidiaries to manufacture global 
                                                          
41 Edquist et al. (ed.) 2000 - Public Technology Procurement and Innovation - analyses such 
relationships and projects, and the development of LME’s AXE, Nokia’s DX 200 and the 
French E10 is analysed in this perspective. 
42 ITT had a “debt equity ratio of 40:60 and interest payments of $686m in 1980, which was 
68% of ITT's net income”. “The Financial Times has been looking at the change in manage-
ment styles at ITT since Mr Rand Araskog succeeded Mr Harold Geneen. . . . “ Financial 
Times 05.01.82, Araskog 1989, p. 6. 
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products. Even if it succeeded in this, ITT would suffer from lack of a coordinating 
head office, and the lack of public funding of R&D from a supportive home nation.  
 
Another vital consequence of the digital switches was that the need for manual la-
bour was reduced substantially compared to the electro-mechanical switches. Thus, 
the telecom industry had more difficulty using employment as a bargaining card in 
the negotiated environment. Liberalisation, i.e. the increased use of tenders for the 
procurement of telecom equipment, implied lower margins and reduced market 
shares for ITT. The transition to digital technology in switching was a paradigmatic 
shift, and was, thus, a window of opportunity for new companies, mainly the «na-
tional champions», encouraged by their governments, to enter the telecom industry. 
The most notable example was CIT-Alcatel with its E10 switch in the early 1970s, 
Nokia with its DX 200 digital switch, and the Canadian offspring of the Bell Sys-
tem, Northern Telecom (later Nortel) with its DMS 100, both in the late 1970s. 
Thus, on the one hand, technological change encouraged some PTOs to act as keen 
industry providers, taking pains to foster a national telecom industry, at the expense 
of ITT. On the other hand, liberalisation also paved the way for those PTOs that 
took pride in being better service providers, by being very demanding customers. 
Although the liberalisation process seriously threatened ITT's telecom business, it 
also held possibilities, in as much as the hegemony of AT&T and Western Electric 
in the US was challenged. 
 
When ITT bought International Western Electric Company from AT&T in 1925, 
there was a tacit understanding that ITT would stay out of the US market, and 
AT&T out of the overseas market. Geneen did try to enter the US equipment market 
several times. He attempted to buy small operating companies to get a foothold in 
the equipment business, but was allegedly blocked by the other suppliers, including 
AT&T.43 A former ITT aide even claims that this caused Geneen’s conglomeration 
strategy.44 In 1974, however, the dominant position of AT&T and Western Electric 
in the US was challenged by the Anti-trust division of the US Justice Department, 
which opened up an investigation of AT&T, and in particular its relationship with 
Western Electric. The case was not settled for some years, but it seemed evident that 
ITT finally would get a chance to enter the US market for telecom equipment. To do 
this, it had to adapt its telecom equipment to the US network, which operated with 
different standards than the European countries. Thus, Northern Telecom from Can-
                                                          
43 Schoenberg 1985, p. 136. 
44 “I don’t think that the concept of a conglomerate was present when Harold first took over 
the company,” says John Jobb. “I think it evolved after it became obvious that it wasn’t prac-
tical to build a system that could fight AT and T. ITT's domestic telecommunications never 
got off the ground, and it hasn’t to this day.” Schoenberg, 1985, p. 137. 
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ada was better positioned than ITT to get a piece of the market. Most importantly, 
however, ITT needed a digital switch. 
 
ITT lagged behind its competitors in developing a digital system, and the situation 
was perceived as critical in the latter half of the 1970s. ITT's old and new competi-
tors were well on the way with digital projects: LME with the AXE, Siemens with 
its EWSD, Philips with the PRX, the British with their System X, the already men-
tioned new entrants, CIT-Alcatel and Nokia, and the North Americans, Northern 
Telecom with the DMS 100 and AT&T with the 5ESS. BTM was busy continuing 
the development and marketing of the Metaconta switch, and thought the SPC 
switches would hold sway for a while. Thus, Doz is right in saying that ITT was 
“caught off guard by the success of digital switching”.45 A major warning for ITT 
was when LME's AXE beat the Metaconta for an Australian tender in 1977, the 
reason being that the Australian PTO wanted digital local switches.46 ITT had sev-
eral switching projects in the 1970s, all of which were based on the company’s 
long-established competence in PCM and Time-Division switching.47 It resulted in 
the development of three different PCM switches throughout the 1970s; one was 
based on the Metaconta architecture, but neither materialised as a public exchange.48 
Hence, despite their notable competence, ITT's European subsidiaries were not able 
to come up with a concept for a digital switch. Instead it came from the United 
States, from Bell Labs.  
 
The genesis of the System 12 switch is difficult to uncover, as there is no written 
record of its history before the 1980s. Chapuis and Joel resort to telling a fairytale:  
 
                                                          
45 Doz 1987, p. 103-104. 
46 Interview with Toon Govers, Fridlund 2000, p. 162. 
47 ITT was also a pioneer within time-division switching, as Maurice Deloraine gave birth to 
this idea during World War II. Several ITT subsidiaries, mainly the French LMT, patented on 
time-division multiplexing (TDM) before PCM was established, thus multiplexing analogue 
signals. It was the PAM-pulses (Pulse Amplitude Modulation) that were multiplexed. PAM-
pulses are the result of sampling of the human voice to higher frequencies, but are still ana-
logue signals, i.e. electrical pulses. Thus, ITT-Europe was in pole position with both PCM 
and TDM in the early 1970s, at the dawn of digitalisation. Chapuis and Joel 1990, p. 307. 
48 Chapuis and Joel 1990, p. 315. 
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“Once upon a time there was a little prince (System 12), the youngest 
child of high-born, rich and powerful family. His grandparents and par-
ents had won great renown and their names - Rotary, Pentaconta and 
Metaconta - had spread to the four corners of the earth.* (…) (H)is family 
had a taste for travel; so, no sooner had his mother given birth to him but 
he was trundled back and forth across the deep Atlantic”.49  
 
The initial concept was developed at Bell Labs in Illinois in 1976.50 The manage-
ment at Bell Labs did not seem to take any interest in the path-breaking idea, which 
was to create a fully distributed digital switch, meaning that it was not to depend on 
one centralised computer. Due to this lack of interest, several engineers left for ITT, 
and formed the nucleus of a switching team at ITT's newly formed laboratory in 
Shelton, Connecticut, named the ITT Advanced Technology Centre. As the other 
projects in ITT's European subsidiaries failed to materialise, the New York head-
quarters decided to back the Shelton project, which it called the Network 2000.51 A 
central vision was that future networks would have to “integrate voice and non-
voice services”.52 
 
The initial ambitions of the defectors from Bell Labs and ITT's headquarters were to 
penetrate the US market with the switch. The anti-trust process that started in 1974, 
against AT&T and its relationship with Western Electric, did not come to an end 
before 1983, but ITT took it for granted that the US market for telecom equipment 
would be liberalised. An application for a US patent was filed in March 1978, and 
was granted in 1980.53 The System 12 became “my baby”, Araskog recalls. Having 
seen how LME attained market shares with the AXE, he stressed they “had to leap-
frog their technology: Developing a better digital switchboard became a $1 billion 
priority”.54  
 
                                                          
* Chapuis and Joel do not mention the grand uncle - the 8B -who resided in the “fifth” corner 
of the world.  
49 Chapuis and Joel 1990, p. 415. 
50 Chapuis and Joel 1990, p. 415 Jeffrey N. Denenberg’s was one of the patents holders for 
the System 12, and he left Bell Labs in Naperville, Illinois in 1976, to start in ITT. Denen-
berg’s CV: http://doctord.dyndns.org:8000/Resume.html. 
51 ITT's CEO, Lyman Hamilton, in a true ITT fashion, acquired two US companies, Qume and 
Courier in 1978, “because these companies provided needed products and expertise to aug-
ment ITT’s System 12”, Sobel 1982, p. 367. 
52 ITT: Electrical Communication, Vol. 56 No 2/3 1981 (The Technical Journal of ITT), p. 112. 
53 The System 12 patent was granted 06.05.80: http://www.uspto.gov/, United States Patent: 
4,201,889, (also: http://www.ffldusoe.edu/Faculty/Denenberg/Patents/4201889details.htm). 
54 Araskog 1989, p. 175. 
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Representatives from the European subsidiaries came to Shelton, either to assist the 
research team, or to become familiarised with the project, so they could carry out 
preparatory marketing in Europe. Knut Berg from STK was in Shelton in 1979 to 
learn about the project.55 Market access in the US was the motivating force for the 
project until 1980. Then Araskog decided to move the further development to ITT-
Europe. The ambition to fight Western Electric in the US was still alive, but ITT 
reasoned that it was wiser to develop a European version first.56 ITT-Europe set up 
the International Telecom Center (ITC) in Brussels, to coordinate the European 
efforts. The other subsidiaries had different responsibilities, and the German, Italian 
and Spanish units had decisive influence in the early years. Still, BTM was, even 
though it was not formalised, the strategic leader of ITT-Europe’s System 12 pro-
ject.57 
 
The System 12 was not based on any of ITT's former switches, originating in Bell 
Labs; it was no descendant of the Rotary, Pentaconta or Metaconta.58 The switch 
was generated from outside ITT, and outside Europe, so there were no evolutionary 
aspects - neither the technology, nor the concepts, architecture nor the knowledge 
base had any roots in ITT. In leading the other European ITT units, BTM had noth-
ing to build on, or to put it another way: any equipment supplier would be as quali-
fied to do the job. The real «fairy tale» with the System 12, is how it came out of the 
blue to save ITT's telecom business. This thesis shows that the history of the tele-
com industry, perhaps more than any other history, is formed by path dependencies 
or technological trajectories, and the technical history is full of evolutionary aspects. 
In this evolutionary setting, at the dawn of digitalisation and liberalisation, when the 
new national R&D policies from the 1960s started to bear fruit, ITT seemed doomed 
in lacking a home market and a national system of innovation to operate in. In this 
setting, ITT was given a last rope to survive in the telecom business, when the Sys-
tem 12 appeared as a rare example of a science push from Bell Labs. But ITT was 
far from saved, as the System 12 was a long way from having proven itself in any 
network. 
 
ITT-Europe and BTM had a huge job before them, in further developing and prepar-
ing the System 12 for the market. ITT acknowledged that the System 12 did not 
benefit from the “evolutionary approach (that) requires less development invest-
                                                          
55 Interview with Knut Berg. 
56 The reason was the lack of experienced and qualified telecom engineers, and the need for trial 
and testing capability that were developed in the European subsidiaries. Moreover, ITT wanted 
the project to be located nearer to familiar markets. 
57 Interview with Toon Govers. 
58 ITT 1981, p. 114-115. 
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ment” as ITT's former switches had done.59 Moreover, it was regarded “as an exces-
sively futuristic system”.60 Everybody agreed that the theoretical concepts were 
exceptional, and that in theory it encapsulated five «Fs»: (1) a fully digital system, 
(2) a fully distributed system, (3) a fully safe system, (4) a future safe system, and 
(5) a full range system.61 Moreover, the System 12 was the first public telephone 
switch to accommodate non-voice transmission, and thus the Integrated Digital 
Service Network (ISDN).62 A common saying, however, was: “if it works it’s bril-
liant, but it will never work”63  
 
In addition to being futuristic in its use of the latest technology, it had a software-
based architecture, which made it very laborious to adjust to the many facilities and 
features that each telecom network possessed before digitalisation was completed. It 
was impossible to get this work going in a realistic manner, without getting a first 
order from a telephone operator. To experiment with a trial network, and to get the 
software working properly in a real, and messy, network, were very different things. 
Consequently, the biggest and most important challenge for ITT and BTM was to 
find a first customer for the switch. One minor step in this direction, or perhaps not 
so minor, was the Norwegian Porsgrunn project. 
 
One supplier or two? 
The evaluation report on the Porsgrunn project, which was presented in August 
1980, endorsed Jonsson’s conclusions from 1978, in as much as it preferred LME's 
AXE to ITT's System 12. It stated, however, that it was difficult to compare the two, 
since they were at different stages of development. The AXE had proven itself in 
service, while the System 12 was still at the developmental phase.64 Despite this, if 
one took the potential and assured features into account, the System 12 was best on 
all points. The concept and technological status was more modern than the AXE, 
but it was on open question whether ITT would manage to realise its intentions. 
Thus, a key result of the Porsgrunn project was that the TA developed an inclination 
for the System 12. Even if the TA did not dare to recommend the System 12, it 
stressed that the system had such a positive impact, that it did not want to rule it out 
                                                          
59 ITT 1981, p. 114-115. 
60 Chapuis and Joel 1990, p. 415. 
61 Interview with Toon Govers, Chapuis and Joel 1990, p. 419. 
62 Based on my interviews, it was unclear from what time the System 12 incorporated ISDN. 
Based on the written sources, however, its evident that the System 12 was to allow non-voice 
services from the outset, and that the ISDN was used as a term when it became normal. ITT 
1981, p. 112. 
63 Interview with Hugo Wuyts. 
64 NTM3: TA 15/8-80 Nj.: “Digital prøvesentral til Porsgrunn”, memo to TBD 22.08.80. 
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for future use, and suggested postponing the trial -project, as “this point of time is 
hardly the best for choosing our future digital DMS system”.65 The TA suggested 
extending Porsgrunn’s network with analogue equipment, and letting Trondheim 
and Økern in Oslo be the location for the first digital switches in Norway. The TF 
wanted to go ahead with the AXE, but the TA prevailed within Televerket. Thus, in 
a sense, Porsgrunn saved STK and ITT, since the TA wanted to install “AXE 
equipment” before the Porsgrunn project in 1978, but to postpone the installation 
after Porsgrunn.  
 
Another influential memo was produced the same month; this examined the effect of 
digitalisation on employment at STK and EB. The companies stated that the num-
bers of employees would be reduced substantially, while the engineering activities 
would increase.66 STK had already faced these problems, as the 11B and Metaconta 
were less labour-intensive than the 8B. Both companies reckoned that by 1990, the 
workforce would be reduced to one third of the level in 1980.67 Hence, the conse-
quences would be radical for both companies, regardless of which company that 
became the sole supplier.68 At the same time, however, the companies claimed that 
the prices on digital switches were less volume-dependent than the older switches, 
provided that the orders were over a certain limit. The engineering costs were inde-
pendent of scale, but the prices on the much-used electronic components, such as 
circuit boards, were stable. Both STK and EB claimed that the discount their mother 
companies were able to achieve on these components was not dependent on scale. 
This meant that the economy of scale achieved on the engineering costs was minor 
compared to the cost of the electronic components, after reaching a certain number 
of lines, stated to be 40,000 per year.69  
 
It seems strange that this information was produced so suddenly, and Televerket 
was caught by surprise. The cost of digital switches was regarded as extremely vol-
ume-sensitive until 1980, but all of sudden; it was less volume-sensitive than older 
switches. The companies themselves provided the calculations, thus it is tempting to 
ask if they collaborated to preserve the market situation. This makes sense on STK's 
                                                          
65 NTM3: TA 15/8-80 Nj.: “Digital prøvesentral til Porsgrunn”, (er at tidspunktet neppe er det 
beste for valg av vårt fremtidige digitale DMS-system.) 
66 NTM3: EB to Teledirektoratet 26/6-80: ”Vurdering av markedsandeler”; STK til Teledi-
rektoratet 7/8-80: “Vurdering av ITT 12240 produksjonsvolum ved STK”. 
67 These figures came about as result of extrapolating known factors, i.e. without taking tech-
nological change into account, which would have made “electronic production ever less 
labour-intensive”. (elektronikkproduksjon blir stadig mindre arbeidskrevende). NTM3: TA 
15/8-80 Nj.: “ Innføring av DMS-sentraler, Eneleverandør eller markedsdeling”. 
68 NTM3: TA 15/8-80 Nj.: “ Innføring av DMS-sentraler, Eneleverandør eller markedsdeling”. 
69 NTM3: TA 15/8-80 Nj.: “ Innføring av DMS-sentraler, Eneleverandør eller markedsdeling”. 
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part, since it had every reason to fear a market with one sole supplier, but not EB's, 
which was confident it would be chosen as the supplier anyway. One could specu-
late further, that perhaps the companies had set the prices on components too high, 
to maintain their traditional margins towards Televerket. There is no evidence of 
such collaboration on price, but Televerket was aware that STK and EB did not 
have Televerket's interest first in mind while suggesting continuing with two suppli-
ers.70 Still, the information was regarded as a blessing for Televerket. Based on the 
industrial considerations, Øvregard expressed relief over the fact that it was eco-
nomically justifiable to continue with two suppliers.71 In addition to Televerket's 
stakeholder responsibilities, there was the aforementioned aspect that Televerket 
would be reliant on STK's supply of the 8B and 11B for years to come. 
 
Deducing from both reports, Televerket decided to let STK install a System 12 
switch at Økern, and EB an AXE switch in Trondheim.72 Kjell Holler, Chairman of 
Televerket's Board and Director General from 1980, endorsed the conclusions in 
October 1980, and was content to continue with the traditional sharing of the mar-
ket. However, Finn Lied, the vice-chairman, was hesitant.73 He feared that it would 
be too expensive for Televerket to attain sufficient competence on two digital sys-
tems. Moreover, he thought the traditional geographical split was unsustainable, and 
stressed that there was a ‘now or never’ chance to alter the relationship with the 
suppliers.74 He wanted to exploit the situation to make STK and EB cooperate 
closely. Lied was a close ally of Jens Chr. Hauge, and had shared his vision for 
creating strong units in Norwegian high-tech industries. After the bankruptcy of 
Tandberg in 1978, however, Lied fronted a reorientation of the Labour Party’s in-
dustrial policy. He led a public committee in 1979, which engaged in self-criticism 
over the state activism in industrial policy, not least the Cornerstone plan, and paved 
the way for a more market-oriented industrial policy.75 
 
Nevertheless, Lied wanted to use Televerket procurement power to restructure the 
Norwegian telecom industry. Around the turn of the year 1980/81 a series of meet-
ings was held with STK and EB, in which Televerket asked them to come up with 
scenarios for their future business and employment, based on different market 
                                                          
70 NTM5: EB to Egil Abrahamsen, Chairman of Televerket's Board, 09.04.81; STK to Abra-
hamsen 09.04.81.; Abrahamsen to Televerket's Vice-Chairman Finn Lied 14.04.81. 
71 LPC-M 9-11.9.80. 
72 TBD 16.10.80. 
73 TBD 16.10.80. 
74 NTM5: EB's minute from meeting with Televerket and STK 22.01.81. 
75 Conf. NOU 1979:35 ”Strukturproblemer og vekstmuligheter i norsk industri”; Sogner 
2002, p. 70; Espeli 1992, p. 191. 
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shares for digital switches. Also, they were asked to form a joint group to work out 
alternatives for the supply of digital switches, and a possible merger of the compa-
nies. Lied demanded that the suppliers loosen the ties to their mother companies to 
be able to export.76 
 
Televerket learnt two significant things through this process. First, that regardless of 
what alternative it chose for supply of digital switches, hundreds of jobs would be 
lost in the telecom industry anyway.77 Second, in this particular issue, both STK and 
EB were guided purely by their own, and their mother companies’ interests, not by 
those of Televerket or the future of the Norwegian telecom industry.78 The compa-
nies had, for instance, not considered a merger, or producing the AXE and/or the 
System 12 on license.79 EB did not fear a single-supplier situation, and STK was 
confident that Televerket would continue with two suppliers.80 The impression of 
the companies was not improved when both turned around shortly after, using econ-
omy of scale as argument for getting a larger share of the market, only a few months 
after they had stated that the economy of scale was negligible.81 Moreover, a key 
argument for continued market sharing was that maintenance of the old switches 
was difficult for the supplier that lost out. STK and EB used this for what it was 
worth and said it was impossible for Televerket do this work itself and that BTM 
and LME respectively would not be able to do it. This was one of the initial reasons 
for the Lillehammer agreement, one of the fingers of the industry’s oligopolic grip. 
STK and EB refused to loosen it. 
 
There was no surprise that STK and EB pursued their own interest, and that of ITT 
and LME. In reality, however, by simply putting forward what served their own 
interest, they declined Televerket's invitation to participate in the formation of the 
future of Norwegian telecom industry. By May 1981, after these deliberations with 
STK and EB, Televerket's Board of Directors had changed its mind on the supply 
question, and was strongly in favour of ordering only one system of digital 
                                                          
76 NTM5: EB's minute from meeting with Televerket and STK 22.01.81. 
77 NTM5: EB's Christian Westring to Teledirektoratet 05.01.81 and Thoresen to Abrahamsen 
08.01.81. 
78 NTM5: Abrahamsen to Lied 14.04.81. 
79 NTM5: TA 23.04.81 Bld - “Avd. T’s kommentarer til EB's og STK's utredning …”. 
80 “We expect that ITT 1240 will be selected for use in the Norwegian network together with 
LME's AXE system. NTA (Televerket) wants to standardize as much as possible and their 
plans with using both systems will entail a district or area split per system.” STK-TC: File 
TEL 23 System 12 - tilbud Porsgrunn; Memo: Pricing strategy for follow-on business of 
System 12 in Norway, STK 15.01.80. 
81 NTM5: EB's Christian Westring to Teledirektoratet 05.01.81 and Thoresen to Abrahamsen 
08.01.81. 
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switches.82 It was the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of Board of Directors, Egil 
Abrahamsen and Lied, who had meetings with STK and EB; these two were instru-
mental in deciding on a single supplier.83 The Board recognised the problem of the 
maintenance and upgrading of the old switches, but argued that the benefits of one 
system outweighed this. First and foremost, Televerket lacked the personnel to op-
erate two systems. After another round of reports and evaluations, Televerket's 
Board of Directors concluded in August 1981, that it “will be most beneficial for 
Televerket to opt for one system family”.84  
 
The TA vs. the TF 
One important lesson the TA learnt during the Porsgrunn project, according to 
Skinnes, was that the evaluation group needed to be united, and not comprised of 
people from different units within Televerket.85 An underlying element in Skinnes’s 
point was the mounting conflict between the TA and TF. There had been substantial 
differences between these two departments before; the TA felt that the TF did not 
assist it with its daily problems, for instance with the 8B in Oslo. This stemmed 
from their different responsibilities within Televerket, the TA's was to maintain and 
modernise the incumbent network, while the TF's role was to prepare Televerket for 
the digital revolution. The divergence is apparent in the documents from the LPC 
meetings. The TA accentuated how digital switches could be integrated into the 
existing network, i.e. how it would and could interact with electro-mechanical and 
analogue equipment. The TA stressed that a successful digitalisation process rested 
on the transitional phase, where the network consisted of both analogue and digital 
switches. This period would last for several years, thus, it was crucial that 
Televerket solved this in a satisfactory manner.  
 
The TF, however, focused on the new services a future digital network could pro-
vide, thus the existing network played only a minor role in shaping its visions of a 
future network.86 Thus, for the TF, prognoses and scenarios of service and technol-
ogy had a stronger bearing on its planning than the incumbent network did. After 
Televerket decided to install digital switches in 1978, these differences became 
                                                          
82 NTM5: Internal note from Director General Kjell Holler to Technical Director Nils Jonsson 
04.05.81. 
83 Abrahamsen to Televerket's Vice-Chairman Finn Lied 14.04.81. 
84 NTM5: Dok 130/81 “Innføring av digitale DMS-sentraler” for TBD 17.08.81, (vil være 
mest fordelaktig for Televerket å satse på en systemfamilie). 
85 NTM5: TAP 22/10-80/Skin: “Utkast til videre arbeid med Innføring av digitale DMS-
telefonsentraler”. 
86 This is particularly clear in “Dok. LP 6/74: “Under lag for presentasjon av «Skisse for 
telenettet 1985 og 1995»“, from LPC-M 4-5.3.74. 
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crystallised, since the TA and TF were rivals over who should dominate the process. 
The TF claimed that the TA was caught in the old world of telephony,87 whereas the 
TA thought the research institute was too theoretical in its approach, and stressed 
that if the future network did not provide decent telephony, nobody would care if 
the digital services where good. The conflict between the TA and TF was classic, 
first in that conflicts between operational departments and R&D departments are not 
uncommon in companies, second in that it reflected the dual motivations for digi-
talisation. One motive was to install a new telephony network that was more eco-
nomical and easier to operate; the other motive was to provide new services, such as 
data communication.88  
 
The main difference in 1978 was that the TF wanted to start the process earlier than 
the TA, and that it wanted a more rapid digitalisation process.89 An important reason 
was that the TF was anxious to offer digital services to business customers as soon 
as possible, to obstruct other potential service providers. An important theme in the 
TF's investigations was whether there should be two layers in the network, including 
a “first class” layer for users of digital services.90 The TF's main project was about 
an overlayered digital network, ODIN.91 For the TF it was crucial to get the ODIN 
project on the move, and it called for prompt installation of digital switches. The 
TA, on the other hand was apprehensive of rushing the process, wanting sufficient 
time to prepare the installation process, claiming that Televerket needed to have a 
competent staff for the project. TA did not accept that digital services were the only 
motive for digitalisation; claiming they were “only one of various benefits that digi-
tal technology provides.”92 What is more, the Porsgrunn project had convinced the 
TA that the digital switches would be improved substantially in the following years, 
and that this called for patience.93 This was, as we recall, in opposition to the TF, 
which wanted to install AXE switches in Porsgrunn. 
 
                                                          
87 Halvor Bothner-By to Lars Thue, Thue 2006. All the interviews with the members of the 
INDIG confirm this, that the TF claimed the TA was outdated. 
88 Ashoka Mody and Ron Sherman: “Leapfrogging in Switching Systems” 1990. 
89 LPC-M 19-20.09.78. 
90 LPC-M 23-24.03.76. 
91 LPC-M 19-20.09.78 Dok LP.11/78: “Utredningsforutsetninger om innføring av digitale au-
tomatsentraler. Synspunkter fra Utviklingsavdelingen.” ODIN was a Norwegian abbreviation: 
“Overlagret digitalt nett.” 
92 RA-14: A/Kro 19-10-78: “Utredningsforutsetninger om innføring av digitale automatsent-
raler” in (bare én av flere fordeler digital teknologi gir.) 
93 NTM3: TA 15/8-80 Nj.: “Digital prøvesentral til Porsgrunn”. 
Chapter 6 Digitalisation and liberalisation 
 228
The conflict was escalating in 1981, when the TA claimed that the TF's assistance 
did not take the digitalisation process any further.94 Another TA document asserted 
that Televerket had been too caught up in theoretical issues, which was a clear criti-
cism of the TF and its influence.95 Knudtzon on his side was offended because he 
felt that he and the TF were sidelined in the process.96 He left an impression that he 
wanted to take over the TA, because it was not competent.97 In 1982, this had turned 
into an open conflict; the TF distributed a document highly critical of the TA's 
work, and the TA responded by accusing the TF of discrediting the whole project.98 
The TA won the internal battle, and had the confidence of the Director General and 
the Board. The group for the introduction of digital switches (INDIG*) was set up in 
1982, and was headed by Gladsø from TA, and so the process was managed accord-
ing to his and the TA's principles. Despite the conflict between the TA and TF, it is 
pertinent to mention that several people from the TF made valuable contributions to 
INDIG's work, particularly with programming, new services and quality control.99 
 
An important reason for organising it as a project was to avoid Televerket's bureau-
cratic decision making, and to have flexible working hours and salaries.100 The 
group contained 15 young engineers, who had been recruited from NTH in the 
1970s. These had little experience with the old electro-mechanical procurement 
regime, in which STK and EB had the upper hand. On the other hand, most of them 
had been tutored by Skinnes, and had been told that what they had learnt at NTH 
about a seamless or optimal network had few practical implications in the real 
world. Two influential members in the group were Christensen and Nilsen. It was 
probably no surprise that they were bored while working at Trondheim District.101 
They thus started their own preparatory project, working out specifications on sig-
nalling and special services that would be useful in a tender for digital switches. In 
this work they were joined by Ingar Hansen, who became an influential member of 
INDIG. In late 1981, they had finished a preliminary specification for a tender for 
STK and EB.102  
                                                          
94 NTM5: TA 20/5-81 Nj. “Innføring av digitale sentraler”. 
95 NTM5: TAP/24.6-81/Arh: “Strategi for innføring av digitale sentraler i Norske telenettet“. 
96 NTM5: Knudtzon to Øvregaard 30.07.81 “Styredokument om digitalisering av telefonnettet” 
97 Interview with Thor A. Halvorsen. 
98 NTM3: Minute from meeting by Gladsø 04.05.82: “Møte mellom representanter fra TF, 
TA, ØRK vedrørende forespørsel og kravspesifikasjoner for digitale sentraler.” 
* Norwegian abbreviation for INnføring av DIGitale sentraler. 
99 Interview with Thor A. Halvorsen. 
100 Interview with Bjørn Gladsø. 
101 Interview with Kjell Christensen. 
102 Interview with Ingar Hansen, who had leading positions in Televerket's Technical De-
partment, most notably Station (switching) office. 1973-, Member of the INDIG-group. 
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If the TF lost influence within Televerket, it gained it outside; Knudtzon became a 
dominant member in a National Tele-commission that was established in 1981. He 
insisted that he did not represent Televerket in the commission, but only himself. 
Making this point several times, he indicated that he shared the general impression 
of Televerket. This made him controversial within Televerket; several thought it 
disloyal to contribute to its bad image. The general sentiment was that Televerket 
was old-fashioned and bureaucratic. The telephone queues and the many problems 
with the network haunted Televerket, and gave it a terrible image.103 Its employees 
were reluctant to reveal their occupation in social life, due to embarrassment and 
fear of harassment.104 Christopher Sjuve cites an illuminating story from the first 
meeting in the Tele-commission. One of the members from Televerket fell off his 
bike on the way to the meeting, and looked bloody and beaten. When he arrived, he 
said: “You all understand where I come from!” The suggestion was that he had been 
beaten up by angry subscribers.105 Thus, in the 1970s, like in the 1960s, Televerket 
was an important whipping boy for the critics of the Labour government.  
 
Liberalisation 
After the election in 1981, the non-socialist parties formed a majority in the Parlia-
ment, and the Conservative Party, Høyre, formed a new cabinet. This was a part of 
the conservative and liberal wind that swept over the western hemisphere in the 
early 1980s; apart from other things, it had strong effects on the telecom sector. The 
break up of AT&T and the privatisation of British Telecom in 1984 are depicted as 
integrated elements of Reaganism and Thatcherism. In Norway it was called the 
“Right-wave”. Televerket's problems and inefficiency became a token of the old-
fashioned and bureaucratic Labour-state.106  
 
The Labour government had tried to meet this criticism by publishing Televerket's 
internal long-term plan as a Norwegian Public Report (NOU*) in 1980, to show that 
Televerket was hands on with the digital revolution.107 But the non-socialist parties, 
and other groups, were not content with this, and made the Labour government 
                                                          
103 Interview with Thor A. Halvorsen. 
104 Interview with Jens Gjerdsjø. 
105 Sjuve 2002, p 80. (Dere skjønner vel alle hvor jeg kommer fra!). 
106 In the campaign for the parliamentary elections in 2005, the Conservatives tried to exploit 
the historical bad image of the name Televerket, warning that the center-left coalition would 
take Norway back to “Televerket-times”. Morgenbladet 07.04.05. 
* Norwegian abbreviation for Norsk Offentlig Utredning. 
107 NOU 1980:10A Langtidsplan for Televerket. 
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establish a national Tele-commission. The commission’s brief was to examine the 
main aspects of Televerket's business in the short - and long-term perspective.108  
 
Televerket felt it as a discredit that somebody else was to consider its future, not 
least because there was a general impression that the commission was to instruct 
Televerket. Moreover, there were rumours that the new Conservative government 
wanted to engage a consultant to administer the digitalisation process.109 The con-
flict was bitter, and Holler and Ole Petter Håkonsen, the new technical director 
since 1982, had a hard time convincing the new Minister of Communication, Inger 
Koppernæs, that Televerket and INDIG were on the right track.  
 
Even today, there is a widespread view that Televerket was not able to handle the 
digitalisation process, and that the Tele-commission was instrumental. As the Minis-
ter of Communication, Torild Skogsholm, stated in 2002: “It may sound weird to-
day, but the Tele-commission actually found it pertinent to recommend (to 
Televerket) a strategy for replacing outdated equipment and implement new tech-
nology, as if that were not a matter of course.”110 Skogsholm and others have tried 
to create a picture of how Høyre and the Tele-commission modernised 
Televerket.111 The present analysis, together with Lars Thue’s volume on 
Televerket's history, shows that such claims have little empirical evidence.112 The 
modernisation of Televerket started long before 1981, and the digitalisation process 
began long before the Tele-commission was thought of.  
 
Still, the commission played an important role in educating the public and the politi-
cians about digital technology, and convincing them of the need to invest public 
resources in it. Televerket's poor public standing made the commission more able to 
set telecom issues on the political agenda.113 There were three reasons for investing 
heavily in digital switches: first, to get more economical equipment; second, smaller 
maintenance and upgrading costs; and third, new digital services.114 The commis-
sion did not put forward bold visions for an information society. These were not 
                                                          
108 NOU 1982:2 Teleutvalgets utredning I; also confer St. meld. 11. 1982-83 “Om Telever-
kets situasjon og oppgaver I 80-årene”. 
109 Interview with Thor A. Halvorsen. 
110 Torild Skogsholm’s talk at Norsk TeleForum, Lillehammer, 24. April 2002 
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2002. 
112 Thue 2006. 
113 Sjuve 2002, p 79-80. 
114 Sjuve 2002, p 81. 
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necessary in order to get the support and funding from the politicians, according to 
Sjuve, it was enough to say that the “digital switches were cheaper and more effec-
tive solutions to acute problems”.115 Still, an important point in the commission’s 
report, as well as in Televerket's “Long-term Plan”, was the significance of commu-
nication and telecom for business and industry, something the Labour government 
in the post-war period had not appreciated. Moreover, even if the Tele-commission 
had a modest impact on Televerket's digitalisation strategy, it had a significant say 
in the procurement question. 
 
After having decided to order only one system of digital switches, Televerket wanted 
to invite STK and EB to a closed tender. Inviting other foreign suppliers would have 
entailed a lengthy and costly procurement process, in as much as Televerket was 
already acquainted with the AXE and System 12. Furthermore, if a foreign company 
won, Televerket would have to wait for it to set up manufacturing facilities in Nor-
way, and the problems with maintaining old switches would escalate.116 A final 
argument was that a new foreign supplier would be troublesome in terms of security 
reasons.117 Televerket recognised, however, that several actors favoured an open 
tender. There was, in accordance with the «Right wave», a general inclination to-
wards liberalisation, and thus an open tender. Inger Koppernæs asked, despite 
Televerket’s reluctance, for a serious consideration of an open tender.118 Televerket 
upheld its position, but Koppernæs did not relent, wanting to wait for a dossier from 
the Tele-commission before deciding.119 To justify the outcome, she informed 
Televerket that 12 out of 14 members favoured an open tender, and asked 
Televerket to prepare the tender documents in English.120 
 
                                                          
115 Sjuve 2002, p 94. 
116 NTM5: Dok 159/81 “Innføring av digitale DMS-sentraler” for TBD 07.10.81. The docu-
ment refers to a meeting between Televerket's management and Board of Directors and Kop-
pernæs and her staff at Ministry of Communication 24.09.81; Abrahamsen to Ministry of 
Communication 22.10.81. 
117 NTM3: Televerket to Ministry of Communication 24.03.82: “Innføring av digitale sentra-
ler. Beredskapsmessige hensyn”. 
118 NTM5: Dok 159/81 “Innføring av digitale DMS-sentraler” for TBD 07.10.81. 
119 The National Telecom Commission was called Teleutvalget in Norwegian, NTM5: Abra-
hamsen to Ministry of Communication 22.10.81; and NTM3: Ministry of Communication to 
Teledirektoratet 25.01.82, and 02.02.82. 
120 NTM3: Ministry of Communication to Teledirektoratet 25.01.82, and 02.02.82. Kop-
pernæs was, according to Gladsø, interested in a technology agreement with Japanese firms. 
This must have been of minor importance, since it is not mentioned in other sources. Inter-
view with Bjørn Gladsø. 
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Televerket was also criticised for its relationship with STK and EB. A conservative 
MP said it was as if STK and EB “had become a part of Televerket.”121 These 
«cosy» relationships were seen as an integral part of the old-fashioned tele-regime, 
which needed revamping. Some perceived STK and EB “as two leisurely «fat cats» 
who had lain beside each other and produced some of the most expensive tele-
products in the world”.122 An open tender would at least get the fat cats onto their 
feet. Accordingly, several perceived the international tender as a means to reduce 
the price, thinking that STK or EB would win anyway. Televerket's Abrahamsen did 
not want a quasi-open tender, and told Koppernæs that if it were to be an open ten-
der, then Televerket would have to accept the best offer. He stressed that Kop-
pernæs would have to bear the political consequences if a foreign supplier won the 
contract.123 Obviously, Abrahamsen said this to put pressure on the minister, but it is 
worth noting that it was in line with Televerket's stance on procurement issues for 
years. It did not want to take political considerations into account in its procurement, 
without clear instructions from the political authorities. There are no signs, however, 
that Televerket's opposition to an international tender was based on principles, either 
stakeholder considerations or ideology. The stance was based on pragmatism. 
 
Televerket hoped Koppernæs would disregard the Tele-commission’s call for an 
open tender, and protested several times, particularly because of the delays this 
would cause.124 The Labour and Socialist parties supported Televerket, fearing the 
loss of Norwegian jobs. They even claimed that a closed tender also would provide 
competitive prices, as STK and EB were members of multinational concerns. 
Høyre’s Inger Lise Skarstein ridiculed the socialist parties’ confidence in the multi-
nationals, given that the multinationals ITT and LME had reaped oligopolic prices 
in Norway since the 1930s.125 Consequently, it was a semi-open tender, meaning 
that seven suppliers were invited to participate, and it was made clear to all parties, 
that Televerket would assess only the price and quality of the offers, and stakeholder 
interests would not be taken into account.  
 
Invitations were sent out in July 1982 to EB (LME), STK (ITT), CIT-Alcatel, Nip-
pon Electric Company, Northern Electric, Siemens and Philips, asking them to hand 
in offers in December of that year. Siemens and Philips withdrew from the tender, 
                                                          
121 St. f. 1982-83 p. 3975, here after Sjuve 2002 p. 87. 
122 “Standard Telefon og Kabel: Prisgitt Televerket”. in Kapital nr. 20 1985. 
123 NTM5: Dok 159/81 “Innføring av digitale DMS-sentraler” for TBD 07.10.81. 
124 NTM3: TBD to Inger Koppernæs 01.06.82. 
125 Inger Lise Skarstein in the Stortinget 28.05.82: St. f. 1982-83: Televerkets situasjon i 1980 
årene”. In fact, the Cabinet invited these companies before the Stortinget had debated the 
issue, and thus it was confronted with a “fait accompli”. Sjuve 2002, p. 86. 
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so only five companies remained. The Tele-commission recommended installing 
slightly more switches than TA had proposed, so Televerket ordered 520,000 lines, 
with an option for another 200,000.126 Thus, it was a huge contract that was up for 
grabs, the largest industrial contract on the Norwegian mainland ever - it was to be 
called “the contract of the century”.  
 
The tender 
An important reason why Televerket wanted a single supplier was that STK and EB 
refused to discuss alternatives for cooperation. In other countries, like Austria, the 
equipment suppliers cooperated and/or produced digital switches on license for 
other companies.127 STK and EB refused to cooperate, STK because it was confi-
dent that Televerket would order two systems, and EB since it did not fear a single-
supplier situation.128 When the companies learnt that it would be only one system, 
Thoresen and Kveim decided to discuss future alternatives for their telecom busi-
nesses, not least because they wanted to prevent an open tender.129 When the open 
tender was announced, the companies considered that a merged telecom unit would 
be difficult for the government to neglect in the tender.130 STK was more eager than 
EB to create such a unit, since it thought EB had a better chance of winning the 
contract.131 STK received approval from ITT-Europe to negotiate with EB. ITT and 
BTM probably hoped that a merged unit would have a better chance of winning the 
contract for the System 12, than the STK alone.132  
 
The political authorities had encouraged STK and EB to cooperate in developing a 
Tactical Digital Communication System for the armed forces in 1978.133 The first 
system was delivered in 1982. It was accompanied by substantial and positive press 
                                                          
126 Sjuve 2002, p. 82. 
127 Llerena et al. 2000, Martin Husz: “On Implementing the Austrian Computerised Digital 
Switching System” 2000. 
128 TEL 23; File TEL 23 System 12 - tilbud Porsgrunn; Memo: Pricing strategy for follow-on 
business of System 12 in Norway, STK 15.01.80. 
129 STKJA: Box 57: Thoresen’s minute from meeting with Kjell Kveim 20.01.82; Harper’s 
minutes from meeting with EB 11.05.82. 
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and August 1982. 
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132 STKJA: Box 57: Thoresen to Jack W. Guilfoyle in ITT-Europe 16.06.82. 
133 RA-STKi: “Forskningskontoret - Statlig utviklingskontrakt” JAM/HE 1.2.78. 
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coverage, not least stressing the possibilities for export.134 Moreover, Televerket put 
cooperation between STK and EB on the agenda by introducing a plan for a joint 
venture between the three companies in 1982. Norsk Bedriftskommunikasjon (Nor-
wegian business communication) was to manufacture and sell equipment for busi-
ness communication. It was an attempt to meet the new challenges and opportunities 
that the convergence of information and communication technologies created in the 
business market.135 Knudtzon, Tidemann and Christian Westring from EB presented 
the proposal to establish Norsk Bedriftskommunikasjon in October 1982.136 It is 
interesting how Televerket induced such a plan, at the same time as it arranged a 
very competitive tender for digital switches.137 This was probably possible only 
because Knudtzon was the driving force within Televerket, so it was detached from 
INDIG work with the digital tender. Nevertheless, it made STK and EB feel that 
closer cooperation among the two would be welcomed by Televerket.  
 
EB's Kveim talked of a “grand scheme”, i.e. a full merger of the companies; if that 
was not viable, he wanted to take over STK's telecom business.138 When STK learnt 
of these ambitions, it wanted only to negotiate shared production if one of their 
systems won, and/or how to present a joint offer. After the invitations were sent out, 
however, STK was advised by its lawyers that STK and EB had been invited as 
separate companies, and thus Televerket could reject a joint offer.139 At this point, 
STK seemed desperate, and wanted to negotiate a merger with EB again. Thoresen 
met with Kveim again in August 1982, and suggested forming one cable and one 
telecom company. EB wanted to take over the telecom company, and leave cables to 
STK, but Thoresen insisted on a 40/60 split in each company. Kveim said it was 
impossible to own less than 75 per cent of the telecom company, because, if not, 
ITT would hold a larger share than LME. The parties were to consult their boards 
and mother companies before negotiations were to continue. Kveim concluded by 
saying that he thought EB would win the «digital contract», and thus would not 
participate in the debate regarding the open tender and the preference for Norwegian 
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industry.140 STK was less confident, and had appealed to the government’s stake-
holder responsibilities towards STK; and the employees went on strike over the 
cabinet’s decision to invite foreign suppliers.141 
 
In a meeting with Erik Ribu, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Com-
munication, in September 1982, Thoresen learnt that it was by no means certain that 
EB would win the contract.142 The Conservative government did not give any 
weight to EB's cornerstone status. On the contrary, such plans and policies were 
something the conservatives wanted to get rid of. Ribu confirmed that STK had 
been perceived as more reluctant towards the open tender than EB, giving an im-
pression of poor self-confidence in telecom, and of being merely a cable company.143 
Ribu advised STK to go public with its competence and product, and belief in win-
ning the contract. He said that Norwegian firms might have some «pricing advan-
tage», some had mentioned 10 per cent, but advised STK to make a note of how 
keen the new government was on competition. From this time on, STK turned its 
full attention to winning the contract. The merger talks with EB were called off, and 
the plans for a joint venture in business communication came to nothing.144 Was it 
the meeting with Ribu that made Thoresen change strategy from defense to offence? 
Or had he been offensive all the time, and used the meetings with Kveim and EB, to 
give an impression of inferiority, in order to boost EB's confidence? It is hard to 
ascertain, and the answer need not be one-dimensional. Still, taking Thoresen’s 
personality into account, it is hard to believe that his humble attitude towards Kveim 
in 1982 was not calculated. 
 
STK, and ITT still faced the problem that EB was ‘more Norwegian’, with the ma-
jority of its shares on Norwegian hands. This was perceived as a barrier to the Sys-
tem 12’s chances in Norway. Therefore, old plans for transforming the 25 per cent 
Norwegian preferred shares into commons, and listing STK on the Oslo stock ex-
change, were taken up. Three things had changed: the stock market was revitalised 
in 1982, the Conservative government, appreciated a stock listing of STK more than 
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the former Labour government had done, and ITT agreed to sell a part of its ordi-
nary shares in STK.145 It was decided to float 15 per cent of the company, and keep 
25 per cent preference shares intact, thus, reducing ITT's stake to 60 per cent.146 The 
stock listing and sale to Norwegian investors gave STK valuable publicity, and an 
opportunity to polish its Norwegian identity.147 STK and ITT started to prepare the 
sale and stock listing in September 1982, shortly after the failure of the merger talks 
with EB and the informative meeting with Ribu.148  
 
ITT had sold stakes in several subsidiaries during the previous years, first and fore-
most to improve its financial situation, but also to enhance the national identity of 
the subsidiaries to improve their market position. This was Araskog attempt’s to 
follow in Behn’s footsteps, by reaffirming national responsiveness. ITT's Cabell 
Woodward told the Wall Street Journal of ITT's strategy in 1985, using STK as an 
example. ITT sold a part of STK “in Norway to the public. ITT later got «a nice 
contract from the government» to supply central office telephone switching equip-
ment”.149 ITT sold shares worth NOK 311 million, which was very much needed 
back at the New York headquarters. The share issue was announced before 
Televerket decided on a digital system. Moreover, in January 1983, STK was ac-
claimed the Company of the Year in 1982.150 Its development of ocean cables was 
highlighted, as was its good industrial relations, leading to low sickness absence. 
Araskog was sure that this “contributed to (Televerket's) confidence in the System 
12.”151 Still, the share issue and the award probably had only symbolic importance; 
the real matter was to put in the best tender. 
 
STK put considerable resources into winning the tender. It set up a «tender team», 
led by Knut Berg, who had been in charge of the System 12 since 1978.152 100 per-
sons were involved in working out the tender, and 5000 hours of overtime and 15-
20 man-years were put into the process. The team members were sent on courses, 
STK engaged several consultants with experience of submitting tenders, and some 
                                                          
145 One of the Labour Party’s leaders, Einar Førde, claimed in 1982 that investing on the Oslo 
Stock Exchange was like “feeding hay to a dead horse”. 
146 STK's Board-meeting 02.05.83. 
147 It was given broad publicity in the media, for instance “ITT-sjef om salg av STK-andeler: 
«STK vet selv sitt eget beste»“ in Norges Handels og Sjøfartstidene 10.10.83. 
148 STK's Board meeting 22.09.82. 
149 “ITT Is Planning to Sell $1.7 Billion Of Its Assets in Streamlining Move” in The Wall 
Street Journal 17.01.85. 
150 Bjørhovde1990, p. 88. 
151 CHA1: Telex from Rand V. Araskog to Fredrik Thoresen, 20.06.83. 
152 The information regarding STK's tender team is based mainly on the interview with Knut 
Berg. 
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of the consultants were hired. Berg was given an office next to Thoresen, on the top 
floor at STK's headquarters at Økern, indicating the priority of the tender, but also 
to secure complete secrecy around the team’s work. It was a closed tender, in the 
sense that all the bidders handed in closed offers, after which Televerket was to 
have secret negotiations with each bidder before choosing a winner.  
 
Thus, information about the other companies’ offers, i.e. price level, would be cru-
cial. So, an important part of the tender team’s work was intelligence, i.e. figuring 
out the price of the other bidders, and it was as important to avoid leakage from 
STK’s own process. To avoid price leakages, STK operated with fake figures in its 
preparatory calculations and held off setting the final price to the very end. It seems 
that STK was able to keep the price secret, while on the other hand, it knew - or 
claimed to know - the price of all the other bidders.153 STK's managers emphasise 
that Televerket was extremely professional in the process, but that the other bidders 
did not take secrecy seriously.154 
 
Knowing the price of the others, it was an open tender for STK, as opposed to the 
others, and it could set its price just below the others. As it happened, CIT-Alcatel, 
with its E10 offer, was 10 per cent lower than STK. STK accepted this because CIT-
Alcatel's product was regarded as technically inferior, and Thoresen probably had 
Ribu’s statement in mind, that Norwegian bidders would be given a 10 per cent 
price advantage.155 Eventually, when all the factors were taken into account, CIT-
Alcatel's offer was found to be more expensive for Televerket.156 Northern Tele-
com’s price offer was double that of STK, and NEC was also much higher, and its 
digital switch was regarded as inferior. Thus, only CIT-Alcatel, EB and STK were 
seriously considered in the final rounds. Most important of all, regarding price, was 
that EB's initial offers were over 40 per cent higher than STK's. After a renegotia-
tion with Televerket in May 1983, EB reduced its price, but it was still 33 per cent 
higher than STK's System 12 offer. This amounted to a considerable sum of money, 
and INDIG estimated EB's final price to be around NOK 700 million, compared to 
STK's price of NOK 528 million. The price difference of NOK 170 million was big 
for Televerket, and the difference was in reality even bigger, as it was taken for 
granted that Televerket would increase the order. 
                                                          
153 Interview with Fredrik Thoresen, Knut Berg, and Tidemann. 
154 Interview with Fredrik Thoresen, Gunnar Tidemann, and Knut Berg. 
155 IØA: “Report from meeting with Permanent under Secretary Erik Ribu 13/9-82”, to STK’s 
management. 
156 NTM3: INDIG's final evaluation of the tender: “Innstilling om Digitalt telefonsentralsys-
tem for det offentlige nett” 06.06.83. The following information about the tenders is based on 
these documents. 
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How was this possible? How could EB misjudge the situation completely, and why 
was STK able to set the price so low? An important factor was Thoresen and 
Kveim’s different corporate governance systems, or their different ranking of stake-
holders. Kveim perceived his prime responsibility to be the safeguarding of EB's 
interests, not LME’s switching market. In this relationship, it is important to bear in 
mind that LME held only a minority share in EB after the Cornerstone Plan. Ac-
cordingly, EB was very anxious about losing money on the project. We know that 
EB's delivery of LME’s telecom equipment financed its Norwegian products, hence 
if it lost money on installing digital switches, the whole company would falter. 
Thoresen, on the other hand, was loyal to ITT's interests, and was willing to risk 
losing money on the project, to accommodate the interests of ITT. In hindsight, 
Thoresen thought the price was fair; it would be tough for STK to make money with 
such a price, but not impossible. He considered that it would be good for STK's 
telecom department to have tighter margins, so the organisation could be straight-
ened up. Hence, Thoresen wanted to get his lazy fat cat up and running.  
 
Kveim considered that his stakeholder responsibilities towards developing EB as a 
«national champion», and thus contributing to a Norwegian high-tech industry, 
were, in a sense, equally binding on the government; that the government had a 
responsibility to support EB’s and Kveim’s industrial ambitions.157 EB's manage-
ment did not believe that the cornerstone status had any significance for the Conser-
vative government, but it considered EB to be the national solution and the natural 
solution. EB was too confident, and it never conceived of losing the bid.158 Some 
say that EB operated with a 10 per cent “confidence tariff” on its offer.159 EB was 
not alone in thinking it would win, as “everybody” thought so.160 Besides its na-
tional ownership, it had attained 70 per cent of the Norwegian switching market. Its 
KV switches were less expensive and had only minor technical problems, whereas 
STK's telecom business had been riddled with problems throughout the 1970s. 
Thus, one might assume that the open tender was not so much to make sure that 
STK lowered its price, but to make sure that EB did. In any case, the “threat” did 
not work. One thing is that EB's price was too high; another was that the actual 
tender was put together in a poor fashion, at least compared to that of STK.161 
 
                                                          
157 Interview with Jon Stenberg, and Peter Pay. 
158 Interview with Fredrik Thoresen, Knut Berg, and Gunnar Tidemann; the members of the 
INDIG group confirm this impression. 
159 Interview with Gunnar Tidemann. 
160 All the interviews confirm this. Televerket's Chairman, Egil Abrahamsen, also thought so. 
161 NTM3: INDIG's final evaluation of the tender 06.06.83. 
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Televerket had specified its requirements on one side of the page in the tender 
documents, and on the other side there was a blank section for the suppliers to fill in 
how they would meet each requirement. After almost a decade of installing 
Metaconta switches, STK had learned to respect the TA's competence and not least 
the significance of very meticulous specifications. Thus, STK had no problems in 
recognising the importance of accommodating Televerket's rigid tender profile. EB, 
however, had not worked with the TA on local SPC switches, which required such 
detailed specification and programming.162 This explains how EB could oppose 
several of Televerket's, i.e. the INDIG-group’s, requirements. This was a misjudge-
ment of Televerket's competence in the field. Besides, EB offered more lines than 
Televerket asked for. This might have suited EB from the industrial point of view, 
according to Bjørn Gladsø, but it was “regarded as extremely arrogant”.163 A result 
of EB's mistake was that it had not given a proper price offer, and it thus had to 
submit a new offer. Televerket asked the other bidders if they accepted this; in real-
ity, Televerket was asking the other companies if they wanted to exclude EB from 
the tender. This happened in April 1983, and by this time STK was fairly confident 
of the result, and allowed EB to adjust its offer.164 
 
EB was perceived as somewhat arrogant, not least its telecom director, Tor Egil 
Holte. After years with lucrative margins in telecom, STK had made Berentsen the 
man he was, and the same can be said of EB and Holte. This was not, however, 
merely a mistake by EB, as LME also misjudged the situation. One result of this 
was that EB, or in reality LME, did not comply with the requirements of Norwegian 
production in the same manner as STK did.165 Moreover, LME's misjudgement of 
realities is also evident from its 125-year history. The author, John Meurling, was a 
key player in developing the AXE, and he writes that the worst loss for the AXE, 
was to ITT in Norway in 1982, “so near Ericsson's home”. He rightly points to the 
fact that “ITT had no commercial System 1240 installations in service”.166 He also 
says that LME “lost to a system which Ericsson believed to be inferior to AXE”.167 
This is the only place, in empirical sources or literature, where anyone suggests that 
                                                          
162 In the evaluation report, INDIG praises the good experience from installing the Metaconta 
with STK, and regretted they had had no such cooperation with EB, since the SPC switches 
EB delivered were not local switches, and thus required fewer specifications. 
163 Interview with Bjørn Gladsø. 
164 STK-TC: File: “TEL 23 - Televerket - Digitale hovedsentraler”, Televerket to STK 
12.04.83 and other documents; Interview with Gunnar Tidemann. 
165 NTM3: “Evaluering av tilbud 02.02.83” (A preliminary evaluation), INDIG's final evalua-
tion of the tender is dated 06.06.83. 
166 Meurling and Jeans 2000. p. 314. 
167 Meurling and Jeans 2000. p. 314. 
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the System 12 was inferior to the AXE. It might reflect the problem of allowing 
employees to write a company’s business history, but even more important is the 
fact that it may also confirm that LME had not done its homework in 1982. Conse-
quently, the EB/LME high price and poor tender can be explained by complacency, 
but how could STK operate with a price that was so much lower than EB's? A major 
factor in explaining this was the desire of ITT and BTM to win the Norwegian con-
tract. 
 
Norway, ITT's lead market 
ITT and Rand V. Araskog were almost desperate to win contracts for the System 12. 
“Araskog's success or failure”, said a former ITT employee, “depended on System 
12”.168 The development costs had been very high so far, and if ITT was to stay in 
the telecom business, it needed several orders. It had won a contract in Mexico, with 
an earlier version of the System 12, known as the “Alec version”, with only 60 lines 
per line board, which had not worked out well.169 The version STK offered to 
Televerket was an ILS version, with 128 lines per line board, known as the 4.2.170 It 
was important for ITT to show the telecom community that the System 12 was more 
than a “paper tiger”, and thus it needed successful installations, and quickly. But it 
was difficult to find any PTOs that would host the inauguration of a new version of 
the System 12 switch.  
 
Moreover, ITT, or BTM, wanted a PTO that had a good chance of having a success-
ful handover. The PTO had to be competent, the network had to be suitable, i.e. not 
too big or complex, and it was no drawback if BTM were well acquainted with the 
PTO and the network. Norway and Televerket fulfilled these requirements. BTM 
had cooperated closely with Televerket on installing the Metaconta 10C switches 
since the early 1970s, and the two had developed a mutual respect. BTM had 
learned to know Televerket as a pioneer in the field of specifications, which was 
crucial in avoiding software problems, which had troubled the installation in Mex-
ico. In relation to the digital contract, INDIG produced 50 files of manuals of speci-
fications. This was unheard of in the telecom world. “The Norwegians were the first 
and only PTO with such demanding specifications”, recalled Rudy Scholliers from 
BTM.171 Hence, Televerket's competence in this field was exactly what “System 12” 
                                                          
168 “ITT may be putting its future on the line” in Business Week 13.05.85. 
169 “ITT may be putting its future on the line” in Business Week 13.05.85.; Kathleen A Grif-
fith: “Telecommunications in Mexico” in http://www.vii.org/papers/mexi.htm. 
170 Interview with Hugo Wuyts, and Toon Govers. 
171 Interview with Rudy Scholliers. 
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needed at this stage. Another factor, which is worth repeating, is the positive per-
sonal experiences BTM's people had had with Televerket. 
 
One thing was BTM's relation with Televerket, another was Televerket's interna-
tional standing. BTM had to find a PTO that was respected among other countries, if 
it was to function as a showcase.172 A slogan developed at BTM: “If you can sell to 
Norway, you can sell to anyone.”173 Televerket had earned a very good reputation 
and international standing throughout the 1970s, not least by its active participation 
in international telecom bodies. Along with the Danish private operators, it had 
become known as a very proficient and demanding customer.174 “All the other PTOs 
looked to Norway”, recalled BTM's Toon Govers.175 Thus, Norway was perfectly 
suited for ITT/BTM's System 12 strategy. It was BTM's test market for the 8B in the 
1950s, and in the 1980s it was ITT/BTM's lead market for the System 12. It should 
be superfluous to distinguish between a “test market” and a “lead market” in this 
context, but for the record, when Norway was a test market for the 8B in the 1950s, 
it was because Televerket was weak in relation to its equipment supplier, so it could 
be turned into a guinea pig. When it was a lead market in the 1980s, it was because 
it was competent and demanding towards its suppliers, and thus, a model for other 
PTOs. 
 
BTM convinced Araskog that Norway could play a key role for the System 12, and 
it was decided to gear the whole organisation, i.e. ITT-Europe, towards winning the 
Norwegian contract.176 It was recognised that the pricing was crucial, and that STK 
would run a large risk if the installation process was not successful. The tender 
invitation from Televerket had completely new rules regarding fines for delays etc. 
If the supplier did not meet the contractual demands, for instance, Televerket could 
call off the order and be entitled to compensation for losses. So, STK needed back-
ing from ITT to be able to set a low price. STK signed back-to-back-agreements 
with BTM, and these were to play an important part in the Norwegian delivery. 
Such inter-company agreements were standard procedure in ITT-Europe, and STK 
and BTM had signed similar agreements for the Metaconta installations in the Oslo 
network.177 In general, it regulated the parties’ duties and responsibilities towards 
Televerket and each other, but the main point, however, was that financial losses 
                                                          
172 There was no marketing value in installing the System 12 in a country that nobody re-
spected. 
173 Interview with Ludo Pignet. 
174 Interview with Hugo Wuyts, Ludo Pignet, Toon Govers, and Rudy Scholliers. 
175 Interview with Toon Govers. 
176 Interview with Ivar Ørbeck. 
177 STK-TC: File: “TEL 23 - BTM/STK back-to-back-avtale 10CN”. 
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resulting from delays or faults that were due to BTM were not to be covered by 
STK. The logic behind the back-to-back-agreements was that the Norwegian con-
tract was not only STK's issue, but also one for the whole of ITT-Europe and ITT. 
Thus, these agreements were to give STK insurance, in case of financial losses.  
 
Araskog and ITT asked Thoresen to set the price as low as possible. 178 A notable 
aspect is that Norway, being a small market, was perfectly suited for “dumping”. 
After all, the STK/EB price difference of NOK 170 million was peanuts compared 
to the total development costs of the System 12, which by 1985 had risen to $1.1 
billion.179 Araskog played a key role in this, as he ran the Norwegian System 12 
project, Ivar Ørbeck recalls, and he saw “Norway as a test case, as ITT's labora-
tory”.180 He visited Norway in 1981, and met with Prime Minister Kåre Willoch, 
and Televerket's Director General Kjell Holler in 1982.181 At this last visit, he was 
joined by the head of ITT's global telecom operations, Jack Guilfoyle, and the head 
of BTM, Eugene A. Van Dyck. In a meeting with Thoresen, the four decided to set 
the price as low as necessary to win the contract.182 STK was given the assurance 
that “BTM would follow this price in their supplies under the contract.”183 As STK 
was secured with the assurances and agreements, Thoresen did not hesitate to com-
ply with this, because, as he said to ITT-Europe just after handing in the bid, an 
order “will be extremely important both to STK, BTM and ITT as a whole”.184 After 
the final calculations had yielded a very low price, Thoresen, after consulting BTM 
on the telephone, reduced it by yet another 15 per cent - or about NOK 90 mill.185  
 
One reason why Thoresen made this final deduction, even though the price was 
much lower than EB's, was that he knew Televerket was apprehensive about inaugu-
rating yet another BTM switch. If Televerket had learnt one lesson from its decades 
of procuring switches, it was to avoid another 8B situation. This is repeated time-
and-again in the documents from the LPC meetings and the TA. Moreover, several 
of Televerket's staff were fed up with STK's equipment. The 8B and 11B experi-
ences almost ruined STK's relations with Televerket. So, the general attitude within 
                                                          
178 CHA1: F. Thoresen to Eugene A. Van Dyck 10.01.83.  
179 Wall Street Journal 19.12.85, here from Chapuis and Joel 1990, p. 419. 
180 Interview with Ivar Ørbeck. 
181 Ivar Ørbeck’s private archive: Fredrik Thoresen to Kåre Willoch, 20.11.82; Araskog 1989, 
p. 168. 
182 Interview with Fredrik Thoresen. 
183 CHA1: Thoresen to Eugene A. Van Dyck 10.01.83. 
184 CHA1: Thoresen to Eugene A. Van Dyck 10.01.83. 
185 CHA1: Thoresen to Eugene A. Van Dyck 10.01.83. 
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Televerket was that EB would and should win the contract.186 INDIG had had an-
other experience, however, which the rest of Televerket did not have, namely a 
fruitful relationship with BTM over the previous decade. Sure, they were anxious to 
be the first to install the new version of the System 12. But the price was much 
lower than that of EB, which was to be the most important aspect. Moreover, “ITT 
1240 is technologically”, concluded INDIG, “the most modern of all the offered 
systems”.187 The distributed architecture seemed to be in line with the recent devel-
opment in microprocessor technology, and it would ease Televerket's operations. 
The AXE, on the other hand, was seen as a bit outdated, and INDIG thought it ap-
propriate to ask whether the AXE’s best days were over.188  
 
So, most aspects were in favour of the System 12, except that Televerket had to be a 
pioneer again. Thus, the 8B ghost burdened the INDIG group.189 Gladsø has been 
characterised as the driving force behind Televerket's digitalisation process. 
Televerket's success, claims Rudy Scholliers, was due to “Bjørn Gladsø’s ability to 
protect Alf (Nilsen) and Kjell (Christensen) from the rest of Televerket”.190 Among 
other things, Scholliers referred to the Metaconta projects in Oslo, where Christen-
sen and Nilsen were allowed to experiment with modern features and services in 
computerised switches, while telephone queues were growing and subscribers 
lacked a dialling tone. Scholliers might exaggerate this aspect, but the descriptions 
fit with how the INDIG group worked, and how the final decision was taken. 
Gladsø said that he trusted Christensen and Nilsen, and would stand by and support 
their conclusions before the board.191 The technical director, Ole Petter Håkonsen, 
did the same, and he told them to follow their «gut feeling». Christensen and Nilsen 
wanted to go for the System 12, but were anxious, not least of the accusation that 
they were in BTM's pocket, after having spent so much time there.192 
 
On one of the final days, their mentor, Johs Skinnes came to see them. He was also 
fond of the System 12, and knew about the dilemma Christensen and Nilsen faced. 
The System 12 was the best, on paper; it was by far the most economical, and a 
                                                          
186 Interview with Magnhild Slettbak. She was not a member of the INDIG group, and was 
thus able to pick up the general sentiment in Televerket regarding the digital contract. All the 
INDIG members confirm this impression. 
187 NTM3: “Innstilling om Digitalt telefonsentralsystem for det offentlige nett” 06.06.83. 
(ITT 1240 er teknologisk sett det mest moderne av samtlige tilbudte systemer). 
188 NTM3: “Innstilling om Digitalt telefonsentralsystem for det offentlige nett” 06.06.83. 
189 Interview with Bjørn Gladsø. 
190 Interview with Rudy Scholliers. 
191 Interview with Kjell Christensen, and Alf Ivar Nilsen. 
192 Interview with Magnhild Slettbak. 
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successful installation could turn Televerket into a world-class PTO. But it would be 
an unexpected choice, and would meet much resistance within and outside 
Televerket. Skinnes boosted the confidence of Christensen and Nilsen, and con-
vinced them that they would be able to program the complex software of the System 
12.193 The members of the INDIG group stress that the System 12 was chosen be-
cause of the price and economy, not because it was more modern than the AXE.194 
Still, there were differences, for instance that the System 12 provided the signalling 
system, Signal 7, which was important for network control and the provision of 
digital services. Nilsen and Christensen confirm that the good relationship with 
BTM counted, and they do not think they would have dared to go for the System 12 
without this experience.195  
 
Consequently, INDIG chose the System 12, and the final evaluation report was sent 
over to the Board of Directors in June 1983. Holler and the Board of Directors en-
dorsed the decision, as did the government after some rounds of protest from and on 
behalf of EB's workers. EB's management was in shock, and the company started to 
drift during the following years. STK, with its fine-tuned intelligence, had antici-
pated the result for some months.196 EB, on the other hand, was caught totally off 
guard. A few days before Televerket announced STK as the winner, EB placed two 
large advertisements in a newspaper, depicting itself as the future supplier of digital 
switches.197 This amused Thoresen, and perhaps it was a sufficient reward for him? 
But STK faced one of its biggest industrial challenges ever; it was a moment of 
simultaneous apprehension and delight. ITT and BTM were more than pleased, 
knowing that they would not get a better opportunity to test and market their main 
product. Televerket was divided; several thought it foolhardy to go for the “paper 
tiger”. The INDIG group knew that there was hard work to come over the following 
years, in installing the System 12. But they probably did not know just how hard it 
would be.  
 
                                                          
193 Interview with Kjell Christensen. 
194 Interview with the members of the INDIG group. 
195 Thus, the irony is that Televerket's relationship with BTM came about as a result of the 8B 
problems in Oslo. The network in “LME's” largest city, Trondheim, functioned perfectly with 
a transit switch, surrounded by many local KV switches. Thus, there was no need to go to 
Stockholm to sort out problems. Thus, BTM's endeavour with the electro-mechanical switch 
from the 1950s finally paid off. 
196 Interview with Fredrik Thoresen, and Tidemann. 
197 “Det er to hovedgrunner til at Norge bør velge telefonsentraler fra EB” in Aftenposten 
16.06.83. and 17.06.83; 16th of June, Aftenposten wrote that Televerket had chosen STK and 
the System 12. 
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Conclusion 
The international tender for one system of digital switches came about as STK and 
EB had lost their oligopolic grip over Televerket. It is apposite to repeat and sum-
marise this development, that is, how each finger had lost its strength. The first 
finger, technological interfaces, started to lose strength with computer-controlled 
switches, and this process was completed with digital switches. Switches from dif-
ferent companies could interact, simply by programming the computer to accommo-
date different signals and so forth. Thus, digitalisation was a major pre-condition for 
liberalisation. The second finger, the maintenance of old equipment, was not solved, 
and it is striking how firmly STK and EB held on to this when they argued that 
Televerket should order two systems, to secure the maintenance of the 8B and KV. 
Televerket did not believe, however, that the firm that lost the tender would close 
down its telecom department. Moreover, these costs were only transitional, as the 
old electro-mechanical and analogue switches were to be replaced in the foreseeable 
future anyway.  
 
The third finger was related to Televerket's lack of network and switching compe-
tence. Jonsson pointed to this problem in the electro-mechanical procurement re-
gime. This was not the case with the new SPC/digital procurement regime. 
Televerket, or the INDIG-group, proved to be world-class in arranging tenders; 
several PTOs came to study the Norwegian tender process, and not least 
Televerket's meticulous specifications. EB failed to recognise this, and made a fool 
of itself when not complying with Televerket's requirements in the tender docu-
ments. The fourth finger was Televerket's responsibility for the industry’s employ-
ees. STK and EB stressed Televerket's stakeholder responsibilities, in opposing a 
tender for one system. Nevertheless, the companies’ own scenarios showed that 
several hundred jobs would be lost in the near future anyway. Hence, Televerket 
disregarded these short-term interests while choosing to go for one system, as did 
the Conservative government when it pushed through an international tender.  
 
The final finger was Televerket's stakeholder responsibilities as an industry pro-
vider. In several other countries, the PTO supported projects for developing digital 
switches, thus leading to higher prices. Televerket did not want a Norwegian digital 
switch, among other things, because its experience with “Norwegian” switches - 
STK's 8B and 11B - was poor. Unlike many other PTOs, however, Televerket did 
not demand that STK or EB should have any role in further developing the System 
12 or AXE. The main reason was that Televerket wanted to cooperate with the 
mother companies on such high-end issues, and not with STK and EB. Still, 
Televerket could have taken industrial aspects into account, arguing that a contract 
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for digital switches would be significant for the other industrial concerns of STK 
and EB, in both technological and financial terms. Moreover, it could have used the 
tender to induce a merger between the subsidiaries, more or less regardless of the 
contract. Televerket recognised this, and invited STK and EB to consider a merger, 
so as to restructure and preserve the industrial and technical environment of the 
Norwegian telecom industry. STK and EB had every chance to influence this, but 
chose to follow their own short-term interests. It illuminated their double identity; 
they were invited as large Norwegian high-tech companies, but responded as small 
foreign subsidiaries. Hence, it was no surprise that Televerket disregarded such 
issues, when the companies also did so.  
 
Consequently, this story supports the general view, that the telecom industry lost its 
oligopolic grip as a result of digitalisation and liberalisation.198 In addition, how-
ever, specific features made this process go more quickly in Norway, so Televerket 
became one of the first PTOs with a true competitive tender on local switches. Such 
tenders were not normal in Europe before the 1990s.199 The most important element 
was Televerket's competence building on specifications and programming in the 
1970s, which it did in close cooperation with BTM. As shown in chapter 4, this 
changed STK's relational setting in the switching business. From its initial position, 
as a controlling mediator between Televerket and BTM in a linear relationship, STK 
was, in certain issues, sidelined within a new triangular relationship, in which 
Televerket and BTM developed an independent relationship.  
 
Televerket 
Ò Ñ 
Ó Ô 
BTM   Í     Î   STK 
 
This relationship was decisive for the outcome of the Norwegian tender. First, in 
that BTM chose Norway and Televerket as its lead market for the System 12, and 
second, in that Televerket dared to be the first customer of the switch. When STK 
mediated between BTM/ITT and Televerket in the linear relationship, a frequent 
topic was whether it could develop into a lead house, either with the 8B or 11B. As 
the triangular relationship replaced the linear relationship, the lead-house issue van-
ished, and Norway/Televerket became BTM/ITT's lead market. Still, STK was not 
out of the equation, as it played a key role in winning the digital contract for ITT 
                                                          
198 Doz 1987, p. 102; Eliassen et al. 1999, p. 24. 
199 Eliassen et al. 1999, p. 24 f. 
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and BTM. It was by no means obvious that a subsidiary, which demanded to be 
perceived as a national high-tech company, and which was about to invite Norwe-
gian private investors as shareholders, was willing to accommodate the interests of 
its main shareholder and mother company by setting such a low price. To explain 
this, we need to return to Thoresen’s understanding of telecom and his corporate 
governance principles. By contrasting the latter with Kveim's view of corporate 
governance, we also shed light on how EB priced itself out of the competition, 
which, after all, is necessary to explain STK's victory. 
 
Kveim did not look upon the supply of telecom equipment to Televerket as his main 
concern; it was above all a means for developing EB as an independent high-tech 
company, as the supply of LME's telecom equipment financed the “Norwegian” 
products. Thus, the price-oriented tender caught Kveim in a “Catch 22” situation. 
EB risked losing money on the contract if the price was too low, and it risked losing 
the contract if the price was too high, and both would be damaging to the Norwe-
gian products and Kveim's strategy. Kveim did not, however, see this as a dilemma, 
as he was sure that EB would win the contract with LME's AXE. He was caught up 
in an outdated perception of EB as a national champion in telecom. EB failed to take 
sufficient notice of the changes that followed from digitalisation and liberalisation 
and Televerket's increased competence and proficiency. Thus, he did not appreciate 
what Robert A.G. Monks and Nell Minow see as the “ultimate aim of corporate 
governance structure”, that it must be “continually re-evaluated so that the govern-
ance structure itself can adapt to changing times and needs.”200 
 
Thoresen was not caught in a Catch-22 situation by the price-focused tender; it was 
probably the only way STK could win with such a futuristic switch. Moreover, as 
everybody expected STK to lose, he probably felt freer to set a very low price. What 
is more, he thought it was a good opportunity to teach his telecom department to 
hold to the budgets, to show them that the times with high margins from Televerket 
were over. Taking his perception of corporate governance into account, one would 
assume that Thoresen was willing to set such a low price, and risk losing money on 
the project, to accommodate the interests of ITT. It seems evident that BTM saw 
STK's offer as dumping. Thoresen rejects this strongly in hindsight, insisting that 
the pricing was fair, which may be indicative of Thoresen’s understanding of tele-
                                                          
200 Robert A.G. Monks & Nell Minow: A View From the Top: Corporate Governance for the 
21st Century, 1996. 
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com. Notwithstanding, if STK lost money due to delays from BTM, it had an inter-
company agreement to fall back on.  
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Chapter 7 The fall of the Norwegian telecom indus-
try 
 
Introduction 
STK was flying high in 1983; it was appointed the Norwegian company of the year 
for 1982, and won the «contract of the century» for delivering digital switches to 
Televerket; and floated 20 per cent of its shares in STK on the Norwegian stock 
market.1 STK’s management was always keen to enhance the company’s Norwegian 
profile, and relished in the publicity the stock issue gave them. ITT sold shares 
worth NOK 311 million, in an issue that was oversubscribed by 100 per cent.2 The 
share price was set at NOK 185, but it soon rose to NOK 270.3 This was at a time 
when the Norwegian economy was booming, due to large oil revenues and political 
liberalisation and deregulation. With the Conservative government, Norway went 
through a period of reform and modernisation, and STK was riding the tide, being 
Norway’s largest and most successful company in one of the industries of the future. 
In May 1986, however, STK’s share price was NOK 90.4 Hence, STK's market 
capitalisation plummeted from NOK 3 billion to 1 billion in less than three years.5 
This reflected the volatile stock market, which crashed in October 1986, but mostly, 
it reflected STK's problems. STK incurred heavy financial losses, as it had serious 
difficulties in meeting the terms of the digital contract with Televerket. Still, it 
hoped it would regain some of the losses in winning the second contract for install-
ing digital switches in 1990.  
 
STK went through dramatic changes during this decade: it laid off hundreds of 
workers, Thoresen stepped down as managing director, and it had new French own-
ers from 1987. EB also experienced hard times after losing the digital contract. It 
was attacked by corporate raiders in 1984, resulting in a new management from the 
financial group Investa. ITT suffered the same on Wall Street, but was able to hold 
off the raiders, not least due to the successful installation of the System 12 in Nor-
way. Another important development trait during this decade was the fact that Euro-
pean champions replaced the old national champions, as the European community 
was further integrated. Alcatel was depicted as a European champion, which pur-
                                                          
1 That was 15 per cent of STK's share capital. 
2 STK’s public issue prospect 12.10.83. 
3 “Standard Telefon og Kabel: Prisgitt Televerket”. in Kapital nr. 20 1985. 
4 ”Kraftig kursfall på Oslo Børs”, in Aftenposten 05.05.86. 
5 There were 11.4 million shares in STK. 
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portedly would provide STK with better chances of attaining a position as a lead 
house in certain areas. Then again, a consequence of the digitalisation and liberalisa-
tion was that R&D was centralised in the multinational telecom companies’ head-
quarters, and that PTOs, such as Televerket, cut down on their R&D and develop-
ment contracts. The main objective of this last chapter is to explain the fall of the 
Norwegian telecom industry in the light of digitalisation and liberalisation. 
 
The negotiated environment changed, in the sense that Televerket no longer felt a 
strong obligation to act as an industry provider. Thus, the Norwegian system of 
innovation in telecom, as it was known from the establishment of the TF in 1967, 
was about to disappear. The second tender for digital switches, in 1990, shows that 
Televerket was totally freed from the oligopolic grip. As Televerket lost its monop-
oly as a service provider, and thus its monopsony in its upstream activities, STK's 
relational setting was about to be cemented: it became sidelined in Televerket's 
relationship with the multinational industry, irrespective of the Norwegian subsidi-
aries.  
 
STK’s Pyrrhic victory 
Having won the contract, STK met with Televerket to negotiate a final agreement 
for the supply of the System 12. This was in accordance with the tender invitation: 
the winner was to negotiate with Televerket, based on its offer. Thoresen claims that 
Televerket exploited its position, with tougher demands than had been indicated in 
the tender, and that they used lawyers on a «no cure no pay»-basis.6 Gladsø rejects 
this, saying that the terms in the final agreement followed naturally from the tender 
invitation and STK's offer.7 This is not the place to assess if there is something in 
Thoresen’s allegations, but it is not surprising that the two parties experienced these 
negotiations differently. Moreover, it is tempting to suggest that Thoresen felt un-
comfortable during these negotiations, because he realised how “expensive” STK's 
offer really was, not least since ITT and BTM did not stand by their promises of 
sharing eventual losses.  
 
In January 1983, only a fortnight after handing in the tender to Televerket, STK 
clashed with BTM over contractual issues. Thoresen wanted to be assured that the 
back-to-back agreements would be changed in accordance with the 15-per cent price 
cut. Moreover, the back-to-back agreements had not been adjusted to the real price, 
since STK and BTM “worked with a fictitious material price” to conceal the actual 
                                                          
6 Interview with Fredrik Thoresen. 
7 Interview with Bjørn Gladsø. 
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price.8 As Thoresen stressed to BTM's Van Dyck, in the meeting with Araskog in 
December 1982, it “was agreed that STK would fix the final price level and that 
BTM would follow this price”, since the order was “very important to BTM and 
ITT as reference for other competitive bids”.9 Van Dyck responded that BTM had 
“been carrying a very heavy burden in the development of System 12”, allegedly 
amounting to 20 per cent of BTM's total turnover.10 Van Dyck also said that STK 
“seems to me to be a very profitable company capable also of taking its share of the 
load”,11 thus indicating that STK's profitable cable business could take its share.  
 
After having won the bid, Thoresen wrote to Van Dyck again, stressing that he felt 
“very strongly that BTM should fulfil its obligations and share their part of the price 
we had to pay in order to get the Norwegian contract”.12 Thoresen was still referring 
to the December meeting with Araskog, Guilfoyle and Van Dyck: “I believe your 
exact words were; «STK must set the price and BTM will follow»“.13 The tension 
between STK and BTM was escalating, and although Thoresen acknowledged 
BTM's System 12 costs, he thought it pertinent to put it in an historical context, 
pointing to the “fact that BTM over the years has obtained excellent results in its 
main line of activity - switching”, and that STK had been a main contributor.14 Van 
Dyck replied that he was delighted with STK's victory, and was sure that STK and 
BTM would “come to an agreement which is satisfactory to both parties”, but gave 
no response to Thoresen’s attempt to include the 15-per cent discount in the back-
to-back agreements.15 Thoresen and STK were disappointed, as this was also prob-
lematic: STK was about to invite Norwegian investors as minority owners, and thus 
the company could no longer be tossed around as a mere department within ITT. As 
a listed company in Norway, it was an independent judicial entity, separate from 
ITT. 
 
STK could just hope that the tight schedule would hold; if not, it would have to pay 
Televerket penalty fines. As STK's price was lower than Televerket had anticipated, 
it decided to increase the orders from 520,000 to over 700,000 lines. When a repre-
                                                          
8 CHA1: File: Thoresen to Eugene A. Van Dyck, “ITT 1240 bid for Norway” 10.01.83. 
9 CHA1: Thoresen to Eugene A. Van Dyck, 10.01.83. 
10 “I believe therefore that, from a corporate standpoint, BTM takes more than its share and 
that this fact should be taken into consideration when judging that overall situation.” CHA1: 
Van Dyck to Thoresen, 19.01.83. 
11 CHA1: Van Dyck to Thoresen, 19.01.83. 
12 CHA1: Thoresen to Van Dyck, 03.08.83. 
13 CHA1: Thoresen to Van Dyck, 03.08.83. 
14 CHA1: Thoresen to Van Dyck, 03.08.83. 
15 CHA1: Van Dyck to Thoresen, 10.08.83. 
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sentative from the Swedish PTO met STK's Gunnar Tidemann at a conference, he 
advised Norway not to install more than 50,000 lines a year, due to the complex 
software handling. When he heard they were going to install 300,000 lines in 1986, 
and another 400,000 in 1987, he thought Televerket and STK were idiots.16 Trond-
heim was to be the pilot switch, a local switch with only 7,000 lines, but this switch 
was crucial, as the firms would have to debug the complicated software, and find 
viable solutions to how the software-based switches were to interact with the old 
electro-mechanical switches in the rest of the country. The Økern transit-switch and 
the Lillestrøm group-switch were to be the next switches. These switches were to 
introduce the main novel features of the System 12 network in Norway; namely 
Signalling System no. 7, facilitating communication between the switches in the 
network, a Network Service Centre, supervising and controlling all the traffic, and 
finally a rural local switch, called the Remote Subscriber Unit (RSU).17 These fea-
tures solved problems that Televerket had struggled with since the 1960s, and be-
came important trademarks of the System 12.  
 
The Trondheim switch was to be handed over in July 1985. A handover meant that 
the supplier delivered the switch to the PTO, which could start on the acceptance 
test, whereas the cutover was when the switch was put in service. BTM's prepara-
tion of the System 12 for Televerket's specifications took longer than it had prom-
ised, so in May 1984, STK announced the first of several delays.18 BTM had known 
all along, claims STK’s Knut Berg, that the promises it had given STK and 
Televerket would not hold.19 We do not know if Berg understood this when the 
offer was handed in, still it calls for some reflections on Thoresen’s competence in 
telecom. As he lacked understanding of telecom, Thoresen was not in a position to 
evaluate the realism in the prognoses or promises BTM gave STK on the System 12, 
before the offer was submitted in 1982. As Business Week wrote in 1985 “Araskog 
pushed some of ITT's subsidiaries in Europe to line up orders for the system before 
it was ready for sale”.20 It is not obvious that Araskog would have been able to push 
such a project onto any other subsidiaries, especially if the manager in charge had a 
better knowledge of telecom than Thoresen had.  
 
Matters became even worse for STK, as BTM was stretched with the System 12. SEL, 
the German ITT subsidiary, was given a bigger role; it was to be in charge of the 
                                                          
16 Interview with Gunnar Tidemann, Bjørn Gladsø has told a similar story. 
17 STK-TC: “Kontrakt om levering av DIGITALT TELEFONSENTRALUTSTYR ITT 1240 
mellom STK og Televerket.” 
18 STK's Board-meeting 05.12.84. 
19 Interview with Knut Berg. 
20 “ITT may be putting its future on the line” in Business Week 13.05.85. 
Chapter 7 The fall of the Norwegian telecom industry 
 253
Network Service Centres. Moreover, the Bundespost ordered the System 12, and it 
demanded from ITT that SEL was allowed to export some of its System 12 produc-
tion. The German contract was crucial to ITT, as it was the first time Siemens had 
lost; and ITT was very eager to maintain its newly gained foothold in Germany.21 
Thus, it complied with Bundespost’s demand, at STK's expense; SEL was to deliver 
100,000 lines in Norway, taken from STK's initial share.22 STK was furious with the 
decision: the economy in the project was very volume-dependent, so a reduction of 
lines would incur bigger losses.23 As compensation, STK was to develop the Re-
mote Subscribers Units, but this generally entailed larger costs. ITT Europe (ITTE) 
promised STK “preferential consideration in forthcoming export projects”, but little 
came out of it.24 Moreover, STK had to fight SEL throughout the 1980s, to get com-
pensation for the penalty fines it paid, which were caused by SEL's delays.25 
 
ITT(E) decided to drop the old Alec version of the System 12, and go for the “Nor-
wegian” 4.2 version for all future deliveries, and thus the Norwegian contract was 
even more important. As a result of the Norwegian delays, ITT(E) rearranged its 
System 12 programme in 1984. Ralph Welken, who was one of ITT's troubleshoot-
ers, was put in charge of the Norwegian project. He set up a new timetable for 
Televerket. The PTO was disappointed, but accepted ITT's new plan in August 
1984.26 Still, the trouble with the System 12 persisted, so Welken took over all of 
ITTE's System 12 operations in December, with STK's Joys as one of his assistants. 
BTM's difficulties had escalated, as it had lost control over its System 12 responsi-
bilities. Jozef Cornu replaced Eugene A. Van Dyck as Managing Director of BTM 
in late 1984, and ITTE took over BTM's System 12 operations.27 BTM was over-
committed with the System 12, so an order for Switzerland was transferred to SEL. 
BTM had signed a very promising System 12 contract in China, with plans of set-
ting up a unit in Shanghai.28 ITT was eager to enter the enormous Chinese market, 
                                                          
21 Siemens lost because of its “natural catastrophe” with its SPC-switch, se footnote 3, in 
chapter 4. 
22 Interview with Carl-Edward Joys. 
23 Interview with Carl-Edward Joys. 
24 CHA1: Daniel P. Weadock (President ITTE) to F. Thoresen 25.06.84. 
25 STKA: File: TEL 23: STK - SEL - BTM avtale: Correspondence between STK and SEL, 
the issue was settled when Alcatel's Joseph Cornu stepped and settled it in 1988. Minute from 
meeting in Brussels 11.05.88, from Harper and Tidemann to Thoresen, dated 02.06.88. 
26 CHA1: Fredrik Thoresen to Kjell Holler 08.08.84. 
27 Interview with Carl-Edward Joys, “Mr Jo Cornu has been appointed managing director of 
the Belgian division of Bell Telephone in Antwerp.” in Textline Multiple Source Collection 
30.09.84. 
28 Interview with Carl-Edward Joys; “ITT Belgian unit receives $240 million China contract” 
in Dow Jones News Service 20.07.83. 
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but it needed the Norwegian project as a showcase for future customers. Thus, 
Welken ordered BTM to give Norway and Trondheim top priority. 
 
Welken set up a new timetable, with an additional 3-4 months’ delay, taking the 
total delay up to seven months, so Trondheim would not be delivered before Febru-
ary 1986. ITTE’s Weadock came to Oslo in December 1984, to assure Televerket 
and Holler that the whole project would be completed according to the new plan. 
Promising that “the contract between Televerket and STK will be given highest 
priority within ITT” and that he would “personally use all means at my disposal”.29 
ITT was in distress during these months, fighting criticism from Wall Street as 
Araskog had cut dividends for the first time since the Second World War.30 More-
over, it proved very expensive to adapt the System 12 to US standards, so there 
were strong doubts about ITT's chances in the US equipment market. Thus, the 
importance of the Norwegian contract increased. As the pressure mounted on Aras-
kog and ITT, so it did on Thoresen and STK, because STK had to pay penalty fines 
due to the delays.  
 
When the seven months’ delay was announced in December 1984, STK had to pay 
heavy fines to Televerket. In addition, it had to finance the development of the Re-
mote Subscriber Units, and finally STK had to pay $1.7 million (ca. NOK 15 mil-
lion) for BTM's increased development costs.31 Therefore, before the end of 1984, 
before the installation of the System 12 had commenced, STK had lost money on 
the contract, and there was worse to come.32 Thoresen appealed to ITTE, but 
Weadock said that “the generic S12 development has been led by the bigger ITT 
Units”, indicating that the smaller houses now had to contribute their share.33 
Weadock wanted Welken and Cornu to meet with Thoresen to “iron out any particu-
lar problems”34 Such a meeting would probably not help at all, as the relationship 
between STK and BTM's management was strained. A BTM aide allegedly opened 
                                                          
29 STKJA Box 89: File Tel 23 - System 12”: Daniel P. Weadock (President ITTE) to Kjell 
Holler 11.01.85: “Delivery of System 12 to Norway”. 
30 Araskog 1989, p. 65; “ITT Profit Fell 41% in Quarter Before a Gain …” in The Wall Street 
Journal 14.11.84. 
31 CHA1: P.R. Geeurickx/ITTE to S. Falck-Pedersen STK 11.12.84. “According to the back to 
back agreement between you and BTM all overrun should be shared between STK/BTM in 
proportion to sales. BTM has estimated the overrun at $1931 of which STK should carry 7/8 
or $1690.” 
32 STK's Board-meeting 05.12.84. 
33 CHA: File “Tele 23 STK-SEL-BTM avtale”: Telefax from Weadock to F. Thoresen 
18.02.85. 
34 Telefax from Weadock to F. Thoresen 18.02.85. 
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a meeting by saying: “Well, sue me, it’s your problem anyway”.35 Televerket, for its 
part, indicated a willingness to cancel the whole contract, which would have cost 
STK dearly.36 Hence, Thoresen and STK were caught between a rock and a hard 
place. The annual accounts for 1985 showed a drop in profit from NOK 180 million 
in 1984, to NOK 30 million in 1985, the main reason being the penalty fines and 
increased costs of the digital contract.37 
 
It is interesting to see the similarities in STK's problems with the System 12 and 
with the 11B. First, STK was persuaded to budget too optimistically. Second, the 
company lacked the capability of running projects of such a magnitude. Third, the 
system specifications were far from completed when the project arrived at STK. 
Fourth, the initial prognoses were also far too modest in terms of costs and required 
material, such as circuits and development tools. Moreover, the 11B’s wired logic 
and the System 12’s software needed much more debugging than expected. Finally, 
delays and time shortages increased the costs.38 The exact same reasons are high-
lighted in explaining the problems STK's encountered with the System 12. It is 
tempting to ask whether Thoresen would have acted the same way with the System 
12 had he known this.  
 
The Trondheim switch 
The first System 12 switch was delivered in Trondheim in March 1986, seven 
months late.39 This was the handover, which was far from the cutover, i.e. the actual 
putting into service. It was now that the real work started; the software had to be 
debugged, and programmed to accommodate the features of the old equipment in 
the network. It was now that Televerket and BTM would have to come up with 
viable solutions for the rest of the network. If the Trondheim switch passed 
Televerket's acceptance test, one could be fairly confident that the rest of the project 
would go well. This was what ITT had waited for; a successful acceptance test in 
Trondheim would mean that the System 12 was endorsed by one of the most de-
manding PTOs in Europe. The cutover was scheduled for June 13, and Araskog 
arranged for an ITT board meeting in Oslo at the same time. “This decision is based 
on my (…) high confidence level that we will successfully cut over the Trondheim 
Exchange just prior to the Board’s arrival”, announced Araskog, suggesting a “visit 
                                                          
35 Interview with Knut Berg. 
36 STK's Board-meeting 05.12.84. 
37 STK's Board-meeting 19.03.85. 
38 Ivar Mo: “Historien om Metaconta 11 B”, p. 13. 
39 “«En milepæl for Televerket» Den første digitale telefonsentral levert” in Aftenposten 
07.03.86. 
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to the Trondheim Exchange might also be appropriate.”40 The main reason was that 
in February 1986, ITT decided to drop the US market, because the adaptation of the 
System 12 was too expensive, and because Araskog had negotiated a merger of 
ITT's telecom business with the French Compagnie Générale d'Électricité (CGE), 
i.e. CIT-Alcatel's owners.41  
 
The handover in Trondheim did not mean that project was back on track: nothing 
could be further from the truth. The switches that were to be installed in 1986-87, 
were, on average, delayed by five months.42 Araskog and several others from ITT's 
management met with Televerket in April 1986, to present a new timetable. At this 
meeting, Araskog told Holler that ITT had dropped the US market, to put all its 
resources into the Norwegian project.43 40 engineers, who had worked on adapting 
the System 12 to the US market, were sent to BTM, SEL and STK to help complete 
the Norwegian contract.44 Despite Araskog's assurance, Gladsø replied that he was 
uncomfortable with the delays.45 Now the strict demands in the digital contract 
proved their worth for Televerket, while they became a heavy burden for STK. It 
had to cover all Televerket's extra costs stemming from the delay, as well as the 
penalty fines. This should in no way, Holler told Thoresen, affect Televerket's right 
to cancel the whole contract.46 Due to the delays, Televerket had to install analogue 
equipment as a replacement. STK wanted to install its own equipment, but 
Televerket preferred to lease AXE and KV switches from EB. STK had to pay for 
this, and it goes without saying that EB was in a favourable position while negotiat-
ing the price with Televerket. 
 
Thoresen wrote to Weadock that Televerket's last claim “amounts to 90 mill NOK”, 
and that STK's Board expected a “fair distribution of Norway’s System 12 costs 
between ITT houses”.47 It wanted ITT to cover half of the sum, but felt it was most 
important that ITT, as STK's majority shareholder, acted on an “arm’s length basis” 
in this issue, because it “was very concerned that the interests of minority share-
                                                          
40 CHA1: R. v. Araskog til D. Weadock, copy Fredrik Thoresen 03.04.86. 
41 Araskog 1989, p. 177. 
42 STKA: Papers for Board-meeting: Letter from Thoresen to Holler 16.04.86, Holler to 
Thoresen 17.04.86. 
43 Interview with Bjørn Gladsø. 
44 STKJA: Box 42: File: “LOV 13 - Ledergruppen”: “System 12 - Aktuell informasjon pr. 20. 
mai 1986” 20.05.86. 
Minutes from STK's management meetings. 
45 Interview with Bjørn Gladsø. 
46 STKA, papers for Board-meeting: Letter from Holler to Thoresen 17.04.86. 
47 CHA: Fredrik Thoresen to Mr. D. P. Weadock, 21.04.86. 
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holders be protected”. What Thoresen did not tell Weadock was that the board had 
decided, in secret, to calculate the costs of cancelling the whole contract.48 The 
situation was somewhat desperate at STK; it was not much better in Televerket. The 
members of INDIG felt that several of those who where sceptical about the System 
12 in 1983, were showing a degree of «schadenfreude» in the midst of their prob-
lems. Some, including Knudtzon from the TF, wanted to cancel the contract.49  
 
Televerket's management, however, never lost faith and was destined to complete 
the contract. They probably envisaged STK's financial problems, while declaring 
that the penalties and compensations STK paid to Televerket, should be seen in 
relation to each other, i.e. that supplementary purchases should be deducted from 
penalties “as it was not Televerket's intention to profit from STK's delays”.50 The 
pressure was mounting on INDIG and Televerket's management, not least because 
of all the critical attention from the media.51 Still, to cancel the contract would be 
dramatic, and probably very costly for Televerket. Moreover, INDIG was confident 
that the System 12 would function, and would equip Televerket with the most mod-
ern network it could dream of. The first obstacle was to have a successful cutover in 
Trondheim.  
 
When the pilot switch was delivered to Trondheim, there were several shortcomings 
in the software package, but the main task was to debug the software. At one point, 
more errors appeared in the program than INDIG or BTM were able to correct.52 
Kjell Christensen described in an article what it was like to be thrown into the in-
ferno of 415 processors at Trondheim, which “tries to break you down psychologi-
cally with its error reports”. One digs into the relational database that is distributed 
in all the processors, and desperately seeks a connection between data elements 
hanging together in kilometres. One makes a move towards the database, but is 
often rejected by ’Data Base Access Failure’.53 A joke, which evolved out of ITT's 
work with the System 12, became popular in Trondheim: the System 12 was to be 
                                                          
48 STK’s board meeting 21.04.86. 
49 BGA: Notat av 08.07. 1986 fra Nic Knudtzon til generaldirektøren og teknisk direktør. 
Interview with Nic. Knudtzon. 
50 CHA: File “Erstatningsoppgjør System 12”: Avtale mellom Televerket og STK 29.04.86, 
(idet det ikke er Televerkets hensikt å profitere på STK’s forsinkelse). 
51 “Telefonsentraler blir ytterligere forsinket” in Aftenposten 22.03.85. 
52 Interview with Bjørn Gladsø. 
53 Kjell Christensen: “Konsept for sentralisert drift av System 12” i Telektronikk nr. 4 1986 
side 354, here after Sjuve 2002, p. 93. 
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operated by a man and a dog; the dog was to make sure the man did not enter the 
switch to do any harm. The man’s task was to feed the dog.54  
 
Televerket and BTM worked long days and nights in Trondheim. Once again, the 
social relations between BTM and Televerket proved fruitful. Christensen and Nil-
sen said it would have been difficult to overcome the problems in Trondheim with-
out the trust that had developed among the parties, and the BTM aides hold the same 
view.55 STK contributed little in comparison. According to the BTM people, STK's 
representatives refused to work overtime at the first switches, where BTM had the 
contractual responsibility. “Norwegian working moral is very different than the 
Belgian”, says one BTM aide. This may be true, but the most important reason why 
the STK people refused to work overtime was that the most competent STK aides 
were not in Trondheim: they were busy preparing the handover of Lillestrøm and 
Økern. Besides, STK's did not want to pay their engineers overtime for work on 
switches that were BTM's responsibility. STK thought it had covered, or lost, 
enough on the System 12. Televerket shared BTM's impression of STK's efforts at 
Trondheim, with the notable exception of Dag Wilhelmsen. He was STK's project 
leader, together with Knut Berg, and was allegedly criticised within STK for being 
more concerned about completing the contract with Televerket than about STK's 
financial problems.56  
 
It is easy to understand STK's attitudes towards BTM, and the company’s apprehen-
sion about working and paying overtime. Still, the fact that STK refused to put in 
overtime may say something about its industrial ambitions. If it wanted to benefit 
from being one of the first installers of the System 12, associated with such a de-
manding PTO as Televerket, and to attain a position within ITT on the System 12, 
then its stance was not very wise. STK did play a substantial role in developing the 
RSU, but did not try to build on that. “Asians and Swedes would have exploited 
such a competence”, claimed Scholliers from BTM, indicating that STK lacked the 
necessary willpower. Perhaps STK did not have such ambitions, or perhaps they 
thought it impossible, or not worthwhile, to attain such a position. If BTM and 
Televerket really did feel that STK lacked ambition, then it is no surprise that STK 
was sidelined in the fruitful relationship that developed between Televerket and 
BTM. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that after BTM delivered the first six 
switches; STK did - according to BTM and Televerket - an excellent job in “rolling 
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out” the rest of the switches. The BTM aides add that STK were good repeaters and 
mass producers of the System 12. 
 
The cutover of the Trondheim switch took place on June 13 1986, in accordance 
with the plan laid out when Araskog met Holler in April 1986. A delegation from 
ITT, headed by Araskog, came to inspect the switch, and was very satisfied with the 
completion. Along with the ITT delegation, were representatives from the French 
state-owned company CGE, who wanted to make sure that the System 12 was more 
than a paper tiger. At its board meeting in Oslo in June 1986, ITT decided to merge, 
and eventually sell, its telecom business to CGE. The next section looks into ITT's 
troubles from the mid-1970s. 
 
ITT - a giant with feet of clay 
ITT’s turnover rose from $765 million in 1960 to $14.6 billions in 1976, and at its 
peak, it was number nine on the Fortune 500 list.57 In 1974, however, its “consistent 
record of increased quarterly earnings over fifty-eight quarters during the 1960s and 
1970s was broken.”58 Geneen left behind “a debt-laden corporation”, claimed Aras-
kog, “one that was struggling to pay its bills for many mergers and acquisitions”.59 
ITT was dubbed “a museum of the investment and management ideas of the six-
ties”.60 The conglomerates fell out of fashion, one talked of “profitless growth”, and 
big was not that beautiful anymore.61 The emphasis was now on such entrepreneu-
rial development as was occurring in Silicon Valley, and on the importance of flexi-
ble specialisation, with “small was beautiful” becoming a new mantra.62 One thing 
was that the conglomerates delivered smaller returns, another thing was that the 
stock market rated such giants much less favourably, and thus the Price/Earnings 
(P/E) ratio fell, as did the market capitalisation compared to the underlying value of 
the firms.  
 
This is not the time or place to assess the reason for the fall of the conglomerates; 
however, some major reasons are worth mentioning. First, a macro-economic condi-
tion for the profitability of the conglomerates was general economic growth. The 
1973 recession hit ITT hard, and its “stock plummeted from 60 in early 1973 to 12 
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in late 1974”.63 An accompanying factor was the increasing competition from Japa-
nese firms. The recession and the «Japanese challenge», called for more corporate 
flexibility, which the conglomerates lacked. Moreover, “Geneen’s methods were 
widely copied in other conglomerates and were taught in business schools,” adds 
Araskog, “He was imitated, admired, and envied.”64 Thus, to some extent, the busi-
ness environment’s imitation of ITT and Geneen’s financial control and report sys-
tem eroded ITT's relative ownership advantage in the management field.65 There 
was also an important change in management fads: away from the Druckerian asser-
tion, that a manager could manage anything, to the trend of “Stick-to-your-knitting”, 
and core-competence. Some saw this a managerial response to the coming of the 
post-industrial society, with concerns shifting from productivity to efficiency.66  
 
Another line of defense was that conglomerates were like corporate mutual funds, 
and that the CEO with his managerial apparatus would be able to beat the market. 
The shareholder revolution from the early 1980s drove such assumptions away. In 
an article entitled “ITT - The death of the Geneen machine”, The Economist wrote: 
“The growing efficiency of capital markets means that investors no longer need 
conglomerates to spread investment risk.”67 Another factor was that ITT's allies in 
the “financial world turned to divestments”, according to Araskog, and “Investment 
bankers found that they could make just as much money - no, even more money - by 
tearing down and destroying what had already been built”.68 A key reason for this 
transition was that when conglomerates enjoyed favourable P/E ratios, the whole 
was worth more than the parts. Conversely, when the P/E ratio dropped in the 
1970s, the reverse synergy became true - the sum of the parts was more worth than 
the whole. Thus, the financial community was no longer ITT's ally: on the contrary, 
in the 1980s it assisted the raiders of ITT.  
 
After ITT's share price fell in the 1970s, several considered the break-up value to be 
worth more than its market capitalisation.69 Araskog recalls that when ITT's stock 
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was worth $40 in 1983, he was approached by some raiders, who thought they could 
make a $20-per-share profit if they succeeded in breaking up ITT. According to this, 
the market value was two-thirds of the break-up value.70 Araskog thought it immoral 
that the raiders should reap this margin, as it belonged to the shareholders, and the 
margin was only a result of an inefficient market. The proponents of hostile take-
overs would argue that the shareholders could simply refuse to sell to the raiders if 
they agreed with Araskog, or that it was Araskog, and his like, who fought share-
holders’ activism, that were the biggest obstacles to achieving an efficient market. 
There were some democratic notions attached to this, that shareholders should take 
control over the companies, and that the CEO was to be the servant of the share-
holder. Michael Jensen laid the intellectual foundations for the shareholder-based 
corporate governance philosophy in 1976, with his normative agency theory, which 
claimed that the shareholder was the principal and the CEO was the agent.71 The 
reasons for this development were manifold and complex; one important aspect was 
the reaction against corporate empires. Several asserted that these were built to ac-
commodate the ego of CEOs like Geneen. 
 
Araskog agree with the raiders in that ITT needed to move from diversification to 
divestment, and between 1979 and 1984 he divested sixty-nine companies worth $2 
billion. He thought, however, that ITT and himself should be in charge of the proc-
ess of restructuring ITT. In portraying his fight against the raiders as heroic, Aras-
kog says that he turned down what he “perceived to be a gargantuan bribe” of $30 
million,72 Others maintain that Araskog’s resilience is best explained by a tremen-
dous stock option programme in ITT, allegedly dwarfing any bribe offers.73 There is 
a strong irony in how Araskog condemns the financial world in his book on ITT, 
claiming that there are more interests to be taken into account than just those of the 
shareholders. He argued in line with a stakeholder capitalism, but he did not learn 
this reasoning from Geneen.  
 
* 
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Other companies in the telecom industry were following ITT's struggle on Wall 
Street like vultures, ready to pick up its telecom business in case of an attack.74 This 
was natural, as it was a common understanding that the rocketing R&D costs, esti-
mated at $1 billion for developing a digital switch, entailed a restructuring of the 
industry. Moreover, the liberalisation of the markets for telecom equipment led to 
strategic alliances, most notably between AT&T and the Dutch Philips, intended to 
give the two companies market access on both sides of the Atlantic. ITT's problems 
led to many rumours about its future; a successful sale of the telecom business 
would improve the balance sheet, and not least, prove how “wrong” the market 
evaluation of ITT was. In 1984, ITT's total market capitalisation was $4 billion, 
while the telecom business alone was perceived to be in the range of $2.5 to $4 
billion, very dependent, obviously, on the System 12’s destiny. 
 
ITT had always struggled with its foreign exposure. Both Behn and Geneen had 
been eager to balance its overseas operations; because ITT's foreign assets were 
“subjected to the particular economic conditions and political vicissitudes in these 
countries”.75 Araskog reasoned along the same lines, as he felt the “writing was on 
the wall in the 1970s and early 1980s”.76 He added that the “swelling nationalist 
sentiment around the world led to pressure on almost all of our subsidiaries, to buy 
them out, force them to sell at absurdly low prices”.77 A major proponent of this 
sentiment was France, which, as a part its Colbertism High-Tech, nationalised both 
ITT subsidiaries. In 1982, ITT sold off its shares in its British subsidiary, STC, 
keeping only 25 per cent. In addition to political pressures on its subsidiaries, it was 
difficult to enter foreign markets with digital switches, which were perceived as a 
key technology and infrastructure in the digital revolution, an area in which it was 
important to have a national capacity. Moreover, because of the nature of public 
procurement, it was easy and even expected to use protectionist measures in the 
digital switching industry. 
 
ITT's US strategy for the System 12 was followed closely by Wall Street; not least 
the internal conflicts in the US System 12 team.78 The writing for the System 12 in 
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the US was on the wall, so Araskog was given the green light by his board to ap-
proach potential future partners. He held talks with Nixdorf Computer Company, 
Digital Equipment Corporation, Northern Telecom, and, last but not least, the 
French CGE. Araskog met with CGE’s Georges Pebereau in late 1985, and pro-
posed a joint venture, in which CGE would hold the majority; this was ITT's first 
step to get out of the telecom business. In February 1986, ITT announced that it had 
given up the US market.79 After renouncing the US market, and writing off an 
enormous loss, ITT concentrated most of its System 12 resources on the Norwegian 
project. The successful cutover in Trondheim was decisive to obtain a good price 
from CGE, which resulted in ITT's decision to merge, or sell, its European telecom 
activities in June 1986. ITT was to keep 37 per cent of the newly formed Alcatel 
N.V., a European holding company, dominated by CGE. Even if this was depicted 
as a merger, there was never any doubt that it was a take over. In its note to the 
press, STK wrote: “STK becomes European”.80 
 
Araskog's support for the System 12 was a bet-the-company decision.81 In a way he 
succeeded: thanks to the System 12, he was able to get a fair price for the telecom 
business. On the other hand he failed, because when the US market slipped away, 
the telecom business was doomed. This was a big loss for Araskog; his strategy was 
to turn ITT into a world-leading telecom company, based on the System 12. Most 
“observers”, wrote the Wall Street Journal, were “shocked that the 54-year-old Mr. 
Araskog would contemplate a major shedding of the overseas telecommunications 
operations”.82 Robert Sobel, the author of ITT’s history, was taken by surprise, as he 
was sure Araskog would hold on to telecom.83 The reason was the failure in the 
United States. The break up of AT&T came earlier than anticipated, says Araskog, 
and ITT was delayed in the USA, because it had to protect its European markets.84 It 
was probably, as one observer noted, a case of “I guess the smart thing to do is to 
get the hell out, save some money and save some face.”85 While the divesture of ITT 
may be explained by a contingent factor, i.e. that the System 12 was not adapted in 
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time for the US market, it was no accident that it was a French company that took 
over ITT's telecom business.  
 
 
Alcatel N.V. - a European champion 
France had always played an important role in ITT's telecom business: it was its 
main market. Behn's ability to win this market with the Rotary switch in the 1920s 
was, in reality, the foundation of ITT's future. The French also played a decisive 
role with the crossbar switches. Furthermore, when the French government in-
creased the price on telecom equipment in the 1970s, “to protect the growth of CIT-
Alcatel”, France became ITT's “golden cage”.86 Still, the French had never been 
content with ITT's domination of its telecom business, and as early as the 1930s, 
CGE had begun its “long march against ITT”.87 From the 1970s, France took advan-
tage of its confederate - some would say weak - structure, when it nationalised LMT 
in 1976. After Francois Mitterrand’s election victory in 1981, six leading industrial 
companies were nationalised, including CGE, Thomson, and not least, ITT's last 
French subsidiary, Compagnie Générale de Constructions Téléphoniques (CGCT).  
 
Thomson’s telecom business was strengthened in the 1970 through the acquisition 
of Le Materiél Téléphone (LMT) from ITT, and LME's French subsidiary. This was 
initiated by the PTO, so as to provide competition for CIT-Alcatel. Thomson did not 
fare well in the civilian telecom business, however, and constantly lost money. So, 
in 1983, despite the fierce protests of the PTO, CGE and Thomson did a major 
swap, as CGE took over Thomson’s civilian telecom activities, in exchange for 
consumer and military electronics. This deal, called the “Yalta de l'électronique”, 
signified that CGE had freed itself from the PTO, and was calling the shots in the 
French telecom business. CGCT was retained as an independent company to give 
CIT-Alcatel competition, but the other ITT subsidiary, LMT, became a major part of 
CGE's telecom business. Thus, in a sense, ITT was swallowed by its French subsidi-
ary. A more precise, but still cunning, interpretation, is that the French authorities 
exploited ITT's weaknesses by stripping it of its French subsidiaries, and thus taking 
over the damaged remains. An ingenuous version is that Alcatel filled the vacuum 
that was created when ITT faded out of the global telecom industry. 
 
CIT-Alcatel became a major equipment supplier, with 87 per cent of the French 
market, and was the fourth largest in the world, with over 7 per cent of the global 
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market.88 Still, it had problems in getting access to foreign markets with its E10 
switch, and the French market base was not big enough to fund the increasing R&D 
costs that digitalisation, convergence, satellite communications and fibre optics 
demanded. As observers noted, a “company needs at least 10% of the world mar-
ket.”89 CGE held talks with AT&T, but this would have left CGE as a junior partner, 
and would have opened the French market to AT&T’s products. In this sense, ITT 
was better, as it did not have a home country or market. After having lost LMT and 
CGCT, the French market was closed to ITT. Without market access in the United 
States, ITT needed a European identity to get market access for the System 12. 
Therefore, selling the “European telecommunications manufacturing facilities to a 
strong European telecommunication company”, recalled Araskog, was an “elegant 
solution to a complex problem”.90 
 
Thus, there was a Euro-dimension to the ITT deal. The political and economic inte-
gration in the European Community in general, and EC's deregulation and liberalisa-
tion of the telecom sector in particular, aimed at creating a single European market 
for telecom equipment.91 A major impetus was that the European «national champi-
ons» had problems in competing with the larger American and Japanese firms.92 
Thus, the EU wanted to stimulate “European champions”, and the national markets 
were considered too small to finance the increasing R&D costs that followed from 
the convergence of information and communication technologies. Thus, the EU put 
forward several legislative measures in the second half of the 1980s, including the 
1987 Green paper from 1987, “ on the Development of Common Market Telecom-
munication Services and Equipment”.  
 
“Alcatel was one of the earliest to formulate an internationalisation strategy”, ac-
cording to Razeen Sally, “to take advantage of these markets trends in good time, as 
opposed to being caught off guard by them.”93 The French, and not least Jacques 
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Delors, were instrumental in this.94 Therefore, CGE's acquisition of ITT's telecom 
business was depicted as the creation of a European champion. It was an “historic 
chance for France and Europe”, according to CGE's Georges Pebereau, to acquire “a 
leading position in the telecommunications business until the end of this century”.95 
The other owners of Alcatel N.V. strengthened the Euro-dimension. Apart from ITT 
and CGE, there was the Spanish PTO, Compania Telefonica, and the Société Gen-
erale de Belgique, which was Belgium's biggest and most powerful industrial hold-
ing group, and Alcatel NV was to be registered in Holland.  
 
Alcatel would attain “a European market share of 42.5% for telephone switches”.96 
CGE representatives stressed that this was not going to be a French company, but a 
pan-European one. It was crucial that the national home markets were replaced by 
one European home market, in order to achieve economy of scale, and critical mass 
to finance R&D. One thing was that trade barriers had to be removed; another was 
that national sentiments had to be modified. This was in line with the overarching 
reasoning for the European integration, i.e. each nation had to give up sovereignty, 
in order to achieve a greater goal on a higher, European, level. Still, the creation of 
Alcatel was not a result of European cooperation, but rather an industrial and politi-
cal power struggle, in which the European countries manoeuvred to get in a position 
for the internal market. Alcatel and the French government succeeded in this game, 
in transforming a national champion into a European champion. Norway, through 
the System 12 contract, played a role in the formation of Alcatel N.V., as did EB in 
creating another European champion. 
 
The Norwegian financial revolution 
After losing the digital contract, Kjell Kveim of EB was in a state of shock. EB's 
management did not conceive of such a possibility.97 In STK's contract for 520,000 
lines, there was an option for another 200,000 lines, and then Televerket was to 
arrange a new large tender in 1990. In 1983, most actors assumed that STK would 
get this contract as well. Televerket had, after all, argued strongly for one supplier. 
Consequently, the prospects for EB’s telecom business were dim. It was to continue 
to supply its KV as an extension of the analogue networks for several years, but 
there was no future in this line of business. Besides, this diluted EB's other product 
segments, since the sale of telecom equipment to Televerket had subsidised the bulk 
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of EB's «Norwegian» products, not least maritime satellite communication.98 The 
backbone of EB’s economy in the 1970s was the supply of KV switches and tele-
phone apparatuses to Televerket.99  
 
With EB in such a dismal condition, it was only natural that a merger with STK was 
considered. Thoresen informed his Board, before it was public that STK had won, 
that he wanted negotiations with EB about a future merger.100 After STK's victory 
was made public the Minister of Industry, Jens Halvard Bratz, asked the two com-
panies to discuss their future.101 Abortive talks were held in August 1983, and 
Thoresen approached Kveim again in November, suggesting a new structure in the 
Norwegian telecom industry.102 Kveim declined Thoresen’s invitation, arguing that 
STK and EB followed very different strategies. Kveim stressed that EB had built up 
a considerable foreign business, consisting of subsidiaries and foreign offices. He 
claimed that this strategy had been possible because EB had no dominant foreign 
owner. If STK acquired EB, Kveim feared that ITT's 80 per cent ownership would 
limit EB's freedom to follow this strategy. He saw the freedom to operate interna-
tionally as much more valuable than the benefits that could come out of a merger. 
STK regretted that EB wanted to negotiate cooperation only in limited areas.103  
 
When rejecting STK's invitation, EB may have thought it could continue its busi-
ness as normal, forgetting that once it had been stripped of its switching business, its 
main cash cow was gone. Its market value plummeted after the stock market learned 
of its poor cash flow in 1984, and earnings per share dropped 70 per cent between 
1982 and 1984.104 In 1984, a financial analyst was asked to give his investment 
advice in Kapital, a business magazine.  
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He considered EB a “sleeping beauty”, asserting “The present stock 
price gives the company a market capitalisation of NOK 700 millions, 
which amounts to the value of its real estate on 100.000 m2. Accom-
panying the bargain is an exciting future in telecommunication.”105  
 
The article helped bring EB into play.106 An ironic aspect is that the book, celebrat-
ing EB's centennial anniversary in 1982, boasted about EB's real-estate values.107 
We do not know if the financial analyst learned about EB's real estate through this 
book, but the mere possibility is food for thought for any business historian.  
 
EB's market capitalisation dropped to NOK 630 millions in September 1984. The 
same month, a well-known, and controversial, financial actor, Nils A. Bugge, or the 
Bugge group, started a raid on EB, buying 2.5 per cent of its shares.108 Bugge had 
been in and out of several companies, and was accused of «greenmailing».109 It was 
not only EB that was “in play” in the mid-1980s: a large part of Norwegian business 
was restructured, some through peaceful negotiations, others through power strug-
gles in the stock market, boardrooms, and general assemblies. Bugge and his likes 
contributed to a fierce debate about “transactions economists”, “raiders”, “sharks” 
and “traders”.110 Critiques claimed that Bugge’s affairs were not productive, just 
speculative, and played with companies that had been built over decades. Other 
asserted that this was just what Norwegian business needed - demanding and finan-
cially oriented owners, who could revamp and open up the old and closed arenas for 
decision-making in Norwegian business.111  
 
Bugge’s raid put Kveim in “a state of shock”.112 When Bugge showed up at Billing-
stad, i.e. EB's headquarters just outside Oslo, to present himself, Kveim remained in 
his office, in disarray, and others from the management group met Bugge. He could 
not conceive of the situation EB had ended up in. Jon Erik Stenberg and others from 
EB's management group had urged Kveim to take steps to accommodate the new 
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shareholder sentiment, not least things that could improve EB's figures and stock 
price, such as the sale of real estate and the cutting of R&D. Kveim refused to en-
gaged in such symbolic endeavours, which had no industrial justification. It went 
against everything he stood for as a human being and as a business leader. No one 
doubted that Kveim was very intelligent, and with high moral standards, according 
to Peter Pay and Stenberg, but he was too rational and fact-oriented to cope with the 
new era. Kveim rejected the need to give EB a more market-friendly profile, and 
though such things could be decisive in the new shareholder-era, Kveim disliked 
such symbolism. Moreover, in accordance with his ethical principles, he lacked the 
taste for tactics and cunning, which was required for the game EB was thrown into. 
 
The Bugge group bought more EB shares, and held 25 per cent, the same as LME, 
in January 1985.113 EB was vulnerable, as the financial results for 1983 were catas-
trophic.114 Kapital pondered the company in several issues, calling it the “losers’ 
battlefield”.115 Others said it was too focused on engineering, rather than market-
ing.116 EB had to spend valuable time and resources on combating an unfavourable 
impression of the company. Kveim renounced his principles, and engaged in a sym-
bolic battle. He tried to adjust EB's engineering image, by giving shareholder-
friendly interviews, highlighting market-orientation, the need for divisionalisation 
and other fashionable phrases of the time.117 The old and honourable name Elektrisk 
Bureau was to be replaced by “The EB Group” (EB-gruppen). He also emphasised 
EB's export-orientation, claiming that EB did not want to be so reliant on the Nor-
wegian market, in which Televerket was so dominating, and away from the constant 
struggle with STK. Most of these strategies were old news for Kveim, as he had 
been pursuing them for industrial reasons from 1972; the new thing for him was that 
he had to go public with it, to participate in the public «beauty contest».  
 
In addition to the media campaign, EB made arrangements with a «white knight», 
an investment company called Nimbus, which bought shares in EB to outweigh 
Bugge’s influence.118 Kapital was furious about Nimbus and other «white knights», 
                                                          
113 “EB-oppkjøp for over 200 mill” Aftenposten 23.01.85. og “Bugge viste EB-flagget” Nor-
ges Handels og Sjøfartstidene 23.01.85. 
114 ”Øket aksjeomsetning” in Aftenposten 27.02.84. 
115 “Elektrisk Bureau: Tapernes slagmark” in Kapital nr. 7 1985. 
116 and “Klarer EB omstillingen” Aftenposten 09.03.85. 
117 “Klarer EB omstillingen” in Aftenposten 09.03.85. 
118 EB rejected the notion that Nimbus acted on their behalf, but Nimbus’ leader admitted this 
in “AKTUELL IDAG: EB-konsernets «hvite ridder»“ in Aftenposten 19.09.85. Nimbus forced 
the Bugge group to sell them 180,000 shares in EB, and this was allegedly possible because 
the Bugge group was financially vulnerable. 
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and credited Bugge for trying to shake life into EB and the assets everybody knew 
were there. They thought it typical that it was the raider who became the scapegoat, 
and not Kjell Kveim, “who has had every opportunity, but failed in the most grue-
some manner”.119 Kapital could not understand why EB's other shareholders ac-
cepted Kveim and EB's deal with Nimbus: was it just another sign of the camarade-
rie in Norwegian business, or were EB's shareholders masochists? EB's financial 
results for 1984, which were presented in March 1985, bolstered Kapital’s assertion, 
and undermined Kveim’s strategy: the figures were even worse than those of 
1983.120 
 
EB had agreed with Bugge to let McKinsey analyse the company, and Bugge was 
probably confident that the recommendations would be in accordance with his inter-
ests. McKinsey suggested splitting EB into different stock-listed companies: cable, 
telecom, real estate, Nera and EB's business communication.121 The report also veri-
fied that the underlying value of EB was much higher than the market capitalisation, 
which was NOK 700 million in August 1985: even the cable subsidiary, Norsk 
Kabelfabrikk, was expected to get a market price of between NOK 400-600 mil-
lions, and the real estate value was still higher than EB's total market value. Even if 
the stock price rose as a result of the report, the conflict with Bugge remained a 
problem, which needed to be solved if EB was to start on its complicated 
reorganisation. At this point, in August 1985, STK made another approach to EB, 
being interested in taking part in the discussion regarding EB's possible 
reorganisation. The main argument was that Norway was too small for two telecom 
companies, and that STK and EB could be a unit to be reckoned with 
internationally.122  
This time it was STK's chairman, Johan B. Holte, who contacted EB's chairman, 
Halvdan Bjørum, perhaps to prevent the Thoresen - Kveim relationship from getting 
in the way. STK was most keen on Norsk Kabelfabrikk, which was profitable. The 
telecom was different, as Thoresen reported to ITTE: “it is here EB has its problems 
(...). Heavy R&D and overstaffing are having negative impact on results”.123 The 
head of ITTE, Daniel P. Weadock, was sceptical and told Thoresen to “go very 
slowly” because STK's “balance sheet is not in the best shape” and was “projected 
to deteriorate”. Weadock allowed for discussions with EB, but “under no circum-
                                                          
119 “Elektrisk Bureau: Tapernes slagmark” in Kapital nr. 7 1985. 
120 “Utbytte på 12 prosent: Svakere for EB“ Aftenposten 21.03.85. 
121 “EB splittes i flere nye ’børsbedrifter’” in Aftenposten 13.08.85; “EB-deling skal avklares 
raskt” in Aftenposten 14.08.85. 
122 STK's Board’s archive: From Johan B. Holte, STK's chairman, to Halvdan Bjørum, EB's 
Chairman 16.08.85. 
123 IØPA: Thoresen to Weadock, Cchluski and Carpenter 20.08.85, Cc. R.V. Araskog. 
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stance, I repeat under no circumstances, are you to get yourself or ITT in a position 
where it could be inferred that we have made a commitment.”124 Weadock reasoned 
that STK would have their hands full in meeting the terms of the digital contract, 
and this was much more important for ITT(E) than the Norwegian market. Workers 
at STK and EB were anxious when they heard the merger rumours, and Thoresen 
promised that STK would not make a hostile move, claiming they were “not inter-
ested in buying ourselves a war”.125 After EB ignored STK's initiative, STK decided 
not to contact the “Bugge group or others with EB shares”.126 Thus, STK and EB 
did never engaged in serious talks on merging the companies.127 
 
Bugge and Nimbus, the «white knight», owned half of the shares in EB by August 
1985, and had agreed to sell out. Elektro-Union, which was owned by Investa, the 
former owner of Nera, was interested. In 1982, the Conservative government sold 
the government's stake in Elektro-Union, and thus it was freer to engage in mergers 
and acquisitions, and it used this freedom.128 EB's cable business was interesting for 
Elektro-Union, since it was in the electro-technical area, but Investa's main interest 
was financial. Bugge-Nimbus met Elektro-Union’s Chairman Oskar A. Munch and 
CEO Kjell Almskog in London, and negotiated a deal in secrecy. A precondition for 
Elektro-Union was that EB's cooperation with LME continued, and that EB ac-
cepted Elektro-Union as a dominant owner.129 Kveim and Bjørum went to Stock-
holm with Munch and Almskog. It was the same quartet that had met when EB 
bought Nera in 1976, and much had changed in Norwegian business during those 
nine years. 
 
On the plane to Stockholm, the four went over EB's accounts, which, according to 
Munch, were a real mess, and he claims that Kveim was not able to understand his 
own accounts.130 Probably, this said more about the circumstances than Kveim’s 
                                                          
124 IØPA: Telefax Weadock to Thoresen, 22.08.85. 
125 STK's internal paper Minutt-nytt 26.08.85; “STK interessert i samarbeide, men: EBs an-
satte må høres” and “STK vil ikke «krige» for å kjøpe opp EB” in Aftenposten 27.08.85. 
126 STK's archive: Board-papers: Thoresen to STK Board of Directors 26.08.85. 
127 STK and EB did cooperate in defence communication, and established some sort of a joint 
venture in this line of industry. (“EB og STK skal forene markedsføringskrefter” i Aftenpos-
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by the Ministry of Industry and Defence. There were also negotiations with Televerket to 
establish a joint venture with all three parties for business communication (Norsk Bedrifts 
Kommunikasjon.), but this did not materialise because Televerket's status was unsettled. 
STK's board meeting, letter from Thoresen to STK's Board members 26.01.83. 
128 Interview with Oskar Munch. 
129 Interview with Oskar Munch. 
130 Interview with Oskar Munch. 
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financial understanding. He understood probably better than anyone else why the 
accounts were so cryptic, that even such financial experts as Munch and Almskog 
were not able to penetrate them. EB's accounts were a riddle in order to conceal the 
fact that the supplies to Televerket subsidised the other product lines.131 In fact, 
Kveim was probably one of the few who really understood these accounts. Never-
theless, LME welcomed Elektro-Union as a majority owner.132 The only one to 
protest heavily against Investa's intrusion was EB's telecom director Tor Egil Holte. 
Kveim had already announced that he would step down as CEO, and Holte had 
positioned himself to replace Kveim.133 Elektro-Union bought the Bugge group’s 
shares, accounting for 25 per cent of EB. As the share price had almost doubled 
after the Bugge group’s entry, it made a huge profit: Bugge himself, allegedly, made 
NOK 35 millions.134  
 
Later, Elektro-Union took over Nimbus’s shares, and some from LME as well, ac-
quiring a majority share.135 Kjell Almskog, who became the new CEO, was re-
nowned for his rough management style, purportedly stating that he would throw 
colleagues out of the window, if they were not able to hold their budget. He stressed 
that financial results are the only thing that counts, and “everything else is bull-
shit”.136 Not too dissimilar from one of Geneen's doctrines, that “the only line, is the 
bottom line”. One might say that Almskog and Munch instigated «Geneenism» in 
EB. Both had studied in the United States in the 1960s, at the time of the financial 
revolution on Wall Street, and were some of the main proponents of this develop-
ment in Norway. It is important to mention that Almskog and his methods came as a 
relief to many EB aides, who longed for financial control and closer following up of 
results. They thought one of EB's main problems was that Kveim lacked toughness 
towards R&D-happy engineers.137 If one did not meet one’s terms during Kveim’s 
regime, recalls Peter Pay, one was never confronted with it, and the problem 
dragged on for years. This way, he added, one “slowly roasted”, whereas with Alm-
skog, the matter was taken care of right away. 
 
                                                          
131 Interview with Jon Erik Stenberg, and Peter Pay. 
132 Interview with Oskar Munch; “EB-ansatte stanset Investas aksjekjøp” in Aftenposten 
24.08.85; “Oskar A. Munch Lyttet til de ansattes ’Nei’” in Aftenposten 28.08.85. 
133 Interview with Oskar Munch; “Nye eiere i EB snart, Kveim vil ha avløsning” in Aftenpos-
ten 22.08.85. 
134 “Solgte EB-aksjer til Investa: Bugge tjente 35 millioner” in Aftenposten 14.09.85. 
135 “L. M. Ericsson: Riktig å redusere andelen i EB” in Aftenposten 17.12.85. 
136 “AKTUELL PROFIL Ville bli noe stort” in Aftenposten 31.03.01. 
137 Interview with Peter Pay. 
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EB's profitability increased substantially after Almskog’s arrival, and so did the 
stock price. One irony in relation to EB's good results from 1985 was that the com-
pany made huge profits on delivering KV switches to Televerket. The installation of 
the System 12 was delayed by several months, and a large switching station in Oslo 
burned down in 1984, and as a consequence EB supplied switches to meet the in-
creasing demand for telephones. So, STK won the digital contract, but EB made 
money on it.138 Critics will have it that Almskog disregarded R&D and EB's hard-
earned competence in electronics.139 It is beyond the limits of this thesis to evaluate 
such claims. It is true that several hundred workers lost their jobs in EB during the 
Almskog regime, but this had little to do with Almskog: it was a result of the tech-
nological and political development. While Peter Pay was head of EB Telecom in 
1986-87, he had to dismiss 1350 of 2500 employees.140 
 
EB bought Elektro-Union in 1986, and the companies were merged, turning into 
one of Norway’s largest industrial companies.141 Now, it was as much an electro-
technical company as a telecom company. Some say that this was the problem with 
Almskog, that with his background in Elektro-Union, he never got deeply in en-
gaged in telecom.142 About the same time, Investa sold 20 per cent of EB's share to 
the Swedish electro-technical giant, ASEA, which, like LME, was a part of the 
Wallenberg sphere. After buying some more cable companies in 1987, EB acquired 
Norsk Elektrisk Brown Boveri (NEBB) in August 1987, which was the Swiss 
Brown Boveri’s Norwegian subsidiary.143 EB was now acclaimed the largest pri-
vately held industrial company in Norway, but that did not last for long. The acqui-
sition of NEBB came about the same time as ASEA and Brown Boveri announced a 
                                                          
138 In June 1986, Televerket ordered KV switches worth NOK 85 million; STK had to pay 64 
million of this sum, and in addition, EB delivered KV equipment worth NOK 24 million to 
replace the switch destroyed in the fire. STK's archive: Thoresen to STK's Board: “Notat om 
System 12 kontrakten 02.06.86” 
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merger, creating ABB.144 In the same month, ABB bought 60 per cent of EB from 
Investa, in of the largest-ever acquisitions on the Norwegian stock market.145  
 
Some say this was the final nail in the coffin for EB's decade-old ambitions of being 
an independent telecom company.146 One thing that goes against this assertion is 
that in 1988, EB joined Simonsen Elektro and ELAB in a government-sponsored 
effort to capitalise on the Norwegian competence in mobile telephony. Simonsen 
was to manufacture the handset and EB the base stations for the future GSM system. 
Notwithstanding, in hindsight, there is little doubt that the most striking thing with 
EB in the 1980s was that Investa made a fortune on the company, according to 
Munch, of about NOK 1 billion in current values.147 Thus, Investa's acquisition and 
transactions with EB were the most successful in Norwegian history, in financial 
terms. EB's financial reserves, earned from supplying Televerket, and intended for 
strengthening its and Norway’s position in telecom, were swallowed by Investa. In 
the mid-1980s, Investa was regarded as a potential Wallenberg-like sphere in Nor-
way, with assets, allegedly, amounting to NOK 30 billion, and ownership in several 
Norwegian industrial companies. But Investa faltered, after hazardous expansion 
into the insurance business.148  
 
ABB - a European champion 
Still, it is fair to assert that the Munch and Almskog engagement in EB was success-
ful in industrial terms as well, only not in telecom. Almskog succeeded in develop-
ing the Norwegian ABB unit into a lead house in oil-related business, and it also had 
substantial business in power generators, and was a major contributor to ABB's 
global success in the 1990s.149 So, Almskog was right when he said that EB was not 
going to be swallowed by the giant Swedish whale, but “sit on its back around the 
world”.150 ABB Norge was frequently used as an example of how foreign owners 
did not need to be a drawback for Norwegian industry.151 Eventually, Almskog 
became Percy Barnevik’s second in command in ABB, and one of the few Norwe-
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gian industrial leaders who has succeeded internationally. It was ABB's strategy and 
structure that made such a position possible, even for a subsidiary from a small 
country like Norway. We should look briefly into ABB’s multinational strategy to 
get an understanding of how European integration and liberalisation had changed 
the perception of MNCs and subsidiaries in the 1990s.  
 
ABB was, like Alcatel, perceived as a European champion, but in the electro-
technical area, and the merger was a positioning for the advent of the EC’s inner 
market, and to meet the competition from American and Japanese firms. An impor-
tant feature of ABB was that it stressed that it was not a traditional hierarchical 
MNC. Its CEO, Percy Barnevik, stressed that ABB was to combine global reach and 
economy of scale with local presence and adaptation.152 He ripped off the environ-
mental slogan: “Think global, act local.”153 The idea was to decentralise R&D and 
innovation, and tap into and exploit each country’s competence bases, or systems of 
innovations. Such ideas were very much in vogue in the late 1980s, and several 
articles were published on how MNCs' strategy and structure should be decentral-
ised and competence-driven, and not centralised and dictated by headquarters. 
Christopher Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal advocated that an MNC should “Tap 
(its) subsidiaries for Global Reach”.154 Similarly, Gunnar Hedlund wrote a much-
acclaimed article about how the modern MNC was a ‘heterarchy’, as opposed to a 
‘hierarchy’, allegedly inspired by studies of ASEA and ABB.155  
 
ABB and Barnevik certainly believed in this strategy, but there were some factors 
that made such an image and strategy more likely for ABB. First, many of ABB’s 
customers were public utilities, and living off public procurement entailed a strong 
degree of national responsiveness. Another important element inducing this strategy 
was that most of ABB's products needed local adaptation, and this required a decen-
tralised structure. Thus, the economy of scale and standardisation was smaller in 
ABB's line of business. ABB's business was R&D-intensive, but first and foremost 
development-intensive, and much of this was conducted while installing products 
such as a gas turbine or an oil installation. There was a similar situation with STK's 
success in the field of submarine cables, which may be a main structural explanation 
for its development into a lead house. In telecom, by way of contrast, there was a 
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transition from local to global products. As more national telecom networks became 
“seamless”, with standardised interfaces, less competence was required for adapting 
and installing equipment. Thus, more of R&D could be centralised. Moreover, it is 
normal that MNCs from small countries undertake more R&D in their subsidiaries, 
as they are not large enough to have the competence and R&D facilities needed for 
a large MNC.156 Finally, Sweden and Switzerland were not EC members, so ABB 
needed to be more responsive to the EU, than, for instance, Alcatel. 
 
For Alcatel to follow this new fashion would entail a breach of the traditional policy 
of French MNCs, since they were known to centralise their R&D in France.157 Not-
withstanding, Alcatel proclaimed an integrated strategy when taking over ITT's 
telecom business. To accomplish standardisation and avoid duplication, Alcatel 
stressed that it wanted to induce cooperation, and promote specialised subsidiaries, 
across the national boundaries. By exploiting national advantages, each subsidiary 
should be able to attain a lead-house position, based on competence.158 Alcatel's 
representatives stressed that it was not going to be a French company, but a pan-
European one. It was crucial that the national home markets were replaced by one 
European home market, in order to achieve economy of scale, and critical mass to 
finance R&D. Alcatel used the prevailing euroism for what it was worth, to combat 
the impression of a French take-over. So, it seemed as if STK had a new - European 
- room for strategic manoeuvre under its new French owners.  
 
STK - a French subsidiary 
If STK's telecom business were to attain a position within Alcatel's integrated strat-
egy, it would have to be in an area in which it had a comparative advantage. This is 
the main idea of the integrated strategy, that multinationals should exploit subsidiar-
ies’ and host-nations’ advantages. STK had such advantages within military com-
munications, based on its development of the Nodal point switch. Such advantages 
are often derived from natural resources and/or geographical features of a country. 
The first was the case for ABB Norway’s strong position within the oil business. 
The second, i.e. geographical structures, lies behind Nera's strength in radio link, 
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and STK's in submarine cables.159 Norway’s relatively strong position within radio 
communication and wireless communication is based on a combination of the two, 
resources and geography, i.e. fish (later oil) and the long coastline. This in turn 
formed the basis for Televerket's contribution to mobile telephony. STK's new man-
aging director from 1988, Bjarne Aamodt, tried to exploit all these advantages in his 
pursuit of positioning STK within Alcatel. He stressed that STK had to move from 
being a miniature replica, to a lead house in certain areas, as each subsidiary had to 
develop in the areas in which they were strongest; adding that “if everybody shall 
produce everything for every market, it goes without saying that the competition 
will be lost.”160 
 
Besides reaching the mature age of 61, Fredrik Thoresen thought it natural to resign 
once Alcatel had become the majority owner. He replaced Johan B. Holte as STK's 
chairman, a position he held until 1999.161 Aamodt had an unfortunate admittance to 
STK, as the employees favoured the Director of Personnel, Lars Harlem, as Thore-
sen’s successor. They claimed Aamodt lacked industrial experience and knew little 
about telecom, and that Harlem was the right man for creating the vibrant manage-
ment team STK needed.162 The discord hit the newspapers, and due to the employ-
ees’ insistence on Harlem, the Board discussed the issue for twelve hours, before 
settling on Aamodt.163 The Board never seriously considered Harlem, and some 
maintain that he had launched himself as a candidate. Despite the Board’s lack of 
confidence in Harlem, he chose to remain in STK. In the management reshuffle 
following Aamodt’s replacement of Thoresen, Harlem took over Tidemann’s place 
as head of the telecom division. Thus, it was Harlem who was to handle STK's tele-
com business within Alcatel. Harlem and Aamodt pursued a growth policy, based 
on the assertion that STK was the only vital telecom company in Norway. This 
belief was strengthened by ABB's take over of EB in 1987, which turned EB into an 
electro-technical company.  
 
The first expansion took place when STK bought Scanvest Ring and its manufactur-
ing subsidiary Kitron in 1989. Scanvest had a strong position in business communi-
cation, while Kitron was one of few specialised and effective manufacturers of elec-
                                                          
159 Norway’s mountainous topography was perfectly suited for radiolink transmission; the 
mountains served as communication “towers” for the transmitters and receivers of micro-
waves. 
160 Aamodt’s message in Annual report 1989, (Hvis alle skal produsere alt for alle markeder, 
sier det seg selv at konkurransen tapes.) 
161 STK's Board-meeting 16.12.87. 
162 STK's Board meeting 26.08.87; Letter from STK's employees to STK's Board, 20.08.87. 
163 “Aamodt STK-sjef efter hard dragkamp” in Aftenposten 28.08.87. 
Chapter 7 The fall of the Norwegian telecom industry 
 278
tronic components in Norway. When ABB announced that it was to sell EB's tele-
com business back to Ericsson, STK presented a Norwegian alternative, wanting to 
take over EB's telecom business.164 Alcatel STK was the only company in Norway, 
Aamodt told the press, which had the capacity to unite the Norwegian telecom in-
dustry.165 He told Paris that he wanted an “integration” of the “Norwegian Telecom 
Industry” with a “majority holding” for Alcatel.166 He thought stronger units in 
defence, business communication, and Nera's radio link business would be interest-
ing to Alcatel. The long-term objective was “to restructure and consolidate the 
Norwegian telecom industry in order to establish a strong subsidiary within the 
Alcatel-group instead of (having) several smaller subsidiaries with different interna-
tional owners.”167 Aamodt’s ambition was never realistic, as Ericsson wanted EB's 
telecom business to position itself before Televerket's new tender for digital 
switches. In reality, it was a reshuffle within the Wallenberg sphere.  
 
A consequence of Ericsson’s acquisition of EB was that EB withdrew from its GSM 
project with Simonsen Elektro and ELAB. Some feared that Ericsson obtained a 
free ticket to the Norwegian development of mobile telephony systems.168 There are 
few indications, however, that Ericsson was attracted by this project.169 Still, Simon-
sen was in trouble after EB's departure from the project. In June, the Ministry of 
Industry asked “Alcatel STK to take over the GSM activity in Norway and look into 
Simonsen as a possible take over candidate”.170 Public bodies urged STK to take 
over Simonsen, as it feared that the national investments in mobile telephony would 
be wasted. It seemed a bitter fact that Norway had the highest penetration of mobile 
telephones, but that Nokia, selling most phones in Norway in 1988, reaped the bene-
fits.171 Negotiations between STK and Simonsen stalled because STK thought the 
price was too high, but then, as Aamodt informed Alcatel, Televerket's “very strong 
chairman”, Egil Abrahamsen, stepped in and forced Simonsen to re-enter negotia-
tions with “STK, based on half the price demand”.172  
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was eager to see STK take over Simonsen was Jens P. Heyerdahl, CEO of Orkla. In addition 
to being generally concerned about Norwegian industry, he wanted to make sure that Simon-
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Simonsen Elektro had had success with manufacturing handsets for the NMT sys-
tem (Nordic Mobile Telephone) since 1978. Its competence in the field was based 
on contracts with the armed forces. It had big challenges in 1989,when it had to 
manage the transition from stationary to portable phones, and the transition from the 
NMT to the GSM system. This required increased R&D and scale manufacturing, 
which in turn necessitated larger markets. The government and Simonsen hoped 
STK could provide it with competence in R&D and scale production, and that Al-
catel would secure market access. Aamodt thought that Kitron’s manufacturing 
capabilities would fit Simonsen’s technology, and endorsed the project, if Alcatel 
granted STK a position as a “«lead-house» for the NMT-area.”173 Alcatel, however, 
was apprehensive from the outset. Perhaps they did not believe in Simonsen as a 
good case. It might also be that they did not want to locate a lead house of such a 
potential important product line in Oslo, far away from French influence. Or it 
might be that Alcatel did not believe in mobile telephony, they allegedly regarded it 
as a Scandinavian toy.174 On the other hand, Alcatel had already formed a mobile 
telephone consortium with AEG and Nokia in 1987.175 An interesting correlation is 
that Siemens’s first mobile handset was developed by its Norwegian subsidiary. 
Siemens Norge, which hoped that it could be Siemens’s lead house in the field, but 
the business was moved to Germany as soon as it reached a certain volume.176  
 
Despite French reluctance, STK pushed the case through, without Alcatel's ap-
proval, and signed an intentional agreement with Simonsen’s main owners in Octo-
ber 1989. More seriously, however, was that the parties notified the press that Al-
catel STK would pay NOK 22 million to take over Simonsen.177 Harlem was in-
strumental in pushing this through. Maybe he hoped that this would secure the deal, 
that Alcatel would feel obliged by the intentional agreement and the press coverage. 
There are strong indications that he did not give accurate reports to his STK col-
leagues about Alcatel's reluctance towards the project.178 This is why Aamodt, as 
                                                                                                                                        
sen’s activity at Løkken continued. This was Orkla’s old industrial site, Heyerdahl had ar-
ranged for Simonsen to locate its plant there, and he had very strong feelings for this local 
community. Interview with Hans Jørgen Blomseth. 
173 STK's Board meeting 26.10.89: Aamodt to STK's Board 17.10.89. 
174 Interview with Ivar Ørbeck. 
175 Häikiö 2002, p. 131; Palmberg 2002. 
176 Ole N Hoemsnes: Siemens i Norge (1898-1998) 100 år, 1997; p. 380. 
177 STKJA-25: File: JAA - Simonsen Elektro mP. 1: Avtale mellom Alcatel STK (ASTK) og 
I.M. Skaugen A/S Bertel O. Steen A/S/Erik O. Steen” 20.10.89. “Alcatel STK overtar Simon-
sen Elektro” in Aftenposten 24.10.89; “Ut i verden med Alcatel” i Dagens Næringsliv 24.10.89. 
178 STKJA-25: File: JAA - Simonsen Elektro mP. 2: Aamodt to Mr. J. Curvale Alcatel N.V. 
01.11.89; and several interviews. 
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late as late 1 November 1989, asked Alcatel for an “approval to acquire 100% of 
Simonsen Elektro A/S”.179 Soon after, STK learned, apparently through a due dili-
gence, that Simonsen’s financial state was worse than thought.180 It is hard to be-
lieve that STK did not have better oversight of Simonsen’s financial state when 
signing the intentional agreement; moreover, the government had given promises 
regarding financial support to STK if it took over Simonsen.  
 
The main reason STK backed down was that Alcatel did not support the project. It 
was Alcatel's Business Systems Group that dealt with mobile telephony, and its 
leader, Christian-Georges Chazot, was furious with STK in general, and Harlem in 
particular.181 Chazot told Aamodt that each time Harlem had contacted his group he 
had received a negative reaction to the Simonsen deal. “We learnt of the STK Si-
monsen agreement via press articles (...) in spite of renewed warnings (...) against 
such operations. (...) No wonder that this negative stand was reaffirmed on Novem-
ber 8.” He concluded by “strongly requesting that, in the future, corporate rules be 
strictly adhered”.182  
 
Perhaps Simonsen’s financial state was too poor, or perhaps it and STK, or even 
Kitron for that matter, lacked the capability to engage in scale production. Neverthe-
less, it was a major blow for STK. It was bad for its public image; and not least for 
its relationship with Televerket and the government, which was important as the 
second tender for digital switches was due soon. It created internal tensions at STK, 
and the relationship with Alcatel was very strained. Still, the major problem was that 
it was difficult to envisage how STK could attain a position as a lead house within 
Alcatel after this. If Alcatel was not interested in trying to exploit the Scandinavian 
and Norwegian competence in mobile telephony, what other field could it be inter-
ested in? It is true that the acquisition of Simonsen was risky, but the NOK 22 mil-
lion it cost combined with the potential losses were nothing compared to STK's loss 
on the digital contract. These losses could be reduced if they won the next contract 
for digital switches. 
 
* 
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The System 12 contract from 1983 was a financial blow for STK. According to the 
press it lost NOK 500 millions, but according to Thoresen and Hans Jørgen 
Blomseth, STK's Economic director from 1986-92, the company lost over NOK 700 
millions.183 Still, STK received much acclaim for its swift installation of the rest of 
the switches, after BTM and SEL had delivered their share. Moreover, the System 
12 installation was regarded as major accomplishment, and Gunnar Tidemann 
claims it is one of the most outstanding technological achievements in Norwegian 
history.184 STK installed 250 switches, serving 700,000 lines, before the end of 
1987.185 After having perfected its System 12 routines, STK hoped to recoup some 
of the losses by winning Televerket's next tender.186 Televerket's was very satisfied 
with the System 12 network, which was confirmed when it used the option in the 
1983 agreement to extend the contract by a further 200,000 lines.187 The upgraded 
software, the Remote Subscribers Switches, the Network Service Centres and the 
Signalling No. 7, all functioned according to the plan. Televerket postponed the next 
tender in 1989, due to capacity problems, and instead it prolonged the agreement 
with STK. Thus, by 1991, STK had delivered 1.4 million lines, covering 40 per cent 
of the Norwegian network.188  
 
In addition to the low prices Televerket paid, the network was regarded as very 
modern and cost-effective. Thus, the System 12 project was a success for ITT and 
for Alcatel as well, as Norway functioned as a good showcase for the System 12. 
Business Week wrote an article about this in 1988, entitled: “How Alcatel turned a 
sinkhole into a success - The System 12 switch, a loser for ITT, is a winner for the 
French”.189 The article misses an important point, namely that ITT succeeded in its 
strategy, in using Norway and Televerket as a showcase for the switch, but this did 
not pay off before after the establishment of Alcatel N.V. Many PTOs sent represen-
tatives to Televerket to examine the network, which, according to BTM, improved 
                                                          
183 “Kamp om milliardkontrakt” in Aftenposten 15.06.90.; Interview with Fredrik Thoresen, 
and Hans Jørgen Blomseth. 
184 Interview with Gunnar Tidemann. 
185 “Pionerarbeid i perspektiv” in Åpen Linje, nr. 14 1997 (Telenor’s magazine). 
186 STK's Annual report 1987. 
187 STK's archive: File: “Televerket/Opsjon 88-89: Press release from STK and Televerket 
16.12.86. 
188 This figure included 1.2 million subscriber lines and 200,000 transit lines. STK's annual 
report 1988; “STK brikke i ITTs spill” i Dagens Næringsliv 07.11.90. Totally, Televerket 
paid about NOK 3 billion to STK, in current prices, for the System 12 switches. It is difficult 
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paid a very low price per line, which contributed to its low subscriber charges in the 1990s. 
Interview with Bjørn Gladsø. 
189 Business Week 09.05.88. 
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Alcatel's sales of the system into the 1990s. It was particularly the Remote Sub-
scriber Units and the Network Service Centres that caught the attention of the other 
PTOs. Thus, the System 12 became a key factor in Alcatel’s growth during the fol-
lowing years. In 1990, a new contract was up for grabs in Norway. 
 
Televerket arranged a new tender for digital switches in 1990, ordering 800,000 
lines, with an option for an additional 500,000 lines. Televerket decided to have a 
closed tender, inviting Alcatel STK, Ericsson Norway and Siemens to hand in of-
fers. There was little debate about this decision, probably because most people con-
sidered that the first tender had been sufficient in removing the «negotiated envi-
ronment», and reducing the prices. An important difference in the 1990 tender was 
that Televerket did not demand Norwegian manufacturing. This was another sign of 
how digitalisation and liberalisation had changed the relationship between 
Televerket and the telecom industry. Digitalisation had erased any ambitions of a 
Norwegian switching industry, and liberalisation demanded that Televerket put 
price and quality before employment in its procurement policy. Still, STK stressed 
that the manufacturing of the circuit boards would take place in Norway, and that 
this would benefit the Norwegian telecom industry in general, and STK in particu-
lar. Moreover, STK insisted that Televerket would be better of with one digital 
system in the network. Thus, it tried to revitalised the logic of the oligopolic grip. 
 
Moreover, STK stressed that it was the only real Norwegian telecom company, that 
Ericsson Norway was more foreign than Alcatel STK.190 Thus, the tactics had simi-
larities to those used by EB in 1982, but the Simonsen issue had made Alcatel STK 
look very French. STK claimed there was a big difference from the tender in 1982; 
that time, the winner would have had to build up its capacity to supply digital 
switches, but this time, if Ericsson won, STK would have to reduce its capacity, 
while Ericsson Norway would have to increase its capacity.191 Televerket, for its 
part, was reluctant to give Alcatel and STK a monopoly in Norway. In fact, Ingar 
Hansen, who was responsible for the price evaluations, put an extra monopoly tariff 
on STK's prices, as he was certain that Alcatel would exploit an eventual monopoly 
in the future.192 LME dumped the price in much the same manner as ITT did in 
1983, and was much lower than STK in the first round. Hansen says LME's price 
                                                          
190 Some of STK's old-timers said to the newspaper that the Swedish PTO would never buy 
equipment from a Norwegian company, as Televerket did from a Swedish. “STK en kjempe i 
motvind” in Aftenposten 13.07.90. 
191 Thor Viksveen, Alcatel STK's Director of public Relations: “Telekontrakten og industripo-
litikken” in Aftenposten 18.07.90. 
192 Interview with Kjell Christensen; Televerket's board meeting 03.07.90: Televerket added 
NOK 350 millions to STK's offers. 
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was about half of Alcatel STK's. His impression was that LME wanted to win the 
contract, because it had seen how valuable Norway had been as a showcase for the 
System 12. And, as with ITT's dumping in 1983, it did not amount to much in 
LME's total economy, as Norway was such a small market.193 
 
When Televerket called for a price reduction, Aamodt gave a new offer without 
including the manufacturing of circuit boards at STK.194 This decision caused many 
misgivings at Økern, and Knut Berg resigned in protest, as did Vidar Østreng, the 
director of switching.195 Ericsson's offer was still much lower than STK's, so 
Televerket chose Ericsson in July 1990. STK, its unions and politicians in Oslo 
protested, not least because Oslo had lost many jobs during the previous years. Nev-
ertheless, the Stortinget endorsed Televerket's choice, so Ericsson Norway won the 
contract. LME's price was decisive for Televerket's choice, as Televerket paid half 
of what the Swedish PTO had paid for the AXE during the same years.196 The 
evaluation group said that Ericsson had defined a new price level with this offer.197 
Moreover, the AXE system had been upgraded considerably since 1982, and had 
advantages compared to the System 12, not least as it consumed only half as much 
electricity. The AXE was also able to accommodate Televerket's demand for 
centralised control through the Network Service Centres. A final reason for 
choosing the AXE was that this laid the ground for competition in the future 
between Ericsson and Alcatel.198 
 
Televerket's choice in 1990 sent STK's share price further down, and it fell to NOK 
33 at the end of 1990.199 It also prompted STK to shut down its telecom manufactur-
ing at Økern and Kongsvinger. Several hundred people were laid off, and STK 
moved the rest of its minor manufacturing of telecom equipment to its newly ac-
quired manufacturing subsidiary, Kitron, at Kilsund in southern Norway. STK's 
unions and the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions protested fiercely. It 
accused STK and Aamodt of merely executing orders from Alcatel's headquarters. 
These reactions said more about the feelings at Økern, than about Aamodt’s rela-
                                                          
193 LME's sales in 1990 totalled 30 billion Swedish kroners, and the Norwegian digital con-
tract of 1990 was worth around NOK 2 billion, for supply over four years. Thus, given that 
100 Norwegian kroners equalled 100 Swedish kroners at the time, the Norwegian market 
accounted for 1.5 per cent of LME's turnover during the four years the installation lasted. 
194 Interview with Tidemann; “Arbeidere ofres i priskamp” in Aftenposten 09.07.90. 
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196 Interview with Bjørn Gladsø. 
197 BGA: “Innstilling om valg av leverandør for utstyr til 90-årenes telenet, no date. 
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199 ”Alcatel STK ble årets aksje i 1991” in Aftenposten 20.12.91. 
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tions with Alcatel. STK did get some new contracts from Televerket, first for the 
upgrading and extending of the already existing System 12 network, and later to 
install System 12 switches for the Winter Olympics at Lillehammer in 1994. Never-
theless, the writing was on the wall, and STK's days as a switching manufacturer 
was over. The 1990s, for STK's telecom business, are a story of downscaling.  
 
The fall of the Norwegian telecom industry 
Ivar Ørbeck elaborated on STK's situation while giving his contribution to the Nor-
wegian Porter study, which was completed in 1992.200 As Ørbeck’s contribution is 
illuminating, we need to take a look at it. Michael Porter’s “cluster theories” resem-
ble Bengt-Åke Lundvall’s “system of innovation” perspective, in that interaction 
between economic actors spurs innovation. Porter argues that in a cluster, upgrading 
mechanisms develop due to demanding customers.201 Hence, both Lundvall and 
Porter stress that innovations take place in the interface between firms. Ørbeck drew 
a dismal picture in his contribution to the Porter study, it sounded like the swansong 
of the Norwegian system of innovation in telecom, as he knew it.202 He did not ac-
knowledge that Televerket had been among the first to pursue a cost-efficient pro-
curement policy in Europe, thus quite contrary to Porter’s call for demanding cus-
tomers. He claimed that this had happened at the expense of the Norwegian telecom 
industry. His main complaint was that Televerket and the TF offered fewer devel-
opment contracts to STK than before. 
 
Ørbeck recapped his perception of multinational companies, which had not changed 
since 1978.203 MNCs were technology and growth diffusers, and Norway, as a small 
country, needed multinationals more than other.204 At the same time, however, he 
conveyed that the R&D in multinationals were much more centralised than before, 
due to liberalisation and the transition from local to global products. Nevertheless, 
Ørbeck advocated the same policies towards STK as before, even though he recog-
nised that the negotiated environment or relational setting had changed completely. 
Ørbeck’s point was that Televerket’s neglect of the national telecom industry was 
short-sighted. The PTO might obtain low-cost equipment in the first years, as the 
development costs of the equipment were covered in the protected home-market of 
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the multinationals, but in the long-term these prices would even out in an open mar-
ket. In the next phase, when Televerket, in its own competitive setting, needed na-
tional partners, Ørbeck claimed, they might be gone. Hence, Televerket would also 
be the victim of such a policy.  
 
Ørbeck told the Porter group that STK's future ought to be bright, given “the con-
siderable competence Alcatel STK A/S has gained in modern digital net-systems” 
and the “international connection the company has through Alcatel N.V”. 205 He said 
that even if Alcatel would have the main responsibility in supplying Televerket, 
STK would direct its effort towards developing system components for the System 
12 network. STK was given a chance to do just this, when it signed a development 
contract with Televerket in 1993: to develop and supply a software-based solution 
for business communication within the public System 12 network. It was called 
Alma Centrex, and in a sense it was the successor of the old PABX.206 Anne 
Kristine Børresen has documented how STK and Televerket “network cooperation” 
was far from a success.207 It is interesting to see that the problem STK encountered 
with the Alma Centrex was very similar to the ones it had faced with the 11B and 
System 12. The main problem was that the technical specifications for the product 
were not good enough; thus, due to a poor start with many delays, unexpected ex-
penditures arose. Once again, STK underestimated the complexity of a project, and 
proved it lacked the capability for complicated programming and software handling.  
 
The project almost broke down several times, due to disagreements among the par-
ties, the main reason being that Alcatel STK thought Televerket should cover some 
of the extra costs. Moreover, it proved to be very difficult to use the software in the 
AXE switches, which also hampered the possibilities for exports. Alcatel STK's 
engineers complained that Televerket was too narrowly oriented on earning money, 
and too little engaged in industrial development. In Alcatel STK the prevailing atti-
tude was that Telenor had abandoned the cooperation with them because the PTO 
was too business-minded, according to Børresen, and Alcatel STK felt “unfairly 
treated by one of its old partners”.208 Her explanation of Televerket's “new” tough-
ness towards STK was that the competition from new service providers demanded a 
                                                          
205 IØPAii: Ivar Ørbeck 15.01.92: ”Et konkurransedyktig Norge - Telekommunikasjon”. 
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greater price-consciousness. This thesis shows that Televerket's toughness was far 
from new, as it had been a demanding procurer since before the digital contract in 
1983. Still, Børresen points to a key issue, namely that Televerket no longer had a 
monopoly as a provider of telecom services. An important consequence in this 
analysis is that Televerket was no longer a monopsonist. 
 
* 
 
Ørbeck was right when he said that Televerket/TF offered fewer development con-
tracts: one reason was that the TF lost its independent role within Televerket around 
this period, and was reduced to a support unit. The TF's director, i.e. Knudtzon’s 
successor, was no longer a member of the management group.209 Another reason 
was that Televerket became more cautious with spending on R&D, as the politicians 
and the public demanded a more cost-efficient PTO. This was a general phenome-
non among other PTOs.210 Thus, the large public expenditure on R&D, through the 
PTOs, which functioned as subsidies for the telecom industry, diminished in this 
period. Televerket/TF had also lost in faith in Knudtzon’s old policy of helping STK 
and EB to obtain a mandate within their multinationals. One thing was the poor 
experience in the past, as with Alma Centrex, another was that the negotiated envi-
ronment had disappeared, and Televerket was no longer expected to be an industry 
provider. It was expected to be a service provider, and to follow a corporate govern-
ance system similar to that of private enterprise, i.e. to generate sufficient return on 
invested capital. 
 
Another important development trait during these years was that the multinational 
telecom industry centralised its R&D. There were several reasons for this. First, the 
increased R&D costs made it compulsory to avoid duplication; second, less R&D 
was needed for adapting global products in a “seamless” network; third, liberalisa-
tion led to reduced need for national responsiveness; and finally, the subsidiaries 
obtained less public R&D funding. Moreover, the PTOs’ R&D spending in general 
decreased during these years, whereas the R&D spending of the telecom industry 
increased.211 Whereas the “`innovative engine' was located largely in the central 
research laboratories of the monopoly network operators” before, according to Mar-
                                                          
209 Collett and Lossius 1993, p. 192. 
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tin Fransman, the new “`R&D engine' has moved decisively into the specialist tech-
nology suppliers.”212 As STK received fewer development contracts from the TF 
and other public bodies, Alcatel ordered Aamodt to close down the FA in 1995. The 
rest of STK's management was allegedly shocked, even if the writing had been on 
the wall for a long time.213 
 
* 
 
The downscaling of STK's telecom business started before it lost the contract in 
1990. The workforce needed for supplying Televerket with System 12, was much 
less than had been needed for the electro-mechanical switches. Thus, this was part 
of the international deindustrialisation process, which for the telecom industry com-
menced with the development of the computer-controlled switch - the SPC switch - 
in the mid-1960s. STK's Ivar Mo gives an illuminating numerical account of the 
process. One 8B line cost Televerket NOK 5000 in 1974, and half of the value crea-
tion was done by STK, i.e. NOK 2500 per line. One System 12 line in 1990 cost 
NOK 1500, but STK's share of the value creation was only 5 per cent, or NOK 
75.214 The main technological reason being that all the manual (re)wiring the 
electro-mechanical 8B switch had required had now disappeared into the microchip, 
and with it, thousands workers lost their jobs. Alcatel STK's telecom business was 
reduced from over 2000 employees in 1989 to 1500 in 1990. The development from 
1990 to 2003 is as follows:  
 
                                                          
212 Fransman 2002, p. 48. 
213 Interview with Ivar Ørbeck. 
214 Interview with Ivar Mo. 
Chapter 7 The fall of the Norwegian telecom industry 
 288
Table 7.1: Alcatel Telecom Norway’s employees and sales (NOK millions), 
1989-2003. 
0
250
500
750
1000
1250
1500
1750
2000
2250
Employees 2046 1501 1056 1159 1164 1170 1257 1289 1033 672 615 374 296 200 160
Sale 1795 1024 1102 1130 1280 1549 1411 1608 1810 1294 1106 1139 856 600 571
1989
* 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Source: Annual reports and alcatel.no. (*The figures for 1989 are not compara-
ble with the others, but give an indication of the pattern.) 
 
The increase in Alcatel Telecom Norway’s (ATN) sales in 1997 was because it was 
merged with another division, Alcatel Telettra. This was an access company that 
Alcatel STK bought in 1993, and it provided broadband solutions for business. 
Combined with STK's own competence in access-technology, which had roots in the 
PCM contract in the early 1970s, it had great success on the export market. It be-
came the main supplier of fibre optics for British Telecom in the mid-1990s, and 
won a contract worth NOK 600 million in 1997.215  
 
Telettra’s success was noted in Paris, but it was not able to attain a leading position 
within Alcatel; a Spanish company with similar competence became Alcatel's lead 
house in the field. This supports the notion that subsidiaries from neighbouring 
countries to the multinationals' home country have a bigger chance of attaining 
leading roles. Or, subsidiaries from bigger countries, like Spain, have better chance 
than subsidiaries from smaller countries, like Norway. ATN’s director at the time, 
Ingvild Myhre, thought that the geographical and cultural distance between Oslo 
and Paris was a disadvantage not least that Norway was not a member of the EU.216 
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Telettra’s fate, as well as other incidents, made it clear to several managers, that it 
was futile to try to attain a lead-house position within the French multinational.217 
ATN was strong on Internet, smart-house and software development in the 1990s, 
claims Myhre, but it was impossible to get any positive backing from Paris on these 
things.218 ATN divested Telettra in 2000, through a management buy-out, to give 
the company a new start outside Alcatel.219 Telettra, or Axxessit as it is called today, 
might be the most promising company at present, with roots in STK's telecom busi-
ness.220 
 
STK's former defence division has a leading role in the French multinational Thales, 
selling equipment for defence communication. The Norwegian subsidiary had al-
most 300 employees, and exports worth about NOK 40 million annually, in 2004.221 
In a restructuring of the French electronics industry, Alcatel sold its defence activi-
ties to Thomson-CSF in 1997, in return for shares in Thomson-CSF. The minority 
shareholders in STK protested, asserting that the French owners sat on both sides of 
the table, and that STK did not get enough money for its defence business, particu-
larly the technological remains of the nodal switch. STK carried out an investigation 
of the deal, and a due diligence of the defence division, which concluded that the 
price was fair.222 Nevertheless, it reflected a conflict between the Norwegian share-
holders and the French majority owner. Aamodt and Thoresen were depicted as 
“errand boys” for Alcatel, and Thoresen chose to resign in 1999.223 The last Norwe-
gian shareholders were forced out of Alcatel STK in 2000, and the papers wrote that 
the starved Norwegians gave up.224 Just after this, Alcatel STK performed a sale and 
leaseback arrangement on its real estate at Økern, which allegedly was worth more 
than the company's total market capitalisation when the last Norwegian shareholders 
were forced out.225  
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In 2000, Alcatel floated its cable business, calling the company Nexans. The only 
corporate remains of STK's telecom business are ATN’s 160 employees. “STK” as a 
name disappeared in 2003, when the holding company Alcatel STK dissolved itself. 
In April 2004, Alcatel Norway moved from Økern to Fornebu, to be located closer 
to its main customer Telenor. For EB the circle was ended when Ericsson took it 
over in 1990. After having been more and more nationalised through Kveim’s ten-
ure in the 1970s, and depicted as a Norwegian company, it became a wholly owned 
subsidiary of LME. The downsizing of Ericsson Norway has taken longer, and it has 
had a more prominent role within LME, than STK had within Alcatel in the 1990s, 
and it considered itself as a lead house in data communication.226 This role is defi-
nitely over. The Billingstad headquarters has been nicknamed the Departure Hall, 
as the number of employees was reduced from 1222 in 1998 to 350 in 2004.227  
 
So, the remains of STK and EB have virtually disappeared. Little came out of the 
ambitions to create a vibrant telecom industry in the Norway.228 Millions of kroners 
were invested in industrial development at STK and EB, on the 11B, the nodal point 
switch, maritime satellite communication and other projects. True, some offspring 
do exist: Nera, Thales and Axxessit, but given the magnitude of the investment, this 
is rather modest. We remember that TF's Knudtzon wanted to help STK and EB 
“win the internal MNC competition among the subsidiaries, so resources and man-
dates could be allocated to Norway with possibilities for export”. Instead, 
Televerket developed into a lead customer for ITT and LME. Telenor has replaced 
the industry as the potent vibrant company, with potential for future business. We 
remember how Televerket had difficulties recruiting competent personnel, as the 
engineers preferred STK and EB. Over the last twenty years, Telenor has recruited 
several of its top managers from STK and EB.229 The old bureaucratic whipping boy 
has become the national ICT locomotive.  
 
Televerket - a world leader 
In a few decades, the Norwegian telecom network was transformed from backward-
ness to one of the most modern in the world.230 It was fifth in the world in terms of 
                                                          
226 Sogner 2002, p. 120 f. 
227 http://www.ericsson.com/no/presse/pressemeldinger/2003_09_22.shtml; “Det er i motgang 
at du skal synes” in Computerworld.no 24.12.04. 
228 Few would call Nera vibrant today, as it has been fighting aggressive shareholders during 
recent months, and its satellite technology never took off. 
229 A few of many examples are Bjarne Aamodt and Ingvild Myhre from Alcatel STK, and 
Peter Pay from EB. 
230 Thue 2006: “Already at the beginning of the 1990s, we had one of the most modern and 
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telephone density in 1989, up from 14th in 1983; it was world-class in usage, density 
and overall growth in mobile telephony, telefax, and data communication; 
Televerket's productivity growth between 1984-1989 was, according to itself, the 
highest in the world; and its willingness to invest in modern advanced technology 
went beyond that of other PTOs.231 Norwegian subscribers paid the highest call rates 
in Europe in 1970, but business subscribers had among the lowest rates in Europe in 
1991, while the same was true for private subscribers in the mid-1990s.232 “We were 
so satisfied with ourselves in the late 1980s”, recalled former employee Kåre Aar-
vik, “that the only thing we lacked was the Lord’s blessing”.233 
 
There are several reasons for Televerket's development into a world-class PTO in 
the 1990s. A very important factor is the joint efforts by Televerket and TF within 
the field of data communication and mobile telephony. Coming from a small coun-
try, Televerket's contributions to international specifications for both data communi-
cation and mobile telephony are outstanding. Halvor Bothner-By’s central role in 
developing CCITT’s X.25 standard, a protocol for packet switched data 
communication, was a sign of Norway’s standing in the field.234 The same goes for 
the contributions of Jan Audestad, Torleiv Maseng and others in developing the 
GSM system for mobile telephony.235 Nevertheless, this thesis is not about data 
communication or mobile telephony: its technological focus is on switching, which, 
at any rate, is an essential area in comprehending Televerket's development into a 
world-class PTO in the 1990s. First, when Televerket had among the lowest call 
rates in Europe in the 1990s, it was due to the low prices it paid for the System 12 
and AXE.236 Moreover, the System 12 and AXE, along with Televerket's demands, 
laid the foundation for efficient network operations. 
 
An important asset from the System 12 was the Remote Subscriber Units, i.e. small 
local switches, operating between 100-1000 lines. This became the final solution to 
the problem of rural switches in sparsely populated Norway. We remember from 
chapter 4 that rural and small switches created an economic dilemma, as the proces-
sor was too expansive for such small switches. The Remote Subscriber Units solved 
this by having limited “intelligence”, thus a less costly processor. They obtained the 
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required intelligence from their mother switch.237 Another important feature of the 
System 12 network was that it could be operated in a centralised manner, through 
the Network Service Centres. There were two national service centres, one in 
Trondheim and one in Oslo. The centralised, and thus simplified, operation through 
the service centres was a major reason for Televerket's low call rates.238 Moreover, 
they signified that a long process had come to an end, that finally, the network had 
become one technological system. We recall that the national automation trans-
formed the national network from several local networks, bundled together by long-
distance lines, into one integrated technological system; however, this process was 
completed by the introduction of the National Network Service Centres.  
 
Both the RSU and the NSC were developed through the Norwegian System 12 con-
tract, in cooperation between ITT and Televerket. Other PTOs admired and copied 
these features, and they became important assets in marketing the System 12 during 
the following years. A pre-condition for the “dumb” RSU switch, as well as NSC, 
was communication between the switches, which entailed a good signalling system. 
This would, in time, mean an end to the problems with inter-faces between different 
switches. The old weed-flora was finally replaced by an almost seamless network. 
Televerket was the first PTO in the world to demand the use of Signal System No. 7 
in the 1983 tender. It was chosen as the international standard by CCITT. In addi-
tion to making the operation of the telephony network better, No. 7 was essential for 
the ISDN.239 “System 7 must be regarded”, claim Chapuis and Joel, “as one of the 
pillars of any ISDN”.240 Thus, INDIG's demanding specifications did not merely 
contribute to a very good telephony system, but also led to increased use of other 
digital services in Norway. Norway, along with Germany, became world leaders in 
installing ISDN.241 Thus, by focusing on telephony as the backbone of the telecom 
network, the TA and INDIG were able to accommodate the TF's vision of digital 
services.  
 
Besides increasing efficiency in operating the telecom network, Televerket/Telenor 
has also gained from providing Value Added Services (VAS). An important reason 
for its success in this field was the technological foundation that was laid in the 
network; the control and oversight Televerket had over the network; and its willing-
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ness and proficiency in choosing the best technology. Televerket's choice of the 
AXE, instead of the System 12 in 1990 is important in this relation. One thing is that 
it would avoid a monopoly from Alcatel in the future, but another is that Televerket 
gained experience from two digital systems, and broadened its access to the techno-
logical development that took place among the multinational equipment suppliers. 
Perhaps most important of all is the fact that Televerket would not be caught up in 
one system, as the Swedish PTO was with Ericsson. At a seminar in Norway in the 
early 1990s, Mats Fridlund presented his work on the relationship between the 
Swedish PTO and LME, for which he coined the term development pair. 
Televerket's Ole Petter Håkonsen stressed that he was relieved that Televerket never 
had been caught up in such a pair.242  
 
Televerket/Telenor’s network competence has also been a valuable for its large 
mobile operations. Its ability to “roll out networks” in other countries has roots in 
the INDIG group. The international mobile business was regarded as very promising 
and as the future of Telenor's business, but Lars Thue has shown that the financial 
results of Telenor's international business and VAS have been modest, and that its 
main source of revenues has been the network in Norway, both the GSM network 
and the fixed network, which includes mobile telephony, ISDN and ADSL. The 
figures for 2000 are illuminating. Telenor’s total net operating profit was NOK 
3,629 billion, the fixed network’s share was NOK 3,047 billion, and for mobile 
telephony in Norway, NOK 2,216 billion. Thus, these two network-based business 
areas accounted for 145 per cent of Telenor’s net operating profit.243 This may very 
well be due to monopolist pricing, as Telenor had a market share of about 96 per 
cent of the fixed network in Norway, but it also reflects the efficient network Nor-
way has, i.e. Telenor’s low costs in running the network. Even though the fixed 
network has been the financial backbone of Telenor during recent years, it is still the 
only Norwegian telecom company with a global potential.  
 
Conclusion 
Televerket's decision to install the System 12 proved to be ruinous for both STK and 
EB. It was a Pyrrhic victory for STK, as it lost NOK 700 million on the contract, 
which was twice the company's market value at the end of 1990. How was such a 
disaster possible? How could Fredrik Thoresen, with his dedication to financial 
control, misjudge the situation in such a manner? One reason, as Chapter 6 con-
cluded, was Thoresen’s commitment to ITT as the main stakeholder. Still, the main 
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cause was that ITT did not stand by its inter-company agreements. Even if Thoresen 
could be quite cunning in business, he probably never imagined being double-
crossed in such a way as he was by BTM/ITT. Another vital factor was his lack of 
understanding of telecom. If he, or the others responsible for the System 12 at STK, 
had investigated the real problems with the 11B, they would have been more able to 
assess the information BTM gave them regarding the System 12. Better integration 
or more cooperation between STK's many switching projects in the 1970s would 
also have been beneficial. There is an irony in that Thoresen’s financially grounded 
disbelief towards telecom-related R&D contributed to STK's greatest-ever financial 
loss.  
 
STK’s problem was that it was naive in its unreserved loyalty to ITT, while EB was 
equally naive in its confidence as a national champion and as an important stake-
holder of Televerket. It was fair enough that EB based its corporate governance on 
this presumption in the 1970s, but Kveim failed to take sufficient notice of the 
changes that were bound to follow from digitalisation and liberalisation. First, it cost 
them the digital contract, and then it afflicted the company through the corporate 
raids. Kveim was a brutal victim of his failure to adjust to the shareholder revolu-
tion. The contrast between Kveim and Bjørum’s meetings with Munch and Almskog 
in 1976 and 1984 is illuminating. EB bought Nera to accommodate political stake-
holders in 1976, whereas Investa bought EB to accommodate financial shareholders 
in 1984. The climate in politics and business had shifted, so the capital market had 
become a central arena for conducting and structuring business. Kveim had mas-
tered the old politicised era, where technological engineering had primacy, while 
Investa's people had mastered the liberal era, in which financial engineering pre-
vailed.  
 
Investa’s shrewdness earned the company NOK 1 billion on the EB adventure. 
Hence, both STK and EB were deprived of their financial reserves during this dec-
ade, by ITT and Investa respectively. To a large degree, these reserves were built up 
by the high prices Televerket had paid for its equipment. Some considered these 
high prices as a means of bringing about a stronger Norwegian telecom industry, but 
it turned out very differently. That is not to say, however, that STK and EB would 
have found good telecom projects to invest money in. In retrospect, however, it 
seems that Harlem’s attempt to buy Simonsen was sensible. There was no guarantee 
that Alcatel STK would have succeeded in turning it into a success. Still, it would 
have been a cheap lottery ticket to take part in the Scandinavian mobile-phone won-
der, and with guaranteed backing from Televerket. Lack of capital was not the main 
obstacle for STK to develop into a lead house, as the new institutional setting in the 
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Norwegian telecom sector and the strategy and structure of Alcatel were more im-
portant.  
 
The French policy makers in telecom contributed strongly to the fall of ITT's tele-
com business, before taking it over. ITT was perhaps one of the most globalised 
companies in the world before 1980, but fell apart as globalisation took off. Al-
catel's self-portrayal as a European champion held promises of improved chances 
for STK to develop into a lead house. Alcatel stressed it would pursue an integrated 
strategy, to avoid duplication of manufacture and R&D, and to take advantage of the 
competence of each subsidiary and home country. In hindsight, however, it seems 
that this was mainly lip service to gain political support for the new European tele-
com giant. It was not only French nationalism that had led to Alcatel’s centralised 
and hierarchical structure, but also digitalisation and liberalisation. The main reason 
was that the rapidly increasing R&D costs called for more centralisation in order to 
avoid duplication of R&D. The other reason was that it was harder for local R&D 
units to attain public funding. The liberalisation led PTOs to abandon their role as 
industry providers; focused on its financial results, they cut back on industrially 
motivated development contracts. Televerket did give STK a chance in the Alma 
Centrex project, but STK failed. Alcatel did not have to worry about national re-
sponsiveness, and when it was impossible for STK to attain sufficient funding for 
the FA, it was closed in 1995.  
 
Thus, the Norwegian system for innovation in telecom, meaning the system that was 
institutionalised in the late 1960s, and based on development contracts from the TF, 
started to evaporate in the early 1990s. This is what Ørbeck complained about in his 
account to the Norwegian Porter study in 1992, that when the development contracts 
dried up, the innovative relationship with Televerket disappeared. Still, a system of 
innovation should not be equated with a system of development contracts. It is also 
points to the user-producer relations in any given industry. In describing such inter-
active relations, there is a difference between the system of innovation and the 
Porterian approach. For Porter, these relations are in concordance with market be-
haviour, thus, he uses the phrase buyer-supplier. In contrast, Bengt-Åke Lundvall 
stress that “pure market interactions” are “incapable of transmitting the qualitative 
information between users and producers”.244 The relation between Televerket and 
STK, regarding the digital contract, resembled a buyer-supplier relation in accor-
dance with Porter. This was confirmed with the Alma Centrex project, when 
Televerket preferred a contractual relationship. Televerket's relation with BTM is 
also best described as Porterian buyer-supplier relation. It was Televerket's role as a 
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demanding and competent buyer that spurred the innovation in the relation, not a 
cooperative user-producer relation. 
 
Hence, it was not only the vanishing development contracts that signified the death 
of the traditional Norwegian system of innovation in telecom, but also the fact that 
Televerket opted for multinational buyer-supplier relations to meet its future needs, 
and not national user-producer relations. Ørbeck warned against this development, 
claiming it would harm Telenor’s development in the long run. In doing this, Ør-
beck was in line with Lundvall’s emphasis on national relations for innovation. 
Looking to the future, this might suggest that Telenor is faced with a problem. 
Looking back at the history of Norwegian telecom sector, however, one can con-
clude that a “multilateral system of trust relationships” does not necessarily develop 
within a national system of innovation - especially if the industry is dominated by 
small foreign subsidiaries. 
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Conclusion: Why doesn't Norway have a Nokia? 
It is pretty straightforward to point to the forces that led to the downsizing of STK's 
telecom business, from around 2000 employees in 1989 to below 200 in 2005. Digi-
talisation and liberalisation freed Televerket from the industry’s oligopolic grip, and 
eradicated the negotiated environment in the Norwegian telecom sector, which to a 
large extent had underpinned STK's telecom businesses. Still, this is not sufficient to 
explain the fall of the Norwegian telecom industry. Digitalisation and liberalisation 
also opened a window of opportunity for entering the telecom industry. It is impos-
sible to explain the emergence of Nortel, Alcatel and Nokia as global companies, by 
pointing to the “general” consequences of digitalisation and liberalisation. One must 
include internal factors, i.e. how these companies were positioned when the elec-
tronic revolution started in the 1960s, and how these companies went through the 
digitalisation and liberalisation the following decades. Therefore, a central reason 
for asking how STK and the Norwegian telecom sector went through the digitalisa-
tion and liberalisation process, has been to detect key reasons for why Norway - 
with its strong capabilities in telecom - did not succeed in using the window of op-
portunity to create an Ericsson or a Nokia. 
 
By analysing how STK and Televerket went through this transformative process, we 
have learned that an important reason why Televerket never wanted to support a 
project to develop a digital switch in Norway was the trouble it had with STK’s 8B 
and 11B switches. Furthermore, we have learned that it was difficult for the gov-
ernment to pursue an industrial policy with STK and EB as partners, as they were 
more inclined to being loyal subsidiaries, than Norwegian high-tech companies. For 
STK, the heritage of ITT's Harold S. Geneen proved decisive, as it shaped Fredrik 
Thoresen’s corporate governance philosophy, in a way that was not beneficial to 
STK as an innovative enterprise in telecom. Finally, by asking how digitalisation 
and liberalisation affected STK's initial relational setting, between Televerket - STK 
- ITT, we have learned that as STK deteriorated, Televerket excelled. Televerket 
succeeded in exploiting the window of opportunity to become a world leader, which 
was not an obvious outcome of digitalisation and liberalisation in Norway. In fact, 
very few would have presumed that the old scapegoat would have achieved the 
global rank it did. In the following we will look a bit closer into these issues.  
 
* 
 
The background and foundation for STK's telecom business was Telegrafverket's 
procurement of Rotary switches. In the first chapter, we saw that this took place 
after a competitive tender in the 1910s, where Telegrafverket used its procurement 
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power, as it was not confined by the oligopolic grip. It was not expected to take 
stakeholder considerations into account, by, for example, caring for EB's workers or 
national industrial development. Moreover, as it was the first automatic switch, 
Telegrafverket was not constrained by path dependencies, i.e. technological interfaces 
and the need for competence to upgrade incumbent switches. Furthermore, it had 
relatively good knowledge of switching when arranging the tender, stemming from 
cooperation with other PTOs and international conferences. After having installed 
the first automatic switches from STK and EB, however, Telegrafverket was trapped 
in the oligopolic grip, which underpinned the Lillehammer agreement. In the follow-
ing years, the automatisation and oligopolisation strengthened the industry's grip on 
the PTO. Path dependencies made their mark, as did Telegrafverket 's stakeholder 
duties. Finally, Telegrafverket's knowledge of switching decreased compared to that 
of the national and international equipment suppliers. Consequently, the oligopolic 
grip became ITT's main ownership advantage as a foreign investor in Norway. 
 
Telegrafverket’s dependence on the industry increased when it became a victim of 
ITT's internal crossbar competition, and thus a lonely rider with the 8B switch. A 
main source of revenue for STK, and thus a main cost for Telegrafverket, was to fix 
ad-hoc problems with the 8B, often with a home-made solution. It appears para-
doxical, however, that while Telegrafverket took a chance in procuring the 8B 
switch from STK/BTM, it also declined to procure, and thus support, Nera's radio 
link equipment. The oligopolic grip offers a sound explanation for this. In relation to 
the 8B, all five fingers made their mark, but especially Telegrafverket's lack of 
competence: turning it into BTM's guinea pig. In terms of Nera's radio link, it had 
sufficient competence and confidence in transmission to fend off the critics, who 
insisted on Telegrafverket’s role as an industry provider. Both of these issues, the 
8B and Nera's radio link, had a strong bearing on later developments. The 8B from 
around 1970, when it caused problems in the Oslo network, while the radio link 
issue had an immediate impact, in creating and shaping the institutionalisation of a 
new R&D system.  
 
The radio link conflict, led to the establishment of the Committee of Electronics. 
The main message of the committee’s report was that Telegrafverket had to start 
doing research. Its arguments were in line with the normative assumptions of the SI 
approach that were developed in the mid-1980s. Still, the SI literature stresses that 
innovations are often incremental, a result of learning by doing, or trial and error in 
a constant process of generating higher quality and lower cost products. The TF, or 
the FA for that matter, was always somewhat detached from the operational activi-
ties of Televerket and STK. Thus, there was a system for innovation. Being a re-
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search institute, it was not surprising that the TF contributed to this. Moreover, its 
theoretical approach was valuable in putting the accent on long-term planning and 
strategising within Televerket, and in bringing forth the new perspectives the elec-
tronic revolution and digitalisation offered. The TF's origin in the radiolink conflict, 
however, probably made it even more distant from everyday operational business, 
thus, explaining, among other things, its inclination to engage mathematicians to get 
to the bottom of switching. The arm’s-length approach to everyday business was a 
good strategy for Bell Labs, where the number of Nobel Prizes was a parameter for 
its success.1 It did not, however, make the TF the successful industry provider it was 
meant to be. One example is how the TF's theoretical approach hampered EB's pro-
ject on maritime satellite communication for years.2  
 
TF was important for turning STK into a high-tech company in the 1970s, but did 
not outweigh Thoresen’s influence. His heart and soul was in cables, where he had 
experienced lucrative innovations through learning by doing. For him, R&D ought 
to be justified by credible possibilities for making profits in the foreseeable future, 
something he had witnessed in the cable business. As such, he was caught in a linear 
perception of technological development, failing to recognise that R&D is only one 
of several factors in innovating. Research is important in codifying knowledge, and 
by that increasing the absorptive capacity and the potential for incremental innova-
tions. Thoresen’s financial focus was hardly beneficial for STK as an innovative 
enterprise. O’Sullivan and Lazonick have shown that an innovative enterprise re-
quires different, in some cases opposite, conditions and perceptions than a financial 
perspective provides. First, Thoresen failed to facilitate organisational integration, 
thus impeding collective and cumulative learning in STK's telecom business. The 
company’s was engaged in five different switching projects in the 1970s, and the 
cooperation was negligible, while the antagonism was noticeable. 
 
Moreover, neither Thoresen, nor Gunnar Tidemann, the head of STK's telecom 
department from 1974 to 1987, was in a position to perform adequate strategic con-
trol over STK's telecom business. The main reason was that they lacked the proper 
technological understanding of the field, which was all the more important as the 
industry went through radical technological changes during their tenures. It ham-
pered STK as an innovative enterprise, because the managers were not able to in-
duce organisational integration, and because it failed to equip STK's telecom busi-
ness with a technological strategy behind its substantial R&D efforts. The lack of 
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strategic control is important in explaining how STK could spend millions of kron-
ers on finalising the semi-electronic 11B switch, while the rest of the telecom world, 
like Alcatel and Nokia, allocated R&D resources to computer and digital technol-
ogy. It was very different from Televerket's strategy. 
 
Televerket's decision to install SPC switches in 1971 was early in a global context. 
At some point, during the 1970s, Per Øvregaard sanctioned Bjørn Gladsø's strategy 
of leaving the old electro-mechanical world behind. Televerket could have spent 
millions of kroners trying to fix the 8B and straightening out the old weed flora, but 
it would it would have been a waste of time. Here lies the answer to what STK's 
Nils Kåre Myklebust thought was a paradox in the second half of the 1970s: that 
Televerket wanted all the features of the SPC switches up and running, like auto-
matic re-direction, wake-up calls, and speed dialling, while it had problems provid-
ing the dialling tone for other customers. Thus, in contrast to STK, Televerket de-
cided to concentrate its resources on the future technology, with the aim of being 
one the best PTOs in the world on the electronic and later digital switching. 
Televerket's use of tenders in its procurement policy was not merely to reduce the 
price, but to make the equipment suppliers meet Televerket's specifications and 
demands. There is little doubt that the TA, and later INDIG, thrilled in being a de-
manding customer, finally getting the upper hand in the relation, holding STK and 
EB in its own grip. 
 
Digitalisation and liberalisation were processes that telecom companies had to con-
front, one way or another, and there was no way of escaping the transformative 
forces of these interconnected processes. Hence, the organisations’ freedom, i.e. 
their room for strategic manoeuvre, lay in how they confronted these interrelated 
developments. STK's handling of digitalisation and liberalisation was hardly proac-
tive. It did not allocate the resources to upgrade its competence in computerised 
switches, and it did everything it could to halt the liberalisation of Televerket's pro-
curement policy. It held on to its oligopolic grip from Televerket's first use of com-
petitive tenders in the early 1970s right into the 1980s. As stated in the introductory 
chapter, STK's strategy in these matters was limited to responding to ITT and 
Televerket's shifting policies and strategies. As such, it proved very loyal to ITT, not 
least in relation to the digital contract. Hence, in its telecom business - in sharp con-
trast to its cable business - STK was more like a small subsidiary than a large high-
tech company. A main reason was the strength in the oligopolic grip, with which it 
held Televerket. It is likely that the complacency and lenience, which Thoresen 
claims it had, was a result of the strong oligopolic grip.  
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Moreover, the relative strength of this grip made Televerket proactive in confronting 
digitalisation and liberalisation. “Televerket was completely dependent on the sup-
pliers”, says Gladsø, and operated with no demand specifications towards the sup-
pliers.3 Most European PTOs went through such a development, i.e. increasing their 
competence in switching and specifications, and international cooperation and the 
nature of electronics paved the way for this. Still, the problems with the Oslo net-
work and the 8B around 1970 made Televerket a frontrunner in freeing itself from 
the oligopolic grip. In some cases the loosening of the oligopolic grip led to tighter 
relations between the PTOs and the national industry. In some countries, like 
France, Britain and to a certain degree Finland, this was a matter of freeing itself 
from the multinational telecom companies. So, when the French broke the oli-
gopolic grip, it freed itself from the multinationals, i.e. ITT and LME, to promote its 
national industry. When Televerket freed itself, however, it did so from the national 
industry, to cooperate with a BTM. An important background for Televerket's 
choice was that the relationship with EB was harmed by moral hazard, and STK had 
proved that it lacked the competence to support Televerket.  
 
Perhaps the Norwegian telecom industry was doomed, as long as it was foreign-
owned. Thus, perhaps the main reason Finland has a Nokia was that its telecom 
industry was not dominated by foreign subsidiaries. Still, Alcatel's rise to promi-
nence goes against this. Then again, the method that the French government used to 
eradicate ITT and LME's subsidiaries could hardly have been applied by a small 
country like Norway. Nevertheless, STK and EB had room for strategic manoeuvre 
in what Doz called the negotiated environment. This was evident when Televerket's 
chairman and vice president, Egil Abrahamsen and Finn Lied, invited them to dis-
cuss a new structure in the Norwegian telecom industry in 1981, in relation to the 
tender for digital switches. If Thoresen and Kveim had sided with the Norwegian 
authorities in this instance, there is a good chance that ITT and LME would have 
yielded in order to maintain their business. This was a last opportunity for the two 
companies to take structural steps before digitalisation and liberalisation were 
launched upon them. One could only contemplate how a merged STK and EB 
would have fared.  
 
Let us call the imaginative company «Norwegian telecom», and let us assume the 
company would have been nationally owned, with a license agreement with ITT 
and/or LME. It would have had at least two strong market segments, namely mari-
time and military communication, through EB's maritime satellite communication 
and STK's nodal switch. Furthermore, one way or the other, the company could 
                                                          
3 Interview with Bjørn Gladsø; Memo from Bjørn Gladsø to Lars Thue, 30.12.03. 
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have capitalised on the national competence in data communication, maybe by hir-
ing Halvor Bothner-By. Similarly, with mobile telephony and the GSM technology, 
they could have hired Jan Audestad and Torleiv Maseng. Moreover, assuming that 
ITT and LME would not have stripped STK and EB financially before a sale, the 
merged company would have had financial freedom to invest in telecom.4 In such a 
counterfactual speculation, one must recall that STK and EB were each “deprived” 
of around 1 billion NOK during the 1980s. Moreover, let us assume that the new 
CEO would be Kjell Almskog, with his taste for rigorous financial control and in-
dustrial ambitions. It is reasonable to assume that «Norwegian telecom», unlike 
STK, would have taken over Simonsen Radio, to compete with Ericsson and Nokia. 
 
Still, could «Norwegian telecom» have succeeded in mobile telephony without a digi-
tal switch? It would probably have needed an international partner with a digital 
switch. Ericsson would have been ruled out, so a solution with ITT/Alcatel could 
have been feasible. Televerket could have used its procurement power, in the 1990 
tender for digital switches, to bring about such an agreement. Maybe Televerket's 
expertise in digital switching and specifications could have been a competitive edge 
for «Norwegian telecom»? Taking the considerable competence into account, it is 
not obvious that such a company would have failed. These are just speculations, and 
it is impossible to consider the possibilities of such a company. Such speculations 
are difficult as they have a number of possible outcomes, but are a good way to 
illustrate the point that deterministic assumptions rarely pay off in explaining the 
turn of events. It is noteworthy, however, that the above-mentioned invitation did 
not come from Televerket's management, but from external board members. 
Televerket and the TA were not interested in exploiting the regained procurement 
power to re/structure or stimulate the Norwegian telecom industry. On the contrary, 
the TA excelled in using this to make the suppliers meet their demands.  
 
The French used their public procurement power to eliminate foreign telecom com-
panies; this was based on the traditional French perception of multinationals as 
obstructers of national industrial development. For the TA, on the other hand, the 
British perception prevailed and underpinned its actions. More or less - probably 
less - consciously, the TA embraced Ørbeck’s notion of a multinational, as a dif-
fuser of technology, competence and prosperity. In forming its relationship with 
BTM, it undertook to “surfride the technological tides”.5 And, as Ørbeck claimed, it 
                                                          
4 When ITT's French subsidiary, CGCT, was nationalised in 1981, ITT stripped it of re-
sources. At an ITT summit in Brussels, CGCT’s managing director complained to Araskog, 
saying that if he went through with what Araskog asked, “they will send me to prison”. Aras-
kog replied: “I’ll come and visit you”. Interview with Hans Jørgen Blomseth. 
5 Ørbeck 27.09.78. 
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was easier to form such a relationship with ITT, or BTM, as it did not have a home 
market. The French took advantage of ITT's trait as a freestanding company, when 
Alcatel swallowed it, whereas Televerket took advantage by becoming ITT's lead 
market for electronic and digital switches. Thus, given the lack of national partners 
to form innovative relationships with, Televerket formed such a relationship with 
BTM. The relationship was characterised by many of the features of the SI ap-
proach: it was a relationship with interactive learning, and the innovations were, to a 
large degree incremental, a result of learning by doing, or trial and error. Still, it 
differed in a major way, as it was an international relationship, thus not part of a 
national system of innovation.  
 
An element in the SI approach is that institutions and systemic features promote or 
constrain innovation. In the TA-BTM relationship, there were no common institu-
tions or systemic features, promoting innovation, but, on the other hand, there were 
no such features constraining it either. Moreover, it did not benefit from a shared 
culture and language, and thus there would be, following Lundvall, constraints to 
“the transfer of tacit knowledge” and the organising of a “multilateral system of 
trust”.6 This is probably why the parties, from both Televerket and BTM, put so 
much emphasis on the social relations that developed, and benefited the business 
relation. Still, despite these social relations, there was never any doubt that the mar-
ket relation was underpinning the activities. It is fascinating to witness the joy of the 
informants, when recalling the TA-BTM relationship, and telling how much fun it 
was. Still, the climate was rather tough, the negotiations and interactions were al-
ways surrounded by contractual realities, rather than trust. So, the relationship is 
better characterised by Michael Porter’s concept of a demanding buyer-supplier 
relationship that led to upgrading mechanisms, than by a trustful user-producer 
relationship. The proponents of the SI approach would probably object to this point, 
claiming that the SI literature also describes demanding, contractual and interna-
tional relations. Well, this is the main problem with the SI approach, that it is too 
open. As it purports to cover every innovation, or every system, its analytical power 
is weakened. 
 
* 
 
Now, returning to the subject from the introduction, this thesis has showed that 
similar dichotomies have reoccurred throughout history. Taking the four theoretical 
approaches as a point of departure, firstly there were contrasting perceptions of 
multinationals: some deprecated multinationals as obstructers of national industrial 
                                                          
6 Lundvall et. al. 2002, p. 219-220. 
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development, while others appreciated them as diffusers of technology and growth. 
Secondly, with public procurement, there were disagreements whether the govern-
ment should support national industry, or concentrate on price and quality. Thirdly, 
regarding innovation, one can envisage disagreements as to whether a trustful user-
producer relation, was more innovative than a demanding buyer-supplier relation. 
Finally, there was the dichotomy of taking all stakeholders into consideration when 
considering a business strategy, or just focusing on the financial interest of the 
shareholder. Although the dichotomies are different, they are also so similar that we 
can label one set of positions continental or market-sceptic, and the other set Anglo-
Saxon or market-friendly.  
 
A striking finding is that the governmental bodies operated with conflicting percep-
tions in most of these dichotomies, which halted a coherent industrial policy towards 
the industry. The most surprising conclusion, however, is that by the first half of the 
1980s, the TA was coherently placed in a market-friendly position, and the rest of 
Televerket followed soon after. It cooperated closely with multinationals, it pursued 
a competitive public procurement policy, it favoured the role of being a demanding 
customer, and it more or less disregarded former stakeholders in its strategy.7 Some 
would find it surprising that the old governmental organisation, associated with the 
Labour Party, took such a stance. The TA and INDIG seemed apolitical, however. 
Yet, in as much as there were sympathisers of the Labour Party within the TA, and 
not least for someone like Finn Lied, they most certainly liked surfriding and ex-
ploiting the market ideology of the ‘Right wave’ to whip the two fat, capitalist, 
cats’. Some might credit TA and Televerket with foresightedness, in that they an-
ticipated globalisation and the convergence towards Anglo-Saxon business princi-
ples. This thesis does not suggest that, rather that Televerket's preference was a 
result of the historical development: that its lengthy experience of being held in an 
oligopolic grip by small subsidiaries made it a competitive, demanding and interna-
tionally oriented PTO.  
 
STK also held contradicting perceptions within the company, but the noteworthy 
trait with STK was that the company’s public stance shifted between an Anglo-
Saxon/market-friendly position and a continental/market-sceptic positioned in a 
rather opportunistic manner. In the 1950s, it wanted Telegrafverket to procure the 
8B and 11B, to promote the Norwegian telecom industry, but advised Tele-
grafverket not to procure the radiolink from Nera. Another example is when Thore-
                                                          
7 It is pertinent to remember that its was Inger Koppernæs who insisted on an international 
tender in 1983. TA's opposition to this, however, was not ideological or based on principles, 
but was simply pragmatism.  
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sen appealed to the government's stakeholder responsibilities to avoid the digital 
contract in 1983. This bore a strong resemblance to Araskog’s criticism of Wall 
Street’s financial capitalism. Be that as it may, Thoresen was placed rather coher-
ently in an Anglo-Saxon/market friendly position on most issues, except for his 
focus on industrial relations. This philosophy had earned him great respect, not least 
in the cable business. Kjell Almskog’s success with ABB Norway is another 
illustration of how such an approach to industrial issues and politics can be 
successful. And the same goes for Televerket's policy.  
 
These three successful cases have an interesting thing in common, namely that they 
faced limited uncertainties, compared to, for example, the manufacturers of digital 
switches or mobile telephones. An innovative enterprise normally faces three classic 
uncertainties. Firstly, productive or technological uncertainty, i.e. what needs to be 
learned or innovated, will in fact need to be learned or innovated. Secondly, market 
uncertainty: does the market want the product? And thirdly, competitive uncertainty: 
i.e. will competitors outperform you with lower cost/higher quality products.8 When 
STK laid submarine cables in Norway, or ABB Norway built oil installations in the 
North sea, or when Televerket invested in upgrading its competence on electronic 
and digital switches, they all faced technological uncertainty, but the uncertainty 
regarding market preferences and or competitors was small in comparison with 
other kinds of business. The same goes for Statoil’s oil business in the North Sea, 
which involves huge technological uncertainties, but minor market and competitive 
uncertainties. Technological uncertainty has not been the main obstacle in Norway’s 
industry, as the technological achievements related to the oil installations in the 
North Sea, STK's submarine cable under the Skagerrak, and last but not least, the 
swift installation of the System 12 in the 1980s, are nothing short of impressive. 
Perhaps the main reason why Norway does not have a Nokia is that Norwegians are 
seldom able to show financial commitment, when facing market and competitive 
uncertainties.  
 
A key point in facing such uncertainties is the ability to perform strategic control. 
STK and EB had limited authority to perform strategic control, as they were small 
subsidiaries in the telecom business. Nevertheless, the decision Thoresen had to 
make when offering the System 12 to Televerket called for strategic control, as there 
were ‘no objective guidelines for making such a decision’.9 It entailed insight and 
oversight concerning a wide range of areas, not least digital switches, and how large 
                                                          
8 Lazonick 2003, p. 24.  
9 A pertinent point in this matter is that most investments and decisions are also uncertain, not 
only those related to innovation. 
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technology projects usually turn out. If Thoresen had examined STK's 11B project 
more thoroughly, i.e. the reasons for the pecuniary losses, he would have been 
warned against trusting ITT and its prognoses for the System 12. The history of the 
11B could have 'instructed his use of reason'. The irony is strong, in that Thoresen’s 
financially grounded disbelief towards telecom-related R&D was a main factor in 
explaining his endorsement of the System 12, and thus STK's greatest-ever financial 
loss.10  
 
After STK's Pyrrhic victory with the System 12, it is harder to engage in counterfac-
tual speculations about a promising Norwegian telecom industry. Thus, the System 
12 contract is significant in explaining why and how STK's telecom business disap-
peared. The financial losses, and the loss of the digital contract in 1990, shattered 
STK’s confidence. Moreover, when squeezed between ITT and Televerket through-
out the 1980s, STK lost its illusions, and most of its industrial ambitions. The same 
reasoning applies, by and large, to EB as well, after being stripped by Investa in the 
1980s. Thoresen was naïve in his unreserved loyalty to his shareholder, while 
Kveim was naïve in sticking to his stakeholder version of corporate governance. 
Another way of putting it is that Kjell Kveim did not pay sufficient attention to the 
liberalisation process, whereas Fredrik Thoresen did not pay sufficient attention to 
the digitalisation, whereas Televerket mastered both digitalisation and liberalisation. 
 
                                                          
10 Moreover, his lack of understanding and standing in telecom, as opposed to cables, affected 
his ability to tackle the mounting problems with the System 12 and ITT in the 1980s. Thore-
sen and STK were in a position to bargain with ITT, i.e. threatening to cancel the contract. 
Thoresen had the personal qualifications to play hardball with ITT, but he lacked the techni-
cal insight to do so. 
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File: A/S Elektrisk Bureau - Partialobligasjonslån (Nera), 1977 = RA-EBiii 
 
RA, Teledirektoratet (Televerket) 
Meetings in Telegrafverket/Televerket's Board of (internal) Directors. 
Fa - Konsernledelse og teknisk direktør;  
Box: FA 0003: Styremøteprotokoller 1963 - 1988 = TBD 
Fa - Konsernledelse og teknisk direktør;  
Box: FA 0018: Direktørmøter 1969 - 1974 = TBD 
A - Direktørmøter; Box: A - 0002 Referater, 1976 - 1980 = TBD 
  326
 
Serie: Eb - Langtidsplanleggingskomitéen (LP), 1968-1989 = LPC-A 
The sources are referred to by the date of the meetings in the ”long- 
term-planning-committee, which are easily traceable in the archive  = LPC-M 
 
D. Saksarkiv 
Box D -0028, File: Samarbeid med industrien 1976 - 1977 = RA-28 
Box D- 014, File: “Korrespondanse Administrerende Direktør 1968-1980” = 
RA-14 
 
Other archives 
Nærings- og Handelsdepartementets arkiv, Box 464 Elektrisk Bureau 
Bjørn Ole Helsing Lossius’ EB-arkiv = LEBA 
Nera’s archive = Nera-A 
Bjørn Gladsø’s archive = BGA 
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Written sources 
 
Annual reports 
Standard Telefon og Kabelfabrik's annual reports 
Elektrisk Bureau's annual reports 
International Telephone and Telegraph's annual report 
Televerket Forskningsinstitutt annual report 
 
Newspapers 
Aftenposten 
Arbeiderbladet  
Dow Jones News Service  
Dagbladet 
Dagens Næringsliv 
Financial Times 
Morgenbladet 
New York Times 
Textline Multiple Source Collection 
Wall Street Journal 
The Washington Post 
 
Magazines 
Business Observer 
Business Week 
Computerworld.no 
Economist 
Forskning.no 
Fortune 
Ingeniør-Nytt 
Kapital 
International Management Europe 
Minutt-nytt (STK's internal paper) 
Norges Industri 
Næringsrevyen 
Teknisk Ukeblad 
Telecom.no 
Telektronikk (Telegrafverket/Televerket internal magazine) 
Økonomisk Rapport 
 
